

The University of Chicago
Libraries



Gift of The American Institute
of Sacred Literature

American Institute of Sacred Literature

THE STUDY OF THEOLOGY

THE STUDY OF THEOLOGY

PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF
KENNETH E. KIRK, D.D.

LORD BISHOP OF OXFORD

American Institute of Sacred Literature



HARPER AND BROTHERS: PUBLISHERS
NEW YORK AND LONDON

FIRST PRINTED 1939

DT50
R21



Printed in Great Britain for Hodder and Stoughton Limited
by Butler & Tanner Ltd., Frome and London

GIFT OF THE AMERICAN
INSTITUTE OF SACRED
LITERATURE

1259600

CONTENTS

	PAGE
FOREWORD	vii
KENNETH E. KIRK, D.D. <i>Bishop of Oxford</i>	
I. WHAT IS THEOLOGY?	3
N. P. WILLIAMS, D.D. <i>Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity and Canon of Christ Church in the University of Oxford</i>	
II. COMPARATIVE RELIGION	85
E. O. JAMES, D.Litt., D.D., Ph.D., F.S.A. <i>Professor of the Philosophy and History of Religion in the University of Leeds</i>	
III. THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION	121
M. C. D'ARCY, S.J. <i>Master of Campion Hall, Oxford</i>	
IV. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION	151
L. W. GRENSTED, D.D. <i>Nolloth Professor of the Philosophy of Religion in the University of Oxford</i>	
V. THE OLD TESTAMENT	189
HERBERT DANBY, D.D. <i>Regius Professor of Hebrew and Canon of Christ Church in the University of Oxford</i>	
VI. THE NEW TESTAMENT	219
C. H. DODD, D.D. <i>Norris-Hulse Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge</i>	
VII. SYMBOLIC THEOLOGY	249
THE LATE H. L. GOUDGE, D.D. <i>Regius Professor of Divinity and Canon of Christ Church in the University of Oxford</i>	

	PAGE
VIII. THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE	291
NATHANIEL MICKLEM, D.D. <i>Principal of Mansfield College, Oxford</i>	
IX. ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY	321
A. HAMILTON THOMPSON, C.B.E., D.Litt., F.B.A. <i>Professor of History in the University of Leeds</i>	
X. MORAL THEOLOGY	363
KENNETH E. KIRK, D.D. <i>Bishop of Oxford</i>	
XI. CHRISTIAN WORSHIP AND LITURGY	409
E. C. RATCLIFF, M.A. <i>Lecturer in Liturgiology and Fellow of Queen's College in the University of Oxford</i>	
INDEX	481

Acknowledgments are due to the Oxford University Press and to the poet's relations for permission to use the quotation from Gerard Manley Hopkins on p. 314; and to the S.P.C.K. for permission to use material from *The Treatise on the Apostolic Tradition of St. Hippolytus of Rome* by Fr. Gregory Dix on pp. 422 ff.

FOREWORD

CREDIT for devising this book is due not in any way to myself, but to my friend, Mr. Leonard Cutts, the head of The Publisher's Religious Books Department. But the high privilege of choosing the subjects and authors, and inviting the latter to contribute, fell at an early stage to my lot. The purpose of the Book can most easily be made clear by a definition of the type of reader whom we have had in view. We have addressed ourselves, in the first instance, to the educated layman or laywoman—to the cultivated Christian whose professional or general training has endowed him or her with a reasonably ample and satisfying fund of secular knowledge, but who is conscious of a depressing and confusing lack of information concerning that which should be, for those who profess it, the very centre and foundation upon which life itself is built, namely, the Christian religion. We have not, indeed, wished to exclude from our purview the needs of ministers of religion or of students who are in training for the ministry of any Christian body; and on this account have as far as possible paid particular attention to the most recent developments in each department of theological study. We are not without hopes, therefore, that what we have written may be of some value to such students, and perhaps of some interest even to professed scholars.

But we have visualised as our potential readers primarily those who, deeply attached to the faith of Christendom as well by instinct, heredity and upbringing as by deep personal feeling and experience, find themselves confronted in this modern world not merely by religious doubts and indifference but by passionately held new faiths, based upon clear-cut theories or bodies of dogma, theories of blood, soil, race or class; who are asking themselves 'What is the underlying theory or scheme of ideas upon which the Christian religion is founded? What are its essential contents? What are the arguments whereby its truth may be established or commended to men of intelligence, and how is it related to the surrounding world of science, philosophy, history, and secular thought and knowledge in general?' and who at present can find no answer to these questions, because they have never received any scientific instruction in the theory of the Christian religion, and do not know what books to read or where to make a beginning with their research.

The answers to the questions just outlined, taken together, constitute what is known as theology. The contributors to this book have not been ambitious enough to attempt the composition of anything like a *Summa Theologiae*, or even of a manual or textbook of theology. Their aim has been the much humbler one of composing a guide to the subject as it exists to-day, a guide which will not purport to be a substitute for the original sources and classical formulations of Christian truth, but which may help the student to orientate himself amidst the bewildering profusion of theological literature, ancient and modern, and may indicate to him what are the main divisions of the subject, what are the chief problems which present themselves for discussion and what are the methods which the theologian employs in dealing with them. To this end, the essays dealing with the particular divisions of theological study are followed by short bibliographies enumerating the books which constitute the easiest introduction for the beginner to the topics with which they deal.

We do not claim to have written more than a *Baedeker* sketching the vast landscape which theology presents, and the perusal of a *Baedeker* is no substitute for a visit to the actual scenes which it describes ; nevertheless, it may perform a useful function in explaining to the traveller the history and geography of the country which he visits, in safeguarding him from losing his way, and in drawing his attention to objects of beauty or interest which he might else have failed to notice. It is our hope that this volume may perform a similar service for those who are drawn to begin the exploration of the fascinating wonder-world of ordered Christian thought and knowledge.

As the book is purely scientific in character, endeavouring to indicate as objectively and dispassionately as possible what actually has been thought, discovered and written within the sphere of sacred learning—and as, accordingly, it neither is, nor purports to be, a ‘pronouncement’ on the merits of any particular theological position—it has not been thought necessary that the contributors should endeavour to attain a ‘common mind’ other than that with which, as Christians, they naturally began their work. They have not held any meetings nor did any of them see what the others had written until the book was in proof ; responsibility for each essay, therefore, rests exclusively upon the author of it.

May, 1939.

KENNETH OXON.

I

WHAT IS THEOLOGY ?

A PRELIMINARY SURVEY OF THE WHOLE FIELD OF
THEOLOGY AND THE VARIOUS SCIENCES COVERED
BY THIS COMPREHENSIVE TITLE

by

N. P. WILLIAMS, D.D.

*Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity in the
University of Oxford.*

I

WHAT IS THEOLOGY?

A. INTRODUCTORY

I

THE first instance known to the present writer of the occurrence of the word 'theology' is its employment by Plato to denote those ideas concerning the nature of God or of the gods which were set forth in pictorial or mythological form by the poets, such as Homer or Hesiod; the founders of his ideal State are to prescribe 'patterns' or 'forms' 'with reference to theology' (τύποι περὶ θεολογίας);¹ and the purpose of these 'forms,' which are to be impressed upon all future stories of the gods, is to preserve the fundamental axiom of the goodness of God, and to safeguard the young against the danger of imbibing unworthy or degraded conceptions of Him through the medium of poetry. Aristotle, on the other hand, uses the word 'theology' to denote what we should call 'metaphysics,' that is, the science of Pure Being, which is the loftiest and most abstract domain of knowledge, to which physics, the science of Things, and mathematics, the science of Number and Quantity, lead up.² The double meaning suggested by these two differing senses in which the term was used by the giants of Greek philosophy, as including both the historical or *quasi*-historical and the purely speculative activities of the human mind, has passed over into the full and rich connotation which the word bears in Christian usage. The Christian religion is based upon the belief that God has, throughout human history and, indeed, throughout the whole evolution of the cosmos, been working out a great purpose, culminating in a stupendous redemptive

¹ *Rep.* ii. 379 A.

² *Metaph.* E 1026 A, K 1064 B (θεολογική).

Act, namely, the life and death of Jesus Christ ; it is bound up with the time-process, rooted in the concrete and factual, and may, accordingly, be viewed and studied dynamically, as the working of a great Force of which the mighty pulsations are felt throughout the age-long story of the Jewish and Christian Dispensations. The story of Redemption may thus be regarded as a divine mythos or epic, the narrative of certain infinitely significant events, and of the interpretations which men have affixed to them. This type of study constitutes what is known as *Historical Theology*. But it is also believed by Christians that the redemptive Act of God throws light upon the mystery of His nature—that what He has done in time reveals, in a measure adapted to the conditions of human understanding, what He eternally is. From this point of view, Christianity may be regarded statically, as a body of revealed and changeless truth, a divine Philosophy consisting of ideas which, though they have expressed themselves and been disclosed in time, yet are the reflection of absolute Being, immutable as the laws of thought, exalted far above the reach of change or contingency. He who investigates the Christian revelation from this point of view will not ask himself, How did these ideas come to be what they are, and how far are they necessitated by the events of which they purport to be interpretations?—for those are the characteristic questions propounded by the ‘historical theologian’; he will, rather, taking the Christian revelation for granted, as a finished, or relatively finished, product, study it with a view to understanding the coherence of its various members and the underlying metaphysical or ontological principles by which it is determined. This latter branch of the study is known as *Systematic Theology*. A clear recognition of the difference between these two modes of theological inquiry is the indispensable guiding-thread, without which the explorer is bound to find himself lost and bewildered in the labyrinth of theological literature, ancient, mediaeval, and modern. Before, however, we can begin to employ this thread, we must survey the labyrinth in question from above, viewing it as it were (if the metaphor be not too bold) from the air, in order to gain a general idea of its lay-out and main divisions.

II

In order that the results of this survey may stand out as clearly as possible, the present writer will take leave to summarise here a dialogue which, during that period of his life which was spent as a Theological Tutor at Oxford, he was in the habit of conducting with his undergraduate pupils, on the occasion of their first introduction to the study of Theology, of the subject-matter and scope of which, it need hardly be said, they had, as a general rule, no more than the vaguest conception. The dialogue opened by a question addressed to the pupil concerning the total numbers of the human race—a point upon which he was often as devoid of exact information as with regard to the nature of Theology itself. It having been settled that this was in the neighbourhood of nineteen hundred millions, the next interrogation had reference to the distribution of mankind amongst the different religions ; and, the real and nominal adherents of Christianity having been shown to amount to about one-third of this total, further information was sought by the Tutor concerning the numerical strength of the chief denominations into which Christianity is divided. At this point the dialogue was apt to become a monologue, the Tutor being constrained to supply the needed information himself. He endeavoured in a few words to sketch the many-coloured, variegated scene which the present state of Christendom offers to a comprehensive gaze. He would speak first of the vast Roman Catholic Church, itself constituting rather more than half of Christendom, with its superb centralised organisation and its imposing unity of faith and worship ; the even more mysterious and wonderful Eastern Orthodox Communion, which, whilst not rivalling the vastness and the world-wide extension of the Roman Church, was until the Russian *débâcle* the next greatest Communion in Christendom ; the much smaller, yet profoundly interesting, dissident Churches of the East, Copts and Armenians, Jacobites and Assyrians, aloof from modern thought and civilisation, yet obstinately surviving, like relics of a vanished world, amidst the surrounding flood of Islam, and preserving in fossilised form institutions and modes of worship which had taken their present shape when the Caesars still reigned at Rome and

Byzantium. From these ancient Churches, connected by uninterrupted continuity of history with the days of the Apostles themselves, his review would turn to Northern and Western Europe, and the Churches of the Reformation : to the national Churches of the Protestant lands of the Continent, classified according to their two types, Lutheran and 'Reformed' or Calvinist ; to the Anglican Communion (though here he would indulge his own point of view sufficiently to enter a *caveat* against the supposition that this Church drew its origin from the Reformation) ; to the various English Free Churches, thrown off from the Mother Church of England during the two and a half centuries which succeeded the Reformation, but, with their various *Diasporae* or dispersions in North America and elsewhere throughout the English-speaking world, now far surpassing it in the number of their adherents ; to the residual congeries of bodies in one way or another departing even further from the type of the ancient churches, Quakers and Salvationists, Seventh-Day Adventists and Latter-Day Saints, and other and obscurer sects of which the names may be learnt from *Whittaker's Almanack*.

'A visitant from another planet,' the monologue might continue, 'reviewing the various rites and modes of worship characteristic of these various societies and communities, ranging from barbaric gorgeousness at one end of the scale, to the barest and sternest simplicity at the other, might deem that Christendom was but a kaleidoscope of jarring fragments, with little in common save the name of Christian ; and this impression might at first sight be deepened by a cursory survey of the innumerable formularies or confessions of faith in which these various bodies have stated what they believe to be the true form of the Christian revelation—the Creed of Pope Pius IV, the Confession of Dositheos, the Thirty-Nine Articles, the Augsburg Confession, the Westminster Confession, and all the other documents which may be found set out at length in Schaff's *Creeeds of Christendom*, or in the even more voluminous and exhaustive *Corpus Confessionum* of Dr. Caius Fabricius.¹ If, on the basis of casual conversation with some of the representatives of reformed Christendom, he were to learn that,

¹ *Corpus Confessionum. Die Bekenntnisse der Christenheit*, hrsg. von D. Caius Fabricius (1931-) : still in course of publication.

owing to the apparently corrosive influence of recent critical study, historical research, scientific discovery, and philosophical speculation, many of these creeds and formularies have in large measure ceased to represent the living belief of the Churches which still nominally adhere to them, he might be excused for supposing that the various bodies which professed and called themselves Christian were like the flocks of minute asteroids which wander through space, having the same origin as being fragments of a shattered planet, but otherwise destitute of any principle of cohesion or any community of being.

‘ Yet a closer acquaintance with the thought and the beliefs of Christendom, even in its present divided state, would show him that such a hasty judgment was indeed wide of the mark. For a careful examination of the credal and confessional documents which we have mentioned would reveal the existence of a definite outline or scheme of ideas, which may be described as the Highest Common Factor of them all ; few educated Christians who have taken the trouble to inform themselves as to the present state of their religion are unconscious of the existence of such a scheme, which has been brought into the arena of public discussion by the great Conferences on Faith and Order, representing the whole of non-Roman Christendom, which are associated with Lausanne and Edinburgh. It will be easy to grasp this scheme if we regard it as consisting of six divisions, viz. (1) the Doctrine of God, that is, of the Trinity, (2) the Doctrine of the Person of Christ, that is, of the relation of the divine and human elements in Him, (3) the Doctrine of the Work of Christ, or the “ Doctrine of Grace,” that is, of His death upon the Cross as in some sense effecting the redemption of mankind from sin, a department of belief which also includes the questions which form the logical context of this great theme, namely, those of the nature of sin, the “ Fall ” and “ original sin,” predestination, free will, and “ grace,” (4) the Doctrine of the Church, which is believed to be the earthly representative of Christ, and in some sense inspired by His Spirit, (5) the Doctrine of the Sacraments, (6) the Doctrine of the Last Things, or of the ultimate destiny of the individual and of the race. There is, indeed, considerable diversity of opinion concerning the true form in which these ideas should be held, a diversity which, so far as the official utterances of

the Churches are concerned, attains its *lowest* point in the two first divisions of the series (the Doctrines of God and of Christ) and its *highest* in respect of the third, fourth and fifth (the Doctrines of Grace, the Church, and the Sacraments). This is because there exists a classical formulation of the first two doctrines, worked out by the Fathers and Councils of that original 'primitive and undivided Church' of which all existing Churches and sects may be regarded as fragments—a formulation which is enshrined in the Creeds and conciliar definitions and which may, for convenience of reference, and without the wish to beg any questions, be labelled 'orthodoxy'; whereas no formulations of indisputable oecumenical authority concerning the third, fourth and fifth doctrines were arrived at during this period, the elaborate statements which exist all dating from the era of division and disintegration.

'These six great ideas constitute the subject-matter of what is known as Theology in the restricted sense of the term, or Dogmatic Theology; which does not indeed profess to have invented them, but to have received them from God Himself by "Revelation" (however this may be conceived), and regards itself as confined to the task of studying, elucidating and defining them. But all these doctrines presuppose the existence of God, the reality of human freedom and responsibility (which alone gives meaning to the concept of Sin) and of human immortality, which is the necessary presupposition of the concept of Redemption. Now, as these three ideas are the presupposition of Revelation, they cannot themselves be part of the contents of Revelation; before we can consider what claim to be supernatural messages, giving us information about the Being, Character and Will of God, we must first be convinced, on the basis of our own judgment, that there is a God, and so with the other basic ideas which underlie and are assumed by the idea of a Christian revelation. In the order of thought, therefore, the study of Dogmatic Theology, or indeed, of any department of theological science, should be preceded by the study of what is known as Natural, as distinct from Revealed, Theology. It will, however, be seen that inquiry into such vast and abstruse subjects as the nature of that Ultimate Reality which Religion calls God, and His or Its relation to the Universe and to man, of man's own nature as a

thinking, personal being, and of the final destiny of the individual (whether this be personal immortality, re-incarnation, re-absorption into some Life-Force or Universal Soul, or annihilation), by means of mere or unaided human reason evidently covers the same ground as what is known as "philosophy," or, to be more exact, those departments of it which are known as metaphysics and psychology. This preliminary survey of man and the universe, which must provide us with the general foundation of Theism on which alone the superstructure of the specifically Christian scheme of revelation can be built, was called by Paley and the theologians of the eighteenth century, "*Natural Theology*," because they assumed that the effect of a candid examination of the universe by a fair-minded person must be to produce definite theistic convictions in his mind. A more modern investigator of the same problems, such as McTaggart, would not regard theism as the only possible, or even as a possible, explanation of the universe; and his studies would, accordingly, be more appropriately described as concerned with the "*Philosophy of Religion*." Moreover, modern thought, which is profoundly interested in religion, but interested in it as it were *ab extra*—

". . . holding no form of creed,
But contemplating all"—

claims the right to analyse the religious sentiment itself, and to determine its position in the total make-up of man's intellectual and emotional nature; hence the study known as the "*Psychology of Religion*," a subject which is claiming a part of ever-increasing importance in the *Philosophy of Religion*.'

'The six great doctrines mentioned above claim to represent factual and existential truth. But the Christian religion does not consist merely of a set of convictions regarding abstract truth: it is, by the common confession of all its adherents, first and foremost a way of life, lived in union with and allegiance to a Person. Consequently, it is to be expected that it would contain a body of doctrine which has reference to conduct, or to moral values. This is the sphere of *Moral Theology*, or *Christian Ethics*, which covers the same ground as secular moral philosophy in so far as it attempts to analyse

the conceptions of the "Right" and the "Good," and to study the nature of moral obligation ; but which does so in the light of the actual values affirmed by Jesus Christ and consecrated by the tradition of the Christian Church. Of this science, Casuistry (in the good sense of the term), that is, the application of Christian moral principles to particular problems or concrete "cases of conscience," is an integral part. Moreover, Christianity includes not merely Belief and Conduct, but also, and indeed primarily, Worship, private and public ; a complete account, therefore, of the scope and ambit of "Theology" must include the mention of "Ascetical Theology," which has been defined as the scientific guide to the acquisition of Christian perfection, and of "Mystical Theology," which is the science treating of the higher walks of prayer and contemplation. Such disciplines as the study of Canon Law and Liturgics may be regarded as lying on the borderland of Theology proper, which, indeed, like Philosophy, has no rigidly or authoritatively defined limits, but shades off, through zones of knowledge endowed with merely archaeological or aesthetic interest, into the surrounding world of secular science.'

We may now drop the form of the Tutorial monologue, and address ourselves directly to the general reader. There is one all-important addition which at this point must be made to the foregoing catalogue of sciences which fall within the ambit of 'Theology'—an addition which, if we had been expounding the subject in a strictly logical and systematic order, instead of sketching it as it may be deemed to appear to the eye of the casual and uninstructed enquirer, would have been mentioned in the first instance and at the head of the whole list, as the source and fountain of all that followed ; this is the study of the Bible, the sacred books of the Jewish and Christian Churches, which are universally recognised throughout Christendom as the authoritative *dossier* or record of the great process of Redemption, and in which all Churches and sects, from the mighty Roman Communion down to the smallest and most eccentric sect of the Western world, claim to find their characteristic tenets either expressly or by implication contained.

"Hic liber est, in quo quaerit sua dogmata quisque,
Invenit et pariter dogmata quisque sua" :

It is not necessary to accept the satirical implication inherent in this distich of Werenfels of Basle in order to realise its general correspondence to the theological conditions of the present day—a correspondence which is not affected by the fact that varying views are now taken by different schools of thought concerning the inspiration and authority of the documents in question, ranging from a rigid ‘Fundamentalism’ which holds fast to the ideas of their verbal inspiration and literal inerrancy in respect of all matters of fact, even purely historical and scientific fact, down to a minimising view which regards them as little more than a noble literature, fraught with uplifting influences not different in kind from those which may be discerned in the writings of Plato, Epictetus, or Carlyle. It is, indeed, true that there is not complete agreement as to what books constitute ‘Scripture,’ the ‘Canon’ or list of inspired books recognised by the Latin and Eastern Orthodox Communion containing the documents known to English-speaking people as the ‘Apocrypha,’ whilst these are placed on a secondary level by the Anglican Church, which reads them ‘for example of life and instruction of manners, without applying them to establish any doctrine’ (Article VI), and by the Protestant parts of Christendom rejected altogether; yet, though opinions may differ concerning the claims of the Deutero-canonical books to ‘inspiration,’ however that may be defined, there can be no disagreement as to the unique historical value of a literature which bridges over the gap between the Old and the New Testaments, or the religious preciousness of the memorials which it contains of the piety of those ‘holy and humble men of heart’ who lived immediately before the coming of our Lord. The study of Scripture (and of the Deutero-canonical books, if these be not counted as ‘Scripture’), textual, linguistic, literary, historical, archaeological and hermeneutic, involves in itself contact with the whole of theological science, and introduces the student to an inexhaustible world of research for the exploration of which a lifetime is hardly sufficient. To the Bible, considered as history, a natural pendant is the continued record of the development and vicissitudes of the Divine Society, from the point at which the New Testament lays it down (which may be roughly designated as the epoch of the deaths of the Apostles)

through the period of the primitive Church, with its Fathers, Councils, and persecutions, through the Middle Ages, the Renaissance and the Reformation, down to the present day, in the shape of *Ecclesiastical History*; and, in view of the fact that the history of the Church has so largely been the history of its great men and of their writings, particularly during the formative period of Christian ideas and institutions, whilst 'the undivided Church' was still an obvious and visible fact, it is the custom of some to reckon as a separate division of this subject the study of *Patrology* or *Patristics*, which, as its name implies, devotes itself to the study and elucidation of the writings of the 'Fathers.'

III

The reader has now, it may be hoped, something like a general panoramic view of the vast and diversified landscape which is constituted by the various sciences commonly grouped together under the comprehensive title of 'Theology.' For the sake of clearness, these may be arranged in a definite catalogue, as follows:

- (1) The intellectual prolegomena of Dogmatic Theology—the *Philosophy* and *Psychology of religion*, conceived as treating, not merely of the bases of religious and theistic conviction, but also of the nature and function of Authority in respect of belief, and the degree (if any) in which this can be ascribed to Scripture, Tradition, or Church.
- (2) The study, textual, critical, historical and expository, of *the Bible*, regarded as containing the 'revealed' *data* for, and the historical prolegomena to, Dogmatic Theology.
- (3) *Dogmatic Theology* itself, the study of 'revealed truth' concerning the six great Christian ideas of the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Atonement, the Church, the Sacraments, the Last Things—the crown and summit of sacred learning.
- (4) *Moral Theology and Casuistry*—the science of Christian conduct. To this may be added as a natural corollary, though its interest is professional rather than general in scope,

- (5) *Pastoral Theology*, the *ars artium* of guiding and influencing souls.
- (6) *Ascetical and Mystical Theology*.
- (7) *Ecclesiastical History* and *Patristics*.
- (8) *Canon Law*.
- (9) *Liturgiology*.

The question, however, will now arise—What parts of this landscape are worth exploring by the educated layman, or the minister of religion who does not aspire to be an academic specialist ?

It is clear that subjects (5), (6), (8) and (9) in the foregoing list, fascinating though they are to those who have time for pursuing them, are predominantly the affair of the professional ecclesiastic, pastor, confessor, or guide of souls. This is not to assert that the lay folk may not or should not interest themselves in such matters ; the writings of Miss Evelyn Underhill, and the researches of the late Dr. J. Wickham Legg, show what treasures can be added to the spiritual store of the Church by lay writers on Mysticism and Liturgics respectively. But it is probable that the ordinary educated layman who desires to devote his leisure to the study of Theology will find most satisfaction in concentrating his attention upon that which, as we have suggested, is Theology *par excellence*, the 'Queen of Sciences'—namely, Dogmatic Theology—upon its primary source and fount, the Holy Bible, and upon that which leads up to it and gives it its characteristic form, the Philosophy of Religion.

We are now in a position to employ the 'guiding thread' mentioned above, namely, the distinction between Historical and Systematic Theology, in the exploration of the territories just delimited. It will be clear that each of the great subjects which we have specified as most suitable for study by the educated layman—the Bible, the Philosophy of Religion, and Dogmatic Theology—is capable of being studied both 'historically' and 'systematically,' though it must be observed that the central subject, namely, Christian Doctrine, when studied 'historically,' assumes a character very different from that which it bears when studied 'systematically.' 'Systematic Theology' represents what is, perhaps, the most daring effort

which the human mind has ever made, namely, the attempt to arrive at as near an approximation to absolute truth concerning ultimate reality as the human mind is capable of attaining, through the investigation of that which God is believed to have revealed concerning His own Being, His operations in the universe, and His dealings with men. Such a study can, naturally, only be carried on by one who is himself a convinced believer in Christianity, and indeed in some particular form of it. Studied 'historically,' however, Dogmatic Theology becomes merely the investigation of the development of certain ideas which men actually have held about God, and presupposes no particular assumptions either for or against their truth; paradoxical, therefore, and even shocking though it may at first sight seem, there is, in the nature of things, no reason why the historical study of Dogmatic Theology should not be carried on by a non-Christian or an atheist. The German language has a pair of terms which conveniently express this distinction between the two types of study just mentioned, viz., *Dogmatik* (the systematic study) and *Dogmengeschichte* (the historical study); the English language does not possess a corresponding pair denoting these two ideas with precision and brevity, and we shall, accordingly, assume the liberty occasionally to employ the German words. It may help to elucidate the existing situation if we point out that what is understood by 'Theology' in the *curricula* of the ordinary, secular universities of Europe and America is almost exclusively 'Historical Theology,' and that the teaching of 'Systematic Theology' is (owing to the divisions of Christendom, and the absence of any universally 'agreed' version of the Christian Faith) confined, for the most part, to seminaries and other institutions under direct ecclesiastical or denominational control.

B. HISTORICAL THEOLOGY

I

We have observed above, that, historically considered, all existing Christian denominations may be viewed as fragments, great or small—or as chips and splinters of fragments—of that primitive Christian Society which in the third century was labelled by an acute pagan critic (Celsus) as 'the Great

Church,'¹ and is now often known as 'the undivided Catholic Church' (though in truth there was never a time, at least from the middle of the second century onward, when it did not find itself ringed about by dissident sects), and that this common origin is reflected in the great architectonic doctrines—those of the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Atonement, the Church, the Sacraments, and the Last Things—which they all (with inconsiderable exceptions) hold or claim to hold. All alike would affirm that these great ideas were—and each individual denomination would add that its own particular version of them was—derived from the teaching of Christ Himself and of His Apostles as recorded in the New Testament. But the Founder of Christianity Himself was born a member of the Jewish Church, and claimed that He came 'not to destroy but to fulfil'; He appealed to the Jewish Scriptures as authoritative, and took much of the current Jewish theology for granted; and the Society which He left behind Him, as we read its mind in the New Testament, regarded itself as being, not a brand-new sect just invented, but the only authentic heir and remnant of the Jewish Church, the immemorial 'Congregation of the Lord,' the Church of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, of Moses and David, Isaiah and Jeremiah, of Ben Sira and the Maccabees. Hence it is clear that an historical survey of the origin and development of the leading Christian ideas must find its starting-point long before the time of Christ, far back in the third millennium B.C., when the primitive ancestors of the Jewish race left their original home in Ur of the Chaldees for the little land of Palestine, destined to play so fateful a part in the history of the world. With the call of Abraham (or, it may be, with the tribal migration symbolised by that episode in the biblical narrative) there begins a single movement of religious thought and feeling, which may, in accordance with the student's point of view, be described either as man's gradual discovery of God or as God's progressive self-revelation to man: which runs continuously down the centuries through the history of the elder Israel, rises to its climax in the life, teaching, and death of Jesus Christ, continues in increasingly

¹ *Ap. Orig. c. Cels. V. lix.* No doubt the epithet 'great' was meant to contrast the Catholic Church with the much smaller, dissident Marcionite Church,

intellectualised form through the great formative period of Christian thought (which includes both the Apostolic epoch, of which the literary remains are embodied in the New Testament, and also the Patristic period, generally deemed to end with St. John of Damascus in the East and St. Bernard in the West) : during the Middle Ages creates those Gothic cathedrals of thought, the majestic systems of the Schoolmen ; bifurcates with the cataclysm of the Reformation into the theology of Luther, Calvin, Melancthon and their successors on the one hand, and the developed scholasticism of the counter-Reformation, expressed in the monumental works of such writers as Suarez and De Lugo, on the other. Owing to the ever-increasing regimentation of theological thought characteristic of the post-Tridentine Latin Communion, this latter branch of the movement has produced few new developments of interest to the student of doctrinal evolution, unless, indeed, the violent revolt against such regimentation which took the form of the ' Modernist ' movement during the reign of Pius X be counted as such a development.¹ In those areas of Continental Christendom, however, which were affected by the Reformation, theological thought has continued to be a living and growing thing, passing through the successive phases associated with the names of Schleiermacher, Ritschl, Harnack, and Barth, nor have critical research and constructive thought stood still within the Anglican or the Anglo-Saxon world. We proceed to indicate, as briefly as may be in order to avoid trespassing upon the peculiar territories of those who will follow us, the methods which should be employed by, and the problems which will confront, the student of ' Historical Theology,' or *Dogmengeschichte* ; and this survey must necessarily begin with the Old Testament.

II

In order to follow the growth of religious ideas it is necessary to have a reasonably accurate knowledge of the history of the people amongst whom these ideas germinated ; and the acquisition of such knowledge demands both a previous acquaintance with the documents in which that history is enshrined, and also the power to evaluate them at their true worth in respect

¹ See below, p. 33.

of reliability, to distinguish myth and conscious allegory from history, early and trustworthy from late and 'tendencious' narratives. But, before the documents can be sifted and classified in order of historical value, their true form must first of all be determined ; that is to say, the purest and most primitive form of their text should be established, in the light of the most ancient manuscripts and versions. In other words—and this is a consideration which applies as much to the New Testament as to the Old, and, indeed, to the whole field of historical research—the student should, in theory, begin with the textual criticism of his documents (the so-called 'Lower Criticism,' which derives its name from the fact that it applies itself to the stream of tradition at a 'low' point in its course, namely, the actual written documents in which it meets us). Being satisfied that he possesses his authorities in their earliest recoverable text, he will then proceed (bearing in mind the complete absence of the notion of 'copyright' in the ancient world, and the wide editorial liberty which primitive writers employed in reproducing, altering, interpolating, blending or morticing together the materials which lay before them) to study them critically, for the purpose (should he see signs of a composite structure in the documents in his hands) of reconstructing, so far as possible, the primitive sources from which they have been compounded. This discipline is known as 'literary' criticism, or the 'Higher Criticism' (so called because it approaches the stream of historical tradition at a point higher than the manuscript or translational forms which are the subjects of 'Textual Criticism').¹ Having worked carefully over his evidence, and sorted out ancient and authentic sources from those which are later, he is then in a position to approach the relatively final task of reconstructing the actual course of events—a study which might well be called (though I do not know that it ever has been) the 'Highest Criticism,' inasmuch as it impinges upon the stream of historical tradition at the highest point which it can reach, that is, as near as possible to its fountain-head in the evidence of eye-

¹ It is a vulgar error to suppose either that the term 'Higher Criticism' means destructive criticism as such or that the epithet 'higher' is meant to claim some sort of intellectual or moral superiority for its exponents ; the precise meaning of the term is as stated in the text.

witnesses. It is probable that the educated layman whom we envisage as our typical student will be content to take the text of the English Revised Version, and the labours which lie behind it, for granted, at any rate so far as the Old Testament is concerned, though it may well interest him to know something of the Septuagint and some of the curious differences from the Massoretic Hebrew text which it presents; the detailed study of the 'Lower Criticism' of the Old Testament must be left by the majority, even of professed theologians, to a small body of specialists.

It is, however, important that he should grasp in its main outlines the revolution which has been effected in our view of the Old Testament documents by the 'Higher' or 'Literary' Criticism. Broadly speaking, it may now be said to be the generally accepted view that the greater portion of the Law is posterior in time to the Prophets, and not vice versa, as a non-critical reading of the scriptural text would naturally suggest; or, in other words, of the written laws attributed to Moses, the greater part was codified after the exile on the basis of existing custom, and ascribed to Moses, by a well-known literary convention, in much the same way as in Greece anonymous fragments of epic poetry came to be ascribed to Homer; and all that can now be ascribed to the great primeval legislator himself, in its present form, is the 'Ten Words,' which form the core of the Decalogue, and possibly the 'Book of the Covenant' (Exod. xx. 22-xxiii. 33)—though in any case the latter cannot be held to contain more than a Mosaic substratum, as it contains many precepts which presuppose the circumstances of a settled agricultural and not of a merely nomadic life. The complete change in the perspective of the religious history of Israel produced by the critical view of the documents is obvious, and can be summed up in a phrase; it substitutes an evolutionary for a relatively static view of the older Dispensation, and of the self-revelation of God which was imparted through it. Many generations of simple believers, reading the Old Testament as it stands, without noticing the internal discrepancies, the doublets and overlappings and differences of style which have provided the critic with the starting-points for his analysis of sources, have believed—as the priestly editors of the Hexateuch themselves no doubt believed and meant

others to believe—that Israel sprang into existence at Mount Sinai as a fully developed Church, equipped with a hierarchy, a Temple (constructed for the time being in portable form as the Tabernacle) an elaborate sacrificial cultus, a fully detailed Book of Laws, a lofty moral standard, and a rigidly exclusive monotheistic creed ; that the history of the nation consisted in a series of perverse and voluntary declensions from a divinely revealed system which stood out in contrast with the surrounding pagan cults as light from darkness ; and that the work of the Prophets simply consisted in recalling the Israelites to an already existent standard of faith and morals. Given the critical view of the documents, this is at once seen to be a highly idealised account of the facts. The elaborate Judaic ecclesiastical system as it existed in the time of Christ, was the product of a long process of evolution, and represents the final, not the initial, phase of Israelitish history. The real truth is that the theological and cultural equipment with which Israel started on its eventful career was of the simplest possible type. The work of Moses was, indeed, to bring Israel into a covenant-relationship with Yahweh ; but Yahweh was originally conceived, not as the Lord of the whole earth, but as a fierce warrior-god, living on much the same plane as the other tribal gods against whom he led his people to battle ; there was no settled hierarchy, and a simple tent was all that Israel possessed in the way of a shrine ; sacrifice may well have been, as Amos appears to imply,¹ non-existent in the nomadic stage of Israel's national life. And, though doubtless from the first the potentiality of a higher morality was impressed by Moses upon the religion of the Hebrews, the cruel deeds which are said to have been perpetrated in the name of Yahweh show that in its earlier stages, at any rate, his cultus would have presented few features whereby an external observer could have distinguished it ethically from the worship of Chemosh or of Moloch.

The religious history of Israel, then, was, on the whole, one of gradual ascent, with many disastrous regressions and setbacks, from rude and barbarous beginnings to a pure and lofty form of ethical monotheism ; it was not a series of declensions from an original golden age of ritual and moral orthodoxy. The study of this gradual ascent opens out at every step problems

¹ v. 25.

which are of the most fascinating interest for the historian of the ancient world, the archaeologist, the student of 'comparative religion.' But the reader whose main interest is centred in Theology proper and in the study of the Christian revelation will probably be content with a general acquaintance with such subsidiary questions, and will concentrate his attention mainly upon the development of religious ideas, bearing in mind the traditional belief of the Christian Church that the Old Testament was in more ways than one a *Praeparatio evangelica*, a *paedagogus* to bring us to Christ. He will approach the religion of the Old Testament, not, indeed, expecting to find that Christ and His teaching can be exhaustively explained on the basis of already existing factors in Judaism, but prepared for the possibility that the elder Dispensation may have been providentially commissioned to assemble much conceptual material with a view to its ultimate incorporation in the fabric of the Christian Creed, even as David is said to have collected great stones and timber for the building of that temple which he was destined never to see. With this thought in his mind, he will see no paradox in the counsel to search the records of Hebrew religious experience for the first origins of those six fundamental ideas which we have already catalogued as constituting the contents of *Dogmatik*, and as, consequently, providing in their gradual growth, the proper subject-matter for *Dogmengeschichte*—namely the ideas of the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Atonement, the Church, the Sacraments, and the Last Things. We proceed to explain the significance of what may still appear, despite the warning just given, to be a somewhat surprising statement.

III

The fundamental doctrine of Christianity, as of Judaism, is the assertion that there is one God, infinitely wise, powerful, merciful, loving and holy, and that there is none other God but he. It is not necessary here to describe in detail the stages whereby this august conception was developed out of the primitive idea of a tribal god, originally, perhaps, thought of as a lunar deity,¹ whose existence did not exclude the equally

¹ See C. F. Burney, *The Book of Judges*, p. 249 ff. ('Early identification of Yahweh with the Moon-God').

real existence of other gods ; the work of Amos in driving home the belief in his righteousness, of Hosea in emphasising his loving kindness, of Isaiah in maintaining his transcendence, of the second Isaiah in proclaiming his majestic uniqueness, can be studied in the scriptural texts and the standard commentaries. But can it be seriously suggested that it is possible to discern in the Old Testament the rudiments of those documents which are most characteristic of orthodox Christianity, and most uncompromisingly rejected by modern Judaism, the ideas of the Trinity, and of the Incarnation ? A careful study of the language in which the Prophets themselves described the source of their inspiration will give us the clue ; for the divine power which possesses them, heightens their normal faculties and makes them the interpreters of a supernatural message, is indifferently described as the ' Word ' or the ' Spirit ' or ' Breath ' of God. These terms, vague, pictorial, metaphorical as they may be, contain at least the germs of the Trinitarian conception : for they imply a real distinction between God as He is in Himself, and God as going forth in operation ; they are the first essay at bridging the gulf which was held to sunder the infinite and purely transcendent Creator from the finite world of nature and of man. During the period covered by the Hebrew Old Testament, the ideas of the ' Word ' and the ' Spirit ' are not decisively differentiated, nor does either of them appear to be definitely hypostatised ; the earliest reference to the Word of God as a personal agent appears to be Wisdom xviii. 15, where ' thy almighty Word ' is identified with the destroying angel of the Exodus. The real work of developing the conception of the ' Word ' or Logos of God to a point at which it was ready for use by the Christian Fourth Evangelist as the means of simultaneously reconciling the Deity of Jesus Christ with the Deity of the unoriginate Father and with monotheism, was carried out by *extra*-Biblical thinkers, notably by the Targumists, those whose speculations replaced, in the Targums or Aramaic paraphrases of the Hebrew Scriptures commonly used in the Synagogues, the name of God, wherever He is described as acting anthropomorphically amongst men, by the name of His *Memra*, or personified Word—and pre-eminently by Philo, the Alexandrine Jew, who in the early decades of the

Christian era took in hand the task of formulating Jewish religion in terms of Greek philosophy. We cannot do more than indicate in the briefest manner the fascinating avenues of research opened up by the study of Philo's Hellenism, which not merely endeavours to fuse the Hebrew idea of God's creative Word with the impersonal Logos or cosmic reason of Heraclitus and the Stoics, but represents the first systematic attempt to ally with the religious experience of Israel that Platonic philosophy which was destined to be, in the phrase of its seventeenth-century Cambridge disciple, 'the old loving nurse' of Christian and Catholic orthodoxy.

It will now be clear in what sense it is true to say that the rudiments of Christian theology are to be found, long before the time of Christ, embedded in the sacred literature of the Jews. Naturally the Christian revelation could not and did not exist before the birth of Him who imparted it; but the mould was gradually being prepared into which the white-hot flood of Christian experience was to be poured, the categories were being worked out whereby the fuller truth was to be expressed. And, as with the pre-Christian presages of Trinitarian and Christological doctrine, so also it was with the precursors of the third of the fundamental Christian ideas, that of the Atonement and the doctrine of Grace which coheres round it. There could, in the nature of things, be no doctrine of the atoning efficacy of the death of Christ before He had actually died; but the mysterious conception of sacrifice, and of the expiation of sin by the shedding of blood, which is employed by St. Paul, St. John, and most notably by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, to provide a *rationale* of that tragic Death which was seen, in retrospect, to have been the predestined goal of Christ's birth and life, has its roots deep in the life and worship of the older Covenant. We cannot, indeed, doubt that those roots go deeper still and are connected with the first origins of sacrifice as it exists amongst the primitive ethnic races. The question of origins, indeed, may seem to belong rather to the sphere of 'comparative religion' than to that of theology: yet the decision between the rival views as to the primordial significance of sacrifice, (*a*) that which regards it as the offering of a gift to the deity,¹ and

¹ See G. Buchanan Gray, *Sacrifice in the Old Testament* (1925).

(b) that which regards it as a totemistic communion-feast¹—or the recognition of both conceptions as operative side by side—cannot be without its influence upon the student's ultimate interpretation of the New Testament doctrines of Atonement, and of the Eucharistic 'blood of the new covenant,' which, if our present text of the Gospels is reliable, was evidently meant to be understood as in some sense analogous to the sacrificial 'blood of the covenant' wherewith Moses inaugurated the old.² The ideas of the Fall of Man, of the 'evil impulse' (*yēṣer ha-ra'*) inherent in man's nature,³ and the problems of Predestination and Free Will, Justification, Faith and Works, are to be found both in the Rabbinical (or official and scholastic) and in the apocalyptic (or popular) theology of the last two centuries B.C.; and it is impossible properly to understand St. Paul's utterances on these subjects without reference to that background of Jewish thought which was presupposed by him and by many of his readers.

The idea of the Church, of the holy people of God, of the 'congregation' (*Qāhāl*) 'of the Lord' is familiar even to the simple-minded and uncritical reader of the Old Testament; and even those for whom the word 'church' calls up no such emotions of affection and veneration as in the mind of the Catholic Christian are associated with the majestic phrase 'one holy catholic and apostolic Church' may find much of purely intellectual interest in the process whereby Israel died as a nation in the cataclysm of the Exile, to live again as a Church, bound together by its Law and cultus even more closely than by the tie of blood-kinship, and, in virtue of its dispersion outside Palestine and the institution of proselytism, theoretically oecumenical in scope and appeal. The epithet 'Apostolic' can hardly be understood without reference to the functions of those Jewish *ἀπόστολοι* or 'commissioners' of whom, it may be reasonably surmised, St. Paul had been one before his conversion, nor can the origins of the Christian ministry be studied without taking account of the institution of 'presbyters' or 'elders' in the Jewish synagogues, the interior organisation of which doubtless supplied the model on which

¹ See W. R. Smith, *The Religion of the Semites* (1925).

² Exod. xxiv. 8.

³ See my *Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin* (1927), Lectures I, II.

nascent Christianity shaped the constitution of its own congregations. It may seem at first sight useless to look for the origins of Christian sacramentalism in the pages of the Old Testament or of Jewish religious literature in general; yet the study of the Passover-ritual, of the *Qiddush* or ceremonial blessing of bread and wine on the eve of a sabbath or feast, of proselyte-baptism, of the ordination of Rabbis by imposition of hands, has an obvious bearing upon the history of Christian practice.¹ The doctrine of the Last Things, on the other hand, opens out a rich, fascinating and fruitful field of research to the historian and to the theologian proper. For the ideas comprehended under this head—in technical language known as ‘eschatology’—were the characteristic gift, albeit often expressed in fantastic and sometimes in morally repellent forms—of Israel to Christianity and to the world. The priceless belief in individual immortality, which determines the whole perspective in which the Christian views the trials and perplexities of this our bitter-sweet human life, and without which his faith would be vain—the affirmation that such immortality is not the mere survival of a disembodied spirit, but includes the perfection of all aspects of man’s nature, physical as well as spiritual, that is, the affirmation of ‘the Resurrection of the body’—the ideas of the Last Judgment and of the apocalyptic ‘Son of Man’ who is to come with the clouds of heaven—these were, humanly speaking, the product of Israel’s burning determination, which no oppression could quench, to live, to assert itself, and to fulfil its destiny, if not in this world then in another; though the student who approaches the genetic study of these ideas with a firm belief in God’s overruling providence will have no difficulty in seeing, behind the craving of the oppressed Hebrews to compensate themselves for the woes of the present by fantasies of a Messianic millennium in the future, the subtle action of the Spirit of God, gently guiding the tumultuous emotions of man so as to bring about in symbolic form the revelation of such information about the ultimate destiny of the race and of the

¹ Detailed information may be found in W. O. E. Oesterley, *The Jewish Background of the Christian Liturgy* (1925), H. Lietzmann, *Messe und Herrnmahl* (1926), F. Gavin, *The Jewish Antecedents of the Christian Sacraments* (1928), etc.

individual as it is good for us to possess. Owing to the concentration of apocalyptic thought upon the national triumph and vindication at the Last Day, little is heard of an 'intermediate state' for individuals: yet 2 Maccabees testifies to a belief in the efficacy of prayers for the dead (xii. 44), and in the power of the intercession of departed Saints (xv. 12-16).

IV

Having observed the gradual formation within the religious thought of Israel of those dim and shadowy outlines which were destined to be filled in with a rich and vital content, so as to constitute the mighty fabric of 'orthodox' or 'Catholic' Christianity, the student of Historical Theology next approaches the crucial question of all questions—'What think ye of Christ?' Who or what was He? What was the true version of His life, and of His teaching? What was the interpretation of that life and teaching which was formed by the primitive Christian community? Does this interpretation truly represent the historical Jesus? If it does, has it been perverted by the 'orthodoxy' of the later Church, or is the Christianity of the Creeds in direct line with it? If it is not, what disturbing influences intervened to distort the impressions formed by their Master by those who had known Him in the flesh? These are the vast questions which confront the student of Historical Theology in its New Testament period; their vital importance for the life of the present day need not be pointed out. The task of our present section must, accordingly, be to state briefly, and as impartially as possible, the main answers to these questions which would be given by the principal schools of theological thought, and to indicate the grounds and methods by which these answers would severally be supported.

The simple believer, taking the New Testament documents at their face-value, not questioning their traditional authorship, and untroubled by critical problems, finds little difficulty in reconstructing the first origins of Christianity. For him, two of the four Gospels are the work of eye-witnesses and apostles (St. Matthew and St. John), and two (St. Mark and St. Luke) of disciples of apostles, men who, doubtless, had every opportunity of ascertaining the exact facts. Consequently, for him

Jesus stands revealed not merely as the Teacher who 'spake as never man spake,' but as the virgin-born, wonder-working Son of God, who, even during His earthly lifetime, commands the worship of His adherents, and on one or two occasions at least claims to be one with eternal Deity itself; who prophesies His own death as a ransom for many, rises from the tomb, and ascends into heaven. It is entirely congruous with this picture of the Divine-human Redeemer that He should have promised to bestow the Holy Spirit in fullest measure upon His followers, that on the last evening of His life He should have instituted a sacramental meal, previously declared to be, or to mediate, the eating of His flesh and drinking of His blood, as the indispensable source of spiritual life to His votaries; that after His resurrection He should have enjoined the continuance of the Jewish rite of Baptism, as the means of initiation into that community which He had previously described as His *Ecclesia*, founded upon the rock of Peter or of the confession of His divine Sonship, and that in connection with this He should have given the clue to the mysterious problem of the relations between Himself, the Father who sent Him, and the Spirit whom He would send, by promulgating the Trinitarian name of God, as 'Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.'¹ Such an one will see nothing to conflict with this, and much that is harmonious with it, in the Epistles and the Apocalypse; the scheme of belief just indicated, which is recognisably the Christianity of the creeds, that is 'Catholic' or 'historic' Christianity, will seem to him to run straight on from the life of Christ, through the teaching of the Apostolic Church, into the patristic and conciliar period, without any substantial aberration or breach of continuity. For convenience sake, we may label the view just sketched 'naïve orthodoxy'; but it should be understood that by the epithet 'naïve' we do not intend any disparagement of this belief, for it is the faith by which uncounted millions have lived and from which they have drawn strength and courage both in the tangled perplexities of life and in the hour of death.

Within the last century this traditional scheme has been challenged at every point, by the acutest intellects which have devoted themselves to the study of Christian origins. The

¹ But see below, p. 71, n. 1.

critical challenge may be roughly summarized as follows—
‘We grant you the compelling power and the emotional attractiveness of the traditional or “orthodox” version of Christianity. But the question of its basis in historical fact is by no means so simple as you suppose. It may be conceded that the main outlines of this scheme—the idea of Jesus as a pre-existent Divine Being who appeared as man, of His death as in some sense an atoning sacrifice, of His adherents as constituting the new Israel or *Ecclesia* of God, of the sacramental efficacy of the Eucharist and Baptism—are already found taken for granted in what are, as they stand, the earliest Christian documents in existence, the eight or nine letters which can with tolerable certainty be ascribed to St. Paul.¹ But it does not follow from this that the ideas in question were either held or taught by Jesus Himself. The history of religion offers many instances—Buddhism and Zoroastrianism being the chief—of an originally simple, ethical, non-sacramental, non-sacerdotal teaching which has been overlaid by sacramental and theological accretions in such a way as to transform it into something which its first authors would never have recognised ; and we must face the possibility that it may have been so with Christianity, and that Paul may, doubtless with the best intentions and quite unconsciously, have read into the teaching of Jesus ideas of Incarnation, Sacrifice, and Sacrament which were completely alien to the mind of Jesus Himself. So long as this doubt exists, the teaching of St. Paul cannot be regarded as irrefragable evidence for the teaching of Jesus Himself ; for this, we must fall back upon the Gospels. And that means the Synoptic Gospels ; the Fourth Gospel cannot be used as evidence at this stage of the enquiry, for it was written at the end of the first century, at least thirty years after the events which it purports to narrate ; its authorship is highly uncertain, and its character hardly less so, many features of it suggesting that it may have been written not as a simple biography but rather as a devotional and dogmatic treatise, couched, by a literary convention well known to the ancient world, in a *quasi*-historical form. If St. Paul is, in effect, on his trial for having misconstrued the

¹ Eph., 2 Thess., and the Pastoral Epistles are those of which the Pauline authorship is questioned, on grounds of varying degrees of objectivity.

authentic teaching of Jesus, so also is " St. John " ; and neither of them can be summoned as a witness in his own defence. We must, therefore, start with the Synoptic Gospels ; and, like the documents of the Old Testament, these must be passed through the successive crucibles of the Lower, the Higher, and the Highest (or textual, literary, and historical) criticism. The process of establishing the true text of the Gospels, though fraught with the deepest interest and fascination as it is for the professional scholar, may not have revealed any results which are of great importance from the point of view of the educated amateur, who, for the purposes of his own reading, may well employ the English Revised Version as a sufficiently accurate text (though it must not be forgotten that textual criticism has been deemed to cast some doubt upon the authenticity of the command " Do this," said to have been uttered by Jesus at the Last Supper).¹ But the literary criticism of the Gospels—the study of what is known as the Synoptic Problem—is of vital importance for the reconstruction (so far as that is possible) of the actual life of Christ. Seventy years of minute and intensive labour have shown that these three biographies are not so many independent records, but are closely interdependent compilations, which have to a large extent made use of the same documentary sources, of which one appears to have been a collection of Sayings (Q), which has perished save in so far as fragments of it have been preserved in the Gospels, but may well have resembled the string of sayings of the primitive Rabbis contained in the Mishnic tractate, *Pirke Aboth* ; to these must be added the special sources employed by " Matthew " and " Luke " respectively. Amongst these latter, the birth narratives are so uncertain, in respect both of date and of *provenance*, that they cannot be treated as serious evidence for the alleged events which they narrate, even if these were not in themselves

¹ Luke xxii. 19 = 1 Cor. xi. 24, 25. It may be conceded that 1 Cor. xi. 24 f. is the only unchallenged authority for the command ' Do this.' But the real issue at stake is not so much the accuracy of St. Paul's report of Christ's words but rather the general question whether our Lord intended what He did at the Last Supper to be repeated by His disciples. For discussions of the ' Dominical institution ' of the Eucharist, see D. S. Guy, *Was Holy Communion instituted by Jesus ?* (1924), *Essays Catholic and Critical* (edn. 1929), pp. 369-423, ' The Origins of the Sacraments,' by the present writer.

impossible, as constituting violations of natural law. Our real authorities, therefore, for the life of Christ are the primitive documents which lie behind our present Synoptic Gospels, namely, Mark, Q and perhaps LQ (St. Luke's special source)—and these may well have been written down before the deaths of St. Peter and St. Paul (? A.D. 64) ; so far as written documents are concerned, they represent the nearest approximation to the testimony of eye-witnesses which is available for us.

' But, even so, we are not yet in a position to treat them without more ado as though they were *autoptic* evidence. Even if, taking the most generous view possible of their antiquity, we assign the first writing down of Mark and Q to the sixth decade of the first century, we are still left with a gulf of a quarter of a century between the occurrence of the events in question and the first formulation of their literary record. During this period the record of Christ's deeds must have been transmitted by oral tradition alone, without any documentary check ; and such a fluid, unofficial, uncontrolled tradition would naturally be deeply influenced, both in respect of the acts and words to be preserved, and in respect of the *form* in which they were to be transmitted, by the missionary and devotional needs of the primitive Christian community (or *Urgemeinde*). On these considerations is based the recently developed science of " form-criticism," which takes as its subject-matter the primitive sources disentangled from the Gospels by purely literary criticism, dissects them into component *pericopae* or sections, and studies each section in isolation, with a view to determining its " form "—that is, the type of narrative, historical, semi-historical, or unhistorical, to which it is to be deemed to belong. The various types of story which are met with in ancient literature roughly contemporaneous with the Gospels, and which therefore (it is assumed) are likely to be met with in the Gospels themselves, have been given technical names by the " form-critics," such as " aretalogy " (a narrative of some manifestation of divine power), " legend " (a narrative about some sainted person), " paradigm " (a short story meant to enforce some moral or religious lesson), and so forth.¹ But the determination of the " form "

¹ See M. Dibelius, *Die Formgeschichte des Evangeliums* (English tr., ' From Tradition to Gospel,' 1934), for an authoritative account of this subject.

carries with it the determination of the *motive* which impelled the primitive Christians to embody a given *pericope* in the written Gospel: it reveals the catechetical or homiletic exigencies which preserved, and at the same time modified, or, it may be, created it. Under the dissolving touch of "form-criticism," and the influence of that anti-miraculous *præiudicium* which naturally flows from the modern scientific belief in the "reign of law," many sections melt away into unsubstantiality, revealed as mere creations of the pious imagination of the *Urgemeinde*; and we are left with a disappointingly meagre residuum of really reliable historical evidence, which yields little detailed information about the doings and sayings of Jesus, though it still permits us to believe that He "spake as never man spake," that He promulgated the purest and most exalted ethic that the world has seen, and re-enforced His teaching by the example of a morally flawless life. What has disappeared in the analytic processes to which modern science has subjected the texts is all evidence that He claimed or believed Himself to be divine, that He thought of His death as an atoning sacrifice, that He meant to found a Church, or re-found *the* Church, that He had any idea of instituting "sacraments"—though it is still open to those, who are not convinced by critical argument that the eschatological sayings in the Gospels (especially those contained in the "Little Apocalypse" of Mark xiii.) are an alien element pseudonymously fathered on Him, to hold that He preached a very definite (though, as events have proved, mistaken) doctrine of the Last Things.

'It may be asked, if the original teaching of Christ was simply morals and the love of God, how did it come to be transformed within the life-time of a generation into an ecclesiastical institution, a sacramental cultus, and a theology centring in the Godhead of its Founder—or at any rate into something which clearly manifests the strong and growing germs of such beliefs and usages? The swiftness of the change is indeed surprising, in view of the fact that Buddhism took some centuries to become transformed into Lamaism. However, it is certain (for the reason just indicated) that the change did take place; and its obvious and primary cause is to be sought in the transplantation of Christianity from Asia into Europe,

and its consequent contact with Greek philosophy, Roman law and government, and the rich variety of polytheistic, sacramental and magical cults which made up Graeco-Roman paganism. The Mediterranean world abounded with divine redeemers who had died and risen again, *Kyrioi* or "lords" who revealed an ultimate and inaccessible Absolute ("gods many and lords many"),¹ sacrificial feasts which were believed to impart to their participants "communion with daemons,"² lustrations which were believed to impart inward purity and freedom from sin; Stoicism and incipient Gnosticism had shown the possibility of the union of philosophy and religion to form a body of dogma; and the all-pervading Roman Empire, with its officially patronised cult of Augustus, must have suggested the idea of a universal spiritual empire, compactly bound together by a uniform law and organisation. It is natural that a young, sensitive, and relatively formless religious movement, such as Christianity was during the first twenty years of its existence, should have been rapidly and deeply coloured by the environment into which St. Paul's missionary journeys had transplanted it. So far as one individual bears the responsibility for the profound transformation of the Christian religion which we have sketched, that responsibility must rest upon St. Paul; who was, indeed, a "Hebrew sprung from Hebrews," but was also a Hellenistic Jew, born in the Greek city of Tarsus, and a Roman citizen by birth, and whose personality, consequently, may be assumed to have included strains sympathetic to the characteristically Greek and Roman elements in ancient civilization. Opinions may vary on the question whether he was specifically influenced by what are known as the "Mystery religions"; but the conclusion forced on us by a broad view of the facts is that the Apostle of the Gentiles, in his zeal for winning converts from the pagan world, "became all things to all men" rather too generously, in the sense of permitting his converts to believe, and eventually coming to believe himself, that Christianity was the cult of a divine redeemer, with a "Church" and sacraments, and not merely an ebullition of ethical enthusiasm within the framework of Jewish religion. The destruction of Jerusalem in A.D. 70 cut Christianity off from its

¹ 1 Cor. viii. 5.

² *Ibid.* x. 20.

Jewish origins and birth-place, thus detaching it from the Hebraic influences which might have counteracted the paganising development, and left it as a predominantly European religion, which tended to become assimilated more and more to the pagan cults by which it was surrounded, and to borrow increasingly numerous details of cultus, organisation and thought from them. The development thus initiated by St. Paul was underlined and stereotyped by the great mystical writer known as "St. John," whose Gospel is designed to trace the origins of what were in reality adventitious accretions, back to Jesus Himself. Christianity was thus, in principle, transformed into Catholicism; and its subsequent history, at least down to the epoch of the Reformation, is the record of an ever-widening divergence between the sacramental, hierarchical and dogmatic shape which it assumed, and the original intentions of its Founder.'

In the foregoing paragraphs we have sketched in clear-cut and explicit terms a theory of which there are innumerable modifications, and less definite, or less radical forms; but it has seemed well for the sake of expressing the logic of the matter, to state it in its most uncompromising shape. It is generally known as the 'Liberal Protestant' view of Christian origins, and during the earlier years of this century was associated with the name of Adolf von Harnack, in his day perhaps the foremost theologian of Europe—though it should be added that 'form-criticism' has come into vogue since his death. We need not do more than notice the variant of this view put forward by Dr. Albert Schweitzer, who holds that eschatology was the dominating interest not merely of Christ, but also of St. Paul, from which it would seem to follow that the beginnings of the alleged 'paganising' process must be placed somewhere between St. Paul and St. John. This, however, is a matter of detail. The broad issue which has divided the students of Christian origin for the last ninety years, ever since the rise of the 'Tübingen School,' is a perfectly clear one—is the Christianity of the creeds and of conciliar orthodoxy the legitimate development of, or a mass of adventitious accretions upon, the authentic teaching of Jesus Himself? Singularly enough, it was within the bosom of the Roman Church that, towards the beginning of the present century, a school

of thought declared itself which was prepared—in fact, though not in name—to surrender unconditionally to the Liberal Protestant assault upon the citadel of traditional dogmatic belief, but claimed the right to retain the whole fabric of traditional liturgy and devotional *praxis* characteristic of the Latin Communion, re-interpreted as an apparatus of beautiful and psychologically effective symbols, and justified on the basis of a highly subjectivist philosophy which introduced an apparently absolute cleavage and reciprocal irrelevance between devotional value and intellectual or factual truth. No dispassionate observer will doubt the nobility of the motives which inspired men like Loisy, Laberthonnière, and George Tyrrell, to attempt this daring, and, as it proved, impossible *tour de force*; and a considerable degree of sympathy was at the time won for them, in quarters where their characteristic theology would hardly have expected a welcome, both by the rigour of the disciplinary measures taken against them, and by the epithet ‘*Modernistæ*,’ attached to them as a reproach by the Papal Encyclical *Pascendæ Dominicæ gregis*, but eagerly adopted by themselves as a complimentary title expressive of what they believed to be their mission. The ‘Modernist’ experiment, however, failed, not merely owing to disciplinary repression but because it made no widespread appeal to the rank and file of the Roman Catholic Church, whose general inarticulate instincts rejected the attempt to balance the great structure of Catholic liturgy and devotion upon nothing: Loisy accepted his excommunication, and the writings of Tyrrell, despite the many beautiful and deeply spiritual passages which they contain, are now of no more than historical interest.¹

Apart from the ill-starred adventure just noted, it is true to say that Orthodoxy has taken up the challenge with vigour,

¹ With the disappearance of the movement above alluded to, the term ‘Modernist,’ as employed in the Encyclical *Pascendæ* and the pamphlet published in reply, *Il Programma dei Modernisti*, ceased to have any denotation: and it is now used (whether as a term of praise or censure) in one of two vague popular senses, as meaning *either* a Christian whose beliefs depart in a greater or lesser degree from traditional orthodoxy, *or* a Christian thinker who endeavours to relate his faith to the best philosophy and knowledge of the day (in which latter sense all the Fathers and the Schoolmen and all educated Christians of the present time might be described as ‘Modernists’).

and joined battle with the 'Liberal Protestant' view all along the line. The true spirit of the Roman Church (if it is permissible for one who is not a member of it to say so) is represented by those who from within it have attacked the advanced critical conclusions, such as Batiffol, Lebreton, Dom John Chapman, and Père Lagrange : but the orthodoxy which these distinguished men have been bound to defend, in submission to the decisions of the Holy See, is of a kind which to those who are unable to share that submission will appear to be of an unduly conservative order, and to handicap the defence of the central verities of Christianity by binding them up with critical positions which are not vital to them, such as the Matthaean authorship of the First Gospel, and its chronological priority to St. Mark's Gospel. Although, therefore, such eminent scholars as those whom we have named are universally admitted to have produced *apologiae* for the traditional position of which the vigour, no less than the erudition, deserves the highest respect, they would seem to have had comparatively little success in converting, or even in swaying, those who do not share their characteristic theological background. More has been achieved (if, again, the present writer may be permitted for a moment to express a personal view) by the champions of historical Christianity in those communions where a close control of theological and critical speculation does not exist, notably (it may be claimed) in the Anglican and Presbyterian Churches ; even von Harnack himself was not insusceptible to the influence of such scholars as Bishop Lightfoot, C. H. Turner and Sir William Ramsay. The 'Critical Orthodoxy' (as we may label it, in order to distinguish it from 'naïve orthodoxy' on the one hand, and the 'Liberal Protestant' view on the other hand) for which such scholars as those just mentioned stood, would hold indeed, that the substance of historical Christianity is the eternal truth of God, expressed in such forms as the human intellect is capable of receiving ; but, precisely because it believes the Catholic Faith to be true, it is convinced that that Faith has nothing to fear from the most candid and open-minded scrutiny of all the evidence, and it is, consequently, able to meet the 'Liberal Protestant' scholars on their own ground, to argue with them on the basis of common premises, and to co-operate

with them in the pursuit of what is the common goal of all scholars as such, the establishment and vindication of the truth. It has, accordingly, claimed the right to criticise the critics themselves, to sift their contentions, and to distinguish what in them is arbitrary or based upon unexpressed mechanistic or materialistic assumptions, from what may fairly be claimed to be permanent and valuable contributions to knowledge. In the relatively uncontroversial field of textual criticism, it can co-operate with them freely; in the elucidation of the 'Synoptic Problem' it can avail itself of the methods and of some of the results of 'Liberal Protestant' researches, whilst watchful to detect and point out the latent influences of anti-miraculous or anti-supernaturalistic presuppositions. But many of its supporters would decisively challenge the pretensions of 'form-criticism,' which they would denounce as a tissue of pure assertion, unproved and unprovable. 'Critical orthodoxy' declines to surrender the birth-narratives of Matthew and Luke as mythological, and challenges the other side to produce an explanation of the existence and practically universal diffusion of the belief in the miraculous Birth, other than the simple explanation that it really happened.¹ It combats with energy the supposition that St. Paul 'paganised' an original, purely ethical Gospel, or that he was influenced by the 'Mystery' or any other heathen cults. Though the upholders of 'Critical Orthodoxy' are prepared to admit the existence of a large interpretative element on the Fourth Gospel, they are by no means willing to surrender its substantial historicity, and there are not wanting scholars who are prepared to defend its Apostolic authorship on purely scientific and *a posteriori* grounds.² 'Critical Orthodoxy' would not deny that Catholic Christianity, with its redemptive scheme centring in the death and resurrection of a divine-human Redeemer and including the conceptions of a Church and sacraments, conforms to a very ancient pattern which underlies many ethnic religions; but they would contend that this pattern springs from and corresponds to the fundamental

¹ This argument is forcibly developed by J. G. Machen, *The Virgin Birth of Christ* (1930).

² Such as, e.g., the late Dr. Nolloth (*The Fourth Evangelist*, 1925), and H. P. V. Nunn (*The Son of Zebedee and the Fourth Evangelist*).

constitution and needs of human nature, and that, consequently, so far from there being any reason why the Almighty should not have providentially shaped His final self-revelation on the lines of this pattern, there is, on the contrary, every reason why He might have been expected to do so. And they would 'carry the war into the enemy's camp' by contending that the whole 'Liberal Protestant' reconstruction of Christian origins is based upon the assumptions that there cannot have been a real Incarnation of a pre-existent Divine Person and that miracles cannot, or at any rate do not, happen; they would point out that, if the *a priori* possibility—even though no more than possibility—of an Incarnation and of the miraculous be conceded, the traditional history of Christian origins, as expounded by 'Critical Orthodoxy,' at once becomes at least as probable as any other; and that he for whom the existence of the Christian Church, and the total impact of Christianity upon world history, are unintelligible except on the supposition that there was a real irruption not merely of Divine energy but of the Divine Being Himself into the time-series, will regard the traditional outline of Christian origins, with any modifications in detail which may be suggested by a sober and objective criticism, as a record of mysterious, but objective fact.

V

From the point of view of one who accepts the 'Liberal Protestant' view that none of the six cardinal doctrines of Historic Christianity were held or taught by Jesus Himself (save in so far as it is held that He was inspired by a crude and erroneous doctrine of the Last Things) the history of the subsequent development of Christian doctrine has but the melancholy interest of the record of the 'decline and fall' of a whole religious movement—of an ever-deepening process of 'Hellenisation' and 'secularization,' which was not reversed until the Reformation of the sixteenth century, and then only in part. From the point of view of the adherent of 'Critical Orthodoxy,' on the other hand, the process whereby the six great ideas—or rather some of them, for some, like that of the Atonement, remain to this day in fluid and undefined form¹—were worked

¹ See below, p. 78.

out, with the help of the categories supplied by Greek philosophy, into lucid conceptual forms, is one with which (despite the recognition enforced by historical candour, of many failures of temper, taste and charity in the primitive champions of orthodoxy) he finds himself in definite sympathy. It should be noted at this point that the divergent assumptions with which 'Liberal Protestantism' and 'Critical Orthodoxy' respectively approach the process of Christian doctrinal evolution have reference not merely to questions of historical fact, but to the question of the part which should be played in religion by philosophy, or by the attempt to understand the deliveries of the religious consciousness intellectually. It is not merely the case that the 'Liberal Protestant' theory assumes (though doubtless, as held by many of its exponents, unconsciously) that Jesus neither was nor believed Himself to be in any existential or ontological sense identical with the Absolute God; it holds further that, even if He had been, it would still have been illicit to invoke the categories of scientific or metaphysical thought in order to understand how, or in what sense He was God. This position, which is hostile to what would be described as the 'intrusion' of philosophy into the sphere of religion, or as the 'contamination' of religion by metaphysics, is derived from the theological system known as Ritschlianism, of which von Harnack himself was an adherent. The pre-suppositions of this system will be mentioned in more detail when we come to treat of 'Systematic Theology'; it may suffice here to observe that the anti-metaphysical prejudice just mentioned flows (a) from the Kantian position that the categories of pure reason are only valid within the sphere of sense-experience, and are, consequently, inapplicable to transcendental and divine realities, and (b) from the post-Kantian view that the essence of religion is pure feeling, analogous to aesthetic feeling, which would be vulgarised and degraded by reduction to an intellectual formula. Students of von Harnack's great History of Dogma will be familiar with this assumption. The adherents of 'Critical Orthodoxy,' on the other hand, would challenge it directly and uncompromisingly; they would claim that the intellect is the gift of God, that there is the highest authority for believing it to be a duty to love God 'with the whole *mind*' as well as 'with the whole

heart,' and 'strength,' that the recognition of the imperfection of our present faculties does not annul the duty to reach as clear and true conceptions about God and the things of God as we can; they would say, with Plato, *φιλοσοφῆτεον ὁμολογήσαμεν*, 'we have admitted the duty of philosophising.'¹ It is fair to point out that there is a mediating school of thought which would not accept either the historical contention of 'Liberal Protestantism' that Jesus was no more than the greatest of prophets, or its philosophical position that the methods and categories of philosophy are inapplicable within the sphere of religion; they would sincerely hold that Jesus was in the fullest sense of the term God, and that we ought to think about, and answer as satisfactorily as we may, the vast and mysterious questions, 'What was His relation to the one God and Father of all, to whom He prayed?' and, 'If He was in a real sense the infinite God, how could He also have been a particular human individual, living at a particular place and time, and liable to hunger, weariness and limitation of knowledge?' But what they are disposed to doubt or deny is that the Church of the Patristic period employed the *right* philosophy in thinking out the answers to these questions, or that the categories of 'person,' 'nature' and 'substance' are the best that might have been used, or such as can claim permanent validity in the world of modern thought. The adherents of 'Critical Orthodoxy' would reply to this challenge by pointing out that the mediating school, so far, does not seem to have suggested any better categories than those upon which the creeds and conciliar definitions are built up; some would go further and affirm that philosophy is not a mere futile ploughing of dialectical sands, ever discussing and never arriving at any valid or universally accepted conclusion, but that there is such a thing as a *philosophia perennis*, an ordered body of truth which arises out of the nature and necessity of things; that this has a congenital affinity with the Christian Gospel, as proceeding from the same God, who is God both of nature and of revelation; that the classical embodiment of this *philosophia perennis* is to be found in the Platonic and Aristotelian traditions, which made contact with the Hebraic revelation through the authors of the Sapiential

¹ *Euthyd.* 288 D.

books of the Old Testament and in Philo, and thenceforward was drawn into an ever-deepening union with Christian thought, which has endured down to the present day.¹ Here, despite the barriers which separate the Roman from the non-Roman theological worlds, they would find themselves in the closest sympathy with Neo-scholastic writers such as M. Gilson and M. Maritain.

As before, the present writer regards his task as being merely that of stating these various points of view, without passing any judgment on them. It will be observed that, in so far at least as they have reference to the Patristic period, they are concerned with the *evaluation* of the facts and are not, for the most part such as to affect the student's historical judgment as to what the facts actually were. For instance, the ' Liberal Protestant ' may find it regrettable that St. Paul should have implicitly suggested the identification of Jesus with the divine Logos,² that St. John should have asserted this identification in express terms,³ that the Apologists, Irenaeus and Origen should have gone on to deduce consequences from it and to make it the keystone of an ordered system of doctrine, and that it, together with the Greek metaphysic which naturally coheres with it, should have become permanently embedded in the fabric of orthodox Christian dogma ; he may be of opinion that the result of this has been to substitute for the picture of the historic Jesus, as a real individual man, whose example might inspire and hearten other men, a walking system of abstract doctrines, and thereby to impoverish the moral and emotional appeal of Christianity. The adherent of ' Critical Orthodoxy,' on the other hand, may, and in fact

¹ For a sympathetic, though non-theological, account of the notion of a *philosophia perennis*, see Wilbur Wright, *The Intelligible World* (1929). The following passage (p. 65) will throw some light on the inwardness of this conception: ' The essence of the Great Tradition is the recognition, consciously or unconsciously, that intellect is oriented towards significance and value. This is the natural bent of the human reason, and in following this natural metaphysic the great ideas of perennial philosophy have been developed. It is of the utmost importance that this orientation of intellect towards value should be understood. Moreover, it is only by understanding this that we shall also understand the last and most fundamental pre-supposition of traditional thought—the prejudice in favour of ultimate reality or of an *ens realissimum*. '

² Col. i. 15-19.

³ John i. 14.

does, disagree fundamentally with these opinions. Believing that Jesus was in fact true God, he will probably regard the Logos conception as the inevitable and only possible means of conceiving His Godhead in a manner compatible both with the recognition of His real distinction from the Father to whom He prayed, and the preservation of what is the fundamental tenet of Christianity as of Judaism, namely, monotheism; and, whilst admitting that in various epochs interest in the intellectual side of Christianity may have been so exaggerated as almost to make men forget the historical Jesus altogether, and to provide some justification for Gibbon's sneer at Christians who 'were more solicitous to explore the nature, than to practise the laws, of their founder,'¹ he will deny that this has always been, or must necessarily be, the case; and will, accordingly, regard the Christological development just alluded to as, on the whole, both laudable and inevitable. Such acute conflicts of opinion are difficult to resolve because they run down into differences of temperament, habit and upbringing. But it is, none the less, perfectly possible for historical theologians representing the three standpoints described above to co-operate in the elucidation of the facts and to appreciate and make use of each other's writings, each school of thought making allowances for presuppositions which it does not share; such a comity of scholarship, indeed, is not merely a possible ideal but an actual fact, transcending the existing divisions of Christendom and providing an earnest of the ultimate restoration of its visible unity, in which intellectual fellowship will be enriched and completed by perfect oneness in sympathy, worship and belief.

We cannot here give a detailed account of the great dogmatic development which took place during the first thousand years of Christianity, an epoch which we have called 'the Patristic period,' but which is often known also as the age of the 'seven Oecumenical Councils,' or of the 'Undivided Church'; the latter title being derived from the fact that it may be deemed to end with the catastrophe of A.D. 1054, when the Pope of Rome (Leo IX) and the Patriarch of Constantinople (Michael Cerularius) excommunicated each other, with the result that the 'Great Church,' as it had been known to

¹ *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, C. xlvii (ed. J. B. Bury, v. 96).

the primitive Fathers, gradually disintegrated into the Communions of Rome and Byzantium, each claiming to be the 'Great Church' and regarding the other as schismatic. No more is possible, within the limits of an introductory essay such as this, than a brief and cursory indication of the main outlines of that development. If the New Testament period represents the birth and infancy of Christian theology, the Patristic period represents its adolescence and youth; and it was natural that the energies of that youth should be employed in the elucidation of the two most fundamental doctrines of the six which we have enumerated as the main constituents of orthodoxy, that is, the doctrines of the Trinity, and of the Incarnation or of the Person of Christ.

The formative period of Trinitarian doctrine came first, coinciding roughly with the period during which the Roman Imperial Government, recognising in the Christian Church its present rival and future successor, made sporadic but ruthless attempts to stamp it out altogether. It is, perhaps, remarkable—in view of the fact that it was the worship of Christ as God which, in the order of historical causality, compelled the enlargement, explication and enrichment of monotheism by some sort of Trinitarian, or at least Binitarian,¹ conception of the interior being of the Godhead—that the Church should have addressed itself in the first instance to working out its ultimate doctrine of God, and not to the clarification of its doctrine of Christ, a task which might seem to have lain more ready to its hand. It is even more remarkable that a persecuted body, scattered over the whole face of the civilised world, with no centralised headquarters, and disposing of but slow and uncertain means of communication and of the exchange of ideas between its various groups, should have succeeded in arriving at a common mind so clear and unanimous as to determine the whole subsequent history of Christian thought. Yet such are the facts revealed by the study of the Christian literature of the first three centuries. The Apostolic Church did not possess, nor does the New Testament contain, any explicit doctrine of the Trinity; but the second generation

¹ On 'Binitarianism,' see K. E. Kirk, 'The Evolution of the Doctrine of the Trinity,' in *Essays on the Trinity and the Incarnation* (1928), espec. pp. 182–226.

of believers, at least, was in possession of the *data* of Trinitarian speculation, or, rather, of the materials from which the Trinitarian doctrine was to be constructed, in the shape of the convictions (a) that there was one God, the Jehovah of the Old Testament : (b) that Jesus was the incarnation of a pre-existent heavenly Being, the ' Son of God ' or ' Lord,' who was a proper object of divine worship, and who might even be described, in Hellenistic-Jewish or Stoic terminology, as the ' Logos ' of God : (c) that Jesus had Himself received, and now was shedding forth on His disciples, the mysterious power known to the saints of the Old Covenant as ' Holy Breath ' or ' Spirit ' : (d) (at least from the date of Matt. xxviii. 19 onwards) that the *Tetragrammaton*, the Jewish name of God, YHWH, had been superseded by the Christian designation of God as ' Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.' When Christian thought during the second century A.D. seriously bent itself to the task of endeavouring to understand the meaning of the Threefold Name, consistently with the belief in monotheism, or, as it was then called, the divine ' Monarchy,' two superficially attractive and diametrically opposed solutions presented themselves. The first of these is commonly called Adoptionism, and consists in the naïve theory that Jesus, though in Himself no more than the best and holiest of mankind, in whom God dwelt pre-eminently, was ' adopted ' by the one God as His ' Son ' and apotheosised so as to become a fitting object of worship ; the ' Spirit ' denotes the divine influences which shaped the life of the perfect man and which He in His turn communicated to others. At the opposite pole of thought stands the theory known as Modalism or Sabellianism, which reconciles the equal deity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit with monotheism by regarding them as successive phases or modes of the one Absolute God's self-manifestation. The former of these views was repudiated by the instincts of Christendom, which demanded nothing less than full deity as the object of the adoration paid to Christ ; the latter offended its reason, which remembered that Jesus had prayed to His Father, and therefore could not be simply identified with Him. The Hegelian opposition of the Adoptionist ' thesis ' and the Modalist ' antithesis ' inevitably necessitated the production of a Catholic ' synthesis ' ; for

this, Greek philosophy had to be summoned to the aid of Christian thought, and the relations of the divine Three were expressed by Eastern Christianity in the conception of three *hypostases*, or 'subsistences,' within the unity of a single divine *ousia*, or 'essence'; the corresponding, though not altogether equivalent, terms employed by Latin theology were *personae* and *substantia* respectively. Under the influence of commanding thinkers in the East (the 'Cappadocian Fathers')¹ and in the West (Tertullian, St. Hilary of Poitiers, St. Ambrose) the formulae—'Three "Subsistences" in one Essence' or 'Three Persons in one Substance' became stereotyped as the universally recognised theological or metaphysical explanation of the Matthaean Name of God, 'Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.' The conception so expressed was given content and definition by the general acceptance of the doctrine of the Eternal Generation of the Son (Origen), which declared Him to be co-eternal with the Father, of the Nicene Creed, which affirmed Him to be 'consubstantial with' or 'of the same essence as' (*homoousion*) the Father, of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit associated with the first Council of Constantinople (A.D. 381), which proclaimed the Spirit to be a 'Subsistence' or a 'Person' in the same sense as the Father and the Son, co-equal and co-eternal with them. So, by the beginning of the fifth century A.D., it may be said that the long process of Trinitarian development which began with the vague speculations of primeval Semitic thinkers about the 'Word' and the 'Breath' of God, had come to its predestined end, and the central Christian doctrine of the Godhead, as it is set forth in the balanced and rhythmical clauses of the 'Athanasian Creed,' stood complete.

But what does this doctrine mean? Too many of those who would regard themselves as bound to believe it are content to take refuge in the thought that it is a 'mystery,' and to regard this as a sufficient excuse for abstaining from any effort to understand it. To give a direct reply to the question 'What does the doctrine of the Trinity mean in itself?' or 'What should or does it mean for us?' is the task of Systematic Theology. But even Systematic Theology cannot answer

¹ These were St. Basil the Great (c. A.D. 331-79), his younger brother, St. Gregory of Nyssa († c. 395), and St. Gregory of Nazianzus (c. 330-c. 390).

this question without taking some account of the problem 'What *did* the doctrine of the Trinity mean to those who first formulated it?' And the answer to this question falls within the proper sphere of Historical Theology, a fact which illustrates what has already been emphasised in this essay, the indispensable function of Historical Theology as a necessary propaedeutic or preliminary discipline for Systematic Theology. The question turns on the meaning of the word *hypostasis* or 'subsistence.' Those who are acquainted with the Greek language will realise that, whatever the detailed content of this term may have been at any given epoch, it must always have meant more than 'phase,' and less than 'separate, self-conscious, individual personality.' It follows from this that, whatever else it may be taken to signify, the Trinitarian formula was designed to indicate a midway point between *Sabellianism*, on the one hand, which reduced Father, Son, and Holy Spirit to phases or aspects of the one God, or *rôles* successively assumed by Him in the drama of creation and redemption, and *Tritheism*, or the belief in three separate Gods, united only as a kind of group or college, on the other. But such a midway point is, considered in itself, merely an unknown x , a cipher devoid of positive content; and the question inevitably arises, 'If the Three are not "phases" on the one hand, nor yet separate individuals on the other, what *are* they?' Or rather, as the question should be phrased from the point of view of Historical Theology, 'What did those who formulated the doctrine believe them to be? Or what solution of the problem, if any, has been reached by "orthodox" Christian thinkers in subsequent centuries?' The student of Historical Theology in whose mind these questions arise, naturally gives special attention in the first instance to the works of the Cappadocian Fathers, in order to decide what is the real meaning of their insistence on the distinctness of the Persons, which has been accused—though, according to a high authority, 'quite unjustly and inaccurately'¹—of amounting to practical Tritheism.

Few developments are more elusive and more difficult to describe in language which will be at once compendious and accurate than the evolution of the meaning of the word *hypostasis*: and the task cannot be attempted here. We must be

¹ G. L. Prestige, *God in Patristic Thought* (1936), p. 242.

content to observe that in these great writers, who laid down the lines on which subsequent Greek theology was to move, the word means 'that which exists in its own right, and not as a quality or adjective of anything else.' The 'Cappadocian Settlement,' as Dr. Prestige calls it, amounted, then, to the affirmation that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three permanent and substantive modes of being existing within the unity of the one Godhead. It amounted to no less than this ; but equally it amounted to no more ; the three eternal Subsistents are not three distinct consciousnesses. Popular religious thought has, however, never found it easy to apprehend so rarefied and abstract an idea as a mere 'Subsistence' or 'substantive mode of being,' especially if it be denied that the 'mode of being' is, or has, a consciousness of its own : and there seems to be at least a *prima facie* difficulty in reconciling the denial of distinct consciousnesses to the Father and the Son with the 'I-Thou' relation which the Johannine Christ affirms to have existed between Himself and the Father before the world was.¹ The Cappadocians thought, not in terms of three consciousnesses but merely of three 'real existents,' because their dominant interest was metaphysical, not psychological : it was not, however, to be expected that this precise intellectual orientation would necessarily perpetuate itself in the minds of those who inherited from them the tradition of approaching the problems of Trinitarian construction from the starting-point of the triplicity of the Godhead's self-presentation to man, rather than from that of the Unity of Essence implied in Hebraic monotheism ; and it is not, therefore, a matter for surprise that there should have been in the sixth century an outbreak of what looked uncommonly like Tritheism, which was largely prepared for by the incautious language of Leontius of Byzantium, who appeared to reduce the one concrete divine Being, possessed with equal completeness by the three *hypostases*, to a mere generic divine nature shared by three individuals. The danger to monotheism was averted by the invention of the doctrine of the *Perichoresis*, or the mutual interpenetration of the divine Persons, which was canonised in the *de fide orthodoxa* of St. John of Damascus

¹ St. John xvii. 5 : and cf. the rest of the 'High-priestly Prayer,' in that chapter.

(† c. A.D. 750). Yet, though Greek Theology never formally committed itself to the idea of three consciousnesses, it may be questioned whether one who thinks rigorously along the lines laid down in its classical period (the fourth century) will not eventually find himself arriving at the conception of three consciousnesses included in an unity which is higher than consciousness, or in a super-consciousness. If we now leave Eastern for Western Christendom, and turn to St. Augustine's monumental treatise *On the Trinity*, we shall find an explanation of the Trinitarian formula which takes its start from a different aspect of the mystery, from the Unity of Being rather than from the triplicity of presentation, and arrives at an interpretation apparently so divergent from the Eastern that it has sometimes been regarded as a different doctrine. If we follow the guidance of the African Father, we shall interpret the fundamental premise of monotheism as meaning that there is and can be only one divine consciousness, and we shall see in the Triune Being of God the reflex, raised to the power of infinity, of that which distinguishes man from the brutes and constitutes the 'image of God' in which, according to Genesis i. 27, he was created, namely, self-consciousness. I know myself, and the 'I' which knows and the 'self' which is known are distinguishable, and yet one and the same man; so also I love myself, and that love is distinguishable both from the 'I' and from the 'self,' though it may be said to constitute the relation between them.¹ Augustine does not claim that this is more than a metaphysical or analogical attempt to explain the mystery, and this admission doubtless turns the edge of the criticism that the application of the idea of self-consciousness to God would not seem to lead us beyond a Binitarian doctrine, as it is difficult to see how a relation or an activity (the 'love' which St. Augustine identifies with the Person of the Holy Spirit) can itself be a *hypostasis*. However, it is no part of the task of the student of *Dogmengeschichte*, as such, to pass judgment on the truth of the ideas which he encounters in the course of his study; he is, as we have before

¹ Cf. *de Trin.* ix. Augustine finds other trinities—as that of memory, understanding, and will—in human personality; and these too are for him traces of the Divine Trinity: but the thought expressed in the text appears to be that which is most fundamental to his main theological construction.

pointed out, concerned solely with the facts of their evolution. He will, accordingly, content himself with noting that the Augustinian view became part and parcel of Western and Latin theology, being repeated with little modification by St. Thomas Aquinas, after whom there is no development of note until we come to the great nineteenth-century reconsideration and attempted restatement of all Christian doctrine in the light of modern knowledge—a subject which is best treated under the head of ‘Systematic Theology.’

The question may still arise ‘But which of the alternative constructions which are suggested to the mind by the study of Historical Theology is to be regarded as the “orthodox” doctrine of the Trinity—the theory of three consciousnesses included in a single super-consciousness, or the theory of a single consciousness expressing itself in three permanent, and in some sense substantive, modes?’ It must be replied that neither of them is. They are explanations of the Faith, and not the Faith itself. What that faith is, or was as held in the inarticulate, diffused mind of the ‘Great Church,’ remains shrouded in mystery; such definitions as can be cited on the subject are, as Bishop Gore was never tired of insisting that conciliar definitions must by their nature be, *negative* in character, ruling out inadequate or superficial formulations of what surpasses man’s understanding; they deny that Jesus is to be identified with the Father to whom He prayed or with the Spirit whom He received at His baptism, that Jesus or the Spirit are less than the absolute and eternal God, that there is, or can be, more than one absolute and eternal God. Within the limits set by these negations, they leave the student free to think as he will. Perhaps the ultimate answer to the question, ‘What is really meant by the word “Person” in Trinitarian doctrine?’ is that which is contained in St. Augustine’s own words: ‘cum quaeritur, quid tres, magna prorsus inopia humanum laborat eloquium: dictum est tamen, tres personae, non ut illud diceretur, sed ne taceretur.’¹

¹ *de Trin.* V. viii. 10. ‘When the question is raised, What are the Three?, assuredly human speech is afflicted with great poverty <of diction>: nevertheless, we say “Three Persons,” not so much that we may say that but in order that we may not be reduced to silence.’

VI

We have considered the evaluation of the doctrine of the Trinity in some detail, not merely because of its intrinsic importance, but because it illustrates with great clearness the method of Historical Theology (*Dogmengeschichte*), the problems which the genetic study of a doctrine naturally raises, and the pattern to which dogmatic evolution usually conforms. That pattern appears to be the Hegelian scheme of thesis, antithesis and synthesis—an originally undefined idea receiving a theoretical explanation or formulation which is generally felt to be one-sided and inadequate, this being succeeded by a counter-explanation which is deemed to lean too far in the other direction, and the controversial tension between the two being ultimately resolved by the production of what some would regard as a synthesis, and others as a compromise, which succeeds in securing the assent of the majority of Christians and in affixing the stigma of 'heresy' to the extreme and one-sided opinions, of which the conflict gave it birth. And when we speak of the problems which this study raises, we do not refer to the initial question, whether the whole of the 'Catholic' and 'Orthodox' development of Christian doctrine represents an 'acute secularisation' of Christianity or the legitimate explication of the teaching of Jesus, for we assume that the student will have made up his mind on this general question during his study of the New Testament period; rather we have in mind problems such as the following, which can in the nature of the case, only arise if the 'acute secularisation' hypothesis has been rejected, at least so far as the most central of the six 'constitutive ideas' are concerned:

1. Is the germ of the evolving doctrine to be found in some explicit saying of the Lord or Scriptural text, or should it rather be sought in the 'experience' of individuals, or of the Church? Within the world of Roman Catholic theology, it would be very generally maintained that all 'orthodox' doctrine is derived ultimately from the explicit verbal teaching of Christ Himself, either given during His earthly life, and recorded in the Gospels, or enunciated during the 'great forty days' after His Resurrection,¹ and transmitted by oral tradi-

¹ Acts i. 3.

tion; outside this world, the pendulum has swung in the opposite direction, and the tendency has been to minimise or reduce to nothing the element of direct Dominical revelation, and to regard all doctrines as rationalisations of 'experience'—a term which, when analysed, appears simply to mean 'feeling,' or 'instinct.' *Legem credendi statuit lex orandi*; what is the legitimate scope of the application of this principle?

2. How far did the employment of Greek philosophy for the elucidation of Christian ideas have the effect of bringing out the true inner meaning of those ideas? or how far did it distort and pervert them?

3. Where explicit credal or conciliar definitions do not exist, how far is it possible to distinguish between the general essence of a doctrine, as held in the diffused mind of Christendom, and the particular theological definitions of it given by individual Christian thinkers?

These problems arise in connection with all the remaining 'fundamental ideas,' though their respective courses of development are unequally distributed over the nineteen Christian centuries. Most especially do they arise in connection with the doctrine of the Incarnation, of the Person of Christ, of which the classical development, and fixation in credal forms, partly overlapped with and formed part of, and partly was subsequent to, the development of the Doctrine of the Trinity. It is in this sphere that the influence of Greek philosophy is most insistent and clearly defined, manifesting itself particularly in the universal assumption, taken for granted by Arian and Nicene, Antiochene and Alexandrine alike, that the nature of God is in itself *impassible*, incapable of suffering and change, and that, consequently, only the human element in Christ was capable of growth, sorrow, and suffering. This philosophic dogma of the Divine impassibility is, of course, pure Platonism, representing the importation into Christian thought of the affirmation of the changelessness of the One Absolute Idea (identified with God, or the *Logos*) which, with its subordinate Ideas, constitutes the intelligible world, lying behind and sharply contrasted with the ever-changing, unreal and evil world of sense; it can claim no shadow of authority from the Bible, and indeed, there is much anthropomorphic language in the Old Testament which, if taken at its face value, would

be evidently incompatible with the belief that God cannot suffer emotion or change of mood. The fact is undisputed ; but the judgment which the student will pass upon it will be determined by his own attitude to the general problem which we have previously indicated. If he regards Platonism as, on the whole, the best embodiment during the Patristic period of the *philosophia perennis*, the fundamental common-sense philosophy which is no wire-drawn product of academic ingenuity, but arises out of the nature of things as they really are, he will, doubtless, hold that the early Church was entirely justified in taking Divine impassibility for granted and using it as a premise for the further elucidation of Christological truth ; if he does not, he may either regard the whole system of Christology based upon it as fundamentally mistaken, or, possibly, view ' Divine impassibility ' as a transitory mould in which the orthodox doctrine of the Person of Christ was formed, but which can now be broken up and thrown away without detriment to the finished product which was shaped within it.¹

Like the doctrine of the Trinity, the doctrine of the Person of Christ developed in accordance with the Hegelian pattern of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, the theological school of Antioch, with its emphasis on the real humanity of the historic Jesus providing the first of these, the school of Alexandria, with its insistence upon the affirmation that He was none other than the eternal and impassible Word, supplying the second, and the Councils of Ephesus (A.D. 431) and Chalcedon (A.D. 451) the third. The ultimate formulation which emerged from the controversies of the fourth and fifth centuries, and which has ever since been regarded as the touchstone of ' orthodoxy,' is the celebrated definition of the Council of Chalcedon (A.D. 451), which confesses ' One and the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only-begotten, acknowledged in two natures unconfusedly, unchangeably, indivisibly, inseparably—the difference of the natures being in no way removed because of the union ' (i.e., the union of God and man effected by the Incarnation) ' but rather the properties of each nature being preserved, and concurring into one Person and one Subsistence (or *hypostasis*). ' This doctrine, sometimes known as that of the ' hypostatic

¹ For a penetrating study of this subject, see J. K. Mozley, *The Impassibility of God* (1926).

union ' was endowed with further precision by the Byzantine theologian Leontius, through the added refinement of the theory of the *enhypostasia* of Christ's manhood, that is, the theory that His humanity was, *qua* humanity, *impersonal*, a set of attributes inhering, not in any human *ego* but in the Person of the Logos—though it is well to remember that this conclusion was never embodied in any formula of oecumenical authority. The coping-stone may be deemed to have been placed upon the fabric of the orthodox Christology by the affirmation of the Sixth Oecumenical Council that the Incarnate One possessed 'two natural wills and operations,' human and divine.¹ From this point onwards the orthodox doctrine remains static, not developing at all during the Middle Ages and only becoming once more the centre of constructive thought when the increasing realisation of the limitations of our Lord's humanity compelled the Lutheran divine Thomasius of Erlangen (1802-75) to elaborate the theory of the *Kenosis*, or of the Divine self-emptying through the Incarnation, in order to reconcile the Chalcedonian formula with what were now seen to be indisputable facts of history.

The question thus raised has pressed insistently upon the modern Christian thinker—' If Jesus grew in knowledge as well as in stature, if He " could not " perform any miracles in an atmosphere of unbelief, if He asked questions with the evident desire to gain information, displayed surprise at the unexpected obtuseness of His hearers, and (apparently) founded an argument on the supposed Davidic authorship of Psalm cx, which we now know to belong to the Maccabean period—if, in short, He was mentally a child of His time, how, or in what sense, could He also be the eternal God, who neither changes nor experiences lack of power, and Whose omniscience can never be taken by surprise or appeal for information ? ' Neither loyalty to the *auctoritas* of the great Councils (where it exists) nor respect for reason and history can now permit modern orthodoxy to avail itself of the facile solutions which com-

¹ The ' Dyothelite ' (or ' two-will ') conception, as expressed in this definition, offers some difficulty to modern thought, which is accustomed to think of ' the will ' not as a ' faculty ' distinguishable from the self, but merely as the self willing : ' two wills, ' therefore, sounds like two selves. This difficulty still awaits a satisfactory treatment from the Traditionalist side.

mended themselves to antiquity, by jettisoning the unity of the Person (with the school of Antioch) and ascribing the limitations of power and knowledge which are recorded by the Gospels solely to the human Jesus, or by sacrificing the full reality of the humanity with the school of Alexandria, and assuming that, when the incarnate Word disclaimed knowledge of the date of the final Judgment,¹ He (in the words of St. Cyril of Alexandria)² ‘for the profit of His hearers pretends not to know, in so far as He is man.’ Those theologians who are unwilling to admit a real *Kenosis* take refuge in the very difficult conception of a single consciousness functioning simultaneously on two planes, Divine and human: those, on the other hand, who, like the late Bishops Gore and Weston, regard the Incarnation as involving a real, though temporary, surrender of Divine attributes by the incarnate Word, have not yet found a satisfactory reply to the question ‘What happened to the cosmic functions of the Word during “the days of His flesh”?’³ And there, for the moment, the matter rests.

We have several times insisted during the course of this essay that the function of the historical theologian, as such, is to ascertain and record the facts of dogmatic development, and not to evaluate them, or to pass moral or religious judgment upon them. Nevertheless, such an ideal spirit of detachment is not often found even amongst professional theologians, and the educated amateur whom we have envisaged as tracing the lines of this development will doubtless not desire to avoid the formulation in his own mind of conclusions concerning the adequacy and objective truth of the conciliar or classical formulation of the central doctrine of Christianity. He will find that objections have been brought against the orthodox doctrine of the Person of Christ very similar to those which have been alleged against orthodox Trinitarianism—namely, that it contaminates religion with metaphysics, that the particular metaphysical categories which it employs are

¹ St. Mark xiii. 32 = St. Matt. xxiv. 36.

² *Adv. anthropomorph.* 14 (PG. lxxvi. 1104): σκήπτεται χρησίμως τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι καθ’ ὃ ἀνθρώπος.

³ The Archbishop of York presses this objection forcibly (*Christus Veritas*, p. 142 f.). Godet’s suggestion that the cosmic functions were temporarily taken over by the Father seems to be mythological and tritheistic.

antiquated and out-worn, that in the last resort it is merely an abstract formula which mechanically juxtaposes the 'natures' or sets of attributes without giving us any real comprehension of the single, vital, breathing, historical personality which it purports to describe. All this can be urged with very great force; yet the same counterbalancing questions will claim his attention as in the case of Trinitarian doctrine—whether it is possible to avoid metaphysics without committing intellectual suicide, whether the categories of 'Person' and 'nature' have been or are capable of being superseded, whether the critics of the Chalcedonian formula have produced any better expedient for safeguarding the fundamental witness of the Christian consciousness, that Jesus of Nazareth both may and should receive that absolute adoration which it would be idolatry to give to any other than the eternal God, whether the instincts of the 'Great Church' of the fifth century may not have been guided by the truest wisdom when (as in the case of Trinitarian doctrine) they evolved a formula which is in the last resort *negative*, (*a*) ruling out on the one hand the specifically Antiochene conception of a mere moral link between two persons, human and divine (a conception which, when pushed to extremes, becomes the Nestorian heresy) and, on the other, the specifically Alexandrine idea (of which the extreme form is the opposite heresy of Monophysitism) of a God disguised in an unreal humanity, but (*b*) within these limits leaving unfettered freedom to theological construction. It is hardly necessary to point out the decisive influence which the answers to these questions, which inevitably arise during the study of historical theology, must exert upon personal belief, and so upon the construction of systematic theology, if and when the student reaches that stage.

VII

During the formative (that is, roughly, the Patristic) period of 'orthodox' Christian theology, the elucidation and definition of the first two of the fundamental doctrines, namely, those of the Trinity and the Incarnation, absorbed most of the time and energy of Christian thinkers, and comparatively little effort was made to impose a clear-cut philosophic form on the idea of the Atonement, which has remained undefined and

veiled in mystery, apprehensible by feeling or intuition rather than by scientific thought, down to the present day. We have not time to do more than hint at the intellectual fascination with which such questions as these are fraught—the authenticity of the crucial saying ‘This is my covenant-blood,’ in which (if in very truth it proceeded from His lips)¹ the Lord Himself imposed a sacrificial significance upon His own imminent Passion and Death: the nature of the experiences which impelled St. Paul to set the Cross in the very centre and forefront of the Apostolic preaching, thereby noticeably modifying the balance of the primitive Gospel, in which Calvary would seem to have been regarded as an accidental tragedy, a relatively peripheral incident of which the main providential function was to be the occasion and presupposition of Christ’s Resurrection and exaltation to the right hand of God;² the validity of the view which has recently received powerful advocacy, that the sacrificial interpretation of Calvary was an inference from what is contended to have been the sacrificial character of the Eucharist which commemorated it, and not *vice versa*:³ the various aspects and elements of truth to be discerned in the various theories which have at different times prevailed in different parts of Christendom or have been maintained by individual theologians of distinction. Such are the classical Patristic theory of Christ’s death as a ransom paid to the Devil, dominant throughout the first thousand years of the Church’s history, and recently revived, in a sublimated form, by the Swedish theologian Aulen; the feudal ‘satisfactionism’ with which St. Anselm replaced it, the ‘penal substitutionism’ of the Reformers, the theory of ‘rectoral justice’ (that is, of Christ’s death as an object-lesson, designed to vindicate God’s

¹ The doubts which have been raised about this point are founded on the existence of a short (the ‘Western’) text of St. Luke’s narrative of the Last Supper (xxii. 14 ff.), which omits the blessing of the cup ‘after supper,’ the saying ‘This is my blood,’ and the command ‘Do this,’ only recording the distribution of a cup before or during the meal, without any words of a mystical or sacramental kind (v. 17). But the ‘Western’ text is an unreliable and often eccentric authority: see the standard commentaries *in loc.*

² Cf. the words ascribed to St. Peter in Acts iii. 17: ‘And now, brethren, I wot that in ignorance ye did it, as did also your rulers’—and the other allusions to the Crucifixion in the early speeches recorded in Acts.

³ See the essay *Corpus Christi*, by the Bishop of Derby, in *Mysterium Christi* (1930).

moral governance of the universe, of the inflexible law that sin must be paid for) held by the great statesman, jurist and divine of seventeenth-century Holland, Grotius. More modern views, such as the subtle 'representationist' theories of Macleod Campell and Moberly, which are built upon the conception of 'vicarious penitence,' will naturally be considered in connection with the stage of Systematic Theology. At this stage also it will be appropriate to attempt a final evaluation of that view, first explicitly formulated by Abaelard and recently championed with energy by the late Dr. Hastings Rashdall, which, if it be true, shears away, with a razor keener than Occam's, all the theories just enumerated, discards as so much useless or injurious lumber all conceptions of sacrifice, expiation, or satisfaction, and simplifies the problem of the Atonement by stripping it of all mystery and representing it as no more than an instance, though the supreme instance, of the bracing and ennobling effort which may be exercised upon the will, through the imagination and the emotions, by the inspired saga of an infinitely heroic martyrdom. As it finds the saving efficacy of the Passion solely in the contemplation of our Lord's example, and repudiates any idea of an objective redeeming work wrought for us or outside us, it is usually known as the 'exemplarist' or 'subjective' theory of the Atonement. Whether such a view provides a rational justification or basis for the ecstatic devotion to the Cross and Precious Blood of Jesus Christ, which has in all ages been the chief fount of the converting power, the missionary enthusiasm, the mysticism, and the hymnody of Christendom, is a question to which the student must be left to formulate his own answer.

We must equally be content with a passing allusion to the great controversy concerning those doctrines which may be described as the immediate context of the idea of the Atonement, and which, together with it, make up what is known as the Doctrine of Grace—namely, the doctrines of the Fall, Original Sin, Election, and Grace—which is associated with the names of Augustine and Pelagius, and which, during the first quarter of the fifth century divided the attention of the Christian world with the simultaneous struggle between the rival schools of Alexandria and Antioch concerning the Doctrine of the Person of Christ. These great conceptions did not,

indeed, originate with the struggle of Augustine and Pelagius, for they are to be found (as Augustine pointed out, with a wealth of exegetical and polemical insistence) in the New Testament, most frequently in the writings of St. Paul and most conspicuously in the Theodicy of Romans ix-xi, whilst modern research has traced their origins back into the Rabbinical theology which moulded St. Paul's early thought.¹ Nor did their development cease with the triumph bestowed by the Council of Ephesus (A.D. 431) and the sword of the Emperor Honorius upon the views of Augustine: Pelagianism itself was suppressed (though not annihilated), but the severity of the triumphant Augustinianism, which refused any recognition of man's own effort as a factor in the work of his salvation, and attributed all to the impact of an irresistible grace, deemed to be bestowed upon the elect and upon them alone, provoked the reaction of Semi-Pelagianism or Synergism, which, whilst reiterating Augustine's assertion of the necessity of grace, affirmed the power of the will to co-operate or not to co-operate with it; and the triangular duel between Predestinarianism, Libertarianism, and the mediating system Synergism, has, with longer or shorter intervals of quiescence, continued until the present day. The successive phases through which the Predestinarian presentation of Christianity has passed, phases which are associated with the names of men of supreme genius—the Apostle St. Paul himself, St. Augustine of Hippo, Luther, and Calvin—offer a spectacle of profound interest to the philosopher who views the unfolding of great logical systems as a kind of intellectual pageant, and to the psychologist, who, observing that the great names just mentioned are those of men endowed with the fervent, 'twice-born' type of religious temperament, can see in the mighty dogmatic fabrics which they reared the reflexion of their idiosyncrasy; nor have any more ingenious attempts been made to resolve the intractable conflict between Determinism and Free Will than those embodied in the 'synergistic' systems of Arminius and Molina. During the peace and prosperity of the nineteenth century, such conceptions as those of Original Sin and Election were thought to belong to a vanished world, and the idea of the Fall in particular, which is the formal starting-point of the

¹ *v. supra*, p. 23.

whole 'Doctrine of Grace,' was deemed to have been finally discredited by Old Testament criticism and biological science ; but the catastrophe of the Great War of 1914-1918 refuted the optimistic illusion of an automatic and unending moral progress in human affairs, revealed unsuspected forces of savagery and bestiality latent in human nature, rehabilitated in some measure, even in England, the home of Pelagianism, the doctrines of the Fall and of Original Sin ; and, in the bitter scarcity and distress of post-War Germany, impelled the prophets of the 'Dialectical Theology,' Barth and Brunner, to raise once more—in opposition to the more than Pelagian self-satisfaction of the nineteenth-century materialism which, they believed, had led Central Europe away from God and to its own ruin—the battle-cry of the Reformers, 'Not by works, but by faith : man is nought, God's glory is all.'

It is sometimes contended that the Predestinarian conception of God's dealings with men makes the Church and the Sacraments otiose, a 'fifth wheel to the coach' ; and the question is asked, 'If there is a *numerus clausus* of the elect, settled by God's decree before the world was, and now incapable of augmentation or diminution, a list of persons who will in any case be saved because God so willed it, aeons before they were born, what can it matter, in principle, whether such persons have belonged to the Church and used the Sacraments, or not ?' We have not time here to review the ingenious answers which have been given to this question, and none of the great Predestinarian theologians has ever admitted a logical incompatibility between a strict doctrine of Election and Sacramentalism. Whatever the rights and wrongs of the matter, it is at any rate safe to say that interest in the more speculative aspects of the doctrine of Grace is likely, at least in the immediate future, to be confined to academic circles, and that the English reader, who is not a professional theologian is likely to be more attracted by the doctrines of the Church (including the doctrine of the Ministry) and of the Sacraments ; for these are the chief matters which at the moment divide Anglo-Saxon Christendom, and, indeed, Christendom as a whole, and which must be solved before that reunion of all Christians into one visible fellowship, which is the world's most crying need, can be accomplished. It is not, indeed, the

function of the 'historical theologian,' as such, to say what is the *true* doctrine of the Church ; but it is his function to explore the question, What was the *original* conception of its own nature, functions and constitution held by the Christian Church itself ? and to supply the 'systematic theologian' with the material which the latter needs for the purpose of deciding which of the existing doctrines (if any) represents the legitimate development of such original conception, or, should all existing doctrines appear to be one-sided or inadequate, of constructing such an idea of the Church as may do justice to history and to the fulness of present-day religious experience. This, in some ways, is the most difficult part of the historical theologian's duty : for during the formative period of Christian theology (or the period of the 'Undivided Church') the Church and Sacraments were used and taken for granted rather than theorised about, the production of clear-cut theories on these subjects being the work of the centuries of division, that is, of the Middle Ages, and in still greater measure of the Reformation and post-Reformation epochs. Nevertheless, the characteristic interest of the historical theologian consists in discovering the germs of the beliefs and institutions of one period in the period which precedes it ; when, therefore, he approaches the doctrine of the sacraments, and in particular that of the Eucharist, he will not consider that his functions are confined to the study of the doctrine of Transubstantiation as impugned by Berengarius and defined by St. Thomas Aquinas, or to that of the Lutheran theory of Consubstantiation as against the Virtualism of Calvin and the Receptionism of Hooker, but will consider how far the rudiments of these ideas just mentioned can be found in the Patristic period and in the New Testament itself, and which of them, if any, may be deemed most truly to represent original and authentic Christian beliefs on the subject. So also in regard to the great primitive sacrament of Initiation, originally a single rite which the introduction of infant baptism has split up into what are now the three substantive sacraments (if we may employ the *usus loquendi* common in Christendom) of Baptism, Confirmation and Penance ;¹ the student of historical theology will not limit himself to the examination of the doctrines concerning these

¹ See *Essays Catholic and Critical* (3rd edn., 1929), p. 376 f.

matters which prevailed at some given epoch, but will endeavour to determine the origins and trace the growth of the ideas underlying them, in particular weighing the evidence for the 'Dominical institution' of baptism, considering whether the growth of infant baptism was generated by, or rather itself helped to generate, a doctrine of 'Original Sin,' and endeavouring to make real to himself the primitive horror of post-baptismal sin, which forms the background against which both the growth of Penance and the Puritan rigorism which opposed it have to be set. And those who are familiar with present-day discussions concerning the reunion of the Christian Churches will not need to be reminded of the important part played by historical research in scrutinizing the beginnings of episcopacy and the Threefold Ministry, and of the beliefs in the Apostolic succession and in the *character indelebilis* held to be imparted by the sacrament of Holy Order. In this sphere, more perhaps than in any other, the bearing of ultimate 'origin' upon present-day 'validity' is obvious and direct.

The last of the great divisions of Christian dogma, the doctrine of the Last Things, is also (with the possible exception of the doctrine of the Atonement) the least defined. Yet, even here, the historical theologian will not lack material in regard to which he may perform his characteristic function of detecting origins and tracing the growth of underlying ideas. The researches of the late Dr. R. H. Charles and others into the contemporaneous Jewish apocalypses which illustrate the eschatological teachings of the New Testament have provided him with an *embarras de richesse* in regard to information concerning 'origins'; and the gradual emergence and classification (so far as it has gone) of the cardinal ideas of traditional Christian eschatology, the Communion of Saints, the 'intermediate state,' or 'Purgatory' as it is called in the West, Resurrection and Judgment, Hell and Heaven, though scantily documented in respect of many parts of its history, will be found by the student to be fraught with a deep intellectual fascination. Two conceptions which will claim his special attention, both because of their inherent interest and in view of the bearing of the conclusions with respect to their origin ultimately reached by historical theology upon much of the

belief and devotional practice of present-day Christendom, are those of Purgatory and of the Communion of Saints. With regard to these, the student of *Dogmengeschichte* will not consider his task completed until he has formulated at least a provisional decision of the question, whether the penal purgatory of the Middle Ages, imaginatively depicted in Dante's *Divina Commedia*, is to be derived from the eschatological 'fire' of 1 Corinthians iii. 15 ('he himself shall be saved, yet so as through fire'), or from the influences of Orphism, which in the fifth century before Christ nourished a swarm of itinerant soothsayers whose claims to the power of delivering departed souls from purgatorial torments are described by Plato in satirical terms which might well have been applied by Luther to Tetzel.¹ Similar questions arise with regard to the Catholic cultus and invocation of Saints, so dear to the hearts of millions of Christians: does this represent the natural efflorescence in devotion of the New Testament conception of all Christians, living and departed, as constituting one body in Christ, or the influx into Christianity of pagan polytheism under a thin Christian disguise? or is it possible that the influence of *both* of these factors may have to be recognised? The historical theologian will doubtless wish to note the comparatively scanty *data* concerning the evolution of the doctrine of the Resurrection of the Body which are provided by the writings of the Fathers, and he will consider it as part of his task to decide how far the spiritualising theory held by Origen (expressed in the strange assertion that the risen body will be spherical,² presumably a symbolic assertion of its perfection, the sphere being in Platonic thought the perfect shape)³ was completely conquered within the 'Great Church' by the materialistic views of Tertullian and Gregory the Great, who regarded resurrection as being neither more nor less than the resuscitation of the buried corpse. He may trace the gradual elimination from Christian eschatology of 'Chiliasm' (that is, the belief in a materialistic millennium on this planet intervening between the first and second resurrections of Rev. xx) and

¹ *Rep.* ii. 364 B ff.

² *Canones adv. Orig.* 5 (Denzinger-Bannwart, *Enchiridion*, ed. 1911, § 207).

³ W. L. Knox, in the *Journal of Theological Studies*, xxxix, 155 (July, 1938).

study what was deemed to be its final refutation by Augustine,¹ and its recrudescence on the American Continent in the tenets of Mormonism and similar sects. But it is possible that the main development of the doctrine of the Last Things may have been reserved for the decades which lie immediately ahead. For the present persecution of religion in certain Continental countries bears so strong a resemblance to the persecutions which were endured by Israel of old at the hands of totalitarian monarchs such as Nebuchadnezzar and Antiochus Epiphanes or Nero that it has driven some Lutheran divines back upon the supposition that there may be more of objective value and truth in the apocalyptic ideas to which those ancient persecutions gave birth than the scientific historian of dogma has hitherto suspected; that we are already living in the 'last times,' and that the present state of the earth, full 'of darkness and cruel habitations' and racked with 'wars and rumours of wars' shows that 'the fashion of this world passeth away.'²

C. SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

I

It may be hoped that the foregoing survey, cursory and superficial as it has necessarily been, may have given the reader some idea of the problems and methods of 'Historical Theology,' of the singular fascination with which the study of the age-long development of the great Christian ideas is fraught, and of the way in which the investigation of the origins and growth of the doctrines reveals, as hardly any other mode of approach to them can do, their true inwardness and essence. We have pointed out that this discipline is of a rigorously scientific character, concerned solely with the discovery of historic truth, and demanding in those who practise it the same severe objectivity of judgment and

¹ *De civ. dei*, xxii. 7 ff.

² Cf. P. Althaus, *Die letzten Dinge* (4th edn., 1933). In discussing the idea of Antichrist and of the various persons or systems with whom the 'Man of sin' has in Christian history been identified, this author observes—'To-day, our thoughts may well turn towards the secular Messianism of Marx and Lenin, towards the embittered enmity to Christ which the Communistic system displays, but also towards a self-idolising nationalism, which designs to suppress the Christ, either by direct action or by perverting His significance' (p. 274).

suppression of personal predilection as is required in the critical historian of more secular subjects. Although, however, it is not the business of the historical theologian *as such* to pronounce upon the intrinsic truth of the ideas of which he traces the development, he will in practice usually be himself a Christian believer; and, consequently, his analysis of the origins and evolutions of particular doctrines, however engrossing a pursuit in itself, will be—or at any rate should be—for him no more than a means to an end, which might ideally be defined as the attainment of a synoptic grasp of Christian doctrine as a coherent whole, as a single, indiscerptible body of truth, of which every part would be seen to be determined by every other part, and of which the totality could be shown, and indeed seen by immediate inspection or intuition, to follow with mathematical necessity from a rational view of the nature of God as He really is—in other words, to the production of a perfect Systematic Theology (*Dogmatik*). Such a divine science, if it could be attained, would avowedly concern itself with what is true concerning God and the things of God, and not with the mere history of the opinions which men have believed to be true (*Dogmengeschichte*); and, whilst the method of the last-mentioned discipline is empirical and *a posteriori*, the method of the former—if it existed—would be purely *a priori*, like that of pure mathematics and logic. Doubtless such an ideal is only realised in fact by those who are *comprehensores in patria*, who, contemplating God in the fulness of the Beatific Vision,

‘ . . . in that depth,
See in one volume clasp’d of love, whate’er
The universe unfolds; all properties
Of substance and of accident, behold,
Compounded, yet one individual light
The whole.’¹

Yet, though unattainable in this life, it may yet act as a lode-star to guide the student across the immense and sometimes arid tracts of *Dogmengeschichte*, and as an ideal pattern of the temple of sacred knowledge, like the pattern showed to Moses in the mount, according to which he may, so far as in him lies, combine the materials given him by history into a fabric not

¹ Dante, *Paradise*, xxxiii. 80–5 (Cary’s translation).

merely founded on empirical fact, but possessing the stability which is given by inner necessity.

We assume, then, that, having explored the historical origins and development of the leading Christian ideas, and so gained an insight into their true essence and meaning, the student will now endeavour to weave the contents of revelation, as he has understood them, into a system as coherent as their nature and the limitations of human understanding will allow. He will, naturally, expect assistance from the works of those who have preceded him in this task. But here we come across two preliminary difficulties which may at first sight appear so formidable as to make the study of systematic theology hardly worth pursuing, at any rate for those who depend upon their own reading and have no access to professional guidance through *viva voce* tuition or lectures ; and these must be dealt with, before we proceed further.

The first of these difficulties arises from the fact that, owing to the divisions of Christendom, all the great treatises on Systematic Theology are expositions of some one denominational version of the Christian faith, there being no work which an impartial observer from without could describe as a reasoned interpretative statement of Christian doctrine as such, uncontaminated by the tenets of any particular Church or sect. It must be confessed that those who lived in the ' Undivided Church ' did not in the least realise how fortunate they were ('*O fortunati nimium, sua si bona norint*'—if they had realised it, they would doubtless not have allowed the Church to become divided), and did not make the best use of the blessing of visible unity with which they had been endowed, by drawing up systematic statements of the Christian faith as a whole, in that form in which it was held by the ' Great Church.' Such attempts at a systematic treatment of Christian doctrine as were made during the Patristic period (as, for instance, the *De Principiis* of Origen, the *Oratio catechetica* of St. Gregory of Nyssa, the *Enchiridion* of St. Augustine, and the *De fide orthodoxa* of St. John of Damascus) are, from the modern point of view, in various ways incomplete, containing no answers to some of the questions (such as that of the fundamental nature, structure, and constitution of the visible Church) which press most insistently upon the Christian of

to-day. The age of the really exhaustive systematic theologies coincides, unfortunately, with the age of divisions; the first *Summa* of Christian doctrine, the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, was written less than a century after the consummation of the great schism between East and West, and its successors, the *Summae* of Albertus Magnus and St. Thomas Aquinas and the *Commentary on the Sentences* of St. Bonaventura, are expositions of specifically Latin Catholicism, such as would not have been accepted by Eastern Christendom, even if they had been known to it. It hardly needs to be pointed out that all subsequent treatises on Christian doctrine as a whole share in this denominational character, and that, the later the date of the composition, the more specific and intense this character usually proves to be. The great works of the post-Tridentine Roman Catholic theologians such as Suarez, De Lugo and Petavius—the dogmatic theology of Macarius, the *Institutio* of Calvin—the treatises of Dorner and Martensen—the *Ecclesiastical Polity* of Hooker, and the treatises *On the Creed* of Pearson, are all expositions of Roman Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, Calvinism, Lutheranism and Anglicanism respectively; a book which could be regarded as a systematic exposition of the Christian doctrine, as such, without any denominational *differentia*, does not exist. The second difficulty consists in the fact that (with the exception of Professor Karl Barth's monumental *Dogmatik*,¹ which is still in process of appearing) there does not exist any comprehensive treatise on Christian doctrine, of dimensions and power comparable to those of the great works just mentioned, which takes account of the subtle changes produced in our understanding of the chief Christian ideas by the scientific study of their origin and growth—in a word, which takes account of and presupposes modern 'historical theology.' These difficulties, however, will not deter anyone who is prepared to read and think for himself. We have before pointed out that there is no reason why the study of 'historical theology' should not be pursued by an agnostic; but it follows from the nature of 'systematic theology,' as an attempt to co-ordinate and comprehend Christian truth as a whole, that no one will in fact

¹ *Die Kirchliche Dogmatik*, 1 halbband, pp. 528 (1932): 2 halbband, pp. 1011 (1938).

desire to engage in this study who does not believe that there is such a thing as Christian truth, in other words, who is not himself a Christian believer. And if he is a Christian believer, it is to be presumed that he is a believer in some concrete and historical form of the Christian faith, possessing some definite denominational allegiance ; though we do not deny the possibility of a man's believing in Christianity, as such, without belonging to any particular Church or sect (like the late Sadhu Sundār Singh), such cases are hardly likely to be found amongst the readers of this book. But there is no reason why a convinced Roman Catholic, or Anglican, or Lutheran, should not begin with the study of some doctrinal text-book embodying the point of view of his own Church, and use this as a basis to which ideas, suggestions, and points of view culled from many other systems may be added, for the general enrichment, amplification and strengthening of his thought. And, even though there may be no modern *Summa Theologica* based upon what may reasonably be deemed to be the assured results of modern critical knowledge, there are many monographs on particular doctrines which fully satisfy this requirement. Though, therefore, it seems inevitable under present circumstances, that every student of systematic theology (unless, indeed, he be an adherent of the Roman Catholic Church) must expect to find himself charged with the task of constructing his own *Summa*, if it is his ambition to possess one, there can be no reason why he should not advance fearlessly into this unknown world, in the assurance that, although it may not be crossed by a single arterial road, there have, nevertheless, been many pioneers who have blazed useful trails for him.

II

As we have before explained, the gateway to Systematic Theology is the Philosophy of Religion, or (to adopt a terminology more redolent of a particular phase of religious thought) Natural, as distinct from Revealed, Theology : not merely does submission to what purports to be a divine revelation presupposes a belief, arrived at on independent grounds, in the God who reveals Himself, but the impulse towards the unification of all its knowledge which is innate in the reflecting mind requires that our conception of the mode of revelation shall be

integrated with our general theory of perception and cognition, and that the actual deliveries of revelation shall, under present conditions of human understanding, be harmonised with the rest of our knowledge of reality. The Roman Church, at least, bears witness to this necessary connection of the two subjects, by the canon which imposes on all seminarists two years' study of philosophy before the theological course is begun.¹ It is not possible here to give an extended account of the various philosophical systems which in successive ages have acted as the handmaid of Theology—to sketch the mediaeval supersession of that Platonism, which had helped to mould the developing outlines of orthodox theology, by the thought of Plato's great pupil and rival, Aristotle, transmitted to the Schoolmen through Arabic translations of his works—to narrate the struggle between the Realism of the Dominicans and the Nominalism of the Franciscans—to survey, even in the most cursory manner, the speculations of Descartes, Leibnitz, and Malebranches, of Kant and Hegel, Lotze and T. H. Green, Kierkegaard and Troeltsch, Eucken and Von Hügel. The mere catalogue of these names indicates the vastness of the field, and we can do no more than indicate some of the main issues with which the systematic theologian will be brought face to face by the serious study of his subject.

Of the three great subjects with which Natural Theology, or the philosophy of religion, is concerned—God, Freedom and Immortality—the most important, as the most august and mysterious, is the first—the idea of God. How can the reality of this idea be certainly known? The greatest of all Christian Churches—the Church of Rome—has no doubt as to her answer to the question. The majestic words of the Vatican Council deserve to be quoted—

'The Holy Catholic and Apostolic Roman Church believes and confesses that there is one true and living God, the Creator and Lord of heaven and earth, almighty, eternal, unbounded, incomprehensible, infinite in understanding and will; who, seeing that He is one single, unique, absolutely simple and unchangeable spiritual substance, is to be proclaimed as distinct from the world in reality and essence, most blessed in and of Himself, and ineffably exalted above all things, which exist and can be conceived beside

¹ *Cod. iur. Canon.* 1365, § 1.

Himself¹ . . . the same holy Mother Church holds and teaches, that God, the beginning and end of all things, can be *certainly known from created things by the natural light of human reason*; "for the invisible things of Him since the creation of the world are clearly seen, being perceived through the things that are made" (Rom. i. 20); but that, nevertheless, it has pleased His wisdom and goodness to reveal Himself and the eternal decrees of His will to the human race by another and that a supernatural way . . . To this divine revelation it is to be ascribed that those divine truths, *which in themselves are not impenetrable by human reason*,² can, even in this present condition of the human race, be learnt by all speedily, with assured certainty, and with no admixture of error . . . this supernatural revelation, accordingly, according to the faith of the Universal Church as declared by the Holy Synod of Trent is contained "in the written books and the unwritten traditions, which were either received by the Apostles from the lips of Christ Himself, or were handed down by the Apostles at dictation of the Holy Spirit, as through a long chain of hands, and so have descended even to our own day."'³

The striking feature of these declarations and of the whole context in which they inhere, is the strong emphasis which is laid upon the function of human reason in leading men to faith, and in elucidating the contents of the Christian faith, when once embraced. This explicit and strongly held *rationalism* (we use the term in its strict, and not in its invidious, sense) expresses itself in the belief, previously mentioned, in a *philosophia perennis*, a synoptic science of reality which is capable of real progress and attaining to real knowledge, which, because it is rooted in the nature of things, whose author is God, must necessarily be harmonious with the revelation which proceeds from the same God, which may be said to be identical with the highest common factor of the systems of Plato and Aristotle, and which found its most perfect expression in scholasticism and especially in the thought of the Angelic Doctor, St. Thomas Aquinas. The words of Leo XIII illustrate this intimate union which, in the view of

¹ Sess. iii. cap. i.

² 'Ea, quae in rebus divinis humanae rationi per se impervia non sunt' (cap. ii). It is not, of course, intended to deny that the truths of revelation are mysteries, or that the supernatural virtue of faith is not required in order to their full apprehension: see cap. 3 (*de fide*).

³ Sess. iii. cap. ii.

the most conservative of all Churches, should subsist between philosophy and theology :

‘ Siquidem praeclarae dotes, quae Theologiam scholasticam hostibus veritatis faciunt tantopere formidolosam . . . praeclarae, inquit, et mirabiles istae dotes unice a recto usu repetendae sunt eius philosophiae, quam magistri scholastici . . . in disputationibus etiam theologicis passim usurpare consueverunt. Praeterea cum illud sit scholasticorum theologorum proprium ac singulare, ut scientiam humanam ac divinam arctissimo inter se vinculo coniunxerint, profecto Theologia, in qua illi excelluerunt, non erat tantum honoris et commendationis ab opinione hominum adeptura, si mancam atque imperfectam aut levem philosophiam adhibuisset.’¹

Outside the Roman Catholic Church, however, or at any rate outside the seminaries and ecclesiastical institutions which are the homes of the strictly scholastic tradition, there prevails a despairing, almost ‘ defeatist ’ view of the value and functions of philosophy, and a strong tendency to disparage the powers of the intellect in the attainment of divine truth, which a recent writer (Mr. Arnold Lunn) has labelled ‘ the flight from reason.’ The present writer has been assured by an academic teacher of philosophy that the only proposition which could be said, after two millenniums and a half of intensive speculation, carried on by the most powerful minds of Europe, to be generally accepted and agreed upon by philosophers of all schools of thought, amounts to no more than this—‘ it is possible that something may exist ’ ; and the meagreness of this result, so disproportionate to the vast intellectual efforts of which it is the fruit, has been attributed to what the Archbishop of York has called ‘ the Cartesian *faux-pas*,’² that is, the mistaken direction which Descartes

¹ *Ep. Encyclica*, Aeterni Patris (‘ De philosophia Christiana ad mentem S. Thomae Aq. instauranda ’). ‘ If the gifts which make the scholastic Theology so formidable to the enemies of the truth were illustrious, as indeed they were . . . those illustrious and marvellous gifts, We assert, are to be derived solely from the right use of that philosophy, which the masters of the Schools were accustomed everywhere to employ, even in theological disputations. Moreover, seeing that the peculiar genius of the scholastic theologians consisted in their power of binding human and divine sciences together as with the straitest of bands, it may well be concluded that the Theology in which they excelled would not have been likely to win so much honour and commendation from the opinion of men, if it had employed a maimed and imperfect or frivolous philosophy.’

² *Nature, Man, and God*, Lecture III.

gave to all subsequent philosophical speculation by his famous aphorism *cogito, ergo sum*, and by the speculations founded upon it, which imbued philosophy with the fatal conviction that all knowledge is merely knowledge of the mind's own ideas, and not, or not necessarily, knowledge of objective reality. Locke, Berkeley and Hume successively intensified this introverted and subjectivist tendency in philosophy, which reached its height in Kant's denial to the human mind of any knowledge of things as they are in themselves, and to the great scholastic arguments for the existence of God, any real validity. This fundamental scepticism completely abolishes the possibility of any real Natural Theology. But religion, and the belief in God and in the possibility of Revelation, must rest on something; this something is found in the moral consciousness, which witnesses to the existence of a moral law or 'categorical imperative,' which we feel to be absolutely binding, but which, nevertheless, cannot be absolutely binding unless we assume a Supreme Legislator as its author. The existence of God, therefore, intellectually unprovable, is thus based upon moral experience; and the supposed effect of this alteration in the fundamental basis of Theology has been summarised in the epigram—'Kant believed that he had removed the Ark of God on to a plane on which the Philistines' (scientific materialists) 'could not get at it'; it may, at any rate, be truly said that the speculations of Kant mark the transition from the view of religion which regards it as based in the last resort upon Reason, even though a reason requiring to be supplemented by faith, to a view which regards it as based from first to last upon what is vaguely described as 'experience.' But what is meant by 'experience,' in a moral or religious connection? The present writer finds it difficult to assign any intelligible content to this term other than that of 'feeling,' that is, men's emotional reactions to the universe in general and to certain historical events which give the impression of being vehicles of God's self-revelation. From this point of view, all the propositions of which 'systematic theology' may consist (including the natural theology which constitutes its necessary prolegomena, or its first and fundamental section) are to be regarded as symbolic rather than strictly scientific, in nature; they are, in the language of

modern psychology, 'rationalisations' of moral, religious or mystical emotion, and so far as they can be regarded as having any content other than the affirmation of the existence of a given state of feeling, such content is no more than the affirmation of the desirability or worth of that state of feeling; in other words, they can be legitimately regarded only as 'value-judgments,' and not as existential or ontological affirmations.

III

It will be seen that two, clearly distinct, views of the nature of the Christian faith, and, by consequence, of 'Systematic Theology' which is its scientific expression, thus stand out as the result of the foregoing survey, views which may respectively be labelled (a) the 'intellectualist,' and (b) the 'empiricist.' There are, indeed, many mediating positions; but here, as elsewhere, it will help to elucidate the position if each of the opposing views is stated in its most extreme form, which, in the case of the 'intellectualist' view, is most conspicuously embodied in Roman Catholic scholasticism, and in the case of the 'empiricist' view, in Liberal Protestantism. The cleavage between these runs through a large area, if not through the whole, of Systematic Theology, including not merely Natural Theology and the philosophical treatment of the idea of God and the nature and media of Revelation, but also those sections of it which deal with two, at least, of the six 'fundamental ideas'—namely, the ideas of the Trinity, and the Incarnation. The 'intellectualist' is naturally led by his faith in human reason, and in the *philosophia perennis* which he believes to be its permanently valid formulation, along the path of the classical arguments for the existence of God, to the conviction of His transcendence and His creation of the universe *e nihilo*; the 'empiricist,' on the other hand, mistrusting all arguments in this connection, and relying upon what Schleiermacher described as 'God-consciousness' and Otto has named the 'feeling of the Numinous,' as being an intuition of the innermost reality of things, will naturally be inclined to a more 'immanentist' or even pantheistic view, which substitutes emanation for creation, and sees in the world something which is as necessary to God's being as He is to its; though it is fair to observe that in most 'empiricist' circles the strength of the

Biblical tradition has been such as to prevent the complete replacement of the living God of Hebrew thought by an impersonal Absolute or *anima mundi*. The 'intellectualist' naturally assumes that Revelation will consist of existential propositions, categorical statements of truth proceeding from the eternal Truth itself, and finds these in the Scriptures, and in the unwritten traditions transmitted orally in the Church and derived from the instruction given to the disciples by Christ Himself during the 'Great Forty Days' which intervened between His Resurrection and His Ascension, when He spake to them of the 'things pertaining to the Kingdom of God'; he will also demand an infallible Church to preserve this tradition without the slightest admixture of error until the end of time, and, when needful, to define the Deposit of Faith in formulations ever more lucid and more precise, which because they are the utterances of a teaching *magisterium*, which is the voice of the Holy Spirit, and are expressed in terms of the *philosophia perennis* which is rooted in the nature of things, constitute as close an approximation to absolute truth as is attainable under the present conditions of human understanding. The 'empiricist' theologian, on the contrary, as a true son of the Reformation, recognises no source of doctrine other than the Scriptures: but he is very far from following his sixteenth- and seventeenth-century predecessors, the Protestant Scholastics, in regarding the Bible as an armoury of proof-texts for the demonstration of particular doctrines, and sees in the sacred writings primarily the record of the 'experiences' of those who may be deemed experts in religious intuition, and whose agreement constitutes the *consensus sanctorum*, than which, on 'empiricist' principles, no higher authority is known.

A corresponding divergence shows itself in the statement of the doctrine of the Trinity. The Latin intellectualist and traditionalist, at least, finds no difficulty in accepting the baptismal formula of Matthew xxviii. 19 as an authentic saying of the Lord,¹ and the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity set

¹ The adherent of 'Critical Orthodoxy' would see no reason for doubting the historical character of the Resurrection appearance narrated in Matt. xxviii. 16-20, or the generally veridical character of this text, in so far as it is an affirmation of the 'Dominical institution' of Christian baptism,

forth in the first part of the *Quicumque vult*, as its factually and ontologically true expression, guaranteed by the infallible *magisterium* of the Catholic Church. He will, moreover, be confident that the metaphysical interpretation of the doctrine of the Trinity which commended itself to two doctors of the Church of such pre-eminent dignity as St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, and which has formed the basis of the theological instruction given in the seminaries and universities of Latin Christendom, is not likely to be seriously mistaken. He will, accordingly, regard the doctrine of the Trinity as endowing us with a deep and searching insight which can penetrate far into the mysteries of the divine Being, and as giving us positive and scientific information no less certain and reliable than that which trained observation can give us about the phenomenal world. On the basis of these assumptions have been built up subtle and (given their premises) profound treatises, like Cardinal Billot's dissertation *De Deo Uno et Trino*;¹ and from them (for instance) are deemed to follow such positions as that the affirmation of the tripersonality of God means, not that there are *at least* Three Persons in the Godhead (though there may be more), or that the affirmation of Three Persons is the best formula whereby human thought can make real to itself something of the nature of the Ineffable and incomprehensible One, but that there are Three Persons, *and no more*, the four relations which may be expressed by the words Generation, Filiation, Spiration, and Procession exhausting all the possible relations that can exist within the

that is, of the position that the employment of baptism as the normally indispensable mode of entry into the Christian Society rests upon the will and intention of our Lord: but, in the light of the New Testament passages (e.g. Acts viii. 16, x. 48, xix. 5) which seem to imply that baptism was at first into the name of Jesus, and of the extremely inchoate character of the only other Trinitarian formula (2 Cor. xiii. 14) occurring in the authentic text of the New Testament, he will be disposed to regard the crisp, clear-cut formula of Matt. xxviii. 19 as representing rather the developed theology of A.D. 80-90 than a literal transcript of the words of the risen Christ.

¹ *De Deo Uno et Trino*, commentarius in I. partem S. Thomae, L. Billot (1935). For scholastic arguments against the supposition that there may be more Persons than three in the Godhead, see pp. 399-402; this supposition has been given a certain amount of popularity by the well-known lines — 'For God has other Words for other worlds' (a statement directly contrary to Col. i. 16-20), 'but for this world the Word of God is Christ' (*The Disciples*, by H. E. Hamilton King, *Ugo Bassi*).

unity of absolutely simple and uncompounded intellectual Being. Far other are the methods with which and the spirit in which the ' empiricist ' handles this august theme. For him, the baptismal formula of Matthew xxviii. 19 and the other Trinitarian proof-texts of the New Testament are themselves no more than ' rationalisations ' of ' experience,' the experience of the *Urgemeinde* or ' primitive congregation ' which, or many of whose members, had known Jesus in the flesh, and had felt the mystic potency of the ' Pneumatic ' influences which streamed out from Him. Moreover, the Logos doctrine, which, as we saw in the sections of this essay which dealt with ' Historical Theology,' forms the corner-stone of the whole Trinitarian concept, is repugnant to the ' empiricist,' because it is a metaphysical concept, and its employment contradicts the fundamental Kantian position that the categories of pure reason have no validity outside the sphere of sense-experience. The only kind of Trinitarianism, therefore, to which he is so much as prepared to give a hearing, will be what is known as the belief in an ' economic ' Trinity, which amounts to little more than the affirmation that there have in fact been three successive ' dispensations,' of Creation, Redemption (in which Jesus of Nazareth was the instrument of the divine Purpose), and Sanctification (in which the divine influences which Christians have agreed to call the ' Spirit ' are carrying on and extending His work).

To the student who is prepared to have regard to realities rather than to terminologies, it will probably seem that the view just sketched is identical in principle with the second-century theory mentioned above (§ B, V, p. 42) and known to modern scholars as ' Dynamic Monarchianism ' ; and that, like it, it presupposes a purely ' adoptionist ' Christology, that is, the view that, ontologically regarded, Jesus was no more than man, but a man in whom God dwelt with singular closeness and intimacy, who responded to the graces which He received with such unfailing fidelity that He may well be called the ' Son of God ' *par excellence*. It is hardly necessary to say that such a view does not provide any basis of *a priori* probability for the beliefs that He was miraculously conceived or really rose from the tomb, but rather the reverse. Nor—surprising though it may seem to those whose notions of the

nature of essential Christian experience have been drawn from one or other of the systems of traditional orthodoxy—is it possible for the believer to hold any intercourse with Him as He now is, in His state of exaltation : we can only have touch with Him as He *was*, in the days of His earthly life, through the historical record which that life has bequeathed to us. Such, at least, is the teaching of the greatest of recent exponents of Ritschlianism, W. Herrmann : ‘ We cannot speak of a communion with the exalted Christ . . . God is revealed to us ; the risen Christ is hidden from us.’¹

‘ The personal life of Jesus can be grasped as a real fact in history by a man who has no faith, or even after the power of faith has been extinguished in such a man. And it is because the invisible God uses this fact to make men certain of Himself, that we can say, He communes with us. In this fact of self-revelation He reaches down into the realm of our earthly experience. But we cannot say that of the exalted Christ. Hence the believer must not try to fly beyond those limits which are drawn around him while as yet his faith has to conflict with earthly experiences. He must admit that the risen Christ is still hidden from him. He may, indeed, express a thought of his faith by saying that Christ lives in him ; but unless, like Paul, he can appeal to visions, he may not say that he experiences the communion of the exalted Christ with himself.’²

Such an affirmation naturally follows from the designation of ‘ religious experience ’ as in the last resort the sole basis of theological conviction, and from the limitation of the sphere within which such experience is valid to the phenomenal and historical, assumptions which compel the conclusions that mysticism is an illusion, and that the only legitimate ground of the experience of God in Christ is the life of the human, historical Jesus as depicted in the Synoptic Gospels. In the light of this historical record we are (so the Ritschlian school maintains) entitled to declare that Jesus, as we know Him from the pages of history, has ‘ the value of God ’—that is, that His human character, manifested in His words and acts, conveys to us reliable information—indeed, the only information that there can be—concerning the character of God ; that through this human character, mirroring His own,

¹ *Communion with God* (English tr. 1906), p. 291. ² *Op. cit.* p. 292 f.

God truly speaks to us ; and that, accordingly, in grateful remembrance, devout contemplation, and worship He may be treated *as though He were God*, much as the material Crown of England, when taken in a State carriage from the Tower to Westminster, before the opening of Parliament, is received with military salutes *as though it were* the Sovereign in person. It would seem to follow from this line of thought that we may never affirm that He *is* God, in any existential or ontological sense, or indulge in any speculations as to His pre-existence ; for that would involve us in metaphysical affirmations, concerned with matters outside the sphere of our experience, and therefore intrinsically illegitimate. Yet there is no responsible theologian of the Ritschlian school, from Ritschl himself downwards, who would not strenuously repudiate any intention of denying the truth expressed in the phrase *die Gottheit Christi* (the Godhead of Christ). It is a paradoxical consequence of the underlying assumptions of Ritschlianism that, as the efficient cause of the 'experience' which issues in the value-judgment 'Jesus has the value of God' is the historical portrait contained in the Synoptic Gospels, it would seem to be the portrait, rather than the portrait's Original, which is really the object of faith ; and it has been suggested that the efficacy of the portrait as a generator of 'religious experience' would not be seriously impaired if it were proved to correspond to no reality at all, that is, to belong to the realm of mythology. But it is difficult to see how such a view, which completely dissociates 'the Christ of faith' from 'the Jesus of history,' can avoid the charge of reducing religion to a beautiful, even though useful, illusion.

V

It will, we hope, now be clear that the conception of the *mode* of Revelation held by the constructor of a 'Systematic Theology' must necessarily exercise a determining influence upon his conception of the *contents* of the revealed doctrines. Lest, however, it should be supposed that the student is necessarily shut up to a choice between an *ultra*-intellectualist, or Scholastic, and an *ultra*-empiricist, or Pragmatist, method, we may here emphasise the *caveat* entered above against any such supposition, and repeat that there are many theories which occupy a

mediating place between these two extremes. We must be content with the bare mention of the position which may be said to correspond in the sphere of 'Systematic Theology,' to that which we designated 'Critical Orthodoxy,' when treating of 'Historical Theology': which, usually starting from, though not necessarily identified with, a form of the *philosophia perennis* which may be entitled 'moderate Realism' (in that it affirms that knowledge is knowledge of real things outside the self, and not merely of the mind's own ideas) maintains the generally veridical character (though not the mathematical cogency) of the traditional arguments for the Being of God, broadly interpreted;¹ whilst not excluding the element of explicit sayings, formulated propositions, enunciated by inspired men or by the Christ Himself, from the content of Revelation, finds this content mainly in events, claiming to be Acts of God; and whilst restrained by historical candour from ascribing a rigid infallibility either to the written records or to the unwritten tradition containing the interpretation placed upon these events by the Christian society, maintains such a general reliability of both as is symbolised by the words 'inspiration' and 'indefectibility.' Nor can we devote more than a passing allusion to the most striking movement of recent years within the field of systematic theology, namely, the growth of what is known as the 'Dialectical Theology,' or 'Theology of Crisis,' associated pre-eminently with the names of Karl Barth and Emil Brunner. This proclaims itself to be a 'theocentric' revolt against the whole 'empiricist' tendency described above, a repudiation of Schleiermacher and Ritschl, and a flat denial of the importance hitherto assigned to human 'religious experience': it recalls men to a respectful attention to 'the Word of God,' uttered by a purely transcendent Deity from His solitary height in eternity—to a 'Word,' that is, message, which is all that man can know or grasp of God, all mystical conceptions of the possibility of man's union with or possession of Him being dismissed as so much presumptuous nonsense. Yet when we enquire, What is this 'Word of God,' and where is it to be found? we are told that it consists in

¹ Cf. Prof. A. E. Taylor's essay 'The Vindication of Religion' in *Essays Catholic and Critical* (1929 edn., p. 30 ff.). The Archbishop of York's Gifford Lectures (*Nature, Man, and God*) contain what may be regarded as a non-scholastic formulation of the *philosophia perennis*.

Scripture interpreted by the inner witness of the Holy Spirit.¹ But this seems to bring us back again to 'experience' under another name. The time has not yet come for a complete evaluation of the Barthian reconstruction of the foundations of theology: but the student of *Dogmengeschichte* is not unacquainted with the phenomenon of the theologian, who, setting out to attack a given intellectual position, is unconsciously fascinated by that which he attacks, and ends by holding a position only differentiated from it in name, as in the case of the anti-Gnostic Fathers of Alexandria, Clement and Origen, whose own positions on some points are indistinguishable from the Gnosticism which was the object of their polemic. If the basic concept of Barthianism is judged by future historians of doctrine to be in the last analysis identical with that of Ritschlianism, that would merely be one more instance of history repeating itself.

V

It must be confessed that in the remaining sections of Systematic Theology—the doctrine of Grace or of the Work of Christ, and the doctrines of the Church, the Sacraments, and the Last Things—the question of a philosophical background, though not by any means excluded, does not necessarily play so great a part as in the doctrines of the Trinity and of the Person of Christ; for the reason that the subject-matter of these remaining doctrines consists very largely in acts, events, and processes, and is, accordingly, of a fluid, moving, dynamic and historical kind, whilst the subject-matter of the first two doctrines consists in transcendent facts, which are static in character, and consequently more amenable, at any rate in theory, to the timeless categories of metaphysical science. It is, of course, conceivable that, if many millennia of history still lie before the Church of Christ, it may not be beyond the powers of Christian thought to elaborate a comprehensive metaphysical and theological scheme which will exhibit God's redemptive Acts as necessary consequences of His eternal nature, without jettisoning that divine freedom without which

¹ A. Keller, *Der Weg der dialektischen Theologie durch die kirchliche Welt* (1931), p. 32: 'Erst Schrift und Geist machen das Wort Gottes. Schrift ohne Geist ist Buchstabe. Geist ohne Schrift führt zur Mystik oder zum Rationalismus.'

He would be reduced to the state of an impersonal Absolute. Such attempts, indeed, have been made in connection with the doctrine of Election and Grace, as in the great predestinarian scheme which, in its broad outlines, is common ground to St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Luther and Calvin ; but, in the case at any rate of the last-named, the philosophical framework which has been inserted into the doctrine has deprived it of all flexibility and life, in such a way that a not unsympathetic student of Calvin's thought can observe ' Calvin was as pure, though not as conscientious or consistent, a Pantheist as Spinoza.' ¹ So also attempts have been made (as by Athanasius in the *De incarnatione*, Anselm in the *Cur Deus homo*, and the Reformers in their expositions of the idea of ' penal substitutionism ') to construct a doctrine of the Atonement which will exhibit the Death of Christ as an event necessitated by one or more of the attributes of the Godhead ; but these attempts have not proved satisfying to subsequent generations, and the unsystematised nature of the Scriptural references to this mystery suggest that in this sphere, at least, and under the present conditions of our knowledge, the *a priori* method of doctrinal construction has a comparatively small part to play, and that the ' empiricist ' method of ' rationalising ' religious or mystical experience (such as is evoked by meditation on the story of the Passion, and, in many parts of Christendom, by devout assistance at the Eucharistic Liturgy) may be deemed to have the field to itself, within the limits set by the sacrificial language of Scripture, which implies that, however its *modus operandi* be conceived, the Death of Christ produced an objective reconciliation between God and man, and rules out all merely ' exemplarist ' theories of its efficacy.

The further that we leave behind the exalted region of abstract reflection on the triune nature of God and the mystery of the Person of Christ—the more that we descend into the historical process which is the extension both of Christ's Incarnation and of His ' Work ' of redemption, that is, the more that we concern ourselves with the nature of the Church and the Sacraments—so much the more shall we find ourselves increasingly compelled to make use of the *a posteriori* or inductive method of theological construction, and to abandon

¹ A. M. Fairbairn, *The Place of Christ in Modern Theology* (1893), p. 164.

the *a priori* method; in other words, to surcease from the endeavour to determine on a philosophical or metaphysical basis what God ought to have done, and to content ourselves with learning from the facts of history what He actually has done. The more we find our thought inevitably immersed in the time-process, the smaller the part that the *philosophia perennis* can play, and the more Systematic Theology finds itself limited to sifting and garnering the fruits of Historic Theology. So with the doctrine of the Church: those who maintain that Christ intended His work to be carried on by a concrete, historical, institutional Church, and those who regard 'the Church' as in its essential nature invisible, the totality of the elect whose identity is known to God alone, must alike strive to establish their case by appealing in the first instance to the evidence of the New Testament, and in the second to the history of the primitive Church. This fact stands out with even greater clearness from the age-long controversies on the organisation and polity of the Church, such as those which have raged around the Papacy and its prerogatives, the three-fold Ministry of Bishops, Priests and Deacons, and the idea of 'apostolic succession.' The same is true of the theology of the Sacraments. The first question which must necessarily be decided before there can be a theology of the Sacraments is the question of their 'institution' by Christ Himself; if they cannot be certainly shown to represent His will and purpose, and still more if it seems that they are pagan accretions upon an originally non-sacramental gospel, there can be no reason why the theologian, as such, should concern himself further with them, even though the working pastor or the psychologist of religion may still think it worth while to draw up practical rules for their observance, considered as edifying ceremonies of purely human institution. If it be held that the Aristotelian metaphysic of substance and accident forms part of, and is endowed with the authority of, the *philosophia perennis*, and that, accordingly, the doctrine of Transubstantiation represents the best intellectual formulation of the content implied in the saying 'This is my body,' realistically and not metaphorically interpreted, it still remains the case that the authenticity of the saying in question must be established *a posteriori* by the ordinary rules of textual evidence, and that, even when this

has been done, the proposition that the saying ought to be interpreted realistically and not metaphorically must either rest upon the *magisterium* of an infallible Church, or be shown to represent the main Christian tradition by induction from a detailed survey of Eucharistic theology throughout the centuries. So also with the great primitive rite of Initiation, the 'Sacraments' (Penance, Baptism, Confirmation) into which this has differentiated itself, and the other observances 'commonly called sacraments': whatever doctrine is held to be 'revealed' and true concerning these must be, in reality, distilled from the actual practice and teaching of Christendom, in accordance with the Vincentian criterion *quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus*, and can only be given a deductive form by the construction of an artificial syllogism in which the major premise consists in the affirmation of the infallibility of some authority.

In the last division of Systematic Theology, that which is described in traditional systems as *De novissimis*, 'Concerning the Last Things,' but is now more generally known by the pseudo-Hellenic name of 'eschatology,' the part played by a *priori* metaphysical construction is reduced to all but nothing. The traditional beliefs concerning the destiny of the human race and the individual, the consummation of history, and the world to come, as briefly affirmed in the concluding clauses of the creeds, elaborated in such a detailed treatment as that contained in the 'Supplementum' appended to the third part of the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas Aquinas,¹ and given artistic expression in Dante's *Divina Commedia* and many mediaeval frescoes, sculptures and other works of art, rest from first to last on authority, and have never yet been integrated with any abstract metaphysical system so as to be capable of being exhibited as a necessary inference from it. It is true that in the eschatological scheme propounded by St. Thomas, and followed by Dante, there is a large admixture of Aristotelian natural science; the empyrean heaven, which is the abode of the Saints, equally with the subterranean *infernus* with its three main divisions, allocated respectively to unbaptised infants (*limbus puerorum*), pre-Christian sages (*limbus*

¹ QQ. LXIX-CI. As St. Thomas died before completing the *Summa*, the 'Supplementum' was compiled, by an unknown writer, from the Angelic Doctor's own *Scriptum super sententiis magistri Petri Lombardi*.

patrum) and the damned (*tartarus*), has been designed in a manner which is fully compatible with the Ptolemaic cosmology, but is not necessitated even by it. It is hardly necessary to observe that neither this nor any other attempt to conceive the next world spatially or to delimit it geographically is likely to be of any, save purely historical, interest to the modern student of Christian doctrine. Moreover, the chronological schematism of the traditional eschatology, according to which the Particular Judgement, experienced by the soul immediately after death, is succeeded in the case of most of the elect by a long period of purgatory, and that again by a preliminary (but disembodied) sojourn in heaven, until the world-process is ripe for the final and General Resurrection and Judgement, seems to compress the transcendent realities of the world of spirits into a framework of clock-time assumed to be parallel to the clock-time of this earth, in a manner so naïve as to prevent its being taken as more than symbolical. Historical Theology, indeed, seems to suggest that the traditional doctrine *De novissimis* has been somewhat mechanically taken over from the Apocalyptic passages in the sacred writings, with the simple omission of obviously inconvenient texts, such as those which seem to connect the *Parousia* of the Son of Man directly with the Fall of Jerusalem, or which appear to predict the factual realisation of an earthly millennium ; and 'empiricist' Theology has, accordingly, been prone to regard the whole eschatological element in Christianity as outworn lumber, inherited from its Jewish parents, which has no serious value save in so far as it can be regarded as a vivid symbolism of the fact that God's purposes cannot be assumed always to realise themselves by the way of automatic progress and smooth upward evolution, but may from time to time find their expression in unpredictable and devastating catastrophe. The intellectualist, on the other hand—at any rate the 'intellectualist' whose position is that of 'Critical Orthodoxy'—whilst taking full account of what 'Historical Theology' has to tell him with regard to the development of Jewish and Christian apocalyptic, and whilst not at the moment furnished with a cut-and-dried metaphysic of the Last Things, will not be prepared lightly to abandon an area of Christian teaching which is admittedly derived from our Lord's own words, and which

must, therefore, be assumed to contain some permanently valuable truth possessing the weight of His incommunicable authority ; nor will he lightly surrender the Christian message as to the eternal significance of our physical nature, embodied in the article of the Creed which affirms the ' resurrection of the body,' and as to the consummation of all things—

' The one far-off divine event
To which the whole creation moves.'

He will therefore deem the production of a modern eschatology, embodying the essentials of the traditional doctrine, but discarding all that Historical Theology has taught us to be pictorial or metaphysical husk, and exhibiting that doctrine as the natural culmination of a consistent Christian philosophy—to be one of the greatest needs of present-day religion. So far, the task of producing an eschatology which will tell us what is revealed truth about the Last Things, rather than what men have believed to be true—has only been undertaken by German theologians of the Barthian school, who have been led by the circumstances of gloom and violence, under which it is their misfortune to live, to a despairing world-view which, like that of 4 Esdras, regards the present universe as irremediably saturated with evil, and looks for its destruction and the creation of a new heaven and earth upon its ruins. It may be the vocation of Christian thinkers, who live in happier surroundings, to elaborate a concluding section of Systematic Theology in a less sombre and terrifying vein.

VI

It may be thought that the foregoing survey of the field covered by Theology, ' Historical ' and ' Systematic,' has skimmed the surface of many problems, without penetrating very deeply into any. But it will doubtless be remembered that the avowed purpose of this essay was merely to provide a preliminary and general view of the vast and varied landscape which is constituted by the subject-matter of the ' Queen of sciences.' If it has indicated anything of the fascination of the subject, and aroused in the reader's mind any desire for that fuller and more detailed acquaintance with its particular areas which will be furnished in the following essays, its purpose will have been more than achieved.

II

COMPARATIVE RELIGION

by

E. O. JAMES, D.Litt., D.D., Ph.D., F.S.A.

Professor of the Philosophy and History of Religion in the University of Leeds

‘ Man’s response to Reality with its myriad graded forms of expression, some so crude and some so lovely, some so concrete and some so otherworldly but all so pathetic in their childishness, affords a clue to the real significance of those rituals and ceremonies common to almost every creed, which express the deep human conviction that none of the serial events and experiences of human life are rightly met, unless brought into relation with the Transcendent.’

EVELYN UNDERHILL

I

COMPARATIVE RELIGION

The Comparative Study of Religion.—Notwithstanding the attention paid to the beliefs and customs of other races in ancient times, notably in Greece and Rome, it was not until the latter part of the nineteenth century of our era that a serious attempt was made to apply the scientific method to the comparative study of religion. The Renaissance revived interest in classical thought and mythology, and the Reformation, though narrowing in its theological outlook, gave a fresh impetus to Biblical studies and a knowledge of Hebrew. The Calvinistic doctrine of the depravity of unregenerate human nature reacted against a sympathetic understanding of pagan religion, but even so in 1685 Dr. John Spencer, Master of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, produced a Latin work on the ritual laws of the Hebrews which Robertson Smith somewhat optimistically described as having ‘laid the foundations of the science of Comparative Religion.’¹

Meanwhile, the discovery of the new continents by the early explorers, and the subsequent missionary enterprises, brought to light a vast mass of new facts concerning the strange ways and curious ideas of peoples in a primitive state of culture which demanded further investigation. The Deists in the middle of the eighteenth century, in reaction against the obscurantism of current theology, met the situation by postulating a primeval revelation of ‘five catholic truths’ vouchsafed at the creation of the human race regarding the existence and worship of God, repentance and rewards and punishments after death. This original religion, pure and undefiled, it was contended was subsequently perverted by a complex system of ritual and superstition invented by a hypothetical order of

¹ *Religion of the Semites* (3rd edn, Lond., 1927), p. xiv.

'priests' to exercise a stranglehold on the lives of their fellows.

This curious attitude to the accumulating data shows how progress in a scientific and unprejudiced study of religion as a whole was well-nigh impossible so long as a sharp distinction was made between the so-called 'Natural Religion' of the heathen and the 'True Faith' revealed to Israel and the Christian Church. In Germany, where thought was beginning to take a new direction, the idea of evolution implicit in the Copernican astronomy, assumed a dominant position in the philosophy of Kant (1724-1804) and Schelling (1775-1854), and in the skilful hands of Hegel (1779-1831) it became the key to world-history. As humanity is one progressive and perfectible organism which advances by becoming more complete and reasonable, and as history is a dialectic expressed in time, not merely one event after another, so 'the religious relation is a process within the mind, developing itself from lower to higher stages and forms according to immanent laws, laws which are essentially the same in the macrocosm of humanity as in the microcosm of the individual.'¹ Thus, he opened the way to the understanding of the history of religion, and he himself made an extended survey of the religious systems of the world as they were known in his day. If he accommodated the facts to his scheme, and employed a monistic definition of religion which is no longer tenable, like the modern anthropologist, he showed development to be an integral element in the life of mind and of religious experience.²

But inasmuch as religion on his hypothesis was an attitude towards the Absolute in its unity, it constituted an expression of Reality belonging essentially to the domain of philosophy rather than to that of science. Moreover, apart from the ambiguity involved in Hegel's position concerning the Absolute in philosophy and the concept of God in theology, the study of religion could never come into its own so long as it was subordinated to any system which used the facts of religion to establish its own doctrines. Religious phenomena as distinct from spiritual experience must be investigated on their own

¹ Cf. O. Pfleiderer, *The Philosophy of Religion* (Lond., 1887), ii, 80.

² *Philosophy of Religion* (English tr. E. B. Spiers, Lond., 1895), i, 79 ff., ii, 10 ff.

merits historically and comparatively, independent of any preconceived theories or accepted loyalties.

It was this formidable task which was undertaken by anthropologists after the great revolution in thought and knowledge initiated by Charles Darwin in 1859 had shown that the workings of the human mind as they find expression in social organization, moral and legal sanctions, and magical and religious beliefs and practices are amenable to scientific treatment. The pioneer in these studies was Sir E. B. Tylor, who in his two masterly volumes, *Researches into the Early History of Mankind* (1865) and *Primitive Culture* (1871), endeavoured to explain the similarities in beliefs, customs and arts in terms of culture contact and the like working of men's minds under like conditions at all times and in all places. Since the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Cartesian doctrine of the invariability of the laws operative in nature and in human life had become a basic principle in philosophical thought, and later Auguste Comte (1798-1857) had laid the foundations of the Comparative Method in the study of social and religious institutions, though he realized that it did not explain the sequence of development, or the co-ordination of the social systems.¹ To overcome this difficulty he sought to establish an 'ideal series,' or successive modifications of mental outlook in what he called the 'Law of the Three States' of intellectual progress, from the theological through the metaphysical to the positive, or scientific stage.² Therefore, before *The Origin of Species* appeared, the evolutionary principle inherent in Newtonian physics and Kantian philosophy had been extended to human society, its ideas and institutions.

In this intellectual environment in which the scientific study of comparative religion came into being, it was inevitable that attempts should be made to devise a system of classification similar to that adopted by the biologist in order to explain the data in terms of origin and development. Thus, Tylor, in his earlier book, worked out a technique of the diffusion of culture, and developed a theory of the borrowing of myths and folk-tales. Six years later in *Primitive Culture* he turned to the investigation of the laws of human nature along the

¹ *Cours de philosophie positive* (Paris, 1877, 4th edn.), iv, 319.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 322.

lines laid down by Comte, though he never lost sight of 'the use of correspondence in culture as a means of tracing lines of connection and intercourse between ancient and remote peoples.'¹ The notion of continuity of civilization, he affirmed, 'is no barren philosophical principle but is at once made practical by the consideration that they who wish to understand their own lives ought to know the stages through which their opinions and habits have become what they are.'² Comte, in his view, scarcely overstated the necessity of this study of development when he declared that 'no conception can be understood except through its history,' and 'the history of culture began with the appearance on earth of a semi-civilised race of men, and from this state of culture has proceeded in two ways, backward to produce savages, and forward to produce civilised men.'³

Animism.—Thus, he recognised growth and decline in all stages of human development, but living at a time when evolution was 'in the air,' he was mainly interested in tracing evolutionary processes in custom and belief. This may be illustrated by his attitude towards the problem of religious origins. His first reference to the subject, destined to occupy so prominent a place in his subsequent works, occurs in the *Fortnightly Review* in 1866,⁴ the year after the publication of *The Researches into the Early History of Mankind*. In this article he called attention to animism as the fundamental aspect of 'the religion of savages.' In determining the part played by images in primitive worship he came to the conclusion that idols obtained their sanctity from the fact that they were regarded as animated by a human soul or divine spirit, and therefore were magically efficacious. Furthermore, they enabled man to give a definite existence and a personality to the vague ideas of higher beings, which his mind could hardly grasp without some material aid.

In attempting to explain how these ideas came into the minds of the lowest savages (a subject upon which he had reserved judgment in the *Researches*⁵), he employed the word 'animism' to describe 'the theory which endows the phenomena of nature

¹ *Report of the British Association* (1894), p. 774.

² *Primitive Culture* (4th edn., London, 1903), Vol. I., p. 19.

³ *Op. cit.* p. 35.

⁴ 1866, vi, 71-86.

⁵ p. 110.

with personal life.' ¹ In opposition to the German philologists of the school of Adalbert Kuhn and Max Müller, who sought to discover the origin of religion by an etymological analysis of the names of gods in Aryan mythology, Tylor argued that it is not language that need be called in to explain how the sun, rain or a river was conceived of as an animated being. 'The simple anthropological view is itself,' he claimed, 'the fundamental principle of mythology, and while it concerns itself with such visible palpable, active, individual objects as these, Language only needs to accompany and express it.' ² Similarly the term 'fetishism,' which Comte, following Ch. de Brosses, had adopted to denote the idea of 'all external bodies as animated by a life analogous to his own, with differences of mere intensity,' was 'utterly inappropriate and misleading' as a description of the animistic hypothesis. It was restricted to objects wrongly regarded as idols ³ used in witchcraft by sorcerers.

Having thus paved the way, Tylor propounded at length in *Primitive Culture* his famous theory of animism, or belief in spiritual beings, as the original form, or 'minimum definition of religion.' In a certain state of culture, he argued, men everywhere distinguish the human soul from the body, and by analogy project their own personality into the order of nature. In support of this contention, he devoted the second volume of his treatise to an impressive marshalling of the facts relating to the 'two great dogmas of one consistent doctrine; first, concerning souls of individual creatures, capable of continued existence after the death or destruction of the body; the second, concerning other spirits, upward to the rank of powerful deities.' ⁴ In short, on this hypothesis, beginning with the soul, the whole complex phenomenon of religion can be explained as a process of evolution and growth in conception of personality, human and divine. In its full development, animism includes the belief in souls and in a future state, in controlling gods and subordinate spirits, these doctrines practically resulting in some kind of active worship. In the religion of the lower races the moral element is little represented, but in the higher cultures the conjunction of ethics and animistic

¹ *Fortnightly Review* (1866), vi, 84.

² *Op. cit.* 81.

³ *Op. cit.* 84.

⁴ *Prim. Culture*, i, 424, 426.

beliefs is powerful and intimate. Leaving these purely moral aspects of religion on one side, animism is said to constitute 'an ancient and world-wide philosophy, of which belief is the theory and worship is the practice.'¹

This universal concept arose, according to Tylor, in answer to the questions, what makes the difference between a living body and a dead one; what causes waking, sleep, trance, disease, death? Again, what are those human shapes which appear in dreams and visions?

'Looking at these two groups of phenomena, the ancient savage philosophers probably made the first step by the obvious inference that every man has two things belonging to him, namely, a life and a phantom. These two are evidently in close connexion with the body, the life enabling it to feel and think and act, the phantom as being its image or second self; both, also, are perceived to be things separable from the body, the life as able to go away and leave it insensible or dead, the phantom as appearing to people at a distance from it.'

By combining the life and the phantom as parts of the body, and, therefore, as belonging to one another, the conception of the *anima*, or 'ghost-soul,' arose as a separable vital principle with a form of its own.²

In the lower cultures, 'the sun and stars, trees, rivers, winds and clouds became personal animate creatures, leading lives conformed to human or animal analogies and performing their special functions in the universe with the aid of limbs like beasts or of artificial instruments like men.'³ Therefore, as in the case of his distinguished disciple, Sir James Frazer, Tylor peopled the world with a multitude of individual spirits in 'every rock and hill, every tree and flower, every brook and river, every breeze that blew and every cloud that flecked with silvery white the blue expanse of heaven.'⁴ But this idea of pervading life and will in nature, and belief in personal souls animating alike human beings and natural phenomena, while unquestionably universal at certain cultural levels, is too large a 'minimum' to represent a satisfactory definition of religion. Indeed Tylor recognised that 'animism is, in

¹ *Op. cit.* 427.

² *Op. cit.* 428 ff.

³ P. 285.

⁴ Frazer, *The Worship of Nature* (Lond., 1926), pp. 9 ff.

fact, the groundwork of the philosophy of religion,'¹ though he also made it the basis of the phenomena as a whole.

Religious Origins.—As Dr. Marett has pointed out, however, 'savage religion is something not so much thought out as danced out, that in other words, it develops under conditions, psychological and sociological, which favour emotional or motor processes, whereas ideation remains relatively in abeyance.'² Belief in spirits and separable souls implies a realisation of personality, a conceptual attitude, which hardly can have arisen till the individual became conscious of himself as a human being. Behind these philosophising there is a more fundamental reaction of which animism, theism, ancestor-worship and similar beliefs are intellectualised interpretations. Religion, as such, independent of any particularised evaluations, is primarily a response to an order of being which transcends the ordinary and commonplace, and controls human destinies and the natural processes of the universe. To establish an efficacious relationship with this transcendent reality, and thereby to deal with the unpredictable element in human experience, a technique has been devised with which certain beliefs have become intimately associated. In this way ritual and myth have arisen.

In a primitive state of culture, the entire magico-religious equipment is directed to certain specific ends concerned with urgent problems connected with the particular nature of the environment and the circumstances of everyday life consequent upon the limitations of human knowledge respecting cause and effect. Any inexplicable occurrence which arrests attention tends to be attributed to supernatural agencies and influences imperceptible to sense but tremendously real and operative in fact, regarded with awe and respect as partaking of sacredness or mystery. Being a kind of beneficent Providence external to himself, to it man turns instinctively in times of need and crisis, such as birth, puberty, marriage and death, when the crops are sown and the harvest is gathered, at the turn of the year, before engaging in warfare or going on a perilous journey, or when beset by plague, pestilence and famine. Similarly, startling phenomena, such as thunder and lightning, volcanoes

¹ *Prim. Culture*, i, 426.

² *The Threshold of Religion* (Lond., 1914), p. xxxi.

or peculiar mountains or trees, curiously shaped rocks, bubbling streams, unusual animals or strange herbs, torrent and flood, are regarded as sacred not because they are animated by a spirit, as Tylor imagined, but because they possess mysterious qualities that are superhuman, and supernatural, i.e., that do not form part of the normal equipment of man or of nature. To the same category belong dead bodies, dwarfs and deformed persons, chiefs and kings, powerful medicine-men and priests, and those who have come into intimate contact with sacredness, e.g., mourners, women in childbirth, and their attendants, a newly born infant, an adolescent at the time of initiation and a bride. It cannot be alleged that all these objects, events and persons are possessed by spirits or ghosts, yet they are equally sacred, and, therefore, not to be lightly approached, i.e., taboo.

The veneration and respect shown to that which partakes of sacredness is more than the result of fear of the unknown, or of an indwelling spiritual being.¹ By itself the emotion of fear is too negative to produce a positive response such as finds expression in ritual and cultus, and before anything can become an object of worship it must acquire a religious significance, i.e., condition religious behaviour. According to Otto, religion is a distinctive category *sui generis*, like beauty, truth and goodness, not reducible to any ordinary intellectual or rational 'knowing.' To this 'unique original feeling-response, which can be in itself ethically neutral and claims consideration in its own right,' he applies the term 'numinous.'²

The primary fact is the recognition of a 'Something, whose character is only gradually learned, but which is from the first felt as a transcendent presence, "the beyond," even when it is also felt as "the within" man.' In its presence the sense of 'creatureliness' is produced, of 'self-abasement into nothingness before an overpowering, absolute might of some kind,' the character of which defies verbal description. But equally

¹ Cf. Marett, *op. cit.* p. 13. F. C. Bartlett, *Psychology and Primitive Culture* (Camb., 1923), pp. 96 ff., 106. Leuba, *The Psychological Origins and Nature of Religion* (Lond., 1912), pp. 80 ff. Selby, *The Psychology of Religion* (Oxford, 1924), p. 41. J. C. Flower, *The Psychology of Religion* (Lond., 1927), p. 11.

² In the cult of ancient Rome the *numen* was an undistinguished supernatural power hardly personal at all which called forth the emotion of awe and *religio* (taboo). *The Idea of the Holy* (Eng. tr. J. W. Harvey, Oxford, 1928), pp. xvi. ff, 7.

this *mysterium tremendum*, felt as unapproachable mystery, has within it a strange fascination and attraction, drawing men towards it in mystical experience and sacramental communion. 'The daemonic-divine object may appear to the mind an object of horror and dread, but at the same time it is no less something that allures with a potent charm, and the creature who trembles before it, utterly cowed and cast down, has always at the same time the impulse to turn to it, nay even to make it somehow his own.'¹ As it develops a rationalised cultus of '*numen loci*,' *daemon*, *el*, *baal*, and the like takes shape, but 'all ostensible explanations of the origin of religion in terms of animism or magic or folk-psychology are doomed from the outset to wander astray and miss the goal of their inquiry,' unless they recognise 'the basic impulse underlying the entire process of religious evolution—primary, unique, underivable from anything else.'²

To make the numinous state of mind, however, irreducible to any other is to eliminate the psychological conditions that call it into being. Actually it is not an 'unnamed Something' which stimulates the reaction to the mysterious, but merely any natural object that is uncanny, abnormal and awe-inspiring, or any situation beyond human control. Such an object or event appears to the primitive mind to belong to an order of reality outside its limited range of experience and knowledge, and, therefore, to be approached with caution and reverence. But it is neither 'wholly other' nor 'non-rational,' as Otto contends. If it were completely transcendent it would not be within reach at all and consequently it would be useless to try to establish beneficial relations with it, which is the essential aim of the religious reaction. Again, if a supra-rational evaluation is given to that which cannot be grasped by ordinary processes of reasoning and controlled by empirical methods, it does not follow that the numinous is non-rational, unless the term rational is to be restricted to conceptual thinking. The primitive is essentially a practical person, and he does not interpret life in terms of religion but religion in terms of life. His rationalisations of his emotional experiences may be secondary, but they cannot be dismissed as non-essentials. The numinous must become articulate to produce

¹ *Op. cit.* pp. 31 ff., 63, 228 ff.

² *Op. cit.* p. 15.

religious behaviour, and the intuitions of religion spring from the intellect no less than those of art, poetry and music.

Nevertheless, if Otto has made his 'category of the sacred' too distinctive, irreducible and non-rational, his main contention remains unassailable; viz., at the root of religion lies the quality to which he has given the name 'the numinous.' Something more than a 'feeling of dependence,' as Schleiermacher supposed, is required to explain this particular reaction, since not all baffling situations produce a religious response. There must be awakened first the sense of awe and reverence, and the realisation of a relationship with an 'other' than itself which is not 'wholly other' but a 'beyond which is within' and around as well as above. While the objects of religious regard, and the sacred generally, are transcendent and external to man, it is doubtful whether a real distinction is made by the primitive mind between the 'natural' and the 'supernatural,' as these terms are usually understood to-day. Levy-Bruhl, indeed, affirms that

'the primitive makes no distinction between this world and the other, between what is actually present to sense and what is beyond. To him it is these that are real and actual. His faith is expressed in his most insignificant as well as in his most important acts. It impregnates his whole life and conduct.'¹

This is an exaggeration and has led the French school of sociologists to deny to the savage any rational outlook and mastery of his surroundings. All things are divided sharply into the sacred and the profane so that the supernatural is the negation of the natural. 'Religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden—beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church—all those who adhere to them.'² But, as we have seen in the case of Otto's hypothesis, any object or event may arouse a religious response given the numinous conditions, and not a particular 'Something' regarded as an ultimate category, be it the idea of the holy, or, as Durkheim postulates, the 'sacred-profane' relationship as an original mechanism.

¹ *Primitive Mentality* (Lond., 1923), p. 32.

² Durkheim, *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (Lond., 1913), p. 47.

By a study of totemism Durkheim arrives at the conclusion that 'in a general way a society has all that is necessary to arouse the sensation of the Divine in minds, merely by the power that it has over them; for to its members it is what a god is to its worshippers.'¹ Since the totemic principle, he thinks, is identical with the god of the clan, the totemic sign becomes a rallying-point of collective emotion. Thus, religion is a purely sociological phenomenon; an expression of the forces by which a social group exercises authority over its members comparable in all respects to that imposed by the gods, in order to secure thereby the conditions of its own continuance. The whole system of religious sanctions and obligatory beliefs is merely a subjective reflection of society. The more exalted than ourselves which imposes its will upon us and calls forth our veneration is in reality the collective will of the group to which individuals belong. But while it is true that religion functions as an element in the preservation of social structure, to make it only a symbolic representation of the organisation and group consciousness of the community, evades altogether the objective validity of its beliefs in their cosmological character as apprehensions of a reality transcending alike the human and natural order.

Furthermore, it is at the great crises in the career of the individual that religion exercises a powerful influence—at birth, puberty, marriage, and death—and not infrequently the most numinous moments are those when the principal person concerned is separated from the rest of his fellows, and in silence and seclusion undergoes a profound spiritual experience during his 'private retreat' in the bush. Behind the process of initiation are strong social sanctions, it is true, but, nevertheless, the mental attitude of the novice is that of a personal relationship with an objective reality external to society directed to certain specific individual ends. Again, as a source of moral control, the sanctions of religion have a personal application apart from their collective significance and independent of any conception of a deified society.

The group theory of categories advanced by Professor Durkheim and the French sociologists derives its inspiration largely from the totemic data produced by Sir Baldwin Spencer

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 206.

and Mr. F. J. Gillen as a result of their elaborate researches among the Central and Northern tribes of Australia, where the clan is a fundamental unit in society. Moreover, in the first blush of a new discovery following upon the papers on the worship of animals and plants by J. F. McLennan in the *Fortnightly Review* of 1869, a former generation of anthropologists was inclined to give undue importance to totemism as a fundamental institution rather than as a secondary and specialised system. Thus, Robertson Smith, thinking in these terms, made religion in its essence and origin essentially an affair of the community instead of the individuals composing the group; a dictum that gained support from the Australian evidence upon which Durkheim mainly relied.

Now it cannot be denied that from the peaceful monotony of the daily round of camp life, concerned chiefly with hunting, fishing, fire-making by friction to cook the food thus collected, and similar economic and domestic activities, at certain seasons the clan assembles at sacred spots for the purpose of engaging in magico-religious rites on the grand scale. In striking contrast to the uneventful and unemotional routine of profane life, the individual is plunged into an atmosphere of collective excitement which is strongly charged with religious fervour. But is it true to say with Durkheim that it is in this effervescence that the religious idea is born? In the first place it is not possible to divide the sacred and the profane as sharply as the French school imagine, since while ordinary (i.e., 'profane') existence in primitive society is placid and occupied with everyday affairs, religion (i.e., 'the sacred') emphatically is not excluded from it and relegated to specific collective occasions 'during periods of concentration.' On the contrary, as W. H. R. Rivers has pointed out, 'religion is not a matter for one day in the week, but influences every act of their daily lives.'¹ Or, again, Dr. Radin affirms from his intimate knowledge of the Winnebago Indians, 'it is not a phenomenon distinct from mundane life, but one of the most important means of maintaining social ideals.' It is definitely connected with the preservation of life values, and 'the multifarious desires and necessities of the day, so that they appear

¹ *Medicine, Magic and Religion* (Lond., 1924), p. 49.

to him bathed in a religious thrill.'¹ Certainly this is equally applicable to the aboriginal tribes of Australia where almost every action of any importance, private or corporate, has some magico-religious sanction or significance attached to or connected with it.

Magic and Religion.—The fact is that so long as hunting, fishing, love-making, and all other occupations, do not present problems outside his grasp and control, the native is as rational and logical as any modern European peasant. As Professor Malinowski says of the Melanesians,

'if the fences are broken down, if the seed is destroyed or has been dried or washed away, he will have recourse not to magic, but to work, guided by knowledge and reason. His experience has taught him also, on the other hand, that in spite of all his forethought and beyond all his efforts there are agencies and forces which one year bestows unwonted and unearned benefits of fertility, making everything run smooth and well, rain and sun appear at the right moment, noxious insects remain in abeyance, and harvest yield a superabundant crop; and another year again the same agencies bring ill-luck and bad chances pursue him from beginning till end and thwart all his strenuous efforts and his best-founded knowledge. To control these influences and these only he employs magic.'²

While special seasons are set apart for collective tribal ceremonies to control the weather and the growth of the species, or the crops upon which the community depends for its food-supply and well-being, these are by no means the only occasions when the primitive mind undergoes a numinous experience which finds expression in appropriate rites. Religion grows out of the necessities of life, especially at the point where they become uncertainties, or hazardous, and wherever or whenever these necessities arise the human soul reacts accordingly, individually or corporately as the case may be. Magic is more restricted, being essentially a human possession which is passed on from practitioner to practitioner according to the prescribed methods of training and initiation. It is never regarded as an impersonal physical force resident in extraordinary objects, as

¹ 37th Report Bureau of Amer. Ethnol. (Washington, 1923), p. 278.

² 'Magic, Science and Religion' in *Science, Religion, and Reality* (Lond., 1926), pp. 30 f.

in the Melanesian concept of *Mana*, inasmuch as magic is the simulation of a real act, a ritualised expression of an emotional desire on the part of the operator enacted by word and deed in the belief that through the utterance of the spell and the accompanying action (rite) the result must follow automatically. The efficacy resides in the things said and done, not in any intervening supernatural agent, such as a spirit, god, or ancestor. Therefore, any deviation from the prescribed formulae or actions renders the rite null and void, and since success depends very largely on the skill of the operator, who is himself the sole actor in the drama, medicine-men, as distinct from priests, are technical experts in the magic art.

In contrast to this practical and highly specialized technique, religion is less restricted in its conditions and operations. The priest, as the servant and agent of powers superior to man believed to direct the course of nature and of human affairs, adopts a submissive attitude in supplication, propitiation and thanksgiving. Self-determination and personal control become dependence and the surrendered will when the magic art gives place to institutional religion. But there is no adequate reason to suppose with Frazer that at the threshold of the human race the magician alone held sway in a godless age of pure magic before his own failure led him to seek the aid of superior powers.¹ No tribe or group exists in which magic to the complete exclusion of religion prevails, and there is no indication of such a stratigraphical division having been a characteristic feature in prehistoric times. Both disciplines serve their own specific purposes, and the suggestion that magic was abandoned in favour of religion at some hypothetical moment in the development of the human race is contradicted by the fact that in primitive society to-day it flourishes as an integral and highly successful element, side by side with an equally definitely established religious cultus.

In almost any complex sacrificial rite, for example, a magical element can be detected since the disposition of the blood and of special parts of the victim, the wearing of the skin by the officiant, and similar ceremonies, are efficacious by virtue of

¹ Frazer, *Early History of Kingship* (Lond., 1905), p. 127. *Golden Bough*, Pt. I (Magic Art), vol. I (Lond., 1917), p. 234 ff. Cf. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Religion* (English tr.) (Lond., 1895), i, 290 ff.

the actions performed, or through the inherent potency of their sacredness which makes them agents or channels of supernatural power. While it can hardly be denied that they have an efficacy of their own independent of 'powers superior to man,' as parts of the rite as a whole they belong to the category of religion if the purpose of the sacred drama is, let us say, a re-enactment of the explanatory myth performed according to a prescribed usage approved by society directed to beneficent ends and addressed to a divine being upon whom the worshippers depend for their life and sustenance. Such a rite should be assigned to religion, but, like the various devices in ancient and modern times to maintain the food supply by resort to supernatural aid, it contains an element akin to magic. In practice the two attitudes to the sacred and occult converge, and since the primitive mind is not inclined to draw sharp distinctions in the exercise of its mental processes, the cumbrous and question-begging expression 'magico-religious' has some justification as a working-principle to describe border-line cases.

Notwithstanding the differences in origin and technique in a magical and a religious traffic with supercausation, magic unquestionably is an ancient heritage which has tended to give place to religion and science in the progressive development of culture and knowledge, and when it occurs to-day it is not infrequently a survival from the past. Moreover, it can hardly be doubted that the spiritual experience of a worshipper kneeling before an altar in a Gothic cathedral, or an Italian basilica, is more strictly religious than were the emotional reactions aroused by a pantomimic dance in a Palaeolithic cave in the Pyrenees, or in those displayed in an Australian initiation ceremony. But judging from the ceremonial interments, even Neanderthal Man and the earliest representatives of *Homo sapiens* known as the Aurignacians, were religious in their attitude to a life after death. It would also seem that in their corporate efforts to maintain the food supply they sought to establish beneficial relations with sacred species superior to themselves and upon whom they regarded themselves as dependent.

While it cannot be maintained, as Hubert and Mauss suggested, that magic is the illicit set over against the licit, or

accepted order of society, since magic may be both licit and corporate, as in the case of rain-making ceremonies, just as religion may be illicit and individual (cf. demonology), it is true that elaborate rites performed by or on behalf of the community as a whole for beneficent ends tend to fall within the domain of religion. Although the influence of magic is felt in adjacent spheres, it belongs essentially to the specialised mechanistic technique through which, according to its own laws and traditions, it exercises control over a passive universe. It is akin to science in that it is directed to practical ends based on a theory of cause and effect. But it is only brought into operation when empirical knowledge and rational methods are inadequate in a given situation. Then resort is made to supercausation, that is to say, to magical control.

Myth and Ritual.—Again, magic is not the disreputable sister of religion. It is essentially the child of its own tradition living an independent life with its own pedigree. The story which guarantees its efficacy differs from the mythology of religion in that it is merely the affirmation of the power resident in the spell and the rite. The religious myth, on the other hand, belongs to the whole supernatural world of faith: 'the pantheon of spirits and demons, the benevolent powers of totem, guardian spirit, tribal all-father, the vision of the future life.'¹ This transcendent order creates a second supernatural reality for primitive man, and around the great religious rituals a sacred story has collected setting forth the inner reality of the actions performed in terms of gods and culture-heroes and their place and function in society. The themes are not abstract philosophisings concerning the origin of the world and fanciful explanations of how things came to be, as Andrew Lang and others have held,² but reactions to certain urgent problems of daily life, such as securing and maintaining the things upon which man depends for his subsistence and continuance.

Myth is the uttered rite directed primarily to certain specific ends, and, therefore, it must conform to the tradition of magic to be effective in spell, or, in its more distinctly religious guise,

¹ Malinowski, *Science, Religion, and Reality*, p. 81.

² Lang, *Myth, Ritual, and Religion* (Lond., 1899), i. 162. Frazer, *Myths of the Origin of Fire* (Lond., 1930), p. vi.

it must confirm the established faith rather than satisfy curiosity. As Professor Malinowski rightly insists,

'myth as it exists in a savage community, that is, in its living primitive form, is not merely a story told but a reality lived. It is not of the nature of fiction, such as we read to-day in a novel, but it is a living reality, believed to have once happened in primeval times, and continuing ever since to influence the world and human destinies. This myth is to the savage, what, to a fully believing Christian, is the Biblical story of Creation, of the Fall, of Redemption by Christ's Sacrifice on the Cross.'¹

It is not an 'explanation in satisfaction of a scientific interest, but a narrative resurrection of a primeval reality, told in satisfaction of deep religious wants, moral cravings, social submissions, assertions, even practical requirements.' As it 'expresses, enhances and codifies belief,' so it also 'vouches for the efficiency of ritual and moral principles,' just as our sacred story 'lives in our ritual, in our morality, as it governs our faith and controls our conduct.'²

Thus, the story of creation, the origin of death and the loss of immortality are the subject-matter of myths all over the world and in all states of culture because they are the eternal problems with which struggling humanity is faced in everyday life. It is not scientific interest, philosophical speculation or poetic imagination that leads the primitive mind to concentrate on these fundamental questions, but a practical concern for health, wealth and happiness here and hereafter. Conscious of the ever-present conflict between good and evil, of a craving for life in the midst of death, of security amid the changes and chances of mortal existence, ways and means are sought to meet the precarious situation. These find expression in myth and rite enacted in the form of a sacred drama or religious mystery.

In the lowest states of culture, hunting tribes like the aborigines of Australia assemble year by year at sacred spots associated with the totems, culture heroes and ancestors for the purpose of reproducing in pantomime the principal events of the sacred lore of the tribe or group, directed mainly to the maintenance of the food supply.³ The actions are made to fit

¹ *Myth in Primitive Psychology* (Lond., 1926), p. 21.

² *Op. cit.* p. 23.

³ Spencer and Gillen, *Native Tribes of Central Australia*, pp. 170 ff. *The Arunta*, i, 148 ff.

the words and intentions of the performers who are regarded as the reincarnations of ancestors, and therefore repeat what was thought to have been done in the 'Alcheringa,' or Golden Age of long ago; the Australian Eden. Ritual being a vent of pent-up emotions by means of which the desire to act discharges itself on the efficacious symbol with which the actors identify themselves, appropriate disguises, imitative actions, and sacramental contact with the source of strength are integral elements in rites of this nature. In this way a vital relationship is established with supercausation and the transcendent order calculated to bring about the desired result, or in a more strictly magical operation, a realistic reproduction of some practical activity is made in order to establish an *ex post facto* efficacy by imitative causation.

At this stage there are no carefully thought-out theologies, or systems of belief, no clear distinctions between magic and religion as separate disciplines (however distinct the two may be actually and theoretically); nothing but absolute faith in the efficacy of the ceremonies. Some rites are known to be anti-social and illicit, others are for the well-being of the community or the individual, but in either case their power to promote either good or ill is not questioned. At no cultural level is genuine ritual mere commemorative ceremonial, still less hokus-pokus, for when a rite ceases to be efficacious it is no longer ritual. Similarly, pageantry is not ritual unless it is in the nature of a sacred drama and then it has a definite function to fulfil in relation to the rite of which it is an integral element.

In short, whether it be an Australian Intichiuma ceremony or the central sacramental mystery of Christian worship, the principle is the same so far as the essential meaning and purpose of ritual is concerned. To attempt to intellectualise, rationalise or to pour scorn on what is fundamentally an emotional reaction to the supra-sensible is to miss the point and confuse the issue. As Miss Underhill truly says, 'man's response to Reality with its myriad graded forms of expression, some so crude and some so lovely, some so concrete and some so otherworldly but all so pathetic in their childishness,' affords a clue to 'the real significance of those rituals and ceremonies common to almost every creed, which express the deep human

conviction that none of the serial events and experiences of human life are rightly met, unless brought into relation with the Transcendent : that all have more than a natural meaning, and must be sanctified by reference to the unseen Powers.'¹

The Divine Kingship.—In agricultural communities where the divine king plays the leading rôle as the representative and embodiment of the gods responsible for the growth of vegetation and the sustenance of the crops—the counterpart of the Australian Alcheringa ancestors—a complex culture pattern has grown up around the royal office. In Ancient Egypt, for example, the life of the nation was wrapped up in the person of Pharaoh, who has been described as 'a living epitome of all that is divine in the Nile valley,' summing up in his complex personality the attributes of all the gods he embodied.² In this capacity it was his duty to perform the rites which secured the health and prosperity of the nation and victory over his enemies, though in practice the local priests acted as his deputies.

It was only on certain occasions that the king officiated in person, as, for instance, at the Harvest Festival of the god Min at Koptos when apparently he impersonated Horus, the son of Osiris, as the living king, and reaped the first sheaf of spelt and of barley for his father (Osiris) on reaching the temple, to insure a plentiful harvest.³ Again, in the Spring Festival in honour of the death and resurrection of Osiris, he walked in the procession round the walls of Memphis, and on a Theban tomb he is represented as assisting the Memphite high-priest in raising the *Ded*-pillar as a symbol of the resurrection of the god (Osiris).⁴ This ceremony included a ritual combat between the people of Buto, the predynastic capital of Lower Egypt, depicting the victory of Horus over his enemies, personified in the reigning Pharaoh, who in all probability, as Dr. Alan Gardiner suggests, thereby renewed his reign. The revivification of Osiris 'was not that of a young and vigorous god of vegetation but that of a dead king, recalled in the tomb to a semblance of his former life.'⁵

It is significant that this feast was considered the proper

¹ E. Underhill, *Worship* (Lond., 1936), p. 11 f.

² Foucart, *Encyclop. Rel. and Ethics*, viii. 713.

³ Gardiner, *Journal of Egyptian Archaeology*, ii. (1915) 125 f.

⁴ Brugsch, *Thesaurus*, v (1898) 1190.

⁵ *Op. cit.* p. 124.

occasion for any Pharaoh to ascend the throne, and it was also the conventional date for the observance of the Sed-festival, or periodic 'jubilee' of Egyptian kings, at which they renewed their coronation rites by assuming the garments and insignia of Osiris. This event was celebrated probably at intervals of about thirty years in conjunction with the spring rites, and since every Horus-king was a potential Osiris, 'the accession of Horus was equivalent to a renewal of the reign of Osiris himself.' Hence the declaration, 'thou beginnest thy renewal, beginnest to flourish again like the infant god of the Moon, thou art young again year by year, like Nun at the beginning of the ages, thou art reborn by renewing thy festival of Sed.'¹

Sir Flinders Petrie sees behind this custom the widespread practice of killing the king when his natural powers began to decline.² Since from the Nile to the Congo petty monarchs suffered this fate, it would not be surprising if in ancient times Egyptian Pharaohs were similarly treated, especially as the rulers in both regions have much in common. Thus, the royal family is a class apart and traces its lineage from a divine hero incarnate in the reigning sovereign. The king marries his sister or daughter as a matter of course in order to maintain the supernatural descent of his successor. His name is so sacred that frequently it is taboo except in oaths, and he controls the weather, the growth of the crops, and the powers of reproduction so that the failure of his own regenerative functions would have a reciprocal effect in men, animals and plants. To prevent these calamities the custom has arisen among the Shilluk of the Upper Nile, for example, and other tribes, of putting to death the ageing ruler whenever he showed any symptoms of loss of virility and failing health. Indeed, to make certain that there always is a vigorous occupant of the throne, the king in some regions is automatically killed at the end of a fixed number of years, regardless of his condition, and Petrie thinks that this practice obtained among the Egyptians in prehistoric times. In due course

'this fierce custom became changed, as in other lands, by appointing a deputy to die in his stead; which idea survived in the Coptic

¹ Moret, *Du caractère Religieux de la royauté Pharaonique* (Paris, 1902), p. 256.

² *Researches in Sinai* (Lond., 1906), p. 185.

Abu Nerus, with his tall crown of Upper Egypt, false beard and sceptre. After the death of the deputy, the real king renewed his life and reign. Henceforward this became the greatest royal festival, the apotheosis of the king during his life, after which he became Osiris upon earth and patron of the dead in the underworld.' ¹

Actually, as we have seen, Osiris was always the dead king, the reigning monarch being equated with Horus. But whatever may have been the precise sequence of events which led up to the celebration of the Sed-festival, it is not improbable that behind the dramatic representation of the death and burial of Osiris and the accession of Horus in relation to the kingship on the one hand and the seasons of the agricultural year on the other hand, lies the killing of the ageing monarch when his physical vigour showed signs of diminishing.

The Institution of Sacrifice.—At first, it would seem, the sovereign sacrificed himself on behalf of his people not as an atonement for sin but in order to secure the continuance of the beneficent forces of Providence, rain, sunshine and fecundity bestowed by the gods whom he embodied as their earthly incarnation and representative. This was at once the most efficacious method of renewing vitality at its source and also of identifying the community with the transcendent order upon which it depended, very much as in totemic society to slay and eat the totem established a mystic bond between the group and its sacred ally. By a process of substitution regicide in course of time became modified. Instead of the king suffering the supreme penalty himself, his eldest son, or some member of the royal family, or of the ruling class, was immolated. By a further transference, a commoner, often a prisoner of war, was temporally raised to divine rank and in that capacity went to the altar.

Although human sacrifice occurs sporadically in most of the more primitive states of culture, as a definite institution in the calendrical ritual it is characteristic only of the phase intermediate between the genuinely rudimentary and the higher developments of civilisation. Thus, the practice reached its zenith in Central America, where the Aztecs are said to have offered sixty thousand victims annually in the

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 185.

ghastly rites which marked their agricultural festivals.¹ The Biblical story of the offering of Isaac and the Greek legend of Iphigeneia are examples of the tendency to replace human beings by animals, and while all animal sacrifice cannot be explained in this way, it would seem that in many cases the practice has arisen as a modification of an earlier human offering, notably of the king or his substitute.²

The Annual Festival.—Another method of rejuvenating the sovereign and renewing his reign is by a ritual death and resurrection drama comparable to the Egyptian Sed-festival. As the monarch-elect becomes divine as the *locum tenens* of a god through the coronation ceremony—and the real purpose of the installation rite is to make the king divine³—so by undergoing a repetition of the ritual periodically, he may be born again to newness of life and vigour. The Annual Festival, held at the turn of the year, has been the occasion *par excellence* when this drama has been celebrated with an elaborate and closely knit series of rites representing the death and revival of the divine hero. It is then that the king as the incarnation of the saviour-god engages in a sacred combat with his spiritual foes, like the gods in the creation story which is enacted as part of the drama. Having won the victory he is re-established in the throne, led forth in triumph and ensures the fruitfulness of the earth and the multiplication of man and beast by his nuptials with the queen.⁴ This event occurs usually either in spring or autumn, and while it has a wider significance than the promotion of the growth of the crops, inasmuch as the prosperity of society as a whole depends on it, it has a clearly defined vegetative function. Thus, it coincides with sowing or reaping, and not infrequently with the ritual of the first-fruits or the harvest.

Thus, in Mesopotamia, where in ancient times the ruler of the city-state occupied a position similar to that of the Pharaoh

¹ Cf. Sahagun, *Histoire Générale des Choses de la Nouvelle-Espagne* (Paris, 1880), pp. 61 ff. Cf. *Golden Bough*, Pt. IX (The Scapegoat) (Lond., 1914), pp. 275-305.

² For a detailed discussion of the evidence cf. James, *Origins of Sacrifice* (Lond., 1933), pp. 78 ff.

³ Hocart, *Kingship* (Oxford, 1927), pp. 70 ff.

⁴ S. H. Hooke, *Myth and Ritual* (Oxford, 1933), p. 8. James, *Christian Myth and Ritual* (Lond., 1933), pp. 5 ff.

in Egypt, a complex New Year Festival was held in the month of Nisan in the spring, which appears to have developed out of the earlier Tammuz cult in which was re-enacted the death and resurrection of the youthful divine hero, the faithful son of Ishtar, the Mother Goddess. In the Babylonian texts the descent of Tammuz to the underworld, the wandering of the sorrowing mother in barren fields and desolate sheep-folds in search of her lover-son, and his return as the 'resurrected child' when the spring rains produced a renewal of life in nature, was re-interpreted in terms of the Gilgamesh epic and the *Enuma elish* creation story, when Babylon became the capital and Marduk its god succeeded to the primacy of the pantheon. Gilgamesh and Marduk, in fact, are localised transformations of Tammuz, and the Annual Festival called *akitu*, celebrated in certain cities in spring,¹ consisted at Babylon in a dramatic representation of the death and resurrection of Marduk followed by a sacred marriage to produce a prosperous season.

The texts are fragmentary, but the ritual setting of the drama appears to have included a fight between Marduk and Tiamat, the victory of the hero and the gods against the monsters of Chaos, the rescue of Marduk from his imprisonment in 'the house of the mountain,' and the leading forth of his image in procession by the king who had previously placed his regalia before the statue, proclaimed his innocence. He was then struck on the cheek by the high-priest, and restored in his royal office. By this act of humiliation the king would seem to have resigned his throne and been reinstated in it by the god whom he impersonated before he conducted the image from the temple (E-sagil) to the Festival House at the conclusion of the rites. From earlier Sumerian sources it appears that a sacred marriage was celebrated to promote the fruitfulness of the year as the climax of the Spring Festival, symbolising the union of heaven and earth.²

In the recently discovered Ras Shamra texts this same theme

¹ At Erech and Ur the festival was held both in the first (Nisan) and seventh (Tisri) months of the year, which is significant in view of the later Jewish custom of observing two New Year feasts in these same months.

² F. Thureau-Dangin, *Rituel accadiens* (Paris, 1921), pp. 86 ff. Gadd, *Myth and Ritual* (Oxford, 1933), pp. 45 ff. Langdon, *Tammuz and Ishtar* (Oxford, 1914).

recurs in Syria in the form of the Aleion-Baal myth.¹ In the Old Testament it is also possible to detect it both in the rôle of the king in the Jerusalem cultus, and in early Hebrew festivals, notably the Feast of Tabernacles at 'the going out of the year' in the autumn, which was apparently the counterpart of the Babylonian *akitu*.² It was, however, in the Graeco-Roman world that this pattern of myth and ritual became established in a series of mystery cults in the first millennium B.C., having made its way into Europe from Egypt, Asia Minor, and later from Persia.

The Mystery Religions.—Early in the Bronze Age (c. 1600 B.C.) Crete became the source of a culture migration to the mainland which at such centres as Mycenae gave rise to a new civilisation known as Minoan-Mycenaean, long before the people whom we call Greeks entered the region from the north. Hellenic polytheism was apparently a fusion of northern elements derived from the nomadic tribes settled in the pastures of Thessaly, under the shadow of Mount Olympus, superimposed on the myth and ritual of the Mycenaean Aegean culture. The Indo-European northern tradition, as it has been handed down in the Homeric legends of the Heroic Age, sung in the courts of princes of Ionia and later transferred to public festivals, was essentially a male society of eight gods who lived on the sacred mountain (Olympus) under the monarchical rule of Zeus, the father of gods and men, and the most exalted of rulers. His divine functions included control of the weather, the giving of rain, and the destruction of his enemies by hurling thunderbolts at them. He and his companions ate, slept, married, fought, and thwarted one another as superhuman mortals. Thus, Dr. Gilbert Murray regards them as

'the mountain gods of the old invading Northmen, the chieftains and princes, each with his *comitatus*, or loose following of retainers and minor chieftains, who broke in upon the ordered splendours of the Aegean palaces, and still more important, on the ordered simplicity of tribal life in the pre-Hellenic villages of the mainland.'³

¹ Virolleaud, *Revue Biblique* (1931), pp. 32 ff. Syria (1931), xii, 193 ff. T. Gaster, *Folk-Lore* (1933), pp. 379. *Journal Royal Asiatic Society* (1932), pp. 857 ff.

² Oesterley, *Myth and Ritual*, pp. 111 ff. Johnson, *The Labyrinth* (Lond., 1935), pp. 73 ff.

³ *Five Stages in Greek Religion* (Oxford, 1925), pp. 66 ff.

The characteristic feature of the Minoan-Mycenaean substratum, on the other hand, was the worship of the Mother-Goddess under various forms and symbols common to the entire distribution of this cult from Mohenjo-daro in the Indus valley, through Elam and Mesopotamia, to Egypt and Crete, and in Western Europe apparently going back to the Aurignacian phase of the Upper Palaeolithic in prehistoric times. Long before the poems of Homer were composed and subsequently written down between 850 and 750 B.C., this female cultus was established in Greece. While the early history of Demeter, the Earth or Corn Mother of Eleusis, is obscure, it seems that at a very remote period she was connected with a vegetation ritual celebrated to increase the fertility of the soil and to commemorate the return of the Earth-goddess in the spring, as in the Tammuz legend. With the break-up of the old social order in the sixth century B.C., the peasants who migrated to the towns introduced into Athens their worship of Demeter and her daughter Persephone, or Kore, the youthful maiden of the meadows and corn-fields of the Rarian plane. This cult goes back probably to Mycenaean times, and attracted an increasing number of votaries for over a thousand years.¹

Our knowledge of the precise details of the things done and the words spoken in the Hall of Initiation at Eleusis, and at the other mysteries celebrated in honour of such divinities as Dionysos, Attis, and Isis, and in the Orphic brotherhoods, is very imperfect and derived from late sources. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that the vogue of these secret cults was mainly due to the assurance they gave to their initiates of a blissful immortality in union with a divine hero who, like the king in the ancient ritual pattern, had passed through death to life. In the tumultuous Thraco-Phrygian worship of Dionysos, in contrast to the refined and decorous Hellenic solemnities at Eleusis, this union was achieved by wild music and frantic dances in which frenzied maenads tore in pieces a bull or calf and devoured the flesh raw.²

¹ Foerster, *Der Raub und die Rückkehr der Persephone* (Stuttgart, 1874), pp. 37 ff. A. Baumeister, *Hymni Homerici* (Leipsic, 1860).

² Farnell, *Cult of the Greek States* (Oxford, 1909), v, 88 ff. J. Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion* (Camb., 1922), pp. 363 ff.

If enthusiastic orgies of this character made no appeal to Greeks of the Homeric tradition, they awoke an unearthly longing in the hearts of the mystically minded, who thereby sought to surmount the barrier separating man from the supernatural order and to find a union with the spirit-world. As Professor Nilsson says,

'there exists in every man, however humble his station, a dormant desire to enter into communion with the divine, to feel himself lifted up from the temporal into the spiritual. This form of ecstasy found its herald in the god who, with Apollo, impressed himself most strongly upon the religious feeling of the age, viz., Dionysos.'¹

In the Homeric tradition the gods were the guardians of such morality as existed, but at most it was a set of rules determining the relations between superiors and inferiors, mainly of a ritual character. Moreover, so long as it was believed that all men passed at death into the same gloomy underworld ruled by Pluto, irrespective of their conduct on earth, and the gods were partakers with man in human weaknesses, it was difficult for religion to become intimately connected with morality. Primitive may have been the setting and ecstatic the methods of the Mysteries, but at least they offered initiates a personal religion in which satisfaction and salvation were sought and found in that divine union which is the goal of all mysticism.

In all ages the crying need of the soul is for relief from a sense of 'sin' (however the concept may be interpreted) and a renewal of spiritual dynamic through some concrete religious experience and institution. Because the Mysteries offered salvation to initiates by ceremonial purification, ascetic practices, and special knowledge, they were able to supply what was lacking equally in the Olympian religion and the metaphysics of the Athenian philosophical schools. Philosophers like Diogenes and Plato might pour scorn upon votaries who lived by doctrines and rites professing to purify from evil independent of moral considerations so that an initiated thief secured a more blissful hereafter than an uninitiated just man, but the cultus spread because it met a deep-seated human need. To be led by an initiating priest from strength to strength and stage to

¹ M. P. Nilsson, *A History of Greek Religion* (Oxford, 1925), p. 205.

stage along the death and resurrection mystery path, gave assurance in life's pilgrimage here and hope beyond the grave. Indeed, it was from Orphism that Plato himself derived his notion of the dual nature of man, made up of a divine soul fettered to a mortal hindering body during its present existence.¹

Reincarnation and the Way of Deliverance.—In the Orphic conception of reincarnation we encounter the first attempt to introduce in the higher religions of the West the idea of transmigration and a moralization of the hereafter. Starting from the notion of original sin and the theory of the body as an impure prison-house of the soul, an elaborate ritual arose in which salvation consisted in a sacramental identification with the Saviour-god (Dionysos) and the complete eradication of evil through a series of rebirths.² The quasi-philosophical sect founded at Samos by Pythagoras (582–500 B.C.) similarly made the goal release from the wheel of existence, but while it coupled initiation and asceticism with the doctrine of transmigration, the primary aim was to produce order in the soul by living in harmony with the fundamental principle in the universe. It only remained, therefore, for Plato to equate the rational pre-existent 'psyche' with the Absolute and the world of ideas, which alone have true reality, to make the mystery tradition the basis of a new philosophical approach to reality. But redemption by knowledge of the ideal world involves an ethical transformation of character unknown in Orphism. The path of philosophic virtue based on reason is a life lived in conformity with knowledge of unchanging reality and the values of the ideal world; a world of absolute goodness, absolute truth, absolute beauty. The end of moral action is moral endeavour for its own sake because it is right and not for any hope of reward here or hereafter. For Plato this alone is the way of salvation—the *summum bonum*.

Unlike the Greek philosophers, the Indian mystics regarded the attainment of knowledge not as the ideal but merely as the means by which release from physical existence can be secured through a process of reincarnation. By the abstraction of the

¹ *Cratylus*, 399 f.; *Gorgias*, 492 E–493 E; *Phaedo*, 63; *Republic*, x, 614 ff; *Phaedrus*, 248; *Timaeus*, 41 ff.

² O. Gruppe, 'Orpheus' in Roscher, *Lex. d. gr. rom. Myth.* (Leipsic, 1884). *Orpheus, Fragms.* 210 ff., 115.

idea of *Brahman*, or the external source of the universe, from the law of sacrifice (*ṛta*), the Absolute was established as a metaphysical principle with which the inner self of man, or *Atman*, was identified. This constituted the essence of Hindu monism in the philosophical treatises called the Upanishads (800–600 B.C.). Although several contradictory systems of thought are combined in this idealistic system, the 'self' and the 'not-self' are resolved into a pantheistic unity as the manifestation of the same Reality from which the Absolute emerges as the all-inclusive Ultimate Principle, neither Brahman nor Atman by themselves but transcending both. On this hypothesis, the highest quest of man becomes the realisation of the real self as free from all changing finite illusory phenomena (*maya*), and the law of *Karma*, or the succession of actions and deeds resulting from life in this world. The ultimate end is absorption into the Absolute, when at last the 'redeemed' soul cries in triumph: 'That thou art! I am Brahman.'¹

In Buddhism this pantheistic doctrine of emancipation reaches its climax in the denial of the self as a stable entity since character rather than the soul is said to transmigrate. The Upanishadic conception of the Atman becomes a series of distinct or dissimilar momentary states of existence, and at death the Karma collected in this life is transferred to another body, either human or animal. This process continues till at length the passionless peace of Nirvana (or Nibbana, in the Pali form of the term) is attained; that is to say, a 'heaven of nothingness' secured by the 'unmaking of the self.' According to Gotama the Buddha, desire is the root cause of suffering (existence being equated with pain). Therefore, the cessation of sorrow can only be gained when all craving for things audible and visible (i.e., of renewed life) has been destroyed by knowledge of the 'Four Noble Truths' concerning sorrow, its cause and its suppression. To this end the disciple must follow the 'Eightfold Path,' consisting of right belief, right aspiration, right speech, right conduct, right occupation, right effort, right thought, right concentration. In short, every man must

¹ Cf. P. Deussen, *Philosophy of the Upanishads* (Edin., 1906), pp. 38 ff., 85 ff., 157 ff., 340 f. S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy* (Lond., 1927), i, 320. M. Hiriyanna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy* (Lond., 1932), pp. 48 ff.

work out his own salvation by a method of the training of the self and the conquering of the ten errors, or evil states of mind, by which the soul is deluded and hindered in attaining its ultimate release. 'To him who has finished the Path and passed beyond sorrow, who has freed himself on all sides, and thrown away every fetter, there is no more fever of grief.' Thus, and only thus, can peace at the last be secured.¹

Ethical Monotheism.—In striking contrast to oriental pantheism and the way of Deliverance, is the ethical monotheism which became the characteristic feature of prophetic thought in Israel from the eighth century B.C. Like the Upanishadic reaction to the Brahmanic law of sacrifice, the Hebrew monotheists repudiated the ancient ritual pattern and endeavoured to establish a spiritual religion deriving its inspiration from the revelation of the desert God of Sinai independent of the influence of the Babylonian, Egyptian and Syrian cults associated with the Palestinian shrines ('high places'). In every age it seems there have always been those who have attached to the notion of a Supreme Being a value superior to that of all other gods, spirits, ancestors, totems and the like; a value that may well accord with the realisation of the divine in the highest sense attainable in a specific cultural level.² This universal monotheistic tendency appears to be more fundamental than any final product of an evolutionary system from animism through polytheism to a belief in one God by a process of simplification and abstraction, as suggested by Frazer.³ Rather is it the emotional evaluation of the 'mysterium tremendum' in the intuitive realisation of a Power awful and mysterious as the ground of the universe.

While this conception of God appears to be recurrent among primitive and civilized peoples as the product of a certain type of religious experience and emotion, normally confined to

¹ Rhys Davids, *Sacred Books of the East*, ii, 341. Horner, *The Early Buddhist Theory of Man Perfected* (Lond., 1936).

² Andrew Lang first called attention to the existence of High Gods among low races in his *Making of Religion* (Lond., 1898), pp. 164 ff. Fr. Schmidt has since collected an enormous amount of material on the subject in his massive work *Ursprung der Gottesidee*, summarised in *The Origin and Growth of Religion* (Lond., 1931). Cf. also Radin, *Monotheism among Primitive Peoples* (Lond., 1924), and James, in *Sociological Review* (July, 1935), xxvi, 328 ff.

³ *The Worship of Nature*, pp. 9 ff.

particular individuals or selected groups in a community, it remained for the Hebrew prophets to reveal transcendent Deity in terms of the Holy One of Israel, the Eternal Lord of all the earth, Maker and Sustainer of all things, Who worked out His purposes through historical events. It was because the ancient ritual order conflicted with this interpretation of ethical monotheism that they found it incompatible with the worship of Yahweh, as they conceived Him as a purely moral and spiritual Being. Nevertheless, as we have seen, the Mystery idea was very deeply laid in the religious consciousness of the human race, and it was revived in post-Exilic Judaism in the apocalyptic Messianic theology which became prominent during and after the stirring years of the Maccabaeon Age. Moreover, if the Servant of Yahweh destined to accomplish his mission through humiliation and suffering was not actually a Messianic figure, he preserved the essential features of the defeated yet victorious Saviour-god. Thus, he is represented as the Davidic King equated with Yahweh who at the New Year Festival (i.e., the Feast of Tabernacles) fulfilled the rôle of the suffering servant, and after a ritual humiliation, like the Babylonian king, he triumphed over his enemies and brought salvation to his people.¹

The Christian Synthesis.—In the Jewish apocalyptic theology the same elements recur, except that the Messiah does not pass through death to life. As Professor Hooke has pointed out, it is this important omission that differentiates Jewish and Christian apocalyptic; ² the death and resurrection of the slain Lamb restoring a fundamental element in the ancient ritual pattern. Nevertheless, despite a superficial resemblance in thought and imagery in Christianity and the pagan Mystery religions, the fundamental differences in the two systems are more significant than their similarities. Since it was to the Hebrew prophetic movement that our Lord and the first generation of the Church made their primary appeal in justification of His claims, it was to ethical monotheism rather than to the Mystery theology that Christianity looked for redemption. Moreover, though St. Paul employed Mystery phraseology to

¹ Cf. Johnson, *The Labyrinth*, pp. 100 ff. Oesterley, *Myth and Ritual*, pp. 122 ff.

² *The Labyrinth*, p. 232.

commend the Faith to the Gentiles, in his teaching on justification, the doctrine of the Spirit, the Church and the Sacraments, he was essentially a mystic (2 Cor. xii.) and thought in apocalyptic terms of a 'New Age' and *parousia*. The redeemed belonged to a new order filled with a new life because Jesus Christ had come in the flesh, and His life, death and resurrection were historical facts rather than seasonal rites centring in legendary beings. By initiation into this Mystery, the baptized were already translated to the life of the age to come.

A comparative study of religion reveals a fundamental urge within the human heart to overcome the disabilities of decay, disease and death, and a craving for life continuous and ever renewing. Therefore, throughout the ages ways and means have been devised, mainly through a ritual technique, to enable the human pilgrim to advance with hope and confidence despite the hazards and vicissitudes of his earthly career in an adverse environment. Even the Indian ascetic ideal of emancipation from the welter of unsatisfied cravings proved to be only a temporary expedient, since in Vaishnavistic and Saivistic Hinduism and Mahayana Buddhism salvation by divine grace replaced in popular religion the negative attitude to life. But in Christianity a new positive ideal emerged grounded in unique ethical and spiritual values. For the Christian the battle fought and won on Calvary was no ritual combat between gods in a seasonal drama to secure the prosperity of the community and the revivification of nature. Rather was it the sequel to a life lived and laid down in perfect surrender to a great and noble ideal, pursued with singleness of aim and steadfastness of purpose. In the higher order of reality Christ conquered and became the focal point of the process of redemption till the new age should dawn and all shadows of the earthly struggle flee away. Then death would be swallowed up in victory. In the meantime He was able to offer to His initiates a renewal of spiritual life and a regeneration of ethical outlook to a degree unknown and unattainable in any other system. This was the Faith which was destined to establish a new era in the Graeco-Roman Empire, and eventually to overcome the world.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- BAILEY, C.: *Phases in the Religion of Ancient Rome*. Oxford, 1932.
- BARTLETT, F. C.: *Psychology and Primitive Culture*. Cambridge, 1923.
- BREASTED, J. H.: *Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt*. London, 1912.
- BUDGE, E. A. W.: *From Fetish to God in Ancient Egypt*. London, 1934.
- COOK, S. A.: *The Study of Religions*. London, 1914.
- CRAWLEY, A. E.: *The Mystic Rose*. London, 1902. (New Edition by T. BESTERMAN, 1927.)
- *The Tree of Life*. London, 1905.
- CUMONT, F.: *Les Religions orientales dans le paganisme Romaine*. Paris 1909.
- DAVIDS, MRS. T. W. RHYS: *Buddhism*. London, 1912. *Manual of Buddhism*. 1932.
- DAVIDS, T. W. RHYS: *Buddhism, its history and Literature*. New York, 1896.
- DEUSSEN, P.: *Philosophy of the Upanishads*. Edinburgh, 1906.
- DURKHEIM, E.: *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*. London, 1913.
- ERMAN, A.: *Handbook of Egyptian Religion*. London, 1907.
- FARNELL, L. R.: *The Cult of the Greek States*. Oxford, 1896-1910. (5 vols.)
- FOUCART, M. P.: *Les grands mystères d'Eleusis*. Paris, 1900.
- FRAZER, J. G.: *The Golden Bough*. 3rd Edn., 13 vols. London, 1911-1937. Abridged Edn. in 1 vol. 1922.
- *The Worship of Nature*. London, 1926.
- *Totemica*, A supplement to 'Totemism and Exogamy.' 1937.
- *Early History of Kingship*. London, 1905.
- FREUD, S.: *Totem and Taboo*. New York, 1918.
- GENNEP, A. VAN: *Les Rites de passage*. Paris, 1909.
- HARRISON, J. E.: *Ancient Art and Ritual*. (H.U.L.) London, 1913.
- *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*. Cambridge, 1907.
- *Themis*. Cambridge, 1912.
- HOCART, A. M.: *Kingship*. Oxford, 1927.
- HOOKE, S. H.: Editor of *Myth and Ritual*. Oxford, 1933.
- *The Labyrinth*. London, 1935.
- HOPKINS, E. W.: *Origin and Evolution of Religion*. New Haven, 1923.
- JAMES, E. O.: *Origins of Sacrifice*. London, 1933.
- *Christian Myth and Ritual*. London, 1933.
- *Comparative Religion*. London, 1938.
- JEVONS, F. B.: *Introduction to the History of Religion*. London, 1896.
- KARSTEN, R.: *The Origins of Religion*. London, 1935.
- KENNEDY, H. A. A.: *St. Paul and the Mystery Religions*. London, 1913.
- LANG, A.: *Myth, Ritual and Religion*. London, 1899.
- *The Making of Religion*. London, 1898.
- LANGDON, S. H.: *Tammuz and Ishtar*. Oxford, 1914.

- LEUBA, J. H.: *The Psychological Origin and Nature of Religion*. London, 1921.
- LEVY-BRUHL, L.: *How Natives Think*. London, 1926.
- LOWIE, R. H.: *Primitive Religion*. London, 1925.
- MALINOWSKI, B.: 'Magic, Science and Religion' in *Science, Reality and Religion* (edited by J. NEEDHAM), London, 1926.
- *Myth in Primitive Psychology*. London, 1926.
- *The Foundations of Faith and Morals*. (Riddell Memorial Lecture.) Oxford, 1936.
- MARETT, R. R.: *The Threshold of Religion*. London, 1914.
- *Faith, Hope and Charity in Primitive Religion*. Oxford, 1932.
- *Sacraments of Simple Folk*. Oxford, 1933.
- MOORE, G. F.: *History of Religions*. Edinburgh, 1914.
- MORET, A.: *Du caractère religieux de la Royauté Pharaonique*. Paris, 1902.
- *Mystères Egyptiens*. Paris, 1913.
- MURRAY, G.: *Five Stages in Greek Religion*. Oxford, 1925.
- NILSSON, M. P.: *A History of Greek Religion*. Oxford, 1925.
- PERRY, W. J.: *Children of the Sun*. London, 1923.
- OESTERLEY, W. O. E.: Editor of *The Age of Transition*, Vol. I. London, 1937.
- OTTO, R.: *The Idea of the Holy*. Oxford, 1928.
- RADHAKRISHNAN, S.: *Indian Philosophy*. London, 1927. *Eastern Religions and Western Thought*. Oxford, 1939. *Primitive Religion*. London, 1938.
- RADIN, P.: *Monotheism among Primitive Peoples*. London, 1924.
- RAGLAN, LORD: *The Hero*. London, 1937.
- ROHDE, E.: *Psyche*. London, 1925.
- ROSE, H. J.: *A Handbook of Greek Mythology*. London, 1928.
- SCHWEITZER, A.: *Paul and His Interpreters*. London, 1912.
- SCHMIDT, W.: *Der Ursprung der Gottesidee*. Munich, 1912–36.
- *The Origin and Growth of Religion*. London, 1931.
- SELBY, W. B.: *The Psychology of Religion*. Oxford, 1924.
- SÖDERBLOM, N.: *The Living God*. London, 1933.
- SMITH, W. R.: *The Religion of the Semites*. (3rd Edn. by S. A. COOK.) London, 1927.
- SPENCER, W. B. and GILLEN, F. J.: *Native Tribes of Central Australia*. London, 1898.
- *The Arunta*. London, 1927.
- THOMAS, E. J.: *History of Buddhist Thought*. London, 1933.
- TYLOR, E. B.: *Researches into the Early History of Mankind*. London, 1865.
- *Primitive Culture*. London, 1871. (2 vols.)
- WEBB, C. C. J.: *Group Theories of Religion*. London, 1915.
- WESTERMARCK, E.: *Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*. London, 1905.
- WUNDT, W.: *Völkerpsychologie*. Leipzig, 1909.

III
THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

by

M. C. D'ARCY, S.J.

Master of Campion Hall, Oxford

'It is not to the discredit of religion that we should use our
God-given intellect as far as may be.'

Page 139.

III

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

As a specific and separate subject of study the philosophy of religion is of comparatively recent growth, and even now it cannot be said to be completely independent. Psychology and the Comparative Study of Religions are closely allied with it and at times tend to usurp its functions. That religion should have taken so long a time to be separated off into a special science need not surprise us. The splitting up of the old cosmology into the separate physical sciences was not accomplished without much labour and effort ; psychology is still in the throes of parturition and aesthetics is a new-comer into philosophy. Religion because of its sacred and exalted character had to become profane before it could be submitted to the scientific and surgical treatment which is the ideal in modern thought.

The views, however, of the ancients on religion cannot be neglected, and it may be that their attitude was more appropriate to the subject than the modern one. In Classical Greece and in the Roman Empire philosophers discussed the meaning of the word ' religion ' and tended to identify it with theology and the metaphysical pattern they conceived the world to have. To take a conspicuous example, Aristotle called his great work, now known as the *Metaphysics*, by the name of *First Philosophy* or *Theology* or *Metaphysics*. God is the supreme perfection of being, the unmoved mover, on whom ' the heavens and the earth depend ', a pure unchanging and self-regarding activity of thought which stirs all else by love of it. This, at first sight, is a philosophy, but scarcely a religious philosophy, and has little or no connection with contemporary Greek religion. He is more interested in thinking out the notion of the good and searching out the first and ultimate principle of

being than in sifting the popular religious ideas and practices of his day. It is worth noticing, nevertheless, that in the heyday of Greek speculation more interest is shown in the nature of God than in the nature of man. It is man who lags behind and receives scurvy treatment till Christianity sets him in a worthy perspective.

There are other philosophers who are more religious than Aristotle. Xenophanes is an early sceptic ready to jeer at the relativity of human notions of the gods, but Empedocles can be called a religious poet and Plato often represents religious passion at its best. Sudden flashes of religious insight and feeling are not wanting in Aristotle, but it is Plato who expressed the religious yearning of men for communion with God and wrote of life as 'a flight' to God and of our singing on our way to God at death like swans. There is not, however, any more than in Aristotle, a philosophy of religion in Plato. He too ignored the evidence of religious worship around him, unless we are to attribute more to the influence of Orphism on him than is usually supposed. The philosophers no doubt felt that the God of their theology could have little resemblance with the gods so ignorantly worshipped by the multitude.

The early Roman religion could have served as a useful basis for a philosophical enquiry. The Romans were not, however, philosophers, and by the time of the end of the Republic the old beliefs had decayed and the cultured Roman was either a sceptic or predominantly a moralist. To the Stoic God was the *anima mundi* and the rational principle and law underlying all phenomena. Such a God could with difficulty be worshipped, but the language of the philosophers is at times coloured by religious passion, as for example: 'All harmonises with me which is in harmony with thee, O universe. Nothing for me is too early nor too late which is in due season for thee. For thee are all things, in thee are all things; to thee all things return.' Seneca could see, like Kant, some hidden connexion between the starry heavens and the moral law within, and Epictetus touches us with his spiritual longings. There is, however, no real attempt to answer the fundamental questions of religion and give it a meaning. What was wanting was a firm religion free from the grosser superstitions and expressing in its literature clear testimony of the desires and

thoughts of man about God and himself. Such a testimony was provided by the Jews in the Bible. There the growth of religious ideas can be traced, a high ideal is inculcated and the main theme throughout all the books is the one high God, Jehovah, and the destiny of the chosen people.

The literature of Israel and the philosophy of Greece did not, however, make a permanent and vital contact until the coming of Christianity. The Christian religion claimed to be entirely new and no mere fulfilment of what had gone before. Nevertheless it took over the Old Testament and in the marshalling of its beliefs borrowed the best in Greek thought and Roman law. All the conditions were ready for the development of a philosophy of religion, abundance of data of the highest quality and minds trained in philosophy; and yet no such development took place. Instead, the Christian thinkers, relying on the sources provided to them by their faith and reason, confined themselves to two aims, the first to provide a rational and historical proof of the truth of the Christian faith; the second, to explore so far as was permissible the knowledge which God had given of himself and the demands which he had made on them. God had given them a glimpse of his 'unsearchable riches' and had set before them a way of life which in its novelty and height excelled all that man could possibly have desired in heart or mind. The right order in their mind was to give ear to the good tidings of truth, to follow the way prescribed and so to enter into a new life. They did not begin with themselves and define religion in terms of their religious experiences, nor ask in what way the desires of their hearts must be answered. They never thought that religion might be a philosophy which began with their own human judgment; they thought that a divine judgment had been passed and a promise made by God. As a result, for fifteen hundred years religion was the main preoccupation of writers and a vast quantity of material was produced, the surviving part of which can still be seen filling the cellars and bookshelves of the great libraries of the world. Of the many known writers two have been accepted as representative, St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas. The first introduced the soul into literature and has left us the portrait of Everyman christened and in love with God. To him everybody must go

who wishes to understand the meaning of religious experience. The second, Aquinas, has left us the most complete and systematic theology of the Christian religion ever written. But neither of these two, nor any other of the Christian writers before the Renaissance, employed the same method as is now used in a philosophy of religion. A change in aim as well as in method has taken place. The mediaeval was concerned with the Christian religion as the exemplar and truth of all religions ; the modern starts with the fact that there are men and women who call themselves or are called religious. As their experiences and beliefs show an immense variety it is necessary to sift them, and in order to do this fairly the scientific philosopher must approach the subject without any prejudices. As Dr. Stanley Cook writes :

‘ There can be a critical, objective or scientific treatment which considers, not the goal or destiny of things, but men’s beliefs and theories on the subject ; not the ultimate facts, but men’s convictions of them ; not the final, objective reality, but religious and related conceptions of this reality.’

This scientific study of religion came into being after the Renaissance. Religious controversies forced thinkers to consider new points, however erroneous, and philosophy and science withdrew themselves from the tutelary overlordship of the faith. Sciences divided off from the parent stem and from one another, and in the growing secularisation of culture it is no wonder that the sacred mysteries of religion came to be examined from a lay point of view. Moreover, the emphasis laid by certain of the reformers on faith as an experience independent of reason and the success of the new mathematical methods in physical science caused many to abandon reason in the religious field. They took off their armour and hoped they were invisible. Kant thought that he could save religion by withdrawing it from the jurisdiction of the understanding and making it a postulate of the moral life. Under the protection of his name many defenders of religion have accepted this line of defence and developed the theory of a religious sense which has analogies with a moral and an aesthetic sense, and they have been to some degree supported by eminent Protestant thinkers, amongst whom Schleiermacher and Ritschl have

probably been the most influential. The former picked out the relation of dependence as the specific characteristic of religion, a relation which manifested itself primarily in feeling. Ritschl was equally opposed to theoretical religion and any form of metaphysics, but he went further than Schleiermacher in admitting value-judgments and in trying to guarantee inner feeling by reference to a standard, which is for him the Kingdom of God as revealed by Christ. Further knowledge has corrected many of the assumptions of these two thinkers, but the principles of their views are still widely accepted. The most recent advance has been in the analysis of this 'religious sense' and its object. At the end of the nineteenth century the preoccupation with 'immanence' by pragmatist and modernist led to an over-emphasis on the subjective side of religion. This has now been corrected in an extreme form by Karl Barth and less radically by such thinkers as Von Hügel, Otto and Karl Heim.

According to Von Hügel any full-blooded religion must have in it an element of the 'given' and admit the 'transcendent'. Immanence needs the fresh air of heaven if it is not to asphyxiate, and again every religious cult must pay proper attention to at least three factors if it is not to stifle the aspirations of man. It must be historical and embodied in an external organisation and so meet man's bodily and sensitive faculties; it must be rich in emotions and associations and mystical, and there must be a cold zone where the reason can have full play. To Otto is accorded the credit of finding a specific object which is in some way directly apprehended or felt by the religious man. This object he calls the 'numinous' and he tries to distinguish it from all other apprehensions, moral or aesthetic. In aesthetic experience we are made aware of the beautiful and in moral of good and evil. The numinous is not composed of these; it is more awful and mysterious and in every religion it is expressed by the awe which is felt before the holy.

If this discovery of the nature of religious experience be a genuine one, a philosophy of religion must use it as a starting-point. But before entering into a discussion of this one other theory must be mentioned. It is that contained in the Hegelian system and especially in *The Philosophy of Religion*. Hegel, by reason of the size and complexity of his work, is the

one modern rival of Aristotle and Aquinas. It shows a return to rationalism, but a rationalism which, like that of Spinoza, takes the human level of thinking as its pattern and standard. Spinoza had left no room for a transcendent and living God in his abstract geometrical universe, and just because human thinking is necessarily abstract Hegel by identifying the real with the rational also found it difficult to do justice to the conception of God and religion. He claimed that religion was the supreme object of philosophy and he calls God the Absolute Spirit. But this Absolute Spirit differs markedly from the Aristotelian God. It is no longer separate and no longer complete in independence of the universe. It is realised in the world and constitutes the perfect whole, the last word, so to say, which sums up perfectly all the inadequate though gradually improving expressions of the nature of reality which preceded it. God is only not identified with 'all that is' in that reality has been but partially realised in the dry and dim idea of it expressed in that phrase. The followers of Hegel have never been able to free themselves from the suspicion of pantheism and of so rationalising religion as to destroy it. That even Hegel was aware of the danger of turning religion into a philosophy is shown by the steps he takes to avoid this danger; and it is interesting to find that in the end he falls back on the anti-intellectualist faith which he held as a Lutheran. The Absolute is the supreme object of philosophy; our thought of it is the highest attitude possible and therefore ought also to be the attitude of religion. But from this it would follow that religion and philosophy must be identical. No, says Hegel, the content is the same in both but the form in which the truth is expressed in religion is feeling. And so at the culminating point of the theory that the real is the rational we are wafted away to a region of feeling. In *The Philosophy of Religion* Hegel attempts to show the historical growth of religion, and his dialectic leads up to the perfect form of religious consciousness as expressed in Christianity. To some of his followers the most valuable contribution of Hegel lies in this insistence on the dynamism of thought and the insistence on history as its veritable expression. Gentile, for instance, regards all other ways of thinking of truth as abstractions, and by removing all the dead matter in Hegel is

able to find in the immediate judgment of the present the one expression which is living truth. God, in this view, is ever active, ever resuming all former acts in the present and it is better to conceive of him in terms of becoming than of being.

The radical weakness of this theology is that the way we have to think of reality and the reality are identified. My thought of nature is all the nature there is; my thought of God is all that God is at the moment. The water in the bucket of my mind is the ocean. The assumption is given the lie by all our experience, scientific, philosophic and religious. Knowledge is more like sailing round a distant island and making out its contours with a telescope. The shifts and devices of science are clearly due to our inability to comprehend the ultimate natures of physical objects. The language of science is symbolic and most of its hypotheses pragmatic. Philosophy, too, knows that deduction and induction, the discursive act of judgment, the mode of knowing through universal and particular all manifest a form of thinking which is through a glass and darkly. This infirmity is confirmed by the fact that we are unable to represent to ourselves the insensible and spiritual without the aid of some sensible symbol. There may be many modes of being of which we know nothing, whose nature we could never possibly understand. A true theory of human knowledge must be rooted in modesty and avoid the twin temptations of over-confidence and agnosticism. All genuine religious thought marvels at the high mystery in which God is hidden. His ways are not as our ways and His thoughts not as our thoughts.

For this reason the Hegelian philosophy of religion cannot do justice to the Christian faith, and we may now ask if the modern conception of a philosophy of religion is worthy of the name. To many such a study means the examination of the truth and value of religious experience. It makes with the moral and aesthetic experience a trinity, and it has been the last of the three to receive recognition. As such the study is of questionable value. Others again mean by it what ought more correctly to be called the psychology of religion. If valuable results can be discovered in such an enquiry they then might provide material for a philosophy. The same holds true of the Comparative Study of religion. The modern student has

this advantage over the past that he is now in possession of a vast quantity of material. The Christian thinkers were not interested in other forms of religion. They were inclined to divide all they knew into two forms, natural and supernatural. By natural they meant the efforts of man to know and serve God without the aid of any direct revelation from God. They took for granted that reason could by its own light know some truths about God, and as God was their last end it was natural that they should be moved also to serve him. In fact, however, owing to the imbecility and sinfulness of man natural religion would usually be stained with superstition and idolatry, and to St. Augustine and other Christian thinkers the forms of worship they saw and knew around them provided ample proof of the justice of their harsh verdict. In theory, however, it was quite easy for them to allow for holiness and special divine assistance outside the visible Church. The Pauline doctrine of grace gave leave for this ; and as the human race had been destined from its origin to a supernatural order and end, it followed that no human being had ever historically been in the status of the ' natural man '.¹

Now that the religion of almost every country and time has been examined we are in a far better position to know the extent of man's knowledge and holiness outside of Christianity, and the wealth of data has at least the negative value of preventing us from jumping to conclusions. We are able, also, to find certain common features in all genuine forms of religious worship and prayer, and this brings us nearer to a satisfactory definition of the meaning of religion. These data, also, not only serve to distinguish the chief characteristics, they enable us to examine more profitably many of the problems which arise in treating of religious subjects, such as the place of knowledge in religious experience and its connexion with emotion, the presence of a special sense or awareness, the form and value of mystical experience and the use of symbols to record beliefs. Nor does it matter whether one approaches

¹ Human beings are, in fact, according to Christian Revelation, fallen from grace ; but philosophy is not directly concerned with this, any more than it bothers with the fact that human beings are always born of some particular race and family. But, indirectly, a philosophy of man might err by the omission. The concept of the noble savage might serve as an example and warning.

these questions with the certainty that the Christian faith is uniquely true or with a neutral mind, so long as the evidence is fairly presented and fairly interpreted. The popular idea that a true scientific enquiry demands the suspension of all belief is unfounded, and in such a vital subject as religion there are few who do not start with a prejudice for or against it. That does not matter so long as the evidence for the conclusion is presented for all to see and criticise. No one can deny that strong partisans, like Pascal, Kierkegaard and Newman have been amongst the foremost contributors to an understanding of the religious attitude. The best philosophy of religion might well be written by a saint.

The position, then, reached is this. Philosophic conceptions of God and man have existed for a long time. The ancients, however, confined themselves for the most part to thinking out the nature of the supreme being in the metaphysical system they had espoused ; they were not so interested in the religion practised around them. The Christian thinkers were too certain of the truth of their faith and its superiority to all others for them to institute an enquiry into the common factors of all religious experience. As their religion was an historical one they did, however, rely on the evidence of their own cult, and with the help of the best philosophical systems they knew they investigated many of the questions which must fall under any philosophy of religion. Time has enabled us to separate off into different departments of knowledge what before were treated together, and the steady secularisation of all science has led to a new critical study of all forms of religious belief and all religious experience. The rich material falls easily into three divisions, the first two, the Comparative Study and the Psychology of Religion being preliminary to the third. The third has no universally accepted form. But most, I think, will admit that it must embrace the following subjects : the object of religion, the existence and nature of that object and its relation to man ; the meaning of religious experience and the mode, whether of knowledge, by intuition or inference, or of feeling, whereby we are brought into contact with the object of our experience ; the form, if any, whereby God can communicate with man and assist man to his end ; the truth and value of any definite formal worship and doctrine, and in

particular, of the Christian Revelation with its emphasis on faith and a supernatural dispensation.

It is impossible to answer all these questions briefly and at the same time adequately, but the main lines of answer can be indicated. The origins of religion, the interconnection of its early forms and the possible laws of its development belong to the study of comparative religion. But in that historical growth a philosopher can observe certain marked stages. In the first, as Christopher Dawson has pointed out,

‘there was a profound sense that man lived not by his own strength and knowledge, but by his acting in harmony with the divine cosmic powers, and this harmony could only be attained by sacrifice and at the price of blood ; whether the sacrifice of virility, as in Asia Minor, or of the first-born children, as in Syria, or of the life of the king himself, as we seem to see dimly in the very dawn of history throughout the near East.’

Man, so to speak, swam with the current and his whole life was pledged to the gods. Kings and priests were one or connected in their offices, nature was the gods’ territory, the fruits of the land were given back to them and nothing escaped their cosmic influence. Already here we have a spiritual if childish credulity, and like a child’s the belief is without doubts and misgivings. The sense of sin, however, which is shown in the forms of sacrifice, leads on to the second stage. In that next stage is the awakened conscience and consciousness, when man’s moral ideals force him to distinguish the good and the holy, which are the attributes of the god, from much that passes on the earth. The world is passing ; there is much evil and little recompense in this life ; the law within clashes with the laws of nature and human law without. This was the period of detachment, of disillusion, of flight from the world and sense, from the visible to the invisible and unchanging. It is described in the famous division of the two cities by St. Augustine. ‘Two loves built two cities . . .’ But whereas the Platonic teachers of Augustine saw no point of contact between the two cities, Augustine inherited a religion where the Word was made Flesh, and he and the Christian thinkers who succeeded him knew that the Christian faith ‘resumed all things in Christ’. Later came another stage, which some would

call that of the decay of religion, when man's growing control over nature and the confidence in his own powers made him sceptical of anything beyond human will and knowledge.

If this be the course which religion has taken it would seem that religion is at first the expression of the spirit of man in relation to some ultimate principle of power and goodness. In fact it has been defined as 'the totality of man's reactions upon what he feels as ultimate in the universe'. This is only a description, and a vague one, which would not be intelligible unless one had already some acquaintance with religion. A more positive description, therefore, would be that of Pinard de Boullaye :

'Objectively, religion is the sum total of beliefs and practices (or practical attitudes), which concern an objective reality or one conceived as such, whether singular or general, a reality which is supreme in some measure and in some way personal, one moreover on which man somehow or other recognises himself as dependent and with which he wishes to enter into relation. Subjectively, it can be defined as a way of thinking, feeling and acting, in short, a state of mind which corresponds with the beliefs and practices now to be indicated.'

In most modern descriptions it is the psychological aspect which is emphasised. That is dealt with in another place. That such a study is necessary and useful no one will deny, but it has grave limitations. The object of our love is not exhausted by the analysis of our emotion. As Dante saw, the soul reaches out to some ultimate love more real and substantial than any Beatrice, and if in this love there be exchange between two, our account of it will be singularly wanting when the chief giver is ignored.

Again, religion must be described in a way which gives full play to all man's activities, aspirational, intellectual as well as emotional, and no account will suffice which fastens exclusively on one or other of these activities. The researches of James, Delacroix, Leuba, Janet and others have been useful in sifting genuine religious experience from its counterfeits, and the work of Von Hügel, Otto, Max Scheler, Maurice Blondel, Girgensohn, and Bergson, for instance, have been of the greatest value in distinguishing within the whole experience

certain marked characteristics. That the holy inspires awe as well as fascination needed to be said ; that religion can sink into a closed system and needs to be revived by those who look ' beyond the flaming ramparts of the world ' is a warning given by Bergson which needs to be remembered ; and Émile Boutroux has admirably said that ' religion is the effort to grow, increase and transform the very basis of our being, by the help of that power which makes us share in a being other than our own and long to embrace the infinite itself ; love '. It is this infinite and transcendent being who must focus all our attention and give a proper perspective to our conception of religion. Just because of the modern tendency to heap together various worships and cults and produce an impersonal composite image of religion or of a religious man, we have to beware of thinking of the object of religion as abstract, as somehow comparable at best with the good or the beautiful, or reducible to a love of justice or humanity. Kant provided us with a high conception of duty, but it is something much more alive than duty which commands the religious act. No doubt morals are an excellent propaedeutic to religion, and there has never been an influential and persisting moral code without divine sanctions. That shows that in his moral life, as indeed in his intellectual life, man is handicapped unless the supreme and ultimate authority and truth be taken into account. When once man has distinguished himself from the world around him and has had to seek for the source of his duties and rights, he conceives of a moral order and is on the track of God. In the primitive religions there is the child's fear and trust in a being who may terrify as an ogre and inspire confidence like a father. In the second stage reflective consciousness confirms the early belief, but the attributes of the divine being are more clearly discerned. If there is an ideal which is at variance with the lower impulses of man and this kingdom is won by fighting against material indulgence and the urge of the instincts, there must be rules of this kingdom and a supreme ruler. The argument is simple and open to attack from the philosopher ; it is none the less an obvious conclusion and the only satisfactory one for those who take their lives seriously and have to have an immediate answer to their very present anxieties. They ask themselves, if the spirit has to control

the instincts and if there is a good to which they are obliged and if it is in thought that truth is found, then must not there be an order which does not perish and some purpose and end in spiritual endeavour? The realm of truth and the moral laws here unite and point to some complete and perfect ending to human life; they are the antechamber to the shrine which man has already erected out of the desires of his heart. Religion is something more than knowledge and duty combined, and to express it the word 'totality' has been used in the definition. But better than any definition is the cry of St. Augustine that 'thou hast made us for thyself and our hearts are uneasy until they rest in thee'. The primitive took for granted that life was a story with an author and an end; Plato took refuge in a myth as nearest to the truth, and the Christian poet saw all as a Divina Comedia, and in all and beyond all a living love 'which moves the sun and other stars'. The whole of man is engaged in religion and wishes as a person to meet the God for whom he was made. The force and anguish of the intensely religious Pascal arise out of this conviction. His desire could never be satisfied with the Cartesian philosophic neatness even if the argument were used to prove a God. The grandeur and misery of man were due to but one thing, that he was made for God and had made himself an exile, and it was the conviction that a merciful and loving God spoke within which refreshed him when in mathematics and philosophy he had thought of himself as just a thinking reed.

'Thou wouldst not be searching for me hadst thou not already found me,' here is the authentic note of religion, a note which recurs again and again in differing forms on the lips of the great lovers of God. It expresses a truth which is so intimate that it has never been properly elucidated in a philosophy. The saints and mystics have found a language to unveil some of the secrets, but they are concerned with what happens to the few and not with the truth, which is the possession of all, did they but know it. We are lucky in that St. Augustine had a passionate desire to understand the dependence of the soul on God. *Deum et animam scire cupio*; and it is from hints of his that we can perhaps learn most. The view is contained in germ in the saying of Aristotle that God moves

all by being the object of its love. Augustine develops the thought in many places as when he speaks of '*pondus meum amor meus*', of love as the bias of my being, and when after quoting the line, '*trahit sua quemque voluptas*,' he says that 'thou holdest out a green bough to a sheep and drawest it to thee. Nuts are shown to a child and it is drawn. Even what the child runs to, he is drawn to: drawn by love of it . . . drawn by the love of the heart.' And if earthly delights draw us thus are we not drawn by truth, 'to eat and drink wisdom, righteousness, truth and eternity'? The same thought is present in the beautiful image: 'The more the strings are stretched the higher in the scale they sound . . . Christ touched them, and the sweetness of truth rang out.' All things, then, are moved to their proper performance by love as iron filings by a magnet, but whereas it is only by an analogy that we can speak of inanimate things as acting out of a kind of love, there is in man a depth and want of which his conscious desires are the expression, and the immediate objects of these desires are symbols which provoke only a greater passion. We have an intellectual passion, shown in our love of truth and justice, and the horizon of it ever extends. And yet, if we knew not in some way what we already wanted we could not be so sure of the inadequacy of the symbols and we could not judge all the foretastes of it as unsatisfactory. There is a truth therefore in the saying that 'thou wouldst not be searching for me hadst thou not already found me'. And it is here that Augustine passes beyond the truth glimpsed by Aristotle, for his God is not impassive like the moon which draws the tides, but active, the One who loves first and makes our love. 'In order that we might receive that love whereby we should love, we were ourselves loved, while as yet we had it not . . .' and 'Thou who art more inward than my most inward self, hast set a law within my heart by thy spirit, as it were by thy fingers. . . .'

From these and many other passages we could construct a philosophy which would fit together the various pieces of religious experience as in a puzzle. But there is no language which can do it justice for this reason that language helps us by images of what are common and within our sensible experience, whereas here we are faced with a relation which is

quite unique and one, moreover, which has for its principal term an infinite being. This introduces the problem of the sufficiency of any language and any conception when applied to God. For the moment I will assume that such language is not just idle babbling, that words like 'creator', 'cause', 'transcendent', and 'immanent' convey some truth. The trouble is that they conceal as much as they reveal. Augustine suggests that God stirs us by love of him as the final cause and is the primary efficient cause of our being and our love, and that in this way God is, so to speak, athwart all our loves and known as present within as the hidden incentive and ideal which controls the yearning of our nature. If we use the language of philosophy we can transcribe this into the terms of first and final cause. To many this abstract language is distasteful because they naturally think of the causes which they know in experience. These produce results and the cause and the effect are on the same level and distinct from one another. The theologians correct this materialisation of the concept by informing us that the first cause is creative, that the being of the creature is kept from nothingness all the while by the conservation and concurrence of God, and that these latter two are identical with the act of creation. But the opaqueness of the explanation is proved by the number of false problems which are always vexing and deluding thinkers. We are asked, for instance, whether such a first cause can leave room for the full, proper, and individual activities of the effect, or again whether God is transcendent or immanent, personal or impersonal. They do not see that God's infinite act can never collide with what is finite, that his act is such that it must be more intimate, for example, than a man is to himself and that the divine being must be thought of in terms of personality as it is only the infirmity of our minds which makes us depersonalise and generalise what is spirit.

We are told by certain modern schools of philosophy that we must hold fast to sensible experience and never desert it for empty metaphysics. The truth is that we never have and never will have any knowledge of pure sensible experience, and the belief in it is nothing but a relic of the old faculty psychology. We are never mere sensitive beings; all our acts are human, with one or another of our activities predominating. It is as

intelligent human beings that we start and wisely start with experience, but just as we are inclined to see an evolution in the physical and animal kingdoms, so we should be able to detect an ascending series from the inanimate to the living and sensitive and spiritual forms of life, which point on to what may well be the exemplar of what is foreshadowed ; power such that it can create constant novelty without any loss or change in itself ; dominion such that there is no coercion. Divine causality is creative ; it liberates energies ; it gives and does not subtract and because, being perfect, it never enters into comparison or conflict with what is finite it remains transcendent and at the same time more immanent than any two finite beings can be with one another. The ground work of this conception must be causality, but because will is our highest experience of cause and God's causality is himself we can for our instruction translate that causality into a loving will, which is God's presence in the soul, the hidden mover, the object of our desire, in whose will is our peace and in whose love is our beatitude.

If some such philosophy be accepted then all the phenomena of religion will be found to fall into place, and even the aberrations of religious thought will be seen to have their explanation. If God be so intimate with the universe, that all natural things cry his name, it is to be expected that simple folk may confuse him with rivers and woods and mountains and stars which breathe his name, that man will feel haunted and be overcome with awe in certain places and before certain sites, and that thinkers will lapse into a pantheism when they wish to describe his nature. And, on the contrary, others will be overcome by the awful majesty of this divine being and by the thought of their own fugitive existence and the transitoriness of life ; all in comparison with him will seem as nothing. The calm reflective philosopher will be bound to frame his argument in terms of causality or dependence and trace the beginnings of things to a first cause, who is responsible for the existence and infinitely varied pageantry and meaning of the universe. A more sophisticated and suffering age may tire of the logic of this argument, but it will find the same argument unconsciously in the loneliness of its interior life and the moral and spiritual weakness of which it is so well aware. In so doing it speaks of

religious experience, but in reality it has but left the contingency of the baffling universe for the dependence and contingency of the individual human life. It is not good for man to be alone, and the desolation of the heart is a testimony of the existence and nature of God. Whether that testimony be by inference or some direct awareness has been often disputed, but here again it may be suggested that the answer lies in the kind of causality exerted by God. The religious lover is dissatisfied with an argument which starts with the known and arrives laboriously at the supposedly unknown. For him there is no labour, and God is more to him than all the universe, and besides, the heart has its reasons. . . . What his dissatisfaction comes to is this, that he is aware of the intimacy and special character of God's causality, God's loving stress on his being, and cannot liken it to the causes he reads of in scientific books. So far he is right. We do not think of our knowledge of our self or of other persons as on all fours with the discovery of a new metal or new star, and God, 'who is closer than hands and feet', may be known in a special way, but it does not follow that this is a direct awareness or experience. All the evidence points against this, except perhaps in the case of the great mystics, and even the great Christian mystics allow that they still live by faith and not by sight. But it would seem entirely in conformity with the view of God suggested above that many should more easily find him within than without, should speak of him as within the depths of the soul and as discernible athwart all their acts and loves.

It remains to pick up certain points in the above account. And first, religious experience. Some lay philosophers wish to treat this as on the same level as an ear for music and leave the subject to the psychologist. The only fact in their favour is that there are some people who claim that they have no religious experience. It is not certain of what they are thinking, but they are as much in error as a misanthrope who because of his lack of feeling for his fellow-men should absolve himself from all duties towards them. If God exists there is a duty towards him whatever be our inclinations, and to obey the commandments is to be religious. The majority of those who have practised religion down the ages have known or taken for granted that their welfare was bound up with their

carrying out the will of God, and the degree of their religious experience will have varied enormously on account of countless imponderable factors, parents, early associations, psycho-physical causes, effort and grace. No doubt psychologists have been able to isolate what is typical of the religious man, and in so doing they have furnished the means of proving the validity of his experience. For if it be true that this experience is not an amalgam of other types, then it must have its cause. It is the object which differentiates our reactions; a living presence produces on us a different effect from dead matter: it is because there is a moral order that we are indignant at wrong-doing and esteem justice, and it is because beauty is not just good or true or useful that we have a specific aesthetic emotion and appreciation. It follows, therefore, that there is still some other object if we are stirred to some special emotion and appreciation, and if the ingredients of that reaction are awe, adoration and love, that object must be awful and adorable and lovable, what, indeed, has gone by the name of the 'holy'.

The evidence of the saints and mystics will clearly be useful here as giving this experience at its highest. That is not to say that all the experience need be true, still less the report of it. The report is to some extent a post-mortem inquest, and therefore must always be tested by reason and extrinsic tests, and we are at liberty to doubt whether it is as direct an experience of God as it is sometimes claimed to be. We may put aside the strictly mystical experience as it is quite different from ordinary religious experience and may be due to a grace from God which is necessarily an incommunicable secret. The more common experiences most probably contain in them inferences which look like intuitions owing to the swiftness and certainty with which they occur. They are like to the knowledge we gain when we are attuned to some subject or to another's mind; the brilliant mathematician seems to see the conclusion in a flash, and we all can read immediately the expression on a dear friend's face. Love and familiarity make holy persons equally quick to see the hand of God, 'the shade of His hand outstretched caressingly'.

When, however, we wish to be as certain as possible that we are not deceived, and when we wish to convince others, it is to reason that we must turn. And this is the explanation of

why at the last there is no escape from the methods of proof adopted by the great philosophers. We are bound to sift our experience and give it a reasonable foundation. It is not to the discredit of religion that we should use our God-given intellect as far as may be. To do so is not to fall into rationalism. Rationalism errs in making the human intellect the measure and judge of all that is, and this is God's prerogative and not ours. Our intellect is limited by the finite nature which is ours; it is discursive and rarely, if ever, intuitional; it is easily baffled and suffers vertigo when strained towards pure spirit, but just because it is intellect it cannot err when rightly used. Nevertheless, just because of the infirmity of the human mind there are those who consider it a presumption to try to catch God in its net, and they point to the arid, mathematical figure which issues from the argument and contrast it with the God revealed in the New Testament. An excellent answer to this has been given by Étienne Borne,

'The idea of proof, far from being the manifestation of a proud intellect, is, on the contrary, an experience for the soul of spiritual humility as well as of intellectual dignity, an avowal at one and the same time of strength and weakness. So true is it—and here Pascal is eternally right—man cannot declare his grandeur without in the same breath exposing his misery. The necessity of a proof signifies that the mind is forced to win its certitudes with great labour and that it lacks intellectual intuition. The foolish ambition to possess an immediate intuition of the nature of God and of the nature of the soul thereby stands condemned. Of course the suggestion of a proof was almost insupportable to a Descartes who wished to see all the proofs condensed into the quasi-intuition of the ontological argument. So too Spinoza wished that every wise man should have the intuition of the necessary existence of God. ("We feel and we experience that we are eternal," says the Ethics.) In the idea of a proof there is, therefore, no naïve dogmatism, but on the contrary an implicit criticism of our manner of knowing . . . And so to make use of proofs will be a school of humility. But it will also show, in conflict with that pessimism which takes its rise in Jansenism, that the human reason is not condemned to error and that sin has not robbed it of its power to reach truth. Humility without despair, optimism without pride, these virtues provide the moral climate in which the intellect can think out the proofs of God and of the soul.'

A similar objection is that the mind is incapable of knowing God and that the proofs are vitiated by going beyond the limits of our experience. This is the fashionable objection to-day, and it rests on the same criticism as that which Kant formulated. It comes to this, that we can never prove the existence of anything by reason, for reason manipulates thoughts or mental constructions, whereas existences 'hit us in the eye'. The plausibility of this rests on the assumption that our experience is restricted to phenomena, sensible appearances, sense-facts, and it is not true. We do not know the surface except as the surface of something ; we should never have employed the language of accident, of quality and quantity and relation, unless we distinguished them from what must be equally primary—the substance of which they are the accidents. The modern empiricist says that we have sense-data and from these tries to explain chairs, landscapes and all we know. I, following a much greater tradition, say that we know things as they appear and look and that in knowing things we seem at first sight to know something which is common to anything whatsoever, cats and kings, wine and laughter, space and spirit and the thoughts and memory of them. The empiricist says that the object before me is nothing more than this-here-and-now-particular, whereas to me it is the open sesame to all reality, the voucher for the validity of knowledge, for it tells me the first name of everything that was, is or can be. Moreover, it breaks the shell of its own particularity and sets before me a world of reality without horizons and without limitation ; and it is just because of this that even God can be included in our concept of reality, and if we find one single thing to exist, however infinitesimal, we can be sure that a being with the attributes of God is also existent. The intermediate stages in the argument are two. First, what we thought to be common is seen on reflection to be much more complex. Laughter and wine are not united as species or genera, and so the multiple variety of beings in reality are all one and yet wholly different. Such a variety can only be explained by their proportion to or analogy with some standard, for example, of origin or end, and approximation to some perfect ideal. Quality and quantity are clearly comparable in their relation to substance, and different sub-

stances in relation to some perfect substance. It is in this way that a fairly easy argument can be made out for the existence of a perfect being, God; for if degrees of perfection really exist and are comparable, they point to an existent perfection as a real standard and cause.

The chief argument, however, must always be that of dependence. The very interconnection of all that we know in the Universe shows their interdependence, and it is only to economise effort that the mind tends to get rid of the problem by stopping at the thought of the Universe as a whole or the basic elements or by pushing back origins indefinitely. A general pattern or theme may give consistency and meaning to the parts, but consistency is not an ultimate nor equivalent to authorship. There may be permanent elements—one can even conceive of one substance—but such an ultimate or ultimates must in turn be dependent or independent, contingent or necessary, both as to their nature and existence. It is as beings that we have to ask whether they are self-evident, self-dependent, self-sufficient. Now it is impossible to conceive of parts without the whole of which they are parts, of effects without a cause, of what comes to be and might not be, without something which exists by its own right and must necessarily be. Nor let it be thought that to posit such a cause or necessary being is to go beyond the evidence or to contradict it. When a proposition is not self-evident we go to other propositions to prove it; but not all propositions are dependent on others. There must be self-evident propositions for there to be any beginning to knowledge. So, too, there are effects and they imply a cause; but not every cause need be an effect. The point is that if there are any existent effects there must be one self-evident and self-sufficient cause.

This abstract argument from dependence comes to life if we take ourselves as the best example. Our body is clearly dependent, and our mind is no less so. We are passive to experience; we learn and grow in self-reliance. We do not make truth, we discover it; we do not invent the moral order, we submit to it for our own welfare and for conscience' sake. The truth and goodness we discover are absolute and immutable; but truth and goodness are attributes of a being and not substantial themselves. Therefore there is a being who is

the source and fountain-head of knowledge and goodness. Moreover, we did not make ourselves and the continuance of our life is not entirely at our bidding. In the core of our being we are aware of our dependence, and this dependence manifests itself in loneliness, in want and in longing; and our longings are directed by what we must already know and possess in some way as our end and bliss.

There is no space to show how this ultimate being must be perfect and living, nor to show how other arguments, such as those from design and the moral order and the absolute laws of conscience, corroborate the proof. What cannot be passed over is the question of the kind of knowledge we can have of such a being. The agnostic says that even granted that we must accept from reason the existence of some Ultimate or Absolute, there is no means of knowing anything about this vanishing contour of reality. The history of philosophy shows that speculation always ends in the burial of God and the passing reign of some pretender. Even such an orthodox writer as Dr. Edwyn Bevan agrees with Mansel that

‘we dishonour God far more by identifying Him with the feeble and negative impotence of thought which we are pleased to style the Infinite than by remaining content with those limits which He for His own good purposes has imposed on us’.

‘Feeble and negative impotence.’ Is this the state to which human thought is condemned? It seems strange that those who believe in God should think it likely that He, the Maker and End of man, should debar man from thinking of Him truly and sabotage his highest of gifts, the intellect. We are surely intended to think of and contemplate that ‘region of plenty’ where God is, and we have a means to do this which is, if humble, efficacious. The beauty and goodness which surrounds us is ‘a good gift descending from above’, and by transcending its limitations we can glimpse something of what God must be. As was said before the mind knows reality and that is without horizons, and there is, therefore, no point at which the mind must stop and say that beyond this the reality is totally different. It will be different, that we know, but there will be some proportion between the love of man and the love of God, between the spiritual and intellectual nature of man and

the nature of God, a proportion closer than that between the sound of the sea, the collision of atoms and the divine nature. The latter, like all things material and in space and time, are necessarily limited and inapplicable to God, but there are many excellences of our spiritual nature which, were their human limitation removed, could be possessed by Him.

Such a knowledge as this is far from intuition or even a proper understanding of the divine nature. It leaves His mystery untouched and it saves us from scepticism. Moreover, it appears to correspond with the facts, for in religion man addresses God as not altogether unknown and yet a *Deus Absconditus*. One important point, however, is necessarily left out. Just as in a philosophic discussion of our knowledge of other persons we leave out the ways in which the object, that is the other person, may assist us to understand him, so, too, in theology we omit the special ways God may choose to enter into communication with us and reveal something of His nature to us. Obviously God is not like a sleeping Endymion or Aristotle's First Mover, indifferent and passive to our love. This opens out new and vast possibilities, but instead of certainty we can have for the most part only guesswork. Without doubt God wishes us to know Him truly and enter into communion with Him and so obtain beatitude. Furthermore, as God has made us for Himself, all our natural desires will receive their full enjoyment in this communion with God, but it is not easy to say anything more about the mode of our enjoyment or the degree of communion possible to us. We know that our capacity is limited, and that is all, unless we look for evidence in the experience of the noblest souls outside Christianity. I say 'outside Christianity' because Christians hold it as an essential belief that by grace they are lifted above their capacity to a supernatural order and are made sharers in the divine life. This distinction of supernatural and natural is straightforward and essential to any understanding of religion. That man as man must have a specific nature and end distinct from that of an animal or immaterial being is obvious, and the word 'natural' is used to describe this. The word 'supernatural' is often misunderstood and used confusedly. In Christian theology it has a technical sense of which the primary meaning is this, that God can so elevate

human nature that it has a kind of equality with His own, and in this new state man can love God with a strength which is God's own and know God as He is. God, because he is omnipotent, can, so to speak, graft a new life on to human nature, and it is in order to explain this new order that the writers of the New Testament use the images of 'regeneration', 'membership of Christ', 'new paste', and 'vine-branches of a vine'. For another image take this: suppose a human family had a beloved dog and that they were able to give the dog the power to know them as they knew each other and share in their own human love without destroying the dog's nature. One may well ask is that not impossible, and I dare say it is impossible for a dog to enjoy human intelligence if a dog has not an intellect. But it is possible for man to remain a man and know with a supernatural power, because an intellect has no limit in itself. Man's intellect is finite because he is a man, and God's intellect is infinite because He is perfect being, but however vast the difference between the two there is something really common, namely truth. We see truth in a glass darkly, and in this life the supernatural power given in grace is exerted in faith, but in the end it will be face to face.

This is a cardinal doctrine of Christianity, which is necessary for any proper understanding of its Creed and its central dogmas of the Mystical Body of Christ and the Eucharist. Is this gift, however, reserved for Christians, and should we, having made the distinction of natural and supernatural, use it to divide Christians from all others? Only the briefest of answers is possible to this difficult question, and that will be the one of Christian philosophy. The key-words are: 'God who at sundry times and in divers manners spake in time past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto us by His Son, whom He hath appointed heir of all things, by whom also he made the worlds.' First, God wishes all men to come to Him and has provided the means to do so, and the part which God plays is covered by the word Providence. In His Providence God normally acts through the ordinary laws of nature and human life, externally and internally in the soul. There is no antecedent reason why he should not also help individuals and peoples by extraordinary helps and by what are called miracles. Since human wills have such

powers over nature and can create such evil conditions, there is no reason why God should not protect His saints and give striking evidence of His Lordship. To say that such an act would be an interference and unnecessary is absurd in the face of man's power of evil and the fact that many doubt the existence of any Providence or God. Secondly, from the text quoted we learn that all Providence is directed towards Christ. (We here have to borrow from dogmatic theology, for if it be true that man has handicapped himself grievously by sin and if the remedy for this is in Christ, no philosophy of religion can be adequate which neglects these truths.) On the assumption of this as true, God's good will towards man will take the direction of helping him towards the supernatural order and providing the means for him to live in it. And if this be so, then there is no immediate reason for denying the apparently supernatural life of many outside the Christian dispensation, so long as they have lived up to the graces and love bestowed on them by God.

Turning from individuals to the religions which preceded Christianity or disputed with it, we can see that they are a mixture of high hopes and beliefs and strange practices. The language of their worship expresses an aspiration for union with the godhead, but as Augustine said of the Platonists, they 'saw truth from afar off' and they worshipped an unknown God. The gods became too human or too remote; communion with them could be won only by ecstasy and loss of self. The god could be the mysterious indecipherable Word, or Flesh like his worshippers, but never both in one. Psyche sought Eros in the night, and his face was hidden from her. In these characteristics, in the broken lights, the isolated flashes of truth, the Christian writers see the condition of men before the coming of Christianity and the consequent need of the Christian Revelation. How human hopes were more than fulfilled—and in what way—belongs rather to Christian theology than to a philosophy of religion. As a philosophy Christianity claims to be pre-eminent in being the solution of the religious questions which have always vexed the human mind. It finds a place for all the activities of our nature, for beauty of sense, for the body as well as for the soul. It is a dew from heaven, not a sirocco. So far from bidding us fly to another world to

escape the duties of this, it crowns natural effort and labour and civic obligations and human love. It is not afraid of beauty or of truth ; it holds together the eccentric thoughts of man and gives a shining order to his desires. Without its light man falls into discord with himself and leans now to the left and now to the right ; he is nothing but a material body to one generation, and to the next he is all mind or spirit ; his aim is pleasure and in revulsion he becomes so puritanical that he scorns all delights ; he is full of self-confidence and plans a millennium and then he comes near to despair and moans in a desert land ; he constructs the most daring metaphysic, and sick of its abstractions and sterility swears only by the evidence of his senses ; he calls himself God and then denies God's existence ; he is so overcome by the mystery of the Absolute that he makes his own life an illusion and sees all finite reality pass away into this incomprehensible greatness. The Christian philosophy of religion alone explains why man should so stagger from side to side and how it is that he can become as God without absorption and leave God in His transcendent majesty. The doctrine of the supernatural has its images and symbols ; it is reflected, e.g., in the marriage union and organic life ; it leaves to God the first and final part in man's communion with Him ; it shows how man cannot lose when God gives, and so solves the last and ultimate problem of how man without loss of his soul and humanity can be so loved by God as to be like unto Him and one with Him in an everlasting happiness.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- The Confessions of St. Augustine.* (Cambridge Univ. Press.)
 AQUINAS : *Summa contra Gentiles.* (Burns Oates.)
 PASCAL : *Pensées* (translated by TROTTER). (Dent.)
 C. GALLOWAY : *Philosophy of Religion.* (T. & T. Clark.)
 VON HÜGEL : *The Mystical Element in Religion.* (Dent.)
 — *Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion.* (Dent.)
 ROBERT FLINT : *Theism.* (Blackwood.)
 G. H. JOYCE : *Principles of Natural Theology.* (Longmans.)
 ÉTIENNE GILSON : *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy* (Gifford Lectures, translated by DOWNES.) (Sheed & Ward.)
 JACQUES MARITAIN : *Des Degrés de Savoir.* (Degrees of Knowledge.) (Bles.)

- HENRI BERGSON : *Des deux Sources*. (Two Sources : Morality and Religion, translated by AUDRA, BRERETON, and CARTER.) (Macmillan.)
- C. C. J. WEBB : *God and Personality*. (Gifford Lectures.) (Allen & Unwin.)
- *Studies in the History of Natural Theology*. (Oxford Univ. Press.)
- C. GORE : *Belief in God*. (John Murray.)
- PRINGLE-PATTISON : *The Idea of God*. (Oxford Univ. Press.)
- W. G. DE BURGH : *Morality and Religion*. (Oxford Univ. Press.)
- E. BEVAN : *Symbolism and Belief*. (Gifford Lectures.) (Allen & Unwin.)
- THOMAS PALEY : *Natural Theology*. (Griffin.)
- MARTINEAU : *A Study of Religion*. (Clarendon Press.)
- ILLINGWORTH : *Divine Immanence*. (Macmillan.)
- HEGEL : *Philosophy of Religion*. (Paul.)
- J. WARD : *Naturalism and Agnosticism*. (Gifford Lectures.) (Black.)

IV
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

by

L. W. GRENSTED, D.D.

Nolloth Professor of the Philosophy of Religion in the University of Oxford

‘ The psychology of religion must, then, in my opinion, take a much humbler position than that which some of its devotees desire for it. It must content itself with a description of human experience, while recognising that there may well be spheres of reality to which these experiences refer, and with which they are possibly connected, which yet cannot be investigated by science.’

J. B. PRATT

IV

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

INTRODUCTORY

FROM the point of view of the student of theology the psychology of religion presents certain special difficulties. These are in the main due to the immensely wide range of modern psychology, and to the very different points of view from which it is regarded by psychologists themselves. There is no one system of psychological theory which can be got up from a text-book and then applied to the problems of religion. Nor is there even any agreement as to the kind of observed facts which might form the basis of such a theory. Thus, though it is very necessary for the student to do some general psychological reading, and indeed to have some knowledge of the main contemporary schools of psychological theory, it is more important still that he should keep an open mind about them, and that he should avoid approaching the problems of religion from the standpoint of any preconceived system, but should rather be capable of thinking psychologically about them, and so of drawing his own conclusions. Even in a brief course of study a considerable proportion of time will necessarily be given to matters which may seem at first sight to be purely psychological and to have little to do with religion. The reasons for this will appear clearly enough as we proceed farther.

A kindred source of difficulty lies in the obscure relations at present existing between psychology and philosophy. Psychologists very frequently make pronouncements upon questions which lie outside their province, and it is not always easy to see what exact point we have passed from matters where their scientific analysis is illuminating to those which properly concern the metaphysician. The adequate state-

ment and comparison of the facts is a necessary preliminary to their interpretation, and it is here that psychology is of the greatest value. But ultimate questions as to the existence of God, or, more broadly, the nature of reality, are not affected in principle by psychology.

This has a considerable bearing upon a further source of some confusion in this particular field. It is almost inevitable that a student of theology should start from certain more or less defined beliefs, and that he should be to some extent on the defensive in dealing with psychologists, many of whom, as he is well aware, either deny those beliefs or explain them in terms which deprive them of most of their value. In spite of this tendency it is really important, whether for lecturers or for students, not to treat the subject as a branch of apologetics, or to take up the position of making a case for religion against its psychological critics. That way lies only an endless guerilla warfare, equally unsatisfactory to both sides, and necessarily (and even demonstrably) inconclusive.

Our task is rather to present a positive and coherent account of human nature, its structure, and its behaviour, in all its aspects, and to show, as we proceed, how those elements in that structure and that behaviour which are more usually termed religious take their natural place in the whole system, and also to point out any indications which lead in the direction of an interpretation of the whole system in terms consonant with what, again, we usually term religion.

The following outline is only one of several possible arrangements. It is intended for the student who has little or no psychological training. Those who have already some knowledge of the subject will prefer to choose their own starting-point, and will be able to amplify the suggestions here made. But what follows is at least systematic in its order, and reasonably comprehensive of the main topics which must necessarily be included in any study of the psychology of religion.

I. THE DEFINITION OF THE SUBJECT

It is clearly necessary to have some understanding as to what we understand by the terms 'psychology' and 'religion.' Both present very considerable difficulties.

(a) *Psychology*.—Psychology proper is a science. It is therefore descriptive in character, and is concerned with facts which can be observed and recorded. From these facts it seeks to infer general laws or hypotheses, which again are tested and corrected by further observations. Thus the 'unconscious' is a hypothesis, invented to cover certain observed facts (which are not themselves in that unconscious and are therefore not beyond observation), and capable of considerable elaboration in the light of further facts.

There is much dispute among psychologists as to the method of observation which is permissible. The early analytic psychology of the classical type was mainly logical in its structure. More recently stress has been laid by some upon experimental and objective methods, and it has been held, as in behaviourism, that only facts capable of external and objective verification, such as bodily reactions and movements, can be taken in evidence. Others argue, on our view rightly, that the data given by careful introspection are of equal and even of prior importance. We may regard psychology, then, as a descriptive science, using the methods of objective observation and of introspection.

It is necessary to draw a careful distinction between this development of psychology as a true science from its numerous and important applications as an art, of which its widespread use in psychotherapy and in education provides examples.

The proper subject-matter of psychology is behaviour, and in particular the behaviour of human beings, though the related behaviour of animals is also taken into account. It is important that the term should not be limited to merely external movements and responses to stimulus. Behaviour is not mechanistic, but is to be understood as the total system of responses of all kinds that constitutes our human organism. It thus includes the mind as well as the body, and material which, whether we are directly conscious of it or not, has an emotional or mental character. Further, since we must not exclude from examination any part of man's total response to his environment, we have to note that the behaviour which is most clearly human is purposive in character, initiated from within the organism as well as by outward stimulus, and directed towards ends more or less clearly foreseen. Further,

the behaviour of each one of us is his own, and this constitutes its most striking feature. We must thus say (whatever explanations we may give later) that psychology is concerned with behaviour which is personal and purposive, which has mental characteristics and which issues in outward acts.

(b) *Religion*.—If the subject-matter of psychology is behaviour, that of the psychology of religion must be religious behaviour. But what part of man's total behaviour should properly be termed religious? It is impossible to answer this question (except in the most superficial way) without having some definition of religion. But religion is notoriously difficult to define. Leuba, in *A Psychological Study of Religion*, collects no less than forty-eight definitions, adds two more of his own, and rejects them all.

The reason for this is not that the definitions are untrue, but that they are partial, each writer emphasising as religious that aspect of life which is for him significant. Thus William James, in *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, says at one point that religion is 'primarily a biological re-action,' and at another that it is 'enthusiasm in solemn emotion.' He consciously excludes the institutional, which Durkheim makes central: 'A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, i.e., things set apart and forbidden, beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church all those who adhere to them.' For Ames, religion is simply tantamount to morality. As good a definition as any is that given by J. B. Pratt: 'Religion is the serious and social attitude of individuals or communities towards the power or powers which they conceive as having ultimate control over their interests and destinies.' It is easy to criticise this definition. It does not apply readily to the individual experience of the mystic, which is not social, or to such systems as Confucianism, Stoicism, and early Buddhism. But it is valuable as emphasising that religion is essentially an attitude or disposition, and that it is directed towards an outward object, a Controller of destinies. This emphasis will be seen to be of great importance later, in connection with the psychological theory of the sentiments.

The difficulty of defining religion is due to the fact that all our human life has precisely this same character. Not only is

it true that if religion is an attitude or disposition it is one in which we are wholly involved, for we cannot take up an attitude from which some part of our organism is omitted, but it is also true that in every part of our human behaviour an attitude or total response is involved, directed to some object beyond ourselves. Thus there is at least a sense in which we must say that a man's religion and his character or disposition are the same thing. Religion is not just a part of life, and so cannot be defined by any special *differentia* which would separate it from other parts of life. It is rather true that all life has a meaning and a destiny, and that we speak of its religious development when it becomes more consciously aware of that significance, and more fully unified thereby. Religion is not a separate function or faculty of the soul, but simply the turning of all life to God.

We have to note at this point that the existence of God is not in question, at any rate at the outset, though certain points raised by psychologists in that connection have to be considered in their place. It is our descriptions of that Other, to which in some form we all turn, that vary, and our descriptions are in the end nothing more than the attitudes which we take up towards that real world in which 'we live and move and have our being.' It is not the function of the psychologist to deal with the correctness or incorrectness of this primary assumption of God's being. That is a matter for the metaphysician, and for faith. The psychologist is only concerned with our response to that Reality, so far as it can be observed and known. He can examine our worship of God, and our beliefs about God. He cannot examine God.

II. HISTORICAL SURVEY

The history of psychology goes back to the first scientific enquiry in which man's feelings, or emotions, or 'mind,' or 'soul,' were treated as an object. This first becomes clear in Plato, and Aristotle's *Ethics* is a masterpiece of analysis, on the lines of the 'faculty-psychology.' His principle of 'moderateness,' which means 'right expression in pursuit of right ends,' is of great value.

Throughout the Middle Ages the problem was confused by

the acceptance of the idea of a soul as a separate and everlasting entity on the basis of the Christian revelation. The relation of this soul to the total personality is not seriously considered, though the great Schoolmen, developing Aristotle's *Ethics* on Christian lines, analyse personality shrewdly enough. Progress in the direction of modern psychology only begins with Descartes, who raises the problem of the interaction of soul and body. The resultant analysis of mental process by Locke provides the starting-point of the two main lines of development, in his view that the mind with its innate faculties of reflection acts upon *sensations* to form *ideas*. Thus (1) the analysis of the faculties of reflection, at first logical in form (and so remaining until after Kant), became broadened out, through the recognition of emotional factors, into the modern psychology of instinct ; and (2) the study of the ideas and their relationship to one another (in such ways as contiguity, or resemblance) was carried out critically by Berkeley and Hume, and in analytic detail by the Mills, Bain, and Spencer, giving rise to the Association-psychology, which is the basis of modern psycho-analysis.

During the last century both types of psychology were developed in much detail. The work of the early phrenologists, such as Gall, led to immense progress on the physiological side. The study of the nervous system, and of the localisation of functions in the brain, and more recently of the influence of glands, paved the way for a thorough survey of human behaviour on the experimental side. The progress of laboratory work, now reinforced by statistical methods, is one of the main features of recent psychology. Though this has little direct bearing upon the more fundamental problems of religion, some knowledge of this type of psychology is a valuable check upon theorising which runs ahead of fact.

In the latter part of the nineteenth century new impetus was given to psychology in several directions : (1) The acceptance of evolutionary theory led to the correlation of animal behaviour with that of man ; (2) the problems of memory and of the recall of apparently buried ideas led to theories of an unconscious level of mental process, continuous with the conscious level ; (3) it was realised that such 'abnormal' phenomena as lunacy, dreams, and ghosts are also facts for

the psychologist, and that they are only extreme cases of processes familiar to normal psychology. Thus a series of writers, of whom William James and Freud are the greatest, developed a new and much more comprehensive science of psychology, and therewith an impressive series of practical applications of that science in psychotherapy and elsewhere.

The main issues in modern psychology are of great importance for the student of religion. They are concerned especially with two points, (1) the nature of the *Unconscious* and its influence upon conscious behaviour, and (2) the nature of the energy, *élan vital*, or *libido*, which constitutes the driving energy of that behaviour. The difficulty which faces the psychologist is that he cannot readily apply scientific methods without using some mechanistic or determinist hypothesis. Thus Freud extended the strict laws of cause and effect to mind as well as to matter. Watson and the Behaviourist school tried to eliminate mind as irrelevant. Pavlov and the experimental psychologists regarded behaviour as wholly a matter of 'conditioned reflexes.'

Against this tendency McDougall has successfully advocated a 'hormic' psychology, which takes the inner autonomy of personality into account, and makes room for purpose. Recent behaviourism is showing a tendency to come to terms with this point of view. This movement should be studied in the light of scientific theories of vitalism (Driesch) and philosophical theories of 'emergent evolution.'

Finally, the recent emphasis upon 'structure' or 'pattern' by Köhler, and the formation of a school of 'Gestalt-psychology,' though still under criticism, is likely to lead to important developments.

III. THE STRUCTURE OF MENTAL LIFE

It is not necessary for the student of the psychology of religion to have more than a very general knowledge of the structure and working of the brain and nervous system. But it is convenient to begin the general survey of behaviour from an outline of the way in which an external stimulus passes into the appropriate response in action. The theoretical basis is the simple reflex arc (whether such a thing can ever be isolated

experimentally or not) in which the stimulus is received as a percept which is linked by a direct neural connexion with the response itself.

As we know this process in ordinary human life it is elaborated at every point. The *percept* may be complex, a single object being apprehended in a variety of sensations. The resultant response may be equally complex, and may be profoundly modified in relation to other responses. In general it is known as *conation*, which covers both action and the tendency to act in the manner indicated. Linking these two is a highly developed neural system, in which afferent neurons carry the stimulus by way of the spinal cord to the brain, and there, in branching systems controlled by the barriers of the synapses (which guard us from excessive reactions), are linked with the afferent neurons, which bring about the total response. The whole process is accompanied in varying degree by a feeling-tone or emotional quality, called the *affect*, and by a more or less definite awareness, rising to full consciousness, and organised in *cognition*.

It should be noted that neither the affective nor the cognitive process can be explained as a product of the reflex activity, which they accompany and apparently in some degree control. The origin of this conscious character, which is so typical of human behaviour at those points where we should be most certainly right in calling it human, remains quite unsolved on the physiological side.

We have also to note that cognition, or consciousness in its rational aspect, appears to have a double reference as knowledge of the external object towards which our attention and action is directed, and as knowledge of the process itself. This double reference of cognition is the source of many of our philosophical perplexities, and needs very careful attention.

IV. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INSTINCT

The central problem here is whether there is a special religious instinct, and, if so, how it is related to the general structure of the instinctive life.

The word *instinct* is usually used very loosely, to cover that which is irrational, or unconscious, and especially for that

which is not consciously controlled or directly anticipated. For Herbert Spencer it is equivalent to that which is merely mechanical, or to compound reflex action. Dewey, keeping the emphasis on unconsciousness, makes it characteristic of instincts that they are directed towards ends not consciously foreseen, as when a bird makes a nest.

But it has long been clear that human behaviour, conscious or unconscious, tends to fall into certain marked patterns. Aristotle had already begun the analysis of these in his list of the 'virtues,' which are, in effect, faculties. Locke's analysis on logical lines was obviously inadequate, and so, long afterwards, was Herbert Spencer's analysis based upon external behaviour alone. McDougall's work has here been critical. He regards the instincts as specific tendencies or dispositions organised (*a*) to perceive certain classes of object, (*b*) to experience a particular type of affect in relation to such objects, and (*c*) to respond with a definite type of behaviour. On this basis he distinguishes twelve basic instincts, in addition to some simple primitive responses, such as sucking and crawling. His list (named sometimes from the affect and sometimes from the conation) runs thus: fear, anger, disgust, curiosity, self-assertion, self-abasement, parental instinct (or tenderness), sex, feeding, gregariousness, acquisition, construction. These basic instincts are also to be found combined in such complex forms as awe, which he regards as a combination of curiosity, self-abasement, and fear.

McDougall's account of these instincts is classical, but it has opened the door to endless discussion and criticism, and very varied lists of instincts are given by different writers. Here Shand's work is very important. He calls attention to the fact that these so-called instincts are at very different levels of organisation and permanence, and prefers to use the term only for very simple primary responses, which in human character are organised as (*a*) *impulses*: repose, exercise, self-assertion, self-abasement, (*b*) *appetites*: sex and feeding, (*c*) *emotions*: fear, anger, disgust, curiosity, joy and sorrow, repugnance, and (*d*) *sentiments*, in which these dispositions are linked into more or less stable systems in relation to objects. The typical sentiments are love and hate.

This theory of the sentiments is fundamental to the psycho-

logy of religion. It should be noted throughout that emphasis is coming to be laid rather upon the affect, emotion in the broader sense, than upon behaviour or upon cognition. It is further clear that this reference to the object about which character is formed is relevant not to sentiments only but to all the instinctive life. Thus, as Dewey suggests, there is at each point a reference of instinct to an end beyond the immediate response. In the sentiments this end has the character of a more or less permanent and organised personal relationship.

The doctrine of the sentiments suggests the understanding of religion as a process of sentiment-formation directed towards God, and thus, as a master-sentiment, providing the unity of all lesser sentiments. The vindication of this hypothesis is not a matter for psychology, but it is possible to argue that psychological theory is incomplete without it.

The question of the existence of a religious instinct appears to be mainly a matter of nomenclature, but it is clear that the use of the phrase does not conform naturally to the general conception of an instinct which we have adopted. Nevertheless, the view that there is a religious instinct, if rightly re-stated, expresses a truth of fundamental importance, not only for man but even for psychological theories about human nature.

V. THE ASSOCIATION-PSYCHOLOGY

The link between the psychology of instinct and the association-psychology is provided by the grouping of the instinctive patterns of behaviour into more or less coherent and permanent systems. This grouping of patterns is closely related to the association of ideas, which has been a central hypothesis of psychology since the time of Locke. It is difficult to give this hypothesis a clear statement, but it is of great importance as forming the basis of the modern psycho-analytic theory, with its widespread applications.

The fundamental conceptions of this theory are as follows :

(1) The *ideas* themselves. These have been variously conceived, sometimes as images of objects, direct and clear, or indirect and faint, sometimes as representations capable of re-call, up to a certain point, as memories. Such descriptions as these have proved very inadequate, especially when affective

and conative factors are taken into account. It is perhaps simpler to speak of mental elements, at once objective and subjective as events and as details of our experience. On the subjective side they might be called *schemata*, the ever-changing orientations of our disposition or personal being, in which cognition, affect, and conation each have their place.

(2) The fact of *association*. It is quite clear that these mental elements are related in many complex ways, so that the appearance of one element tends to call related elements into activity. The link may be through the conceptual, affective, or even the conative factors involved.

(3) This association has a *mechanism* of its own, through which *energy* is enabled to act and so to issue in the responses which constitute behaviour. This mechanism has been described in various ways: (a) The ideo-motor theory regarded the energy as attached in some way to the ideas as such. This, in its original form, is mere description, explaining nothing. (b) The pleasure-pain theory, as in hedonism, regarded the energy as attached to the ideas of pleasure and pain, and so associated with other ideas. This breaks down because pleasure and pain cannot be regarded as ideas. It is in fact only a complicated form of the ideo-motor theory, which has no meaning unless the term 'idea' is used in a sense very far from its original conceptual one. (c) The theory that it is the will that acts, energy being attached to conscious choice. But the term 'will' is difficult. It is used most naturally of the developed choice of ends, and not of instinctive behaviour. Further, the will cannot be regarded as a faculty. It is rather a movement or tendency of the whole organism, implying an end towards which that tendency is directed.

Thus it appears that we should think of the energy as an energy inherent in the whole organic structure of human personality. The ideo-motor theory, and the concept of the will, alike become intelligible if we regard the ideas as *schemata*, orientations of that personality in which it makes choice of ends and so acts in relation to the changes of environment which affect it.

(4) The *energy* which is involved gives rise to a number of problems. Probably no account of its actual nature can be given. It is only known as an energy, or life-force, because there

must be a motor-determinant of human behaviour. Different writers have urged that this energy is derived from some particular instinct. Freud and Jung suggest sex (naming the energy *libido*), Adler self-assertion, Sidis and Rivers fear, or the self-protective impulses generally. This raises the question whether there is a special energy attached to each of the instincts or emotions, a point of great practical importance, since the hope of sublimating undesirable tendencies rests entirely upon the possibility of transferring energy from one behaviour pattern to another. Probably we should regard the energy as a property of the whole organism, and the various instincts as organised systems for its self-expression.

At this point the *Gestalt* theories are of some importance, suggesting that the energy is in some way related to the completion of pattern or structure in life, a movement towards the whole.

A fundamental question arises as to whether this energy acts mechanistically (so Freud), or is creative (so Jung, following Bergson). Or, in another form, does *libido* at the instinctive level pass over into *will* at the fully personal level, and so become the ground and energy of freedom? Upon the answer to this question depends the possibility of correlating psychological theory with the doctrines of God's grace and of the work of the Holy Spirit as fully personal.

VI. CONSCIOUS AND SUB-CONSCIOUS MENTAL PROCESS

The problem of the sub-conscious and unconscious mental processes which accompany those of which we are conscious is of great importance, especially in connection with the study of temptation, sin, and guilt. Various theories as to their nature have been suggested:

(1) That consciousness depends upon a physiological basis, so that ideas and memories are stored as physical structures, presumably in the brain, and only assume a mental character when they excite some conscious correlate. This view raises more difficulties than it explains.

(2) That some parts of our consciousness are central and some marginal. The problem thus becomes one of attention. This description only covers a small part of the facts. It does

not explain such conditions as the failure to remember a well-known name.

(3) That there is a 'subliminal self' and that parts of this self are capable at times of entering consciousness. There is thus a variable 'threshold of consciousness.' This theory of Myers is the basis of the view now usual among psychologists, as a result of the work of Freud:

(4) Freud divides the activity of the self into a four-fold structure. The *conscious* events and behaviour to which we are attending rests upon a structure of 'mental elements' which are at once available if wanted. Thus we are not ordinarily thinking of our names, but can at once remember them. Below this region, which he terms the *fore-conscious*, there is a wide region of similar mental elements which cannot be so recalled. This is barred off from the fore-consciousness by what in his earlier writings he called the 'censorship,' and in his later writings a structure of the 'super-ego.' It is in itself a region truly mental or personal, and equally truly unconscious. He regards it as having two parts, the *primary unconscious* and the *secondary unconscious*, the former being a natural product of the process of psychological growth, and the latter a result of conflict. The study of the former is thus important for the understanding of some of the phases of religious development, and the latter for the understanding of conflict and its effects.

In general it may be said that the primary unconscious is formed biologically, in a manner akin to that described by Rivers in his account of the development of higher instincts as 'suppressing' more primitive forms which are no longer serviceable. Though suppressed, these still remain capable of affecting our conduct at times when, for any reason, the higher instinct is in abeyance. The secondary unconscious, formed by 'repression' (in itself an unconscious process), rather resembles well-known pathological conditions due to unsolved emotional tensions. Such conditions are seen in an extreme form in the dissociated selves of so-called 'multiple personalities.'

A clue to the nature of these mental processes in the unconscious is provided by the partially recalled material of experience which is in some way freed from adult control.

Such experience occurs in disease, in drug-taking, and, in the most harmless and accessible form, in dreams. In these, so far as what we remember of them represents their true character, we find certain definite features, which correspond to similar features in the ordinary mental life of the child. Thus they are expressed in concrete and pictorial symbolism ; they are full of action ; they have a very marked type of feeling tone or affective quality, more liable to extremes and differently related to circumstances than that of adults ; and they have a very low order of rational coherence. We notice that rationalisation proper, the arranging of the dream into a sensible (and a moral) story, happens when we wake. Waking is, in fact, equivalent to growing up.

Other processes in dreams have a separate cause and function. Their distortion and absurdity arises as a result of conflict, providing some measure of protection for us, lest the dream, coming too near reality, should wake us up. In particular, processes of *identification* and *projection* are found. These are of special importance for religion and will be discussed later.

The mechanism of the dream seems to be that elements in the unconscious find indirect expression through alliance with symbols in the fore-conscious. Here we have a clue to the problem of the relation of *idea* and *meaning*, the meaning being primarily affective and conative and only secondarily conceptual.

Freud argues that this 'dream-work' continues as an undercurrent to all mental life. At this point comes in also Jung's theory of 'archetypal' or 'racial' thinking. In both theories *symbolisation* is prior to *rationalisation*. This suggests that in religion (as appears clearly enough in practice) feeling and conation are prior to theology, and frequently are the true grounds of belief and action which theology subsequently expounds and justifies. Theology, for all its importance, thus plays a secondary part in religion, as facilitating the expression of the 'God-sentiment,' but not as its cause, either in ourselves or in God.

VII. THE SECONDARY UNCONSCIOUS AND THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF SIN

Whatever be the fundamental interpretation of Freud's account of the 'secondary unconscious' it is of great value as a description of the effects of conflict, and as a preliminary to the understanding of the psychological aspects of sin. For the unconscious, in this aspect, is formed at the emotional and not at the lower instinctive levels. It is due to the conflict of emotional dispositions, each of which claims the attention of the whole self and seeks to act as the principle of its unity. This psychological conflict results in repression of one or another disposition, with the accompanying associated groups of 'mental elements.' Thus significant events may pass completely out of memory, if their significance is not in accord with the dominant trend of the ego. This process, when completely healthy, is accompanied by a process of integration, resulting in adult health or wholeness. More often certain elements resist this integration, and remain powerful in the unconscious life, and capable, directly or indirectly, of influencing behaviour, sometimes in ways that are both unaccountable and undesirable.

In this case it is customary to speak of the existence of a *complex*, a term which is used by the majority of psychologists to denote an emotional disposition which is more or less completely repressed and which may therefore be said to have a pathological character. A complex is thus distinguished from a sentiment, which is an emotional disposition directed towards an accepted object and therefore in accord with the dominant trend of the ego. But it should be noted that certain well-known writers, such as Jung, Hart, and Tansley, use the word 'complex' in a wider term, making no distinction between it and 'sentiment.' In these writers it simply denotes an organised system of mental elements, in all the complexity of their inter-relation by association, perceptual, affective, cognitive, and conative.

It is important to note the repression of the disposition tends to carry with it the repression of a wide range of association-groups, and that this is especially marked in their cognitive aspects, so that the memory of significant facts may be com-

pletely lost while strong and dominant affects remain, with the resultant conations, or tendencies to action. These then attach themselves, in a manner which is at first sight perplexing, to elements in the fore-conscious with which they have some distant link of association. It is in this way that the symptoms of the neuroses, especially those of the hysterical type, arise.

Repression is thus, strictly speaking, a psychological process which takes place automatically whenever there is a conflict of disposition. The term 'repression' in ordinary speech is used mainly of the conscious refusal to act in certain ways. But this refusal is itself the result of the inner conflict. To say that we can resist the suggestion of temptation by an act of will introduces a confusion of thought, which is actually dangerous in its results in practice. For the will is only the whole self as identified with some one trend or disposition, and in this case we are really urging a conflict of dispositions. The real function of the will (if we can rightly use the term) lies rather in our freedom to choose and identify ourselves with those objects about which a strong and integrated disposition may be formed. It is the radical claim of religion that the will only has this freedom in its entirety when it chooses God, and so makes possible the formation of a master-sentiment capable of unifying every lesser disposition.

We can now deal with the problem of *sin*.

Sin is a disposition directed towards a wrong object, wrongness being determined at each level by the refusal to turn to God or to His symbolic surrogate. *Sins* are acts proceeding from such a disposition, and are therefore secondary and symptomatic. We may make the distinction clearer by saying that sins need *forgiveness*, while sin needs *cure*. Sins are not limited to conscious acts, as is commonly supposed, since much of our behaviour proceeds from unconscious dispositions, which are frequently sinful. It is of importance to recognise that forgiveness has a meaning as applied to such unconscious acts, and to determine the sense in which this is true. This is one of the fundamental problems of moral theology.

The condition of sin implies conflict, since to speak of a wrong object implies that there is an object which is right, and that each of these objects is claiming our attention and our allegiance.

Theoretically this conflict may result in perfect sainthood,

in which the right object is unfailingly chosen, or in perfect wickedness, in which it is equally unfailingly rejected. Actually what we meet in ourselves, and in those about us, is the partial and wavering choice of right and wrong objects. This, when it is in the open, is a conflict of sentiments, issuing in distress or anxiety, but such conflict expresses itself in various ways and has various issues :

(1) The usual state is one of lowered tension, with partial repression and partial continuance of the open conflict. There is thus *no conviction of sin*.

(2) Sometimes there is complete repression of one tendency from consciousness, and the formation of a pathological complex. Sin then gives rise to *moral disease*, and needs special treatment.

(3) There may be an hysterical division of consciousness, so that the sinful disposition is admitted either periodically, or upon certain special associations (*occasions of sin*). This has again an element of disease and must be treated accordingly.

In either (2) or (3) there may be acute physical symptoms, and spiritual healing may result in very striking cures.

(4) The conflict may be solved by sudden or gradual sublimation (whether accompanied or not by healthy repression or suppression). This is accomplished by the transference of the life-energy, through the association-groups, to right objects.

The bearing of this on certain terms is of interest :

Conscience is a sentiment directed towards a right object. Its negative character is due to its repression by conflicting and sinful dispositions.

Original Sin can only mean an innate disposition to accept wrong objects.

The sense of *Guilt* is very usually regarded by psychologists as a condition of anxiety due to conflict. It more properly means our sense of the moral judgment to which our choice of wrong objects has rendered us liable. It is of the greatest importance, practical as well as theoretical, to determine how far psychologists, especially those of the Freudian school, are right in this attempt to substitute an emotional for an ethical meaning of the term 'guilt.' It should be added that the problem is one which it does not rest with the psychologists to decide.

pletely lost while strong and dominant affects remain, with the resultant conations, or tendencies to action. These then attach themselves, in a manner which is at first sight perplexing, to elements in the fore-conscious with which they have some distant link of association. It is in this way that the symptoms of the neuroses, especially those of the hysterical type, arise.

Repression is thus, strictly speaking, a psychological process which takes place automatically whenever there is a conflict of disposition. The term 'repression' in ordinary speech is used mainly of the conscious refusal to act in certain ways. But this refusal is itself the result of the inner conflict. To say that we can resist the suggestion of temptation by an act of will introduces a confusion of thought, which is actually dangerous in its results in practice. For the will is only the whole self as identified with some one trend or disposition, and in this case we are really urging a conflict of dispositions. The real function of the will (if we can rightly use the term) lies rather in our freedom to choose and identify ourselves with those objects about which a strong and integrated disposition may be formed. It is the radical claim of religion that the will only has this freedom in its entirety when it chooses God, and so makes possible the formation of a master-sentiment capable of unifying every lesser disposition.

We can now deal with the problem of *sin*.

Sin is a disposition directed towards a wrong object, wrongness being determined at each level by the refusal to turn to God or to His symbolic surrogate. *Sins* are acts proceeding from such a disposition, and are therefore secondary and symptomatic. We may make the distinction clearer by saying that sins need *forgiveness*, while sin needs *cure*. Sins are not limited to conscious acts, as is commonly supposed, since much of our behaviour proceeds from unconscious dispositions, which are frequently sinful. It is of importance to recognise that forgiveness has a meaning as applied to such unconscious acts, and to determine the sense in which this is true. This is one of the fundamental problems of moral theology.

The condition of sin implies conflict, since to speak of a wrong object implies that there is an object which is right, and that each of these objects is claiming our attention and our allegiance.

Theoretically this conflict may result in perfect sainthood,

in which the right object is unfailingly chosen, or in perfect wickedness, in which it is equally unfailingly rejected. Actually what we meet in ourselves, and in those about us, is the partial and wavering choice of right and wrong objects. This, when it is in the open, is a conflict of sentiments, issuing in distress or anxiety, but such conflict expresses itself in various ways and has various issues :

(1) The usual state is one of lowered tension, with partial repression and partial continuance of the open conflict. There is thus *no conviction of sin*.

(2) Sometimes there is complete repression of one tendency from consciousness, and the formation of a pathological complex. Sin then gives rise to *moral disease*, and needs special treatment.

(3) There may be an hysterical division of consciousness, so that the sinful disposition is admitted either periodically, or upon certain special associations (*occasions of sin*). This has again an element of disease and must be treated accordingly.

In either (2) or (3) there may be acute physical symptoms, and spiritual healing may result in very striking cures.

(4) The conflict may be solved by sudden or gradual sublimation (whether accompanied or not by healthy repression or suppression). This is accomplished by the transference of the life-energy, through the association-groups, to right objects.

The bearing of this on certain terms is of interest :

Conscience is a sentiment directed towards a right object. Its negative character is due to its repression by conflicting and sinful dispositions.

Original Sin can only mean an innate disposition to accept wrong objects.

The sense of *Guilt* is very usually regarded by psychologists as a condition of anxiety due to conflict. It more properly means our sense of the moral judgment to which our choice of wrong objects has rendered us liable. It is of the greatest importance, practical as well as theoretical, to determine how far psychologists, especially those of the Freudian school, are right in this attempt to substitute an emotional for an ethical meaning of the term 'guilt.' It should be added that the problem is one which it does not rest with the psychologists to decide.

Original guilt might be an inherited tendency to such anxiety, or to the weakness which renders us liable to such judgment. But in this case the word guilt seems to be misused.

It is important to note the relation between sin and mental or moral disease. There is great need for clear diagnosis, and for a full understanding of the relation between psychological and spiritual treatment.

VIII. THE PRIMARY UNCONSCIOUS AND THE BEGINNINGS OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE

The development of religion is not separable from that of life in general. Confusion arises through the idea that it is some special kind of life intervening. There is a theological truth in this, but it is also true that the religious life is organically linked with the ground structure within which it has its early development. We have thus to examine the general process of development in the child, noticing also that the mental processes of the child will conform in type to the account which we have already given of the primary unconscious. Thus the true beginnings of religion in the child will be concealed from adult memory and observation, being relegated to the unconscious, though not destroyed, by the process of biological and psychological suppression.

It is easy to see this process of suppression in the successive emergence of such instinctive modes of behaviour as sucking, clutching, crawling, and walking, and in the progressive organisation of the appetites of feeding and, still more strikingly, of sex. As each phase develops, its predecessor is overlaid. Interest is withdrawn from it, and it only reappears if called into activity by special circumstances, such as a regression in face of reality.

We have already noted the conflict which can be produced by the divergent claims of sentiments as they form. It is important to attempt to give some account of the process by which this conflict issues in suppression, so forming, at the earliest stage, the primary unconscious. Theories of three types are possible: (a) *physiological*, based on the suggestion that when new channels are cut for psycho-physical energy in the association tracts of the brain, the older channels are

drained of energy ; (b) *psychical*, based upon the re-direction of attention as new patterns of behaviour become possible (here the Gestalt theory is relevant). Neither of these theories is more than descriptive, and neither avoids the difficulty that it does not distinguish the formation of a sentiment from the results of a *trauma*, or psychological shock. We must therefore fall back upon (c) a view which takes *purpose*, or the direction of life towards objects, into account. It is in relation to the 'other,' the 'reality-principle' in an even wider and more objective sense than given to the phrase by Freud, that impulses are drawn into unified systems of behaviour. This *convergence of impulse* is the basis of the psychological understanding of conversion.

This view that human behaviour always takes place within the ego-other relationship is fundamental, and deserves careful analysis. It will be found that the objects which form the basis of the developed emotions and still more of the sentiments are necessarily personal. When a strongly developed sentiment for some such activity as photography or gardening is found, the real object to which it is directed is always some personal relationship, for which the inanimate objects act as surrogates. Thus we garden to please ourselves, or to feed ourselves, or to show off to our friends, but never solely for the sake of the garden.

This principle is of great significance in explaining the growth of personality in the child, which is conditioned by successive orientations in which (to take boys as our example) first the mother, then the father, then other boys in the group, and finally the girl sought as a mate, form the psychological centre not only of attention but also of growth. It should be noted that this is the true importance of Freud's theory of the primacy of sex, for at times he extends that term to cover every aspect of the 'love-life.' It should be noted further that in the broad psychological sense these phases are divided into heterosexual and homosexual, and that some of the undesirable later perversions to which the latter name is given are due to a partial arrest of development at the childish level.

The scheme in the ordinary psychological treatises ends, like a Victorian novel, with the successful marriage. Actually the development continues throughout life, with new orientations

through the family to the wider human fellowship, and with the growth of that final orientation, never complete in this life, to God, which can be seen, though not demonstrated, to be the fulfilment of the psychological process and its significance at every stage.

The development of personality through childhood can be described in another way, based upon these personal relationships. The progressive identification of the child with its parents, and the mode in which they are taken over into the child's own self, so that they become significant parts of the child's own personality, results not only in the gradual formation of the *actual ego*, which is the true self in contra-distinction to the *empirical ego*, the self as it appears to itself, but in the appearance as controlling powers of the *super-ego*, in which the child protects itself against the dominance of parents, especially the father, by reproducing that dominance within itself, and the *ego-ideal*, in which the child's own choices of that which is worth while become shaped as its own autonomous pattern of personality. The super-ego and the ego-ideal, which are usually to some extent in conflict, are the raw material of morality. It is very important to recognise that the severe sanctions of morality, and in particular the disorder known as 'scruple' or 'scrupulousness of conscience,' are based primarily upon this primitive identification with the dominance of the father, and have no ethical dignity of their own.

IX. CONVERSION AND SAINTHOOD

Conversion is familiar ground for psychologists, since it is with the more striking experiences of this type that the earlier studies of the psychology of religion begin. Attention was naturally called to the dramatic conversion of St. Paul, and to St. Augustine's account of his own conversion in his *Confessions*. At the same time the developments of Methodism, especially in America, led to a widespread emphasis upon sudden conversion as normal in the religious life. There were also both individuals and sects who laid claim to the attainment of a higher holiness as a result of this experience, some even going so far as to say that they had passed beyond the power of temptation and could no longer sin.

The earlier studies, by Starbuck and James, are based on a large amount of material obtained through *questionnaires*, and raise serious problems as to the value of this method of enquiry, since both the questions and the particular sphere within which they are circulated may seriously prejudice the conclusions. Three main problems have arisen in the discussion of conversion :

(1) To what extent are sudden conversions due to an 'uprush of the subliminal self,' the establishment of a new disposition which has been developed during a period of 'unconscious incubation'? The pathological parallels to sudden conversion are very striking. Yet the results of such conversion are certainly at times capable of being regarded as an integration of personality at a higher level.

(2) How far can we regard gradual conversion as more normal, and better in its results than sudden conversion? It is sometimes denied that gradual conversion is conversion at all. This seems to be a mere matter of nomenclature. The psychological evidence is that the convergence of impulse which constitutes conversion takes place in different people in different ways. A distinction has been made between conversions with and without conflict, conversions in which the intellectual process is protracted, and conversions in which there is a strong affective element, so that the readjustment may be very swift and may appear almost wholly irrational.

(3) The *questionnaire* method indicated a close connexion between conversion and adolescence, and it is certainly true that dissociation phenomena, with sudden transitions of disposition, are common in adolescence. This accounts, further, for the relation which often appears between conversion and the conflict in regard to sex, and for the strong sense of guilt which accompanies the conversion experience, and which is often exaggerated in retrospect. But the evidence in this respect is very uncertain. Many observers would deny that the connexion with adolescence is so common, and it is probable that other strong emotions (conscious or unconscious) may be involved.

(4) It remains probable that the essence of conversion lies in an orientation towards an object, end, or person beyond ourselves, and this leaves open the religious view that the ground

of all true conversion is in man's relationship to God, at first resisted and then accepted.

The result of conversion is some degree of *sainthood*, this term being used to denote the unified character which results from this convergence of impulse, whether sudden or gradual. There is much confusion as to the use of the term 'saint.' Properly it means one who has attained the unification of his personality in allegiance to God. More often it is used of those who are seeking to attain that unity by the exercise of 'heroic virtues,' who are seeking to overcome the world, the flesh, and the devil by sacrifice and asceticism. This often involves a serious confusion of thought between rigorism and sanctity.

This confusion rests upon a deeper psychological fact. The attainment of apparent unity may take place in two ways:

(1) By the repression of undesirable elements in the conflict of dispositions. This is in essence a hysterical solution, leading in extreme cases to the dissociation of personality. It is likely to be unstable, and even if stable is crippled, since only part of the whole system of emotions is drawn into the new allegiance. It is such characters as these that give rise to the common feeling that good people are not attractive, or that they are hypocrites, a criticism which, though gravely unjust to their intention, may yet be psychologically true.

(2) By the true formation of a single unified disposition directed towards some one object. This may happen at a low level (James records a conversion to avarice), and can only be regarded as saintly in the Christian sense when that object is God.

X. SUGGESTION, AUTO-SUGGESTION AND PRAYER

If the development of unified personality is through the power of successive objects to draw our impulses into convergence a problem arises as to the way in which object exercises that power. This is the problem of *suggestion*.

Suggestion is usually regarded as the power of one person to cause an idea to be accepted by another person without rational grounds for that acceptance. This type of definition, though very often applicable, is too narrow, since it makes

Related to an influence exerted upon us by many objects, so suggestion primarily a personal matter, whereas it is closely far as they respond to tendencies within us. Suggestion is in fact the admission of the power of an object to influence us in any way, perceptual, cognitive, affective, or conative. In principle it is simply the acceptance of an ego-object relationship, with resultant effects upon our behaviour. The fact that objects or ideas, when presented to us, do exercise this influence is unquestionable. We eat in response to the suggestion offered by food. We love in response to the suggestion offered by one capable of calling out our love. We worship in response to God.

This is the basis of the Law of Reversed Effort, which declares the imagination to be stronger than the will, so that the efforts of the will only secure the victory of the imagination. The terms 'will' and 'imagination' are here obscure, but the fact so stated is obvious to anybody who has struggled with temptation.

Suggestibility, or the tendency to accept suggestion, is a special characteristic of childhood, and is a principal factor in the child's process of learning. It is not merely cognitive (as in Pratt's conception of 'primitive credulity') but affective and conative. It is perhaps best regarded as readiness to accept a *schema* or pattern of behaviour.

One of the necessary processes in growth to adult life is the gradual suppression of unnecessary suggestibility. This is correlated to the establishment of a fully constituted self, with its own accepted directive tendency (the 'guiding line' or 'guiding principle' of Adler). For in order to be effective we must limit our activities and interests. The streams that run most strongly are narrow.

Thus, if suggestion is to be received by an adult it must be accepted by him as in line with his own unified personality. If we cannot bring this about we may still be able to impose suggestion by securing some degree of reversion to infantilism. He may be willing to accept this, or there may be unconscious forces in him encouraging such regression. In the latter case he must be regarded as suggestible, whether at superficial levels or under hypnosis. Suggestion at the cost of infantilism may be called regressive, and has obvious dangers.

The stages of such regressive suggestion are the securing of *attention*, through prestige or interest, the fixing of attention in what Baudouin terms *contention*, so that wandering of thought becomes very difficult, the *hypnoidal state*, which is conscious but no longer rationally controlled or even free, and *hypnosis*, when attention is withdrawn from everything except the suggestion of the hypnotist. These states pass into one another imperceptibly, and are of great importance in psychotherapy. A light degree of the hypnoidal state greatly assists psychoanalysis. Suggestion under hypnosis is now little used, but general suggestion treatment can often be valuable. Its danger is the tendency to increase the desire to slip back into infantile modes of reaction, and especially the need for dependence upon the psychiatrist. It is also superficial in its attack upon symptoms, and needs supplementing with insight into their real cause.

It is obvious that similar considerations apply to much religious preaching, and to the ordering of religious worship. It is possible to pay too high a price for easy results, and an eloquent preacher may have a large following of people whom he prevents from growing up, and who 'love to have it so.'

Hence the emphasis laid by Coué and Baudouin upon auto-suggestion. Ideally this prevents the tendency to regression or hysterical dissociation. In fact, however, auto-suggestion cannot be separated from hetero-suggestion, and the practice of auto-suggestion has very definite risks.

It is often said that *prayer* is only auto-suggestion, and there is truth in the charge, as applied to many prayers. But it should be noted that auto-suggestion always rests upon an original hetero-suggestion. The impulse to pray does not arise wholly within ourselves.

Further, prayer, in its simplest and truest form, is essentially the conscious effort to enter into and to accept the relation between ourselves and God. The most typical prayer is thus 'vocal' prayer, which is quite objective, without any reference to our feelings as we pray. Its analogy is a child's conversation with its father, in which there is no thought of anything other than the father himself and of the conversation in which both join. Such prayer may of course include prayers for our own spiritual progress, e.g., for grace to keep our temper, but

its essential character rests not in our feelings or states, but in the directness of our approach to God.

The more complex exercises in prayer of the 'mystic way' should be studied in their relationship to the stages of regressive suggestion, to which they have an obvious affinity. Yet it may well be true that for certain people, capable of correcting the danger of regression (which shows clearly enough in some of the mystics), this concentrated exercise in prayer leads to levels of personal development beyond the reach of others.

XI. CORPORATE OR GROUP-RELIGION, AND WORSHIP

The study of the Group follows immediately upon that of suggestion, since the group is at certain stages, especially round about adolescence, an immensely powerful factor in the development of the ego, acting through suggestion enhanced both by prestige and by deep and complex personal relationships. Writers of the school of Durkheim have made this the fundamental factor in the growth and stabilisation of religion.

It is important to distinguish the primitive herd impulse, as seen in many animals, from the fully organised 'herd-sentiment.' Freud has worked out analytically, and McDougall descriptively, the distinction between a true group and a crowd. The latter is a temporary, unstable, and emotional structure, corresponding in the group to a neurotic crisis in the individual. Thus, like a neurotic crisis, it has a markedly infantile character. This character persists to some extent even in more highly organised and stable groups, since they tend to induce strong suggestibility in their members. It is only at the very highest level of development that organised groups are able to develop adult freedom side by side with a loyalty which at lower levels sets all criticism in abeyance.

Personal life clearly develops in relation to ever-widening group environments, starting from the parents, and gradually including all the home, other children, and then various larger or more organised groups, such as the school, the local community, various societies, a church, a class, a party, a nation. Combining the analyses of McDougall and Freud we find that the ideal group, capable of giving the opportunity of full personal development to all its members, would have the

following characters. It would have permanence, stability and flexibility of organisation, and an end sufficiently clear-cut to be effective in and for its members. This end would normally be symbolised, as in a national flag or in traditional institutions. All would be responsible for the actions of the whole body and disloyalty would be the most formidable of all offences. Under those conditions there would be a true equality of members, since the ego-ideal of each would be identified with the same object. This would have the further consequence that each member would also be in principle capable of leadership, since the function of a leader is to embody, symbolically and effectively, the common ideal. The true leader thus holds his position by being psychologically identified with his followers, their ego-ideal, objectively identified with the leader, being subjectively identified once more with their own actual ego. Thus they are individually developed into full and effective citizenship. Only a leader who is such a leader of free followers is a leader in the full meaning of the word. A leader who has to secure a common ideal among his followers by any form of compulsion is not a true leader at all.

This account of the complex structure of the highest type of group is strikingly worked out by Freud with reference to the army, which corresponds to it imperfectly, and to the Christian Church which, in ideal, corresponds to it far more fully. For in the army member and leader are not fully identified. There is an 'object-tie.' But in the Christian Church Christ is wholly one with the members of His Body, and each in principle is the bearer of the ideal of the whole community. There is thus 'object-identification.' This conception should be studied closely, since 'identification,' as Freud understands it, is a childish condition, to be outgrown in the adult life. It nevertheless shows a very remarkable correspondence with the essential characteristics of Christianity.

The importance of the group for its members is thus (1) that by the greater strength and prestige of the group it safeguards from attack the individual ego-ideals of its members, and (2) that by its power of suggestion it tends strongly to conform the ego to the ego-ideal which is its true objective, but which in isolation it might not achieve.

It is obvious that this analysis is of great importance for

the understanding of the Church in its relation to its members. In particular it can be applied to the problems of *worship*.

Psychology is not concerned with the metaphysical aspect of worship, or with the proof of the reality of the God to whom it is offered. It sees in it rather the system of corporate and symbolic acts in which the community of believers consciously accepts and expresses those ideals which have constituted them a community. Thus normal worship is the centre of the life of the Church. Psychologically its effect upon the individual is that his ego is developed by suggestion, in which the group-ideal reinforces and modifies the ego-ideal. Where the worship is healthy this process is saved from regressive tendencies by the reference of the ego-ideal back to the ego, with resulting conation. In other words each worshipper must make the worship his own, and its suggestion must issue in action.

Much worship, especially of the revivalist kind, is clearly pathological. Results are produced by direct suggestion, overwhelming adult freedom and inducing childish suggestibility. The use of advertisement, of hymns, and of emotional preaching, needs great care. There is real danger not only of lack of permanence, but of religious hysteria. Public missions of healing are open to similar dangers.

XIII. IDENTIFICATION, PROJECTION, AND THE REALITY OF GOD

The principle of *identification*, already mentioned, is a primitive or childish type of object-relation, in which the ego and the object are not clearly separated, so that either may be seen in the other. Secondly there may be identification of, or failure to distinguish, object and object, through their common identification with the ego. This is really the ground of the whole process of association of mental elements. It is especially important in the curious mode of behaviour seen in imitation and play.

Whether this principle is prior to the conscious ego-object relation is a difficult problem. Undoubtedly it remains operative and even dominant in later life, even though it can never be conscious, for if it were conscious it would at once be rationalised.

The principle is one of the main sources of the symbolism of dreams, but can easily be illustrated in daily life. Thus a child playing with a doll is actually identified with the doll in various ways. It may use the doll as a means of gaining credit for some inhibited part of its own ego. Thus a scolded child will later scold its doll. A child frustrated in its desire for nice clothes will dress its doll as splendidly as it can. So in adult life an angry man will accuse his opponent of losing his temper, a drunkard will accuse others of drinking, an egoist will accuse others of conceit. The principle is thus the basic energy of all prudery, and much reforming zeal is by no means as reputable as it appears, since it is often an attempt to escape the fundamental need of reform which the reformer refuses to admit to consciousness in himself.

In this form the principle is often termed *projection*. It is to be noticed that any emotional disposition may be so projected, whether lower or higher. Very frequently it is the higher ego-ideal that is so displaced, and honoured in some external setting, as in some person who is admired at a distance, or in the hero of a novel or a biography, or in a church.

It is often argued that God does not really exist, but is only such a projection, partly of the ego-ideal and partly (in His threatening and authoritative aspects) of the super-ego. This suggestion involves some confusion of thought, since projection is a wholly real process, and ideals are only projected upon a reality capable of receiving them (and, so Christianity claims, of modifying them in a creative manner). Ultimate Reality, or its surrogate in some mediate real, is the necessary basis of all such projection. Thus we cannot say that God is a projection, but only that we project our ideals, and even our fantasies and errors, upon God.

It is clear that psychological analysis must necessarily mean a serious mortality amongst false Gods, but the ultimate source of this mortality is that what is fundamentally real must also be fundamentally true. And this is only another way of making a claim which the Christian makes for the God whom he worships. But in making this claim the Christian must needs accept a challenge to his own life. Until that is free from conflict there will be elements of unreality in his

God. A problem so arises, but if God is real, the answer to that problem lies with Him and not with us.

XIV. RATIONALISATION AND THEOLOGY

Rationalisation is the name given to a psychological process which passes in its developed form into the full and conscious activity of reason. In principle it is the development of the ego-object relation in awareness of itself as a relation of two, the ego and the other. It is thus the corrective of identification, and leads to adult freedom as a developed personality 'aware of mine own self and of the world.'

In the study of dreams it appears that the orderly arranging of the dream, its structure as a story, its logical coherence, and its explanation all begin to appear as we awaken. Rationalisation is in effect the harmonising of the dream with the fully accepted adult life. Its function is two-fold: (a) primarily it harmonises the dream in all its aspects with the unity of the ego. Thus elements not in accordance with waking morality will normally be forgotten, or distorted so as to pass the 'censorship' (the product of the super-ego and the ego-ideal) which stands between sleep and waking, in order (so it is suggested) to guard the former. (b) Secondly it harmonises the dream with itself, making it into a story capable of being told. It is now presentable, logically and morally. This secondary process takes place for the sake of the primary function of harmonisation, whereby the dream is only remembered so far and in such a form as is acceptable to the ego.

This observation is suggestive in connexion with the interpretation of the whole cognitive process, and the rôle which it plays in human behaviour. It points to the late appearance of consciousness in the scale of evolution, whether we are to regard consciousness as itself simply evolved, or as 'emergent,' or as coming into the evolutionary process from outside, or, for that matter, with the Behaviourists, as non-existent or illusory. Clearly conation and affect have a certain priority.

Cognition has an obvious series of stages. The simple ability to receive a stimulus may be merely mechanical as in a mouse-trap. *Awareness* is the recognition of that function; *consciousness* is the attention of the ego to its own awareness;

self-consciousness is the attention of the ego to itself as so conscious. It is noteworthy that in ordinary speech self-consciousness is regarded as a defect. Clearly in some cases it can become pathological, as in Hamlet, who lingers in the cognitive process as a result of inhibited conation. To say that the ego can be conscious of itself is strictly inaccurate, but it can be aware of its own states, and this awareness (as in narcissism) may become obsessive, with very undesirable results.

This conation and emotion, as we have said above, precede theology in the religious life. This is the justification for the claim that belief rests upon the will to believe. So far as this is intended as a criticism of belief (William James did not so mean it) it rests upon a confusion as to the meaning of the term 'will.' Will is not the cause of belief, but simply another term for the same thing. The ego-object relation, accepted into the self-expression of the ego, is the ground of both. Belief, in fact, in that full sense which constitutes *faith*, is at once the acceptance by the ego of its own directive trend, and the acceptance as directive of the object towards which it is directed.

XV. THEORIES OF THE RELATION BETWEEN MAN AND GOD

Under this heading comes in the statement and criticism of certain theories which have been suggested to explain the interaction between the ego and that 'Other more than itself' which we term Reality, or in the traditional usage, God.

Of these the two most important are :

(1) The suggestion of William James that the self in its highest part is continuous with a More of the same quality. This James interprets by the aid of the theory of a subliminal self. He notes the sense of 'otherness' which is a striking feature of the 'uprushes of the subconscious' in conversion experience. He suggests, as his own 'over-belief,' that at the further margin of this subliminal self we may be in touch with that which is actually 'other,' and so with God Himself. This would be the source of those ideal impulses which seem to emerge unaccountably. The theory is obviously important in relation to the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, or of any immanent theology.

It seems to break down (a) in face of more recent psycho-analytic study of the unconscious, and (b) in giving the unconscious priority in worth to the conscious and rational aspects of the ego.

(2) The suggestion of Otto that religion is concerned with a mode of apprehending reality as the 'numinous' at the supra-rational level, by the special supra-rational faculty of divination. This should be compared with, and criticised in the light of, J. Oman's conception of the 'sacred,' to which it is closely akin. Otto's description of 'creature-consciousness' in the face of *mysterium fascinans et tremendum*, its relation to panic fear, and to the holy, and its schematisation by the ethical, is only in part capable of criticism on psychological lines. But it is important to investigate how far his descriptions of the emotions concerned are borne out by the facts, and what explanations of these facts psychology, again in the light of psycho-analysis, has to offer. It is possible that the sense of the numinous may be sub-rational rather than supra-rational, and that the case for the apprehension of the 'Other' or the 'Given' is weakened rather than strengthened by the stress laid on a particular group of affects. What is essential is not awefulness but 'given-ness.'

XVI. MYSTICISM

The study of mystical experiences forms a large field of psychological enquiry in itself. It is confused by the use of the term 'mysticism' in several senses. In its broadest use it covers almost any religious behaviour in which we are aware of an affective element. In its specialised use it is applied to the stages in the development of a certain type of disposition, marked by special experiences of an ecstatic kind.

The mystical state has been defined by Pratt as 'the sense of the presence of a being or reality through other means than the ordinary perceptive processes or the reason.' This definition clearly links its study with that of the numinous or the sacred, and shows the reason for taking the material in this order.

The study of the stages of mysticism involves some reading of the works of the greater mystics, and the attempt to relate

the rather diverse accounts which they give. These are clearly due to the different types of disposition in the mystics themselves. In general it may be said that the experiences show a certain alternation between ecstasy and 'dryness,' between contemplation and action, between the positive and the negative ways. There is a stress upon purgation as leading to illumination, and so to union, and this sense of one-ness between the soul and God, so strong that often all awareness of the individual self is lost, is the most marked character of mysticism. St. John of the Cross develops the conception of the negative way, regarding the *Dark Night of the Soul* as twofold: the *Night of the Senses* lying between ordinary prayer and the prayer of simplicity, and the *Night of the Spirit*, lying between the prayer of union and ecstasy.

St. Theresa shows very full psychological insight of her own experiences. She distinguishes (1) the *Prayer of Quiet*, in which the will is united to God, but thoughts are distracted, and the power of movement is not wholly lost; (2) the *Prayer of Union*, in which distractions cease, and emotion is heightened; (3) *Ecstasy*, in which sense impressions and the power to move are lost, and visions and locutions may occur; (4) *Spiritual Marriage*, in which trance gives place to a state of active service, though contemplation remains permanent, and the soul is at peace, even if there is conflict 'in the other mansions.'

It has been argued, as by Jung, that mysticism is a periodic or continuous introversion of *libido*, and that what really happens is the acceptance by the ego of itself as its own object. Such regressive mysticism would be infantile, and not creative, and certainly the lives of some of the mystics, as is fully shown by Leuba, are open to this criticism.

But it is impossible upon this theory to account for the effective lives of some of the greater mystics. Von Hügel's account of St. Catherine of Genoa is classical in this connexion. Thouless has described such effective mysticism as a heightened (and to some extent abnormal) form of *deoverversion*. Its special character is due to the peculiar liability of the growth-processes to dissociate, an adolescent tendency which sometimes persists in adult life. This suggests parallels between mysticism and hysterical dissociation, but it should be noted that hysteria

itself, as a psychological process, has a progressive as well as a regressive character.

Mysticism may therefore be a highly specialised growth process, revealing possibilities in the apprehension (or rather, in Whitehead's phrase, 'prehension') of Reality (or of man by Reality) impossible to normally balanced people, in whom this tendency cannot find full expression. There is no psychological reason for denying the claim of the mystics that in their experiences they are in fact drawn nearer to God.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

In the list of books which follows the items marked with an asterisk (*) would constitute a short introductory course of reading, covering the main ground of the subject. Items marked with a dagger (†) are inexpensive and not technical.

The last section of the list is added mainly for reference. It covers the most necessary books for any student who desires a general knowledge of the present position in psychology, as a background for his special study of psychology of religion. A certain amount of reading in this section is necessary if that study is not to be one-sided.

A. GENERAL STUDIES OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

- E. D. STARBUCK: *Psychology of Religion*. (Scott.)
 *W. JAMES: *Varieties of Religious Experience*. (Longmans.)
 J. B. PRATT: *Psychology of Religious Belief*. (Macmillan.)
 *———: *The Religious Consciousness*. (Macmillan.)
 *R. H. THOULESS: *An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion*. (Cambridge Univ. Press.)
 W. B. SELBIE: *The Psychology of Religion*. (Oxford Univ. Press.)
 G. A. COE: *Psychology of Religion*. (Chicago Press.)
 E. R. UREN: *Recent Religious Psychology*. (T. & T. Clark.)
 *L. W. GRENSTED: *Psychology and God*. (Longmans.)

B. SPECIAL SECTIONS OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

(1) *Conversion*

- ST. AUGUSTINE: *Confessions*.
 S. G. DIMOND: *Psychology of the Methodist Revival*. (Oxford Univ. Press.)
 *A. C. UNDERWOOD: *Conversion: Christian and Non-Christian*. (Allen & Unwin.)
 S. DE SANCTIS: *Religious Conversion*. (Kegan Paul.)
 W. LAWSON JONES: *A Psychological Study of Religious Conversion*. (Epworth Press.)
 W. BRYN THOMAS: *The Psychology of Conversion*. (Allenson.)

(2) *The Development and Adjustment of Personality*

- *†G. STUART: *The Achievement of Personality*. (S.C.M.)
 †F. KÜNKEL: *What it means to grow up*. (Scribners.)
 †P. FLETCHER: *Mastering Nerves*. (Rich & Cowan.)
 †L. D. WEATHERHEAD: *Psychology and Life*. (Hodder & Stoughton.)
 †— *Psychology in Service of the Soul*. (Epworth Press.)
 †— *The Mastery of Sex*. (S.C.M.)
 *†J. A. HADFIELD: *Psychology and Morals*. (Methuen.)
 W. BROWN: *Psychology and Psychotherapy*. (Arnold.)
 W. E. HOCKING: *Human Nature and Its Remaking*. (Oxford Univ. Press.)

(3) *Spiritual Healing*

- *†H. ANSON: *Spiritual Healing*. (University of London Press.)
 †M. SPENCER and H. W. WORKMAN: *Spiritual Healing*. (S.C.M.)
 A. G. IKIN: *The Background of Spiritual Healing*. (Allen & Unwin.)
 G. DAWSON: *Healing, Pagan and Christian*. (S.P.C.K.)
 M. GREGORY: *Psychotherapy, Scientific and Religious*. (Macmillan.)

(4) *Pastoral Psychology*

- L. DEWAR and C. E. HUDSON: *A Manual of Pastoral Psychology*. (Philip Allen.)
 *H. BALMFORTH, L. DEWAR, C. E. HUDSON and E. W. SARA: *An Introduction to Pastoral Psychology*. (Hodder & Stoughton.)

(5) *Group Psychology*

- E. DURKHEIM: *Elementary Forms of Religious Life*. (Allen & Unwin.)
 *C. C. J. WEBB: *Group Theories of Religion*. (Allen & Unwin.)
 R. MARETT: *Faith, Hope, and Charity in Primitive Religion*. (Oxford Univ. Press.)
 — *Sacraments of Simple Folk*. (Oxford Univ. Press.)

(6) *Mysticism and the Knowledge of God*

- RUFUS JONES: *Studies in Mystical Religion*. (Macmillan.)
 *E. UNDERHILL: *Mysticism*. (Methuen.)
 — *The Mystic Way*. (Dent.)
 G. POULAIN: *The Graces of Interior Prayer*. (Kegan Paul.)
 E. VON HÜGEL: *The Mystical Element of Religion*. (Dent.)
 P. ELMER MORE: *Christian Mysticism*. (S.P.C.K.)
 J. H. LEUBA: *The Psychology of Religious Mysticism*. (Kegan Paul.)
 *R. OTTO: *The Idea of the Holy*. (Oxford Univ. Press.)
 J. OMAN: *The Natural and the Supernatural*. (Cambridge Univ. Press.)

(7) *The Relation between Psychology and Religion*

- *†D. YELLOWLEES: *Psychology's Defence of the Faith*. (S.C.M.)
 †L. W. GRENSTED: *Religion, Fact or Fancy?* (S.C.M.)
 C. H. VALENTINE: *Modern Psychology and the Validity of Religious Experience*. (S.C.M.)
 W. BROWN: *Science and Personality*. (Oxford Univ. Press.)
 — *Mind and Personality*. (University of London Press.)

C. A GENERAL COURSE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL READING

PLATO: *The Republic* (*passim*).

ARISTOTLE: *The Nicomachean Ethics*.

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica*, II. Pars. 2.

J. C. FLUGEL: *A Hundred Years of Psychology*. (Duckworth.)

C. S. MYERS: *A Textbook of Experimental Psychology*. (Cambridge Univ. Press.)

G. F. STOUT: *Manual of Psychology*. (University Tutorial Press.)

W. WARD: *Psychological Principles*. (Cambridge Univ. Press.)

W. JAMES: *Principles of Psychology*. (Macmillan.)

†W. MCDUGALL: *Psychology*. (Home University Library. Williams & Norgate.)

*— *Introduction to Social Psychology*. (Methuen.)

— *An Outline of Psychology*. (Methuen.)

— *An Outline of Abnormal Psychology*. (Methuen.)

S. FREUD: *The Interpretation of Dreams*. (Allen & Unwin.)

— *Psychopathology of Everyday Life*. (T. Fisher Unwin.)

*— *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis*. (Allen & Unwin.)

*— *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*. (Hogarth Press.)

— *The Future of an Illusion*. (Hogarth Press.)

— *The Ego and the Id*. (Hogarth Press.)

— *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. (Hogarth Press.)

*— *New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*. (Hogarth Press.)

C. G. JUNG: *Psychology of the Unconscious*. (Kegan Paul.)

— *Psychological Types*. (Kegan Paul.)

*— *Contributions to Analytical Psychology*. (Kegan Paul.)

— *Mankind in Search of a Soul*. (Kegan Paul.)

A. ADLER: *The Neurotic Constitution*. (Kegan Paul.)

*— *Individual Psychology*. (Kegan Paul.)

— *Understanding Human Nature*. (Allen & Unwin.)

†G. COSTER: *Psycho-analysis for Normal People*. (Oxford Univ. Press.)

E. HITSCHMANN: *Freud's Theory of the Neuroses*. (Kegan Paul.)

E. JONES: *Psycho-analysis*. (Baillière, Tindall, & Cox.)

H. W. FRINK: *Morbid Fear and Compulsions*. (Kegan Paul.)

C. BAUDOUIN: *Studies in Psycho-analysis*. (Allen & Unwin.)

I. D. SUTTIE: *The Origin of Love and Hate*. (Routledge.)

*M. NICOLL: *Dream-Psychology*. (Oxford Medical Publications.)

*†H. CRICHTON MILLER: *Psycho-analysis and Its Derivatives*. (Home University Library. Williams & Norgate.)

R. ALLERS: *The Psychology of Character*. (Sheed & Ward.)

*†B. HART: *The Psychology of Insanity*. (Cambridge Univ. Press.)

A. G. TANSLEY: *The New Psychology and Its Relation to Life*. (Allen & Unwin.)

C. SPEARMAN: *The Abilities of Man*. (Macmillan.)

W. H. R. RIVERS: *Instinct and the Unconscious*. (Cambridge Univ. Press.)

- *A. F. SHAND: *The Foundations of Character*. (Macmillan.)
- *R. S. WOODWORTH: *Contemporary Schools of Psychology*. (Ronald.)
 — *Psychology—A Study of Mental Life*. (Methuen.)
- J. B. WATSON: *Behaviourism*. (Kegan Paul.)
 — *Psychology from the Point of View of a Behaviourist*. (Lippincott.)
- W. KÖHLER: *The Mentality of Apes*. (Kegan Paul.)
- *— *Gestalt Psychology*. (Bell.)
- K. KOFFKA: *The Growth of the Mind*. (Kegan Paul.)
- *†H. CRICHTON MILLER: *The New Psychology and the Parent*. (Jarrold.)
- SUSAN ISAACS: *Intellectual Growth in Young Children*. (Routledge.)
 — *Social Development in Young Children*. (Routledge.)
- J. PIAGET: *The Child's Conception of the World*. (Kegan Paul.)
- C. BURT: *The Young Delinquent*. (University of London Press.)
- G. LE BON: *The Crowd*. (Benn.)
- W. TROTTER: *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*. (Benn.)
- W. MCDUGALL: *The Group Mind*. (Cambridge Univ. Press.)
- C. H. BROOKS: *The Practice of Auto-suggestion*. (Allen & Unwin.)
- C. BAUDOUIN: *Suggestion and Auto-suggestion*. (Allen & Unwin.)

V
THE OLD TESTAMENT

by
HERBERT DANBY, D.D.

Regius Professor of Hebrew in the University of Oxford

‘ After more than a century of scrutiny, perhaps more thorough than has been directed towards any other literature, the Old Testament emerges unequalled as a source of knowledge about the history of civilisation in one important region of the ancient world, and unsurpassed also as a vehicle of mankind’s deepest devotional thoughts and aspirations.’

Page 192.

V

THE OLD TESTAMENT

I

THERE has been a lessening of interest in the Old Testament since the beginning of the present century. Old controversies have died down, and indifference has taken their place. A defensive, almost a diffident, attitude is considered fitting in him who, to-day, would put forward the Old Testament's claim to be still a usable and even a useful item in the Christian's spiritual armoury.

The unspoken assumption is that, in consequence of our greatly enlarged knowledge of the civilisation contemporary with the Old Testament age, the Old Testament emerges as but an inferior record by an inferior race : a record of secondary and often negligible value, whether as history, as literature, or as religious expression.

Such an assumption is the relic of ideas which had a vogue a generation ago. It is not in line with present tendencies in Old Testament study. Of recent years technical investigations bearing directly or indirectly on the Old Testament have shown for it undisguised respect. Whether as a quarry of facts about the civilisation and thought of the time, or as a series of carefully and, on the whole, faithfully transmitted records, the Old Testament's repute has grown the greater the more we have learnt of the civilisation contemporary with it.

Yet though the wrongness of the recent disparagement of the Old Testament is apparent, it is necessary to understand some of the causes for it.

Certain older ideas associated with 'inspired Scripture' now prove difficult of acceptance. As popularly understood the Old Testament's inspiration was bound up with inerrancy in historical and scientific fact, with consistent and unim-

peachable standards in moral teaching and action, and even with a text whose original integrity had continued unspoilt by transmission and unimpaired in sense and spirit despite translation. Such a mechanical conception of inspiration and revelation postulates a condition of things wherein divine thought is committed to man and transmitted through man, while both the thought and the literary form embodying the thought continue unchanged and undistorted, despite the limitations of human understanding and the frailties of copyists.

To-day we are much more conscious of the part played of necessity by human understanding and human powers of expression in providing the means of communication by which the thoughts and teachings preserved in the Old Testament records have reached us in their present form.

If, then, the contents of the Old Testament Scriptures have depended on human knowledge and ability for their expression, their literary form, and their literal transmission, they should be susceptible to the resources of human intelligence for their better understanding and interpretation.

That is the principle underlying and justifying the manner of studying the Old Testament commonly labelled 'higher¹ criticism.' This is a misleading and misunderstood label, connoting as it does in common language an attitude of both superiority and condemnation; whereas it is but the laudable and legitimate attempt to discern—not to 'criticise'—the manner in which the Old Testament Scriptures assumed their present form, the circumstances in which they were written, and the motives and meaning of their writers.

An impression persists that the results of this type of study have 'discredited' the Old Testament. (This is equivalent to supposing that the earth has been 'discredited' by being shown to be round and not flat.) What higher criticism has done—and what it goes on doing—is to analyse and scrutinise the contents of the Old Testament in an effort to increase our understanding of them. The conclusions which it offers from time to time may not always be correct, but they are efforts to

¹ 'Higher' is an unfortunate choice of adjective specifying the study of literary and historical problems as distinct from the study of the actual language, text, manuscripts, and early versions of the Old Testament, a study which sometimes goes by the name of 'lower' criticism.

solve real difficulties and to present the substance of the Old Testament in a form that satisfies the requirements of logical sequence and natural growth. None the less, the impression has been created that higher criticism has laid bare such-and-such flaws and so displaced the Old Testament from its former pedestal: the extreme conclusion is drawn that a body of literature which had masqueraded under the cloak of sanctity and inspiration is now exposed by the acuteness of the modern intellect.

Another factor which has helped to undermine confidence in the Old Testament is the supposed result of studies in comparative religion and anthropology. Such studies have, it is true, brought to light numerous and sometimes remarkable resemblances between Old Testament customs and beliefs and those current among other ancient or primitive races. The rough-and-ready conclusion has followed that just as higher criticism has undermined the Old Testament's authority, so comparative religion has robbed it of any claim to uniqueness.

Even archaeology (though it used to be and sometimes still is considered an infallible court of appeal in favour of traditional views against the supposed disintegrating efforts of higher criticism) has done disservice: the Old Testament, instead of being accounted of value in its own right, strong in its own authority, has been made to figure as a beneficiary of archaeology; and the perverse impression lingers that the Old Testament is a frail fabric in need of archaeology as its buttress.

In short, a notion prevails that the problems surrounding the Old Testament, which provoked controversy during the latter half of the nineteenth century, have been settled once and for all and that there is nothing more left to discover; and that though there may once have been a time when the Old Testament stood beyond criticism and when its contents were deemed a gauge by which the truth of external knowledge must be measured, it must itself now be tested by other, more 'objective,' standards.

Meanwhile, it has become necessary to bridge the gap which exists between views such as these and those which follow from the results of recent Old Testament scholarship and related studies. We know now a great deal about the religion and

customs and literature of Israel's neighbours and contemporaries and how far Israel resembled them and differed from them; and it is becoming increasingly easy to recapture the material and the spiritual environment out of which the Old Testament arose. The consequence is that

'it is only when we seem to have deprived the Old Testament of all that once was thought to be peculiar to it that we discover how much more brightly its distinctiveness shines forth. The more the religion and history of Palestine appear to be submerged in the religion and history of its environment, the more impressive is all that which makes the Old Testament unique.'¹

'In the Old Testament some fundamental religious ideas not unique in themselves, were uniquely shaped by Israel.'²

Nor is it only in the quality of its teachings that the Old Testament emerges supreme. As a living picture of ancient life and, rightly understood, as a history of a nation and its ideas, as a nation's spiritual autobiography, it has no rival in pre-Christian times. 'No other oriental nation was able to create such an historical literature. Even the Greeks succeeded in producing one only at a much later stage of their development.'³

To assume that the Old Testament is 'outmoded' and to ignore it as though it were a literature of solely antiquarian interest, is (at the lowest estimate) to forfeit the benefit to be gained from one of the greatest creations of the ancient world. After more than a century of scrutiny, perhaps more thorough than has been directed towards any other literature, the Old Testament emerges unequalled as a source of knowledge about the history of civilisation in one important region of the ancient world, and unsurpassed also as a vehicle of mankind's deepest devotional thoughts and aspirations, couched in language which still retains its original vigour and its moral intensity.

¹ S. A. Cook, *The place of the Old Testament in modern research* (Cambridge, 1932), p. 28.

² S. A. Cook, *The Old Testament: a reinterpretation* (Cambridge, 1936), p. viii.

³ Eduard Meyer, *Die kulturelle, literarische und religiöse Entwicklung des israelitischen Volkes* (1930), p. 4.

II

The question 'What is the Old Testament?' can only call forth the answer that it has meant different things to different people at different times. It meant one thing to the ancient Jews, other things to the Christian Church in its early days and before and after the Reformation, and it means yet another thing to most of those who study it to-day.

For its first possessors, the Jews, it was a collection of ancestral traditions, historical narratives, genealogies, laws, sermons, prayers, Temple liturgies, and essays in religious and practical philosophy. For the Jews it was a national literature alike edifying and practical: in it they found a record of the relations between God and Israel, the salutary story of Israel's national and religious past, and rules controlling Israel's religious life in the present; it preserved a record of the divinely ordained rules of everyday social life and ethical conduct (the 'moral law') and the manner of worshipping God and acknowledging His authority and fulfilling His (to all appearances) arbitrary dictates (the 'ceremonial law'); and both the moral law and the ceremonial law were equally revered as divinely revealed.

Much more needs to be said concerning the attitude of the Church towards the Old Testament.

Since the first Christians were Jews, the Church inherited Jewish conceptions about the Old Testament (excluding only the binding character of certain of the social and ceremonial laws): the Old Testament still counted as the record of God's dealings with Israel, and God's revelation of Himself and His will through Moses and the Prophets. This earliest Christian attitude is defined precisely by St. Paul (Romans iii. 1 f.): 'What advantage then hath the Jew? . . . First of all, that they were intrusted with the oracles of God.' But in addition, and predominantly, the early Church saw in the Old Testament the historical and logical preliminaries to the Christian faith: particularly it found there the prophetic preparation for the coming of the Christ, the long-heralded promise which, in the fullness of time, had been fulfilled in the person of Jesus. Following naturally on this, the Church made of the Old Testament a quarry out of which it brought together both testimonies

to the Messiahship of Jesus and passages foretelling the admission of the Gentiles into what had been a solely Jewish covenant-relationship with God.

The Church treasured the Old Testament, accepted it as 'Sacred Scripture,' as revealed truth, primarily because of its divine testimony to the truth of Christianity. The early Church's faith in this witness was robust and unqualified. It saw in the Old Testament Scriptures—even in the imperfect Greek translation of them—literally 'the oracles of God.' Though the Church inherited its Scriptures from the Jews it accepted with them no Jewish traditions of interpretation: the place of such a tradition was taken by an *a priori* conviction that everything, in every part, when properly understood, foretold Jesus Christ and the Christian Church.

This acceptance of the Old Testament as an inseparable part of the Christian revelation did not remain unchallenged within the Church.

Marcion and the Gnostics in the second century, and the Manichaeans in the following centuries, were as ardent as any present-day Jew-haters in their anxiety to purge their religious books of all sign and taint of Jewishness. Marcion and his successors pointed out examples of defective morality in the Old Testament, such as the polygamy of the Hebrew kings and patriarchs, primitive principles of jurisprudence, the cruel wars of extermination ordained by Israel's God through the mouth of Moses, the treachery of Jael, the savage cursing of Israel's enemies by psalmists and prophets, and anthropomorphic conceptions of God; and they argued that in such things the guiding hand of the true God could surely have had no part, and that, therefore, the Christian Church must cut itself free from such degrading association with Judaism and the Old Testament.

The ancient Church refused to take this line. Its leaders—St. Augustine chief among them—refused to make the break: they refused to admit that God's hand was not at work in the Jewish scriptures and in Jewish history. Their refusal did not arise out of conservatism but out of conviction. They insisted on seeing the hand of God in all Hebrew history; and they showed themselves conscious of the obvious principle that the offending moral standards in parts of the Old Testament must

be seen in the light of contemporary circumstances, and that God's revelation of himself must necessarily be that of a father revealing his will and thoughts to a growing child, 'here a little, there a little, line upon line, line upon line.'

Before long the Old Testament ceased to be a problem. The more learned, when confronted by alleged difficulties, acquired skill in finding in them symbolic truths. As for the simpler folk and the newly converted nations of Europe, when they accepted the Gospel they accepted the history of Israel also, without scruple or criticism.

But much more was involved.

St. Paul's interpretation of history had made the Church the true Israel, the rightful inheritor of God's promises to the Chosen People. St. Augustine, therefore, in *The City of God*, found all effective world history to be contained within the history of that Kingdom of God which in early times had been introduced into the world through Israel and in later times entrusted into the keeping of the Church. All non-Biblical history was thus stript away in its entirety as irrelevant, while Israelitish history no longer remained an exclusive property of the Jews: it was now the property of the entire body of the faithful, the Church.

Translated into popular idea and practice this meant that the Christianised European races came to think lightly of their own cultural origins, to pay little regard to those ancestral traditions which they had preserved in their myths and sagas, and even to suppress them. Instead, they saw themselves the spiritual and, in some sense, the cultural successors of the Hebrew patriarchs and the heroes of Israel.

From this there followed an idealising of the people and institutions of Israel: so much so, that the utterly alien, oriental, Semitic people and things displayed in the pages of the Old Testament were naturalised, assimilated, and transformed in the thought of mediaeval Europe, and still more conspicuously in its graphic arts, and transmuted into idealised types of the faith and the forms cultivated by the Church of the Middle Ages.

The Continental Reformation in the sixteenth century made its wholesale attack on the beliefs and practices, the scholarship and piety, of the mediaeval Church; but the Jewish Scrip-

tures emerged on an even higher pedestal than before. In them, together with the standards and practice of primitive Christianity, Luther saw his ideal, his gauge of truth, the criterion by which he could test, and by testing condemn, the ways of the Church of Rome. The Church's faith and practice must be scrutinised and judged in the light of the plain sense and precedents of the Old and New Testaments.

In the light of the Reformation's acceptance of such standards as these, Israel became still more specifically the ideal people, the chosen nation, the 'revelation nation,' the men and nation chosen by God to be the channel of divine revelation to mankind. For the early Protestants, the laws and usage of Israel became a divinely sanctioned authority defining true religion.

This rigid and naïve faith in the authority and perfection of a literature which, after all, dealt with the lives and thoughts of far from perfect men and women, was first shaken by the Biblical scholarship of the seventeenth century, and it proved an easy and obvious target for the matter-of-factness and the chilly intellectualism characteristic of the eighteenth century, the English Deists and the Continental Rationalists.

It was not, however, the Old Testament itself which was the object of criticism, but traditional conceptions about Israel.

The eighteenth-century argument ran along the following lines :

There were three basic ideas in the traditional scheme of the Biblical revelation : faith in God, obedience to Him issuing in the practice of certain virtues, and belief in the immortality of the soul. But, asked the eighteenth-century sceptics, was full and willing response to these three ideas the characteristic factor in the life of ancient Israel ? It was not. Also, on the other hand, was not a ready belief in some or other of these ideas found among certain ancient nations other than Israel ? It was. How, then, could Israel have been the Chosen People, the 'revelation nation,' the sole transmitters and exemplars of the truth ? How could such a thing be when, in fact, the Old Testament itself exposes the people of Israel as backsliders from their God, continually denounced for their moral failings, and without belief in the immortality of the soul and in future reward and punishment ?

Out of such negative criticism there emerged certain positive ideas which have become more or less standard in our present-day understanding of the Old Testament.

Israel ceased to be regarded as an isolated race standing at the dawn of history. Nor was Israel to be thought of as a peculiarly ideal people. But the eighteenth century did not wholly break away from the idea of Israel as the means, utilised by God, for fulfilling His purpose.

In 1771 the German theologian Michaelis developed the thought of an Israel singled out and favoured by the teaching of Moses, through whom was revealed the 'true' God—an Israel so favoured and chosen from among the rest of the nations, not because it was the most worthy, but because it was the most convenient for God's purpose.

Lessing, in 1780, saw in Israel the medium between humanity and the God of history; and though Israel was, in fact, but a 'crude and sensual race,' it was brought by degrees to a recognition of the full truth and so was enabled in the fullness of time to transmit this truth to the Gentiles which had not known God.

The eighteenth century tried, in fact, to rationalise God's manner of revealing Himself through a people like the Jews.

It was left to the nineteenth century to reverse the process: instead of trying to penetrate the divine plan it preferred to scrutinise the records of Israel's history, religion, and literature and to study them as records of ordinary earth-bound and natural development, as human records of purely human failure and aspiration.

The most significant step was in 1835, when Wilhelm Vatke produced his book *The Religion of the Old Testament*. He was inspired by the philosophical system of Hegel. In Israel's religious and national development he believed that he could identify the three Hegelian stages: he found a primitive, pre-Mosaic religion of forms and externals; this endured for many centuries in opposition to its antithesis, the spiritual and ethical religion inculcated by the teaching of Moses and the Prophets—an opposition at last reconciled in the Levitical legislation, the post-Exilic religion of the Temple, a synthesis whereby the externals of sacrificial ritual were indeed preserved but given a spiritual and ethical significance.

Vatke's broad generalisations have not entirely stood the test of closer scrutiny and analysis, but they provided the clue which, in the hands of a succession of better qualified scholars, helped to suggest the course of Israel's religious development and the approximate dates and order of the laws and narratives of the Old Testament ; and it was the efforts of these scholars during the later decades of the nineteenth century which built up the now generally accepted documentary hypothesis which seeks to explain how the Old Testament reached the form in which we know it.

The picture of Israel's religious and material development as drawn anew on the basis of this hypothesis is one which, on the whole, is comprehensible and consistent ; and concerning its broad outlines there is considerable unanimity among scholars. But about many minor details and a few major issues this unanimity is not complete and it is constantly being disturbed. We must beware of talking about ' the conclusions of higher criticism ' : in the nature of things the work of higher criticism can never be conclusive. ' Higher criticism ' is not a key to the problems of the Old Testament : it is only a process—the same process of historico-literary study and patient investigation which is the fitting tribute paid to every great and ancient literary creation. The process is not, and never can be, completed, since it is essentially one of applying new knowledge and added understanding. The results of the process must go on changing—or growing more precise—so long as our knowledge of the contemporary civilisation and thought increases.

III

Before discussing the revised outlook on Old Testament history and religion which has resulted from a century's critical study, we need to recall the traditional picture which has been displaced—or, rather, whose features have been differently arranged or emphasised.

By the time that the Jewish ' national library ' had been adopted by the Church its contents had been so arranged as to convey the impression of a panorama or a roughly chronological survey of Hebrew history from the times of the Patriarchs to the period when the Jews had re-established themselves in Judea after exile in Babylon.

A specific interpretation of Hebrew history is conveyed to the reader. The One God was already known to the Patriarchs and worshipped by them ; and in due course, when their descendants had multiplied and become a nation, He raised up for them a leader, Moses ; and, through Moses, God revealed Himself and His will fully to Israel. At Sinai the Israelites learnt the divine Law in all its detail, and there they made a covenant with God : they on their part undertook to observe God's will as revealed in that Law, and God on His part accepted them as His chosen people and heirs to the promises which He had made to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Israel's subsequent history was, however, nothing but a recurrent display of disloyalty to God, of backsliding and lapsing into the idolatrous ways and beliefs of the Canaanites and the other heathen nations whom the Israelites had dispossessed. Repeatedly God warned them and rebuked them by the mouth of His prophets, from the days of Moses to the days of Jeremiah. This divine admonition proved unavailing, and first the Northern Kingdom and then the Southern Kingdom was destroyed by Israel's enemies, and rulers and people were carried off into exile. The Babylonian Exile was the punishment inflicted by God on a disobedient Israel. The return from exile, permitted by the Persian king Cyrus, was God's proof of forgiveness bestowed upon the penitent remnant of Israel.

In the re-representation which is made possible in the light of the more commonly accepted results derived from the critical study of the documents of the Old Testament, there is no great change from the traditional panorama of Hebrew *history*. What change there is constitutes, rather, a shifting of the centre of gravity in Hebrew *religious* development, a transference of the climax in Israel's spiritual education. The centre of gravity is transferred from the Exodus to the later stages of the Monarchy. In other words, the creative age, the high level, in Hebrew religious history was not during the wanderings in the wilderness (as would appear from the traditional presentation), but during the age of the Writing Prophets, approximately 740 to 540 B.C. The effect of this is that Israel's religious history no longer takes the form of a continuous falling away from a defined and lofty standard, a

falling away culminating in widespread apostasy and divine chastisement and, subsequently, forgiveness and restoration of a penitent remnant; but, rather, a slow, upward struggle and development from some relatively primitive standard of beliefs and practices (not markedly different from contemporary Semitic practices) to a pure and lofty conception of Godhead, to belief in a God who is universal in His rule and who demands of His worshippers such standards in social and personal ethics as to override all national or personal self-seeking.

However natural and comprehensible, and even inevitable, such gradual development may seem to us to-day, the Jewish teachers and editors in the Exilic and post-Exilic age interpreted their nation's growth differently, and so produced that 'traditional picture' to which we have referred.

The prophets, from Amos to Ezekiel, had taught that national disaster was the result of national sin and disloyalty to the God of Israel; and the faithful remnant among the Jews saw the truth of the prophets' teachings convincingly and harshly demonstrated by the fate of Ephraim and Judah at the hands of Assyria and Babylon. Those ways of life which the prophets had denounced as national apostasy had, indeed, been followed by national calamity. With this idea deeply rooted in the national consciousness, it was not unnatural that, in the pictures of past greatness which popular thought shaped for itself (more particularly in its pictures of the days of redemption from Egyptian bondage, or the days of national greatness and unity in the time of David) these past ideal ages came to be associated with a deeper faith in God, a full knowledge of His Law for His people, and obedience to that Law. Therefore the same ideals of national worship and personal religion which had inspired the teachings and practice of the later priests and prophets were easily and instinctively thought of as dating back to the priests and prophets of the ideal earlier ages. What prophets like Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, and Jeremiah taught, and what the priests of the post-Exilic Temple practised—these moral teachings and this sacrificial system were (according to the post-Exilic interpretation of Hebrew history) already and essentially included in the conditions of the Covenant established at Sinai between God and Israel, and had been taught

and practised throughout the days of Israel's past greatness and national innocence.

Thus large sections of detailed legislation which Jewish piety attributed to Moses, are, in the critical view, to be attributed to a later age—some to the end of the seventh century and much more to a period during and after the Exile. The present framework of the historical narratives (many of which are admittedly early) is likewise attributed to later hands which wrote, some under the influence of the eighth- and seventh-century prophets and others under the chastening influence of the Babylonian Exile.

The literary methods of the time were such that the Jewish editors and scribes embodied without substantial change shorter or longer sections of older documents, and these are frequently distinguishable by reason of some peculiarity of style, language, subject-matter or general religious and national outlook. Part of the task of Old Testament literary analysis has been to distinguish between relatively early records of events told in all simplicity, without afterthought, and between interpretations of those events or editorial comment or re-writing, seeking to convey an edifying moral.

How much of this literary analysis will continue to be accepted as sound remains to be seen. Much of it is subjective. It is not altogether pointless to bear in mind that the critical reconstruction of Old Testament history and ideas took shape under the influence of the nineteenth-century conviction of the inevitability of progress, and of the antecedent likelihood of evolution in the growth of religious ideas. To-day, with civilisation less convinced of its solely upward trend than it was a century ago, we are perhaps able to entertain a doubt whether progress and improvement must necessarily be assumed as the sole natural law in the development of religious ideas and social institutions.

But, granted the correctness of the hypothesis of a gradual evolution in religious thought, such as is traceable in the writings of the Prophets, it is possible to attach approximate dates to narratives and legislation reflecting some recognisable stage or emphasis in their religious or social standpoint.

But even if the critical reconstruction of Israel's religious history may lay no claim to completeness or faultlessness, it

cannot be condemned as arbitrary. It has called to its aid and has used to the full all available resources. Thus a greatly increased knowledge of Hebrew and Semitic philology accumulated during the past half-century, throws light on varieties of literary forms, style, phraseology, and vocabulary, and enables us to use the evidence which these afford as to the relative age and priority of passages and portions of the Old Testament. Furthermore, systematic analysis and patient study of subject-matter have gone far towards making it possible to account for numerous awkwardnesses and seeming contradictions: inconsistencies in belief or usage cease to be problems when it is realised that extracts from sources of varying age and origin have been placed side by side by some annalist or editor who was himself undisturbed by what, for later minds, would appear to be irreconcilable statements.

Modern Biblical criticism began by trying to perceive a rationally comprehensible process of development of ideas within the Old Testament. At first its only weapons were logic and literary analysis. Later it was able to continue its course with the more objective aids of comparative religion and folklore, anthropology, and those other branches of knowledge which come under the general heading of 'archaeology.'

Earlier controversy encouraged a belief, still occasionally heard, that what 'Biblical criticism' sought to destroy, 'Biblical archaeology' has succeeded in proving solid and indestructible; and that the 'material proofs of archaeology' have discredited the 'subjective hypotheses of the so-called higher criticism.'

This is to misunderstand both the nature of Biblical criticism and the nature and contribution of archaeology. They are not antitheses: both aim to contribute towards a better understanding of the contents of the Bible—the one by closer analysis of the Old Testament's own contents, the other by supplying knowledge from outside the Old Testament. Archaeology has indeed done a very great deal towards improving our knowledge of the Old Testament's physical and cultural background, and we know in consequence a great deal more than did the previous generation about the Bible's historical context. But the precise range of archaeology's helpfulness should not be misunderstood or wrongly rated.

Biblical archaeology, in the narrower sense, makes it its purpose to throw light on Old Testament times and conditions by discovering and interpreting tangible remains originating from the age and places spoken of in the Old Testament. Such remains are not only inscribed monuments, written tablets, papyri and ostraca, but such other evidence of early civilisation and occupation as may be forthcoming from common and everyday objects of human use and manufacture—potsherds, artifacts, remnants of building, and much else. In the interpretation of these 'dumb' witnesses to the past, the present-day archaeologist has developed a highly specialised skill and technical resource, and, when called upon, a richly endowed imagination.

In its wider sense, Biblical archaeology draws on the less tangible generalisations and details derived from the study of folklore, comparative religion, anthropology, ethnology, and geographical research. A half-century of such study has equipped us with very much new knowledge of the countries, nations, languages, customs, and beliefs of the age—roughly 2000 to 100 B.C.—dealt with in the Old Testament.

Much of the archaeological evidence with a possible bearing on the Old Testament is of such a nature that, far from providing confirmation of some obscure and debatable detail, it is itself obscure and in need of clarification and interpretation—for which, quite often, help is forthcoming from the Old Testament and from nowhere else. Reiterated emphasis on the achievements of archaeology has made it sound a paradox, but the truth is that the Old Testament throws at least as much light on the problems of archaeology as does archaeology on the problems of the Old Testament.¹

¹ Had we lacked the Old Testament some of the most resounding archaeological discoveries might have remained partially incomprehensible or even insoluble enigmas. Thus the inscribed potsherds found in 1935 at the site of ancient Lachish would, without a knowledge of the language and contents of the Hebrew Scriptures, have offered well-nigh insuperable difficulties in decipherment, while the guesses at their interpretation must have been even more hazardous than those so far propounded. These ostraca, which are mainly letters from Hoshaiah, an officer in charge of an outlying garrison, to Yaush, the governor of Lachish, are in themselves bafflingly uninformative; and only Professor Torczyner's brilliant (but not necessarily correct) suggestion to read them in the light of an incident in the Book of Jeremiah,

This is, of course, only natural when we compare the vividness and copiousness, and the intensely human and personal quality, of the contents of the Old Testament with the surviving records of contemporary neighbouring civilisations. So far Mesopotamia, Egypt, Syria, and the Hittite regions have brought to light no literature at all comparable in quality with the histories, homilies, and praises preserved in the Old Testament. A passage in a Babylonian or an Egyptian incantation reminiscent of ideas and language familiar to us from the Old Testament is indeed cause for comment, but this is due as much to the rarity as to the impressiveness of the reminiscence or parallel.

For the rest, archaeology serves to reveal traces of the material civilisation of the Hebrews and their neighbours; it can sometimes show the relation of Hebrew ideas and practices—generally the more degraded of them—to those of contemporary neighbouring nations; it can often determine the sites of places mentioned in the Old Testament and (a direct check on many of the Old Testament's historical references) it can estimate the periods when these sites were in occupation; and it can recognise the traces and approximate ages of Egyptian, Babylonian, Assyrian, or other foreign conquests and occupations of Palestine.

Rarely does it give precise and relevant evidence on some incident recorded in the Old Testament. Imagination can occasionally interpret some archaeological discovery as confirmatory or contradictory of some Biblical detail; but it is normally true that discoveries which seem most nearly relevant

xxvi. 20-3, concerning a certain prophet Uriah (whose name does not occur in the ostraca), gives the letters a possible glimmer of meaning.

Even so important and apt an inscription as the Moabite Stone (found in 1866 and treating of the wars of Israel and Moab in the time of Omri and his successors) receives from the verses 2 Kings iii. 4-27 more light than it gives.

The cuneiform tablets in a proto-Hebraic dialect, discovered in 1929 at Ras-esh-Shamra, Northern Syria, are likewise indebted to Old Testament scholarship for the understanding of much of their cultural and philological significance. They treat of a period (fourteenth century B.C., or earlier) anteceding the Old Testament documents, yet it is chance hints and clues from the Old Testament which have solved difficulties or spurred the imagination of archaeologists and helped them to reconstruct a more or less convincing picture of the civilisation of the time.

to Old Testament issues, create new problems and seldom solve existing problems.

Archaeology has gone far towards filling in the background-scene before which the Biblical drama was acted ; it often gives added life and more vivid colour to episodes described in the Bible ; and it provides us with a truer perspective in our estimates of the Bible's contents as a whole. That is archaeology's proved worth.

IV

The Scriptures of the Old Testament are ' profitable for teaching, for reproof, for correction, for instruction which is in righteousness ' ; they ' are able to make thee wise unto salvation through faith which is in Christ Jesus ' (2 Tim. iii. 15-16). That is to say, the Old Testament can be studied primarily (as its Jewish compilers and editors intended it to be studied) for spiritual admonition and edification ; it is also, historically and theologically, the prelude to the Christian Gospel and the teachings of the New Testament. (The latter function of the Old Testament falls properly within the scope of formal New Testament study and will not be enlarged upon here.) But whether we seek to profit by the Old Testament's ' instruction which is in righteousness,' or whether we are chiefly interested in it as the explanatory prologue to the New Testament, we shall appreciate it the better by studying it and seeking to understand it in, so to speak, its own right—as the many-sided and many-coloured record of a people's national, social, and religious history, told with almost merciless honesty and directness, and laying bare (in a way unmatched in any other literature) the thousand-years-long process of a people's material and spiritual growth.

Primarily the Old Testament is a manual of national and personal religious experience. No other purpose than this was before the eyes of those Jewish teachers who, some time between the Return and the second century B.C., reduced the national literature to its present form. Their purpose was indeed remarkable. Here is no thought of compiling a record to preserve proud memories to flatter a nation's self-esteem. Material for such a patriotic chronicle is not lacking ; but any tendency towards national glorification is suppressed by the

greater purpose, which is, to demonstrate the wonder of God's intimate care for Israel and Israel's failure to show corresponding loyalty and gratitude.

The elements which make up the Old Testament, in spite of their miscellaneous character, their differing ethical standards, their wide disparity of age and authorship and intention and mood, are presented to posterity in such fashion as shall serve the single purpose of religious edification. The nation's surviving literature, its mythology, its ancestral traditions, its folklore, its primitive laws, its more formal legislation, its elaborate regulations dealing with Temple ceremonial, its royal chronicles, its psalms of penitence and praise, the denunciations and consolations of its preachers, and even the doubtings and sceptical guesses of its philosophers, are all utilised as a means for conveying a knowledge of God's will for mankind and of the story of man's gropings after God.

Into this profusion of detail which leaves untouched scarcely any phase of life, four main strands of religious teaching are woven and are rarely out of sight.

1. God is not only Creator and Ruler of the world : He also watches over the life of men, guiding them towards an ideal of social and personal righteousness and holiness.

2. The ideal for man is that he shall seek after God and know himself to be wholly in God's service, utterly dependent on God's care ; and that he shall show in his way of life that quality of moral holiness which alone makes him worthy and capable of entering into fellowship with the God of holiness.

3. The subject of human suffering is treated repeatedly, and, whatever the solution offered, the basic assumption is always that God is just and merciful. The problem is never abandoned as insoluble or meaningless or the play of arbitrary fate : suffering is to be accounted for either as penalty for sin, or as moral discipline, or as a burden to be borne in the service of others.

4. The same characteristic moral emphasis is apparent, too, in the visions of the future, in the Old Testament's messianic teachings. For individual, for nations, and for all mankind, the ideal is found in that condition of things when God's

kingship is accepted throughout the whole earth and social righteousness prevails in every corner of life.

It remains to give a brief survey of the action within the Old Testament as seen 'in its own right,' namely, the course of Hebrew life and religion which can still be traced in the records which later editors adapted, transposed and added to in their wish to drive home more forcibly the lessons of Israel's history as they themselves had come to understand it.

The period covered is, roughly, a thousand years, and it falls naturally into seven divisions: the nomadic period; the settlement in Canaan; the period of consolidation and the early Monarchy; the predominance of the Northern Kingdom; the pressure of the Assyrian and Babylonian empires; the extinction of the Hebrew kingdoms and the Babylonian Exile; the post-Exilic Jewish state. Each of these periods is marked by a definite stage in the development of the religion and (except for the first period) each gave its peculiar contribution to the literature that has survived.

1. Between 1500 and 1300 B.C. certain Semitic tribes, including the Hebrews, attempted to penetrate into the more fertile regions of Canaan. Canaan already had a long history of occupation and conquest; for long periods it had been under Babylonian, Hittite, or Egyptian control, and the archaeology of this period reveals abundant traces of Egyptian administration and Babylonian culture. The Tell-el-Amarna Letters, correspondence in Babylonian writing from Canaanitish petty governors to their Egyptian overlord, have preserved a picture of the time illustrating the constant pressure from outside by nomadic tribes, and, within, the medley of tiny states and rival princelings, already playing the diplomatic game which characterised the statecraft of the later kingdoms of Israel and Judah—negotiating alternatively or simultaneously with the greater powers and mutual rivals surrounding them: in this case, with the Hittites to the north and Egypt in the south.

No Hebrew literature can be attributed to this period, but, from the traditions which they later recorded, we know that the most cherished memories of these invading Hebrew nomads were of miraculous escape from Egyptian bondage, of Moses who

had organised their escape, and of the God Yahweh who had taken them under his protection.

2. Later tradition (cf. Joshua xi. 23) simplified the process of the Hebrew occupation of Palestine, making it one of irresistible conquest completed within a generation; other references (cf. Judges i. 1—ii. 5) indicate that the process was gradual. It was no conquest but slow and gradual infiltration and amalgamation with the people of the land: not until the days of the early Monarchy was Israel master of the whole country. Religiously the period was one of adaptation during which the simple nomadic worship of the Hebrews, learnt in the wilderness, took on new forms to fit it for the agricultural and relatively advanced manner of life in Canaan. Yahweh took the place of the local Canaanitish nature gods, but the Israelites adapted or appropriated much from the religious practices of their settled neighbours—veneration of local sanctuaries, observance of sundry seasonal festivals and sacrificial customs. On the one hand such adaptation sought to associate the fuller settled agricultural life with the worship of Yahweh; on the other hand it exposed the Israelites to the sensual and degraded practices of nature-worship, the Baal-cult of Canaan. Herein lurked a peril to which the Hebrews remained exposed until long after the Exile, and it was this syncretism of Baal-worship and the worship of Yahweh, destructive of the simpler and sterner Yahweh-worship of the days of Moses and the wilderness, which was a constant theme in the denunciations of the prophets in the centuries which followed.

The Old Testament has preserved several long and short saga-like poems, war-songs, and oracles which may be attributed to this period (1200–1000 B.C.). Of them the most notable is the Song of Deborah (Judges v.).

3. The weakening of Egyptian control over Syria coincided with the rise of the Philistines, non-Semitic invaders from Crete or the Aegean. They had long dominated the coastal regions, and it was in the course of resistance to their progress inland that the Hebrews combined as a nation under Saul, the first of the Hebrew kings. Until his time we hear only of local leaders or heroes, the so-called Judges. After Saul's defeat and death the leadership fell to David. Under him the Hebrews

achieved complete unity, the Philistines suffered defeat, and he was able to impose his rule over the whole of Canaan and even beyond ; so that the Hebrews were free from molestation from within and without. Under Solomon the Hebrew state enjoyed more formal and elaborate organisation, and in Jerusalem was set up the king's palace, the principal sanctuary of Yahweh. The few decades of unity and splendour under David and Solomon never faded from national memory : brief though the period was, the glory of the undivided kingdom remained vivid and gave shape to the ideal for the future. Of this vision of past and future the royal sanctuary in Jerusalem was an inseparable part, and for later generations it became the centre and physical symbol of the nation's worship and the assurance of Yahweh's presence among his people.

To this period may be attributed certain poems (2 Sam. i. 19 ff., iii. 33 f. ; Deut. xxxiii.), the beginnings of the royal chronicles in the Books of Samuel and Kings, and (though this is disputed) the collections of laws (Exod. xx. 23-xxiii. 19 ; xxxiv.).

4. After Solomon's death the centre of importance for Hebrew religion and history passes to those Hebrews in the north who had rejected the rule of the Davidic dynasty. Judah, faithful to its Davidic rulers, became a small isolated kingdom, cut off from the main stream of political events, though occasionally summoned (almost it would seem as a vassal state) to the aid of the northern kings. It was, too, in the Northern Kingdom that the issue between Yahweh-worship and the Baal-cult was fought out in the time of the Omri dynasty (887-843), when Elijah in his zeal for the God of Sinai resisted at peril of his life the Baal-cult which, owing to Ahab's marriage with the princess of Tyre, threatened to oust the simpler desert faith ; while his disciple, the prophet Elisha, was even instrumental in overthrowing the House of Omri and in setting up a new dynasty, more loyal to Yahweh.

The period covered by the Omri and Jehu dynasties (the ninth and first half of the eighth century B.C.) marks the beginning of the greatest age of Hebrew literature. To it can be attributed the stories of Elijah and Elisha, and the vivid history of the House of Omri ; and, above all, the two earliest retrospects of Hebrew national life, traditions and origins, the sources ' J '

and 'E,' two parallel narratives (emanating perhaps the one from the Southern and the other from the Northern Kingdom), telling the story of the national past from earliest times to the days of King David. These two parallel sources, in their combined form, are found in Genesis, Exodus, Numbers (parts of Joshua, Judges, and Samuel may also be the work of the same writers), and are precisely the narratives which to the modern reader make the readiest appeal.

5. From the beginning of the Monarchy to the middle of the eighth century, foreign powers had not greatly disturbed the life of the Hebrews in Palestine, but the next century and a half (*c.* 750–586 B.C.) found the Hebrews, and the neighbouring petty states between Mesopotamia and Egypt, either the tools or the victims of Assyria, Egypt or Babylon. Their position on the highroad between ambitious and rival empires made their independence impossible. This period's importance is, however, not its bearing on Hebrew politics, but the new phenomenon which it evoked in Hebrew religion. Instead of types like Elijah, champions of a national religion, we find prophets like Amos and Hosea who, in their exhortations to the Northern Kingdom, conceive of Yahweh not as Israel's own national deity but as one who himself moves, or frustrates, the wills of the great world-empires. In the larger prophetic vision, therefore, the Assyrian threat to the nations of the west is a divine judgment on those nations for national and social wrong-doing, and on Israel in particular for their idolatry and disloyalty to Yahweh who had revealed himself specially to them.

The Northern Kingdom fell to Assyria in 722; and the Southern Kingdom, though it had previously accepted Assyrian protection to save itself from invasion by Damascus and the Northern Kingdom, now turned to Egypt for protection from Assyria. The Judean prophet Isaiah protested in turn to the kings Ahaz and Hezekiah against the futility of trusting to foreign alliances, urging, rather, trust in Yahweh, loyalty to him and to his demands of social righteousness. Some measure of reform was carried out by Hezekiah, and in 701 when Egyptian help had failed and Assyria was at the very walls of Jerusalem, the city was saved, owing to a pestilence which beset the Assyrian army. Judea, throughout Manasseh's long

reign was subject to Assyria and succumbed largely to Assyrian religious influence. In 621 Josiah brought about a reform of the national religion; but within a few years the Judean Kingdom was wiped out by the new Babylonian empire, and all but the poorest of the people were carried away into exile.

This period began with a wealth of written prophecy—the writings of Amos, Hosea, Micah, and Isaiah. Then, for the greater part of a century, the literature like the religion suffered eclipse. The ‘Book of the Law’ which, in 621, Josiah found in the Temple and which inspired his reforms, is generally accepted as identical with the main part of our present Book of Deuteronomy. The teaching of Deuteronomy is a pivotal point in the religious history. In addition to its code of laws embodying the moral and social standards taught by the eighth-century prophets, it instilled the doctrine that Jerusalem was the sole place of sacrificial worship, and it elaborated the conception of the Covenant at Sinai as the solemn acceptance by Israel of a divinely imposed standard of morals and worship, a standard from which Israel had continually fallen away. About this time the national story was scanned afresh from the standpoint of the writer of Deuteronomy, and the result was the bulk of the present Book of Kings, while ‘editorial comment’ in the like spirit was added to the earlier chronicles. To the closing decades of this period belong the prophecies of Zephaniah and Nahum, and most of Jeremiah.

6. The Exile (586–537) killed Jewish worldly ambitions but it gave life to new ideas in Israel’s religion. It fortified the convictions of those who, in the spirit of Deuteronomy, cherished the thought of a nation which had been rightly punished, and whose life in the future must be centred on the service of God and worship of Him at His single sanctuary in Jerusalem. This is a leading idea in the teaching of the prophet Ezekiel and of that section in the Book of Leviticus (xvii.–xxvi.) known as ‘The Code of Holiness.’ To others, the experience of exile opened up a wider vista of God’s working: world movements were seen as part of the divine purpose, and the rise to world-power of Cyrus was, for the writer of chapters xl.–lv. of Isaiah, both proof of God’s universal rule and God’s appointed means of restoring the repentant remnant of Israel to their former home in Jerusalem. Most remarkable are the

four poems (Isa. xlii. 1-4; xlix. 1-6; l. 4-9; lii. 13-liii. 12) which personify the afflicted Israel as God's servant who should spread to all nations a truer knowledge of God, and whose sufferings were innocently borne for the sake of the ungodly, as part of God's redemptive purpose. On the eve of the Exile Jeremiah had taught of a 'new covenant,' this time not between Yahweh and Israel, but between God and each individual soul (Jer. xxxi. 31 f.); this new emphasis on the personal rather than the national or group relationship to God is found again in Ezekiel.

7. Return from exile was disillusioning. Judea was a remote, derelict province governed from Persia; the Jews were poor and harassed by hostile neighbours; and for a hundred years the returned exiles lacked the will or the opportunity to create the new life envisaged by the Exilic prophets. This period is depicted in Haggai, Zechariah (i-viii.), and Malachi. The arrival of Nehemiah and Ezra revitalised nation and religion; but the scale of life was small, the new Jewish state being no more than a tiny community with its interests confined to the Temple and its worship. We know little of the history of the following centuries except that in 332 Persian rule gave place to Egyptian rule, and this in turn, a century later, to Seleucid (Syrian) rule. Yet these were the centuries to which we owe some of the most valuable parts of the Old Testament; and it was during this period that the component parts of the Hebrew histories, laws, and prophecies took the shape now familiar to us.

The law code introduced by Ezra is believed to have been substantially that survey of Hebrew origins and legislation (now conveniently described as the Priestly Code) whose peculiar style and quality of subject-matter make it easily distinguishable from the other sources in the Pentateuch. Owing to our ignorance about this period it is impossible to associate most of the remaining books (e.g., Psalms, Proverbs, Job, Ecclesiastes, numerous prophetic pieces attached to the collections of the major prophets, and such works as Jonah, Ruth, Esther, Canticles) with any specific course of events. A wide and miscellaneous range of religious thought is represented—from the picturesque narrowness of the Book of Chronicles, the last retrospect of Israelitish history which

adapts the ancient historical narratives to the point of view of 300 B.C., to the scepticism of Ecclesiastes, from the savage nationalism of Esther to the kindly universalism of Jonah and the neighbourliness of the story of Ruth, from the desperate soul-searchings of the Book of Job to the bridal-songs of Canticles. This variety reflects interests and an outlook on life extending beyond the Temple ceremonial and meticulous adherence to the details of the law preserved in the Scriptures.

At least one reason for the widened outlook on life was the contact with Greek civilisation and ideals which was scarcely avoidable in Syria and Palestine by the end of the third century B.C. The narrower ideals of Judaism were gradually involved in what might well have been a losing battle against the peaceful encroachments and enticements of Hellenism had not the Syrian overlord, Antiochus Epiphanes, sought forcibly (in 168 B.C.) to suppress the Temple worship and hasten the process of hellenising the Jews. The Jews revolted. The story of their success is told in the First Book of Maccabees, and the Book of Daniel, the latest book in the Old Testament, is a summons to the Jews in their time of trial to accept martyrdom rather than fail in their loyalty to the Law.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The *Revised Version* of the Old Testament is indispensable. It does not suffer from the defects usually alleged against the Revised Version of the New Testament. The changes from the Authorised Version are relatively slight and few, the familiar phraseology and archaisms have been kept except when they would hinder a right understanding of the text. The changes adopted were the minimum necessary to bring the translation abreast of the Hebrew scholarship of the time. The past half-century, however, has seen such an advance in our knowledge of the Hebrew of the Old Testament and in the study of its text, that the Revised Version is itself now in need of revision. Some idea of the changes that have been proposed can be obtained from *The Old Testament. An American Translation*, Edited by J. M. POWIS SMITH (Chicago, 1927 [Edition with an Appendix of Textual Notes]).

An authoritative, simple and readable guide to the problems of the literature, history, and religion of the Old Testament will be found in :

- H. WHEELER ROBINSON : *The Old Testament : its making and meaning.*
(London, 1937.)
— — — *The History of Israel : its facts and factors.* London, 1938.
— — — *The Religious Ideas of the Old Testament.* London, 1934.

JULIUS A. BEWER'S *The Literature of the Old Testament* (New York, 1933) presents the results of the critical study of the Old Testament in connected form, made up of long, typical extracts, linked together by short and adequate comment, providing a readable survey of the whole range of the Old Testament literature in the order of its growth and in the light of Hebrew national and religious development.

Handy aids to the appreciation of the separate books will be found in the five volumes of *The Clarendon Bible* (Oxford):

Vol. 1, W. L. WARDLE: *The History and Religion of Israel*. 1936.

Vol. 2, L. E. BINNS: *From Moses to Elisha*. 1929.

Vol. 3, T. H. ROBINSON: *The Decline and Fall of the Hebrew Kingdoms*. 1930.

Vol. 4, W. F. LOTHOUSE: *Israel after the Exile: Sixth and Fifth Centuries, B.C.* 1934.

Vol. 5, G. H. BOX: *Judaism in the Greek Period*. 1932.

For those who propose to make a more thorough study of the Old Testament, S. R. DRIVER'S *Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament* (Edinburgh, 9th edn., 1913) is indispensable. It has been the standard work for 40 years, and its sane treatment of critical problems makes its judgments still stand as reliable and authoritative. Only exceptionally have its conclusions (e.g. the authorship and unity of Ezekiel) been since abandoned.

A slighter work, but of value in showing developments during the last thirty years, is

An Introduction to the Books of the Old Testament, by W. O. E. OESTERLEY and T. H. ROBINSON. London, 1935.

No satisfactory work on the religion of the Old Testament exists. An adequate treatment necessarily turns on a sufficiently thorough and balanced preliminary survey of Semitic religion generally, and such a work, and perhaps even the material for it, is still lacking. An idea of the complicated field which must be covered may be gained from

W. O. E. OESTERLEY and T. H. ROBINSON: *Hebrew Religion, its origin and development*. 2nd edn., London, 1937.

Older, but still useful, studies are

A. B. DAVIDSON: *The Theology of the Old Testament*. Edinburgh, 1904.

KARL BUDDE: *Religion of Israel to the Exile*. New York, 1899.

T. K. CHEYNE: *Jewish Religious Life after the Exile*. New York, 1908.

The writing of a satisfactory History of the Hebrews is faced by the difficulty of overtaking and digesting the new information which archaeological research continues to offer. The present standard works are:

- A. T. OLMSTEAD : *History of Syria and Palestine down to the Maccabean Conquest*. New York, 1931.
- ADOLPHE LODS : *Israel, from its beginnings to the middle of the Eighth Century*. London, 1932.
- — — *The Prophets and the rise of Judaism*. London, 1937.
- T. H. ROBINSON : *A History of Israel, from the Exodus to the fall of Jerusalem, 586 B.C.* Oxford, 1932.
- W. O. E. OESTERLEY : *A History of Israel, from the fall of Jerusalem, 586 B.C. to the Bar-Kokhba revolt, A.D. 135*. Oxford, 1932.

Some idea of the contributions of archaeology to the study of the Old Testament can be gained from

- G. A. BARTON : *Archaeology and the Bible*. 6th edn., Philadelphia, 1933.
- W. F. ALBRIGHT : *The Archaeology of Palestine and the Bible*. 3rd edn., New York, 1935.
- S. A. COOK : *The Religion of Ancient Palestine in the Light of Archaeology*. London, 1930.
- S. L. CAIGER : *Bible and Spade : an introduction to Biblical Archaeology*. Oxford, 1936.

Illuminating as showing the complicated problems posed by Biblical archaeology and the type of resourcefulness with which they are met, is the recently issued volume *The Lachish Letters* by HARRY TORCZYNER. Oxford, 1938.

Valuable surveys, studies and discussions of a more general character will be found in

- S. A. COOK : *The Old Testament : a Re-interpretation*. Cambridge, 1936.
- The People and the Book*, ed. A. S. PEAKE. Oxford, 1925.
- Record and Revelation*, ed. H. W. ROBINSON. Oxford, 1938.

(The last two volumes are collections of highly authoritative essays on sundry aspects of Old Testament scholarship by members of 'The Society for Old Testament Study'.)

A very full bibliography, including works on special departments of Old Testament study as well as a list of the principal commentaries on the separate books of the Bible, is given in OESTERLEY and ROBINSON'S *Introduction to the Books of the Old Testament*.

VI
THE NEW TESTAMENT

by

C. H. DODD, D.D.

Norris-Hulse Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge

‘ These writings are a first-hand record of the creative period of the Church, in which the springs of its life are laid bare. . . . The New Testament offers the indispensable, and irreplaceable, foundation upon which the Christian theologian must build.’

Page 220.

VI

THE NEW TESTAMENT

CHRISTIAN theology may be described as the attempt to understand the content of a divine revelation given in history. In the process of understanding, the content of the revelation has to be related to our total experience of the world and of ourselves. Theology therefore cannot dispense with philosophy, which is the attempt to make sense of our experience as a whole. The specific *datum*, however, from which Christian theology starts is not to be found in our general experience, or in the rational concepts which philosophy employs. Nor is the starting-point to be found in what is called 'religious experience,' if by that is meant some kind of non-rational (or super-rational) inward illumination. Christians, indeed, believe that divine illumination is both needed and granted for the apprehension of the revelation of God in Christ. But the revelation itself is given in a complex of events which took place in the first century of our era. These events may be sufficiently described, for the moment, as a crisis in the religious life of Judaism under the Roman Empire, out of which the Christian Church emerged as an historical phenomenon. This crisis is recorded, and reflected, in the writings of the New Testament. To the New Testament, therefore, we must go. For no one can arrive at a knowledge of historical events by rational argument from first principles, or by inward illumination.

The Christian Church, which emerged out of the crisis 'under Pontius Pilate,' remains as a permanent extension of the history from which it took its origin, and as a witness to the actuality of that history. But while the Church is in itself a witness that something happened, of a kind and upon a scale adequate to account for its appearance, it is from the New Testament that

we must learn what happened. Its writings, by whomsoever they were produced, were accepted by the general mind of the Church as an authoritative exposition of the revelation of God by which its life was created and sustained : of the facts and of their significance. Apart from all particular questions regarding authorship, date, and the like, these writings are a first-hand record of the creative period of the Church, in which the springs of its life are laid bare. The Church itself refers us to them as its credentials ; as the ' Canon,' or norm by which its faith and practice are authorised and authenticated.

The Creeds do not displace the New Testament as the Church's ultimate standard. The primitive confessions of faith out of which they grew doubtless antedate some of the canonical writings ; but in their historical forms they were devised as pointers to those elements in the Christian revelation which appeared most vital and fundamental, and more particularly as antidotes to interpretations which had proved tempting but fallacious. They safeguard the faith declared in the Scriptures, but are themselves authenticated by the Scriptures.

The New Testament, therefore, offers the indispensable, and irreplaceable, foundation upon which the Christian theologian must build. A succession of able thinkers have given to the Church in different ages schemes or systems of theology which are all designed as ways of understanding the data of the New Testament. Such systems differ because they necessarily make use of the modes of thought provided by contemporary philosophy, and philosophies change as the perspectives of experience alter from age to age. In the early ages Christian theology was deeply coloured by Platonism, in the Middle Ages by Aristotelianism. Since the break-up of the mediaeval synthesis the thought of the West has flowed in many varied channels. Theologians have embraced now this, now that system of philosophy as the means of making the Gospel intelligible to their age. In the process it must be confessed that theology has sometimes lost its sharpness of outline, and become little more than a Christian embroidery of some current system.

In reaction from this, some of our teachers at the present day forswear the attempt to relate theology to a general philosophy of life and the world, insisting that the Christian revelation is *sui generis*, since it is the Word of God, standing over against every word of man. Indeed, man, being a fallen creature, is incompetent to attain any measure of truth by his natural faculties, impaired as they are by sin. He can only accept with complete submission the truth as it is given him in the Bible, which first reduces all human wisdom to mere foolishness, and then supplies a divine wisdom by which man and all his works are judged.

This kind of biblical absolutism has cropped up at different stages of Christian thought, and its attraction can be understood. But the dualism which it sets up between our reasonable thinking about the world and that which we accept as revealed truth is dangerous. It may easily have the effect of relegating whole sides of human existence, such as politics and the social order, to a sphere where the Gospel does not run. Or it may introduce a double standard of truth. But the truth of God is one. If it is revealed in the New Testament, that revelation should make sense in the context of our total experience. It must, therefore, be intelligibly related to our judgments in every field of human activity, however temporary and relative such judgments may be.

To say, therefore, that our starting-point must be the New Testament does not mean that a complete theology can be achieved simply by exegesis of the New Testament. It does mean that the New Testament must be regulative of our theology, and not illustrative of a philosophy derived from other sources. The new Biblicism, therefore, though it may find exaggerated expression, has the value of reminding us that revelation is an absolute, and systems of theology are relative. Any such system is subject to criticism and revision, because it uses instruments which are necessarily relative and temporary, and when the conditions to which they belong have passed, they may for another age obscure the revelation which they were designed to illuminate. But the revision of theology is not achieved simply by concessions to 'modern thought' (and how different a meaning that phrase conveys to-day from that which it had even thirty years ago!). It demands a return

to the primary documents of revelation, and a fresh attempt to interpret them.

For this purpose our approach must be as objective and open-minded as we can make it. The writers must, above all, be allowed to speak for themselves, and our first endeavour must be to understand them as nearly as may be in the sense which they intended to convey to their original readers. Only when this task has been performed to the best of our ability are we free to essay the further task of re-interpretation in terms of the thought of our own time.

The historical method of study is thus justified, and indeed commended, by the very nature of the Christian faith. Our faith makes the assumption that the eternal and divine was revealed in a series of events (including the human reactions to those events), which took place in a particular historical situation. That situation was subject to the same kind of conditions and limitations to which any particular historical situation is subject. It had its own special conditions of time and place. The actors and the commentators on the action were men with a particular outlook upon life, with the psychological and intellectual limitations imposed upon all men by their place in history. The whole story is exposed to 'the scandal of particularity.' And yet it is our faith that the temporal was taken up into the eternal; that the particular events were laden with a universal meaning; and that the meaning is capable of shining through the words and conceptions (human and therefore limited) of the witnesses. The Christian theologian is not afraid of the paradox that absolute truths of religion are bound up with contingent truths of history.

Something further, however, must be said about the nature of history considered as a medium of revelation. By historical events we do not mean mere occurrences as such. An event which is in the full sense historical differs from a mere occurrence in that it includes the part played in the occurrence by the human spirit in interaction with its environment. The will of men is engaged in it, and their understanding. For the meaning which an occurrence has for those implicated in it determines its place in history. The extraordinary events which since the war have changed the face of Europe are what they are because of the 'ideologies' which they express; that

is to say, because of the way in which large communities of men have understood the course of history (rightly or wrongly), and by understanding it so have re-directed it, for good or ill. Similarly the occurrences 'under Pontius Pilate' bore for those who were implicated in them a meaning by virtue of which they gave rise to the Christian Church. It is in this sense that the New Testament is a record of events: not simply a chronicle of occurrences, but a record at the same time of the meaning which the occurrences bore for those who were immediately touched by them.

In accepting the New Testament as an authoritative record of the facts, the Church accepts its valuation of them as 'saving' facts. It could not deny that valuation without destroying the basis of its own existence, or replacing it with a merely pragmatic basis. It is no doubt a theoretical possibility that the entire structure of Christian life and thought rests upon an illusion; just as it is a theoretical possibility that the postulate of the rationality of nature, upon which natural science is built, is false. But the scientist is not disturbed by this theoretical possibility, even when he is met by apparent traces of irrationality in the behaviour of electrons which at present he is unable to resolve. His postulate justifies itself sufficiently in experience. Similarly the Christian theologian does not seriously contemplate the possibility of a fundamental delusion. His primary beliefs are corroborated to a sufficient extent in the experience of the Church, even though there are depths in them which are not open to full corroboration by any experience possible within the limits of time and space.

The proclamation of the facts of the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, in a setting which exhibited their value as 'saving' facts, was by the early Church called 'The Gospel,' and the Gospel is the major theme of the whole New Testament. The aim, therefore, of all theological study of the New Testament is to recover and illuminate the Gospel, in its whole scope, as fact and as meaning, through a true understanding of what was written by the first witnesses to the Gospel, and authenticated by the common voice of the Church as a Canon of Holy Scripture.

The New Testament, then, lies before us: twenty-seven writings of various kinds, constituting together a Canon or

standard of Christian faith and life. Let us try to plot out the process by which we attempt to enter into their meaning.

The canonical books of the New Testament are all in Greek. A knowledge of the Greek language, and of the Greek language at a particular stage in its development, is therefore an indispensable preliminary to a serious study of the New Testament. No doubt excellent translations exist. But translation is an art in which complete success is impossible. Anyone who is acquainted with even one language beside his mother-tongue knows that the words of two languages are rarely exact equivalents. A word is an index to a whole area of meaning, and the areas of meaning in different languages may overlap, but rarely coincide. What is the English equivalent of the German word 'Reich'? 'Kingdom'? 'Empire'? But the German Reich has neither king nor emperor. 'State,' then? But the old German Reich had many states. The Greek word βασιλεία is neither exactly 'kingdom' nor exactly 'Reich,' though the phrase ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν is commonly translated 'the kingdom of heaven,' or '*das Himmelreich*.' The greatest of all New Testament words is ἀγάπη. How are we to translate it? The Authorised Version gives 'charity,' the Revised Version 'love.' But 'love' is also ἔρως, στοργή, and φιλία. 'Charity' in common usage means either almsgiving (ἐλεημοσύνη) or a generous and forgiving temper; and ἀγάπη πρὸς τὸν θεόν could certainly never be translated 'charity towards God.' Yet the current use of the word 'love' as the equivalent of ἀγάπη may give rise to misunderstanding. Moreover, every word carries, beside what we may call its dictionary meaning (or meanings), an *aura* of associations, which can scarcely be defined, but can be felt when the word resides in the mind as an element in a language which is a living whole. A language is the crystallisation of a particular way of thought. Before we can enter into the way of thought employed by the New Testament writers we must learn their language.

The instruments at our disposal for a knowledge of New Testament Greek have in recent times been greatly improved through the study of non-literary papyri and inscriptions of the period. The form of Greek employed by their writers is closer to that of some of the New Testament writers than any other form of Greek known to us. This is not surprising, for

they are the work of just such people as those among whom Christianity first spread : the *petite bourgeoisie* of the Eastern provinces of the Roman Empire, who were literate, but not academically educated, and who wrote Greek as they spoke it, and not according to the artificial rules of the rhetoricians. Not that the language of the New Testament is to be equated *sans phrase* with the Common Greek of the papyri. At bottom the language is the same as that which was used on the farm and in the market place and in the camp ; but to turn from the papyri to the New Testament is to discover how the language is receiving a new depth and a new refinement as it is used to express ideas strange to the pagan world.

So much may be said by way of suggesting the importance of linguistic discipline as a preparation for the study of the New Testament. The decline of Greek as an element in our general education makes it all the more necessary that the Christian teacher should at least be able to read the documents which it is his duty to understand and interpret ; to read the documents themselves, and not a translation, which cannot be the same thing.

A further preparatory discipline is textual criticism. In no case is the original autograph of a New Testament book available. The autographs must have perished centuries ago from much handling, even if they escaped deliberate destruction. All existing copies of the New Testament, whether written or printed, have come down to us through a process of transcription in manuscript carried on for a long time. Such transcription cannot easily be kept entirely free from errors. The person copying a manuscript in which such errors occur may fail to notice them, and pass them on in his copy ; or he may observe them, and correct them as best he can ; but that his ' correction ' will restore the original reading is a rare piece of luck. The fact that the numerous manuscript copies of the New Testament differ in a vast number of details shows that this process of error and attempted correction has actually taken place. It is obviously desirable that we should read the work of an ancient author in as nearly as possible the form in which he wrote it. Textual criticism is the attempt to restore the original text. It can never be entirely successful. But by scientific methods perfected by practice through

centuries of careful scholarship we can certainly approach gradually nearer to it.

The Eastern Orthodox Church indeed treats as authoritative that text of the New Testament which we know as 'Byzantine,' and which is the result of a scholarly revision in the fourth century. It is virtually the same text as that which is translated in our Authorised Version. But during the period in which the Canon was fixed, the Church possessed no uniform text. The Fathers cite different types of text, according to the place and time at which they lived. Manuscripts still exist which attest texts more primitive than the Byzantine, some of them as early as the third (or even in fragments, the second) century.

In this country the text of Westcott and Hort (which was available to our revisers of 1881) has long enjoyed a well-deserved confidence. It was the product of a wide and discriminating examination of manuscripts, versions, and patristic citations, guided by scientific principles of criticism. It is based upon the best and oldest manuscripts then known, and it is unquestionably nearer in general than the Received Text to the original autographs. But no text is final, so long as fresh material continues to turn up, and so long as the instruments and methods of textual criticism continue to be improved. Since 1881 fresh manuscripts of great importance have been found, both of the original Greek and of early versions; manuscripts already known have been re-examined; the text of many of the Fathers has been brought into order, so that their citations may be used with greater confidence; the study of the 'pedigree' of manuscripts has made advances, and a fresh classification has been made. It appears that down to about the middle of the second century the process of transcription had been relatively free and easy, and resulted in a great variety of local texts. From that time there was a gradual tendency to uniformity. No one manuscript, therefore, and no family of manuscripts, can be supposed to preserve in all cases the original text. It may happen that an inferior manuscript, descended perhaps from some obscure local text, may here and there preserve a reading which was corrupted in all other texts, and never restored in any subsequent revision. The two great manuscripts, the Sinaitic and the Vatican,

which are the chief foundation of the text of Westcott and Hort, though they are still pre-eminent, scarcely hold the same exclusive position of authority. Their text is no longer regarded as a 'neutral' text, unaffected by the tendencies which have corrupted other manuscripts, but as the result of a scholarly, and probably conservative, revision. Other groups of manuscripts have acquired a fresh importance, especially the group which Westcott and Hort called 'Western,' and the newly recognised 'Caesarean' family.

Few critics would be bold enough to think that we have reached a stage at which Westcott and Hort could be superseded by a text commanding the same general confidence. But it is clear that we are already in the midst of a movement in textual criticism comparable with that of which the text of Westcott and Hort was the brilliant result. To take part in this movement is work for specialists, but every serious student of the New Testament needs some acquaintance with its principles and processes, in order to appreciate intelligently the help which such criticism supplies towards the elucidation of the biblical documents.

Supposing that we may regard the text as relatively secure, there remain questions regarding the actual character and setting of the documents as literary products: their authorship, their date, their relations with one another, their sources, and the like. The study of such questions is comprised in what has been called 'higher criticism' (as distinct from textual criticism which is 'lower'). The term is not felicitous, but some general term is required to cover this type of criticism. The questions with which it deals are from one point of view of secondary importance to the theologian. Whoever was the author of a given canonical writing, and at whatever date it was composed, it comes before us with the authentication of the Church as a witness to the Gospel. It may candidly be said that the predominant emphasis upon the detail of 'higher criticism' in the recent past was not entirely profitable to theological studies. Nevertheless such questions have a real importance.

It has been suggested above that the 'history' which is the medium of revelation is a record not only of occurrences but also of their meaning. This meaning was apprehended in

the Church by stages and from various points of view. The movement in time which is represented by the successive appearance of the several documents is a part of the relevant history; for it is a movement in the understanding of the Gospel, directed, as Christians believe, by the Holy Spirit. The real significance of 'higher criticism' is appreciated when detailed questions of date and authorship are seen as parts of an attempt to reconstruct the process of early Christian thought as a living thing. From this point of view, the composition of the Epistle to the Romans, or of the Fourth Gospel, is an event in itself. Its relation to other events is significant: such events as the composition of other documents, or the spread of the Christian mission, the controversy with Judaism, and the entry of Christianity into the field of Hellenistic thought. It is not that the several documents form an abstract sequence, depending upon one another like the writings of a 'school' of philosophy (as some of the earlier critics seem to have assumed). They are varied expressions of a continuous movement in history, which had its centre in the growing apprehension of the Gospel.

Moreover, in an historical movement the individuality of the writers is significant. For the 'inspiration' which gives insight into what God has done is a function of personality under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. It is, to speak strictly, the man and not his book that is inspired. In studying the New Testament as the vehicle of an historical revelation, it is necessary to recover the individuality of its writers; to recognise, for the example, the idiosyncrasy of the mind of Paul as it is disclosed in his epistles. For this purpose we must isolate those writings which are of Pauline authorship from the rest of the Canon. The purely critical question, whether Paul was or was not the author of (say) the Epistle to the Ephesians or the Pastoral Epistles is acutely relevant to this task. (We may recall that the judgment, now generally accepted, that Paul did *not* write the Epistle to the Hebrews had the effect of clearing up some real confusions in conceptions formerly held of Pauline theology.)

This isolation of the several components of the Canon, it may be observed, is a preparatory stage. Before our work is complete the unity of the whole must be restored, with the

relations of its parts clearly articulated so as to exhibit their interdependence as constituents of an historical revelation. But so much may safely be said : the so-called ' higher criticism,' by directing our attention to the movement in history by which the Gospel was apprehended in the early Church, and by rediscovering for us the individuality of its writers, has opened the approach to a more truly Biblical theology.

Finally, the ' higher criticism ' of the New Testament has a direct bearing upon the question of the credibility of its record of historical facts, especially in the Gospels. Here the personality of the author is of less importance than the sources of information upon which he may be supposed to have drawn. The peculiar combination of agreements and differences observed in the several Gospels has provided material for ' source-criticism,' whose conclusions, so far as they go, are not likely to be upset : that Mark is the earliest Gospel, to be dated between 65 and 70 or thereabouts ; that Matthew and Luke depend partly upon Mark, and partly upon a lost written source (' Q '), which is probably at least as early as Mark ; and that each of these Gospels includes also material whose particular source is as yet undetermined. As for the Fourth Gospel, it is recognised that it has a character different from that of the other three, and is of relatively late date, though how late is a question variously answered. Indeed, the state of Johannine criticism can perhaps best be represented by a series of questions. Was the author acquainted with any or all of the Synoptic Gospels ? Does the material peculiar to this Gospel represent an independent tradition of respectable antiquity and antecedents, or is it a late development ? Are the discourses in any sense a rendering of the teaching of Jesus as handed down in tradition (that they are anything like a verbatim report few would maintain), or are they the free composition of the Evangelist ? Who is the ' beloved disciple ' ? A fictitious *dramatis persona* ? Or a revered figure in the early Church (John, son of Zebedee, or another) to whom the Evangelist owed his special tradition ? Or the Evangelist himself ? There is no agreed answer to such questions. Johannine criticism is still in a state of flux.

We must, however, do justice to the most important generally accepted conclusion of the source-criticism of the Gospels,

namely the recognition of Mark and 'Q' as twin pillars upon which the Synoptic presentation of the life of Jesus rests. They are probably independent of one another, and proceed from different circles in the Church. They can be compared, and from the comparison we may draw inferences regarding the character of the tradition at a date long anterior to the writing of the Gospels.

But the task of exploring the tradition in its original oral condition is chiefly undertaken by the method known as 'form-criticism.' It starts from the observation that much of the material of the Gospels consists of separable units of narrative or of teaching, and that these units tend to exhibit certain typical 'forms' or patterns. These forms can be traced not only in Mark and 'Q,' but also in the material peculiar to Matthew or Luke, and even in the Fourth Gospel. It is reasonably assumed that the material was shaped into these patterns during the period of oral transmission.

The form-critics have been greatly occupied with the extent to which the formation of the tradition was influenced by the changing needs and interests of the early Church. But at least they seem to have established the fact that many of the units of the Gospel tradition had been fixed in more or less stereotyped forms at a very early date, and are by no means the creation of the Evangelists. 'Form-criticism,' which is a comparatively recent study, dating from about 1918, has not so far any considerable unchallenged results to show, but it is a method which promises to enlarge our knowledge of the tradition of 'the Jesus of History' during its formative period.

At this point the kind of criticism which is concerned with the character of documents merges in historical criticism properly so called. To this we shall return at a later stage.

The disciplines with which we have so far been concerned are properly preparatory to the theological study of the New Testament. We must now address ourselves to the main task, the exegesis and interpretation of the writings themselves. I use these two terms by way of distinction, meaning by 'exegesis' the work of understanding precisely what an author wrote, word by word, sentence by sentence, paragraph by paragraph; and by 'interpretation' the effort to make sense of the whole in a wider context. No sharp line can be drawn

between the two processes. In general it may be said that exact exegesis should precede interpretation. Much harm has been done by premature interpretation, before the precise signification of the words has been determined. On the other hand a work of pure exegesis which never gets beyond the meaning of the words leaves an impression of barrenness. Indeed, in a measure exegesis must sometimes depend on interpretation, dangerous as the principle may be. For the true meaning of a single sentence may remain uncertain until the intention of the whole work is comprehended. That is why most good commentaries contain by way of introduction a section on the thought or teaching of the work which is dealt with. Logically, the thought of the work as a whole can be understood only when detailed exegesis is complete. But the student must have some notion what it is all about in order to appreciate what the author actually says in detail. Nevertheless, it seems useful to distinguish the two stages, if only to remind ourselves that as in any science the forming of large generalisations is the reward of much patient observation and experiment, often concerned with points of apparently little significance, so insight into the profound theological import of the New Testament is the privilege of the student who has grappled with the problems presented by the actual words of its authors.

Not that such a study need, or should, have in it anything of drudgery. The study of words, seriously undertaken, has a fascination of its own. Words are a key to the human mind engaged in its lofty and God-like function of thinking; and, in the Bible, thinking about the highest themes accessible to us. The turn of a phrase, the distinction of tenses, the position of a particle, may give us the thrill of catching a great mind in the very act of seizing upon some elusive and significant aspect of truth.

The exegete takes as his task the attempt to understand what the New Testament writers wrote as precisely as possible in the sense in which their first readers would understand them. He starts from the linguistic study which we have already seen to be indispensable. The words must be appreciated as elements in the vocabulary of New Testament Greek. Their grammatical relations must be explored. The structure of

whole passages must be examined. An author's style, which can be studied only by a survey of his whole extant work, is of the greatest value to the exegete. It may often happen that the characteristic rhythm of an author will determine the connexion of words in a particular passage, where such connexion is not obvious on the face of it. Such phenomena as Paul's addiction to antithesis, aposiopesis, and parenthesis, or the rhetorical balance of clauses in the Epistle to the Hebrews, or the Johannine use of parataxis, have an important bearing on exegesis, and a due regard to them will often help to determine the meaning of a passage which, taken by itself, is puzzling. The exegete begins to attain his end when he finds himself as it were thinking with his author, and divining the meaning of passages which are at first sight obscure, and of words which at first sight are commonplace.

In exegetical study, however, we soon find that a knowledge of Greek, and of the authors' habits of mind, is not sufficient to solve all the problems. Already at this stage environment and background are becoming important, and their importance is enhanced as we proceed to the wider task of interpretation.

The reader of the New Testament who comes to it with some knowledge of the common dialect of Greek has an uneasy feeling that this language is at times being used in an unfamiliar way. There is an alien strain. It is, in fact, a Semitic strain.

Christianity arose in a Semitic environment, and the idiom of some of the earliest Christian writings is deeply scored with its influence. This is especially the case in the Gospels. The reported sayings of Jesus frequently lend themselves to translation into Aramaic, and there is every reason to believe that such translation is of the nature of re-translation into their original language. Even where actual translation is not probable, Semitic forms of construction in the Greek sometimes betray a bilingual author. The investigation of the Aramaic behind the Gospels has made important contributions to exegesis, and is likely to make more.

But apart from the phenomenon of Aramaism in the idiom, the vocabulary of the New Testament also is not to be fully understood without reference to a Semitic background. I have already referred to the '*aura* of associations' which words carry. Such associations are of course due to the use of the

words in a particular context of thought. The study of the context of the vocabulary of New Testament Greek leads us beyond the limits of the New Testament.

In the first place, the Semitic strain shows itself in the specialised meanings which certain words have acquired through their use in the Greek version of the Old Testament. In fact, the exegete can rarely satisfy himself about the meaning of any important passage unless he takes that version into account. For it was the Bible of the early Church, and its language was to early Christians what the language of King James's version has been to generations of English-speaking people. One of the most valuable books of reference for the student of the New Testament is a concordance to the Septuagint.

The Old Testament background, however, has an importance going beyond matters of language. Its importance for interpretation can hardly be exaggerated.

The New Testament is a part only of the Canon of Holy Scripture. The other part is the Old Testament. The Old Testament has a place of its own in the study of theology, to which attention is given in another chapter. But for the student of the New Testament it has importance as providing a clue to a highly significant part of the background of early Christian thought, and not only of the thought, but of the action towards which all the thought is directed.

The events with which the Gospel is concerned took place upon a stage largely prepared by the history which is recorded in the Old Testament. The categories through which these events were interpreted were also in the first place supplied out of the religious thought of Judaism, which preserved the Old Testament heritage. The questions to which the New Testament gives the answer are the questions asked by the Old Testament. The hopes and aspirations which are the burden of the prophets are those whose fulfilment is declared by apostles and evangelists. We have described the New Testament as the record of a divine revelation in history. More properly, it is the New Testament read in relation to the Old that constitutes such a record. For if it be true that the revealing history consists of events which include both occurrence and meaning, the meaning is decisively affected by the

relation of the events to the whole providential order of the history of the people of God. It is therefore impossible to understand the New Testament properly without a serious study of the Old Testament, with its concomitant studies, linguistic and historical, including the study of the Judaism which continued the Old Testament tradition.

In particular, attention must be given to the Jewish apocalyptic literature, and to Rabbinical writings. It is now some years since the former was made available to students of the New Testament. More recently, the labours of Jewish and Christian scholars, in opening up the vast stores of Targum, Talmud and Midrash, have supplied material of the utmost value. The appreciation of this material is correcting a certain one-sidedness in our conception of the Jewish background, which was the result of the first impact of the rediscovered apocalyptic literature.

But we have not exhausted the environment of early Christianity when we have surveyed its Hebraic background. Long before Christianity began, the Jews had become subjects of Greek monarchies, and although they offered more resistance than other peoples to the penetration of Greek culture, yet three centuries of contact with it had not left them unaffected. Hellenistic Judaism is a well-marked feature of the religious scene about the beginning of our era. The extent of Greek influence in Palestine, the homeland of Christianity, was certainly less than in the Dispersion, but it should not be underestimated. It is significant that we hear of 'Hellenists' in the Church of Jerusalem in the earliest days. But very soon Christianity moved out into a wider world, where Hellenistic culture was in one degree or another universal. Its great centres during most of the New Testament period were Antioch, Ephesus, Corinth, and other Greek cities. Its leading writers, Paul, the author to the Hebrews, and, among the Evangelists, at least the third and fourth, are men of the Hellenistic world, whether they were by race Jews or Gentiles. (If we conclude that the Fourth Evangelist was by origin a Palestinian Jew, we must suppose that at some point he had acquired a Hellenistic outlook.)

We must, therefore, extend our study of the environment to include the Hellenistic background. The conquests of Alexan-

der the Great in the fourth century B.C. had resulted in establishing the Greek language as the common medium of intercourse and of education over the whole of the Near East. With the language, Greek thought and the Greek spirit quickly established an ascendancy. But while the East became Hellenised, the Hellenic heritage was profoundly modified by its contact with Oriental cultures. In particular the religious traditions of the East exerted a fascination upon Greek thinkers. Philosophy and religion drew together. There gradually emerged that complex phenomenon which modern writers denominate sometimes 'Hellenistic Mysticism,' sometimes 'Gnosticism' (using this word in a wide sense which is not original to it). It was not a system, but a well-marked tendency, which found for itself a bewildering variety of expression. It took over a great deal that was traditional in the ancient religions of Greece, Asia Minor, Syria, Persia and Egypt, and was not uninfluenced by Judaism. This higher paganism (for some such term is less question-begging) was vaguely monotheistic, at least in the sense that it postulated some ultimate Being to which the name God might be applied, while it was content to recognise the worship of many gods as manifestations of the One.

At its lower end it spread a veneer of philosophical mysticism over popular cults. The so-called Mystery-religions, in the forms in which they are known to us, appear to represent a sophistication of more or less primitive rituals, often originally vegetation or fertility cults, like those of Eleusis, of Cybele, and of Adonis. Most of our information about the Mysteries belongs to a later date than the New Testament. They appear to have developed alongside Christianity, and the frequent assumption that features of thought and practice associated with the Mysteries, and showing some similarity with Christian thought or practice, are prior to Christianity, and must have been 'borrowed,' needs to be scrutinised in each case in the light of datable evidence. But it is certain that many of the Mystery-religions had already entered upon their Hellenistic development in the first century, and it is probable that their ideas and practices formed part of the background of some of the early converts.

At its upper end the higher paganism takes the form of a

pure and lofty religious philosophy, in which the rites and mythology of traditional religions are rationalised and spiritualised away. Such a philosophy is represented, for example, by the Hermetic writings. Here again most of our documents are later than the New Testament, but the fact that Philo the Jew (who was a contemporary of Jesus and Paul) shows the influence of a closely similar philosophy is evidence that it was already at work in the environment of early Christianity. Indeed, much of the evidence which some writers have urged in support of the view that Christianity borrowed from the Mystery-religions points rather to contact with this more spiritual form of pagan religious thought.

Between the extremes there were various grades. What appears to be common to them all is the idea of salvation by 'knowledge'—salvation being construed chiefly as the assurance of immortality. At its lowest, this may mean no more than a knowledge of the rituals and spells, by the aid of which the soul may dodge the superhuman powers which lie in wait for it after death on its upward flight. At its highest, it is knowledge of God, either in the sense of personal communion, or in the sense of mystical absorption in the divine Being. In any case it is not scientific knowledge, but the light of revelation, that leads to life after death. The craving for immortality, and the quest for supernatural knowledge as the way to it, were, to judge by our available evidence, the most widely spread and deeply felt motives of the spiritual life of the Graeco-Roman world.

It is natural that the Christian Gospel should be conceived, so soon as it passed into this world, as an answer to this double need. It offered revelation and it offered eternal life. That the Church did come into close contact with the tendencies of the higher paganism is proved by the appearance of a rank crop of 'Gnostic' heresies in the second century. That the contact had begun earlier is proved by New Testament references to doctrines of a quasi-Gnostic type: explicit polemic in the Epistle to the Colossians and the Johannine Epistles, and implicit allusions in other places. It is therefore clear that we have here an important part of the background of the New Testament.

The amount of work which has been done upon this Hellenis-

tic background in the last half-century is enormous. Neglected by-ways of Greek literature have been explored. New documents have been discovered in large numbers. The study of Egyptian and Iranian religions has been made to contribute to our knowledge. The result is that we have an immense mass of materials at hand ; an unwieldy mass, it must be confessed, until the specialists do more than they have yet done to introduce order and discrimination into it. Our commentaries are enriched or burdened with abundant ' parallels ' brought from all departments of Hellenistic religion. They are not always illuminating. Nevertheless, this material is of great value, if it is properly used.

The student should have a clear conception of the real aim of this study of the Hellenistic world, so far as it bears upon the New Testament. It has often appeared as an attempt to ' explain ' the thought of the New Testament by pointing out the ideas which it has derived from other sources. We are to observe that Paul, or John, or another, drew *this* idea from the Mystery-religions, *that* from Platonism, the other from ' Gnosticism,' and so forth. The New Testament dissolves into a hotch-potch of unacknowledged borrowings. I do not say that this was the intention, but such is the impression produced.

Against this mere common sense urges some considerations. The leading writers of the New Testament were on any showing men of marked individuality and independence. One effect certainly of the religious crisis in which Christianity arose was to stimulate men to bold and original thinking. Among Hellenistic writings of the period we can find passages which express a deep personal piety, a sense of the majesty of eternal and spiritual realities, and a genuine enthusiasm for holiness of life. But it would be difficult indeed to set any of them in competition with the Pauline Epistles or the Fourth Gospel for strength, freshness, and consistency of thought. These have the real creative quality. It is not likely that the sources of their thought, in any important sense, are to be found in haphazard borrowings from the common stock. Moreover, to recognise the derivation of an idea is not in any case to explain it as an element in a new unity of thought. It is no doubt true that Karl Marx was influenced by the Hegelian

philosophy ; but a study of Hegel will not greatly help us to understand the springs of the Russian revolution.

The primary aim, for the student of the New Testament, of an exploration of Hellenistic religion is to reconstruct the world of thought in which the New Testament writers and their readers lived, in order that we may read the documents as nearly as possible as they were originally intended to be read. We may usefully draw a parallel with the work of translation. The New Testament is written in Hellenistic Greek. Only by accustoming ourselves to that language can we get at its meaning. But it is also written in the thought-idiom of the Hellenistic world, and we can acquire that thought-idiom only by entering into the spiritual life of the time, so far as it is open to us. The missionaries of early Christianity were concerned to persuade men of their own time that the Gospel met their felt wants, answered the questions that troubled them, gave them a real knowledge of God and a real assurance of eternal life. As we have seen, they masterfully constrained the common Greek to express their meaning. Equally masterfully they compelled the thought-idiom of the Hellenistic world into the service of the Gospel.

One thing is certain : anyone who has taken the trouble to think himself into the ways of Hellenistic thought, and who then turns to the New Testament, is impressed by the immense difference between the current answers given to religious questions, and the answers given in the New Testament. It is clear that this difference impressed itself upon the minds of the first hearers of Christian preaching, whether they accepted or rejected it. We have the testimony of the Apostle Paul that after his best endeavours, his Greek hearers still felt the Gospel to be ' foolishness.' It is possible, by sympathetically studying, say, the Hermetic writings, to put oneself temporarily into the position of those Greeks, and to feel just how foolish this ' word of the Cross ' must have sounded. It might be stated in Hellenistic terms, but it shattered the presuppositions of Hellenistic religion. A superficial and piecemeal attention to ' Hellenistic parallels ' produces the impression that the New Testament is a hotch-potch. A deeper appreciation of the background as a whole compels one to recognise the unity and uniqueness of the New Testament. The first recognition

of the extent to which Christianity early naturalised itself in the Hellenistic world led to painful attempts to strip off one by one those elements in the New Testament which might be suspected of derivation from external sources, and so to reach the 'essence of Christianity.' As knowledge of the environment grew, the area from which such external 'borrowings' might be excluded diminished. But if the process is reversed; if one starts by becoming (to the limited degree which is possible) a Hellenistically thinking person, and then reads the New Testament afresh, one is under no difficulty in recognising what is distinctive and essential in Christianity. It cannot be formulated in a few words. The growing sense of it is the reward that awaits upon a serious study of the background.

Thus the study of the wider environment throws us back upon the immediate context of all the New Testament writings, which is no other than the life of the early Church itself. This life, with its strongly marked character, with its distinctive motives and attitudes, with the common faith which informs it, gives unity to the New Testament in all its diversity of expression. The lines of study which we have reviewed—the preparatory linguistic and critical disciplines, the exact exegesis of the text, and the exploration of the background—fail of their intention unless they lead to an apprehension of the original and inherent unity of the whole. Its modes of expression are diverse: narrative, ethical teaching, personal confession, argument, Old Testament interpretation, philosophical reflection, liturgy, apocalypse. But all this is directed towards a central object, which we can best define by writing the sacred Name, 'Jesus Christ our Lord.' 'Jesus' is the personal name of an historical Character who suffered under Pontius Pilate; the title 'Christ' points to an historical rôle which He filled, in relation to the divine calling of Israel; the phrase 'our Lord' expresses the divine authority which the Church acknowledges in Him.

From whatever point we start, we are led directly to this centre. To speak more particularly, the variety of life and thought which comes to expression in the New Testament is controlled by two principal conceptions, the Gospel of Christ and the Commandment of Christ, which are in the main the themes of 'preaching' (*kerygma*) and 'teaching' (*didache*)

respectively. The Gospel is the story of the saving acts of God in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. The Commandment is the authority by which the practice of the Church is governed. Neither is intelligible without reference to an historical tradition. The Gospel is never thought of as a body of helpful or illuminating ideas ; it is testimony to that which happened when God sent His Son into this world. The Commandment is that which Jesus taught His disciples. It is applied, expanded, and supplemented under the guidance of His Spirit to meet changing conditions ; but its authority is 'the word of the Lord Jesus.' (Recall how carefully Paul distinguishes between 'the commandment of the Lord' and 'my opinion,' even while he claims that this is the opinion of one enlightened by the Spirit (1 Cor. vii. 8-12, 25, 40).) The whole life and thought of the Church therefore is controlled by a central tradition which offers itself as historical.

The Gospels represent the definitive crystallisation of this tradition. The diversities in the Gospel reports are sufficient to show that the tradition was not static or unalterable. It lies in the nature of the case that it responded in greater or less degree to the rapid and vigorous development of Christian life and thought during the early period. The immediate aim of the historical criticism of the Gospels is to distinguish, so far as may prove to be possible, between those elements in their reports which belong to the central and primitive tradition, and those which bear the marks of later development. The instruments of such an investigation are supplied by 'source-criticism' and 'form-criticism' as described above.

In theological thought since the War there has been a certain revolt against what is now called 'historicism.' The term implies, so far as the study of the Gospels is concerned, the assumption that it was possible to go behind the whole dogmatic structure of Christianity, and to arrive at a kernel of purely 'objective' historical fact, solid and unquestionable, upon which the Christian religion could be founded anew. It went with a method of criticism which rejected as unhistorical everything in the Gospels which showed the marks of the faith or experience of the Church. The results of such criticism were largely negative. We were left with a picture of 'the Jesus of History' on the one hand, and a picture of the early

Church on the other, which appeared to have little to do with one another. Nothing could well be more artificial than the attempts made to bridge the gulf between history and faith which this method of criticism created. The real historical problem remained unsolved. In reaction, the newer school tends to decry the value of historical facts, supposing they could be discovered, to doubt the possibility of discovering them, and to present the New Testament as an indivisible whole of revelation, which may not be analysed or questioned.

The emphasis upon the unity of revelation is salutary. But the question of the historicity of the Gospel narrative is not so easily to be disposed of. For better or worse, Christianity grounds itself upon a revelation *in history*, and history consists of events (including the meaning borne by events, but necessarily including what actually happened). It remains, therefore, a question of acute relevance, what actually happened. Historical criticism must retain its place in the study of theology.

But it is well to consider what is the aim in view. The aim is not to define the bare minimum of facts which remain when the faith of the Church is left out of account, for that evades the real problem. It is rather to discover, in the first place, the purest tradition, the most primitive, the tradition which was most influential in directing the life of the Church in its formative period, and then to reconstruct upon the basis of this tradition a view of the facts which best accounts for the actual character of early Christianity as a way of life, of belief and of worship. It is not difficult to explain, after a fashion, the development of Christianity when once it started. To account for the original impulse is the problem. Unless the New Testament misleads us hopelessly, unless the writers were themselves misled, the account must be given in terms of what happened 'under Pontius Pilate,' the life that Jesus lived, what He taught, how He died, and what happened thereafter. This is the task of the historical critic of the Gospels.

We have now completed our cursory survey of the field of study, and we are in a position to consider what it all comes to. Our approach to the New Testament has been historical. The results at which our study aims, supposing them to be attained, might be stated, in the first place, as an historical account of the

beginnings of Christianity, including the first chapter of ecclesiastical history, and the first chapter of the history of doctrine. Such an account would leave a number of questions open. At many points it would be difficult to come to a decision upon matters of fact in the narrative, and matters of interpretation in the thought, without raising questions which go beyond the scope of a plain record. The difficulty is not peculiar to this particular field. In any passage of history where the spiritual interests of mankind are deeply involved, the historian, if he is to be more than a mere chronicler, is forced to make judgments of value, explicit or implicit, upon the subject-matter with which he deals, and these judgments will affect his presentation. In the case of the New Testament such judgments cannot be avoided. The report given upon the *data* will show that the reporter either affirms or denies the main assumptions which the New Testament makes.

The Christian theologian accepts these assumptions. He believes that the New Testament contains a passage in the history of the spirit of man in which a reality beyond history discloses itself. (The justification of this belief lies within the sphere of the philosophy of religion, to which another chapter of this book is devoted.) The study of the New Testament from this point of view issues no longer in a simple historical record, but in a Biblical Theology. In such a theology the New Testament is not only understood in the sense in which it spoke to its own time, but re-interpreted in terms intelligible to our time. Such re-interpretation is a delicate and even perilous enterprise, not to be undertaken prematurely. Its demands are not satisfied by the convenient formula which distinguishes the 'permanent element' in the New Testament from its 'temporary' embodiment. In one sense everything in the New Testament is temporary, for the whole action, inward and outward, takes place in an historical setting which is remote from the twentieth century. In another sense nothing in it is merely temporary, for even those features which appear most clearly to betray the individual limitations of the writers, and their subjection to the conditions of their time, are inseparable elements in a whole which transcends these limitations and conditions. Least of all does the re-interpretation of the New Testament mean its subordination to any passing phase

of contemporary thought. On the contrary, the New Testament challenges the thought of our age, as of all ages, and challenges it the more effectively, the more it can be made to speak our language.

Finally, as the New Testament was produced within the Church, so it is to be understood in the last resort only within the Church. While the subsidiary disciplines of our study can be practised, not without success and profit, in detachment from the Christian context to which the New Testament belongs, the interpretation of its contents as a biblical theology is work for those who are living the life of the Church. That life is continuous with the life depicted in the New Testament. (The way in which the continuity is maintained and manifested is a point at issue between different Christian communions, but the reality is known to them all.) Within the Church, where the Gospel is preached and heard, where the law of Christ is acknowledged, and where we share in an ordered fellowship of prayer, worship and sacrament, the essential clue to the biblical revelation is held. For we believe that as the fact of Christ was made known to apostles and evangelists by the Spirit, so the same Spirit in the Church is guiding us into all truth. 'He shall take of Mine and shall declare it unto you.'

BIBLIOGRAPHY

(*English books alone, or English translations, are given*)

NEW TESTAMENT GREEK

- J. H. MOULTON : *Grammar of New Testament Greek* (Vol. II completed by W. F. HOWARD). (T. & T. Clark.)
 E. D. W. BURTON : *New Testament Moods and Tenses*. (T. & T. Clark.)
 ——— *New Testament Word-Studies*. (T. & T. Clark.)
 MOULTON and MILLIGAN : *Vocabulary of New Testament Greek*. (Hodder.)
 G. MILLIGAN : *Select Greek Papyri*. (Cambridge Univ. Press.)
 H. MEECHAM : *Light from Ancient Letters*. (Allen & Unwin.)
 ABBOT SMITH : *Manual Greek Lexicon of the Greek New Testament*. (T. & T. Clark.)
 MOULTON and GEDEN : *Concordance to the New Testament*. (T. & T. Clark.)

ENVIRONMENT AND BACKGROUND

- G. F. MOORE : *Judaism*. (Harvard Univ. Press.)
 I. ABRAHAMS : *Studies in Pharisaism and the Gospels* (Series I and II). (Cambridge Univ. Press.)

MONTEFIORE : *Rabbinic Literature and Gospel Teachings*. (Macmillan.)
Judaism and Christianity. Three volumes by various writers. (Sheldon Press.)

I. *The Age of Transition*, edited by W. C. E. OESTERLEY.

II. *The Contact of Pharisaism with other Cultures*, edited by
 H. LOEWE.

III. *Religion and Law*, edited by B. D. ROSENTHAL.

R. H. CHARLES : *Eschatology, Hebrew, Jewish and Christian*. (Black.)

F. C. BURKITT : *Jewish and Christian Apocalypses*. (Oxford Univ. Press.)

S. ANGUS : *The Environment of Early Christianity*. (Duckworth.)

F. LEGGE : *Forerunners and Rivals of Christianity*. (Cambridge Univ. Press.)

A. NOCK : *Conversion : the Old and the New in Religion from Alexander the Great to Augustine of Hippo*. (Oxford Univ. Press.)

C. H. DODD : *The Bible and the Greeks*. (Hodder.)

TEXTUAL CRITICISM

SIR FREDERIC KENYON : *Handbook to the Textual Criticism of the New Testament*. (Macmillan.)

— *Our Bible and the Ancient Manuscripts*. (Eyre and Spottiswoode.)

G. MILLIGAN : *The New Testament and its Transmission*. (Hodder.)

A. SOUTER : *Text and Canon of the New Testament*. (Duckworth.)

KIRSOPP LAKE : *The Text of the New Testament*. (Rivington.)

B. H. STREETER : *The Four Gospels*, Part I (textual criticism of the Gospels). (Macmillan.)

J. H. ROPES : *The Text of Acts* (in *The Beginnings of Christianity*, edited by JACKSON and LAKE, Part I, Vol. III). (Macmillan.)

HIGHER CRITICISM

J. MOFFATT : *Introduction to the Literature of the New Testament*. (T. & T. Clark.)

A. H. MCNEILE : *Introduction to the New Testament*. (Oxford Univ. Press.)

E. F. SCOTT : *The Literature of the New Testament*. (Oxford Univ. Press.)

LAKE and LAKE : *Introduction to the New Testament*. (Christophers.)

F. B. CLOGG : *Introduction to the New Testament*. (Hodder.)

F. C. BURKITT : *The Gospel History and its Transmission*. (T. & T. Clark.)

V. H. STANTON : *The Gospels as Historical Documents* (three volumes). (Cambridge Univ. Press.)

B. H. STREETER : *The Four Gospels*, Parts II and III. (Macmillan.)

M. DIBELIUS : *From Tradition to Gospel*. (Nicholson & Watson.)

VINCENT TAYLOR : *The Formation of the Gospel Tradition*. (Macmillan.)

B. S. EASTON : *The Gospel before the Gospels*. (Scribner.)

- LATIMER JACKSON : *The Problem of the Fourth Gospel*. (Cambridge Univ. Press.)
- J. E. CARPENTER : *The Johannine Writings*. (Constable.)
- W. F. HOWARD : *The Fourth Gospel in Recent Criticism and Interpretation*. (Epworth.)
- JACKSON and LAKE : *The Acts of the Apostles : Prolegomena : Criticism* (in *The Beginnings of Christianity*, Part I, Vol. II). (Macmillan.)
- K. LAKE : *The Earlier Epistles of St. Paul*. (Rivington.)
- G. S. DUNCAN : *St. Paul's Ephesian Ministry*. (Hodder.)
- P. N. HARRISON : *The Problem of the Pastoral Epistles*. (Oxford Univ. Press.)
- E. F. SCOTT : *The Epistle to the Hebrews*. (T. & T. Clark.)
(and Introductions in commentaries on the several books)

EXEGESIS

Commentaries are innumerable. The volumes of the following series are of varying merit, but it would be both tedious and invidious to attempt discrimination here :

- (i) Commentaries on the Greek New Testament.
The International Critical Commentary. (T. & T. Clark.)
The Expositor's Greek Testament. (Hodder.)
The Cambridge Greek Testament (brief, but some of the volumes remarkably good on their scale). (Cambridge Univ. Press.)
- (ii) Commentaries on the New Testament in English.
The Westminster Commentaries. (Methuen.)
The Moffat New Testament Commentary. (Hodder.)
The Clarendon Bible (New Testament volumes, brief, but in general excellent). (Oxford.)

The following commentaries are in one volume, and deal briefly with the English version :

- Peake's Commentary on the Bible*. (Nelson.)
The Abingdon Commentary. (Abingdon Press, New York.)
A New Commentary on Holy Scripture, including the Apocrypha. (S.P.C.K.)

In addition, the following commentaries on particular books are of especial value :

- The Mission and Message of Jesus* (a commentary on the four Gospels), by MAJOR, MANSON and WRIGHT. (Ivor Nicholson & Watson.)
- St. Matthew*, by MCNEILE. (Macmillan.)
- St. Luke*, by J. M. CREED. (Macmillan.)
- St. John*, by B. F. WESTCOTT. (Macmillan.)
- Acts*, by LAKE and CADBURY, in *The Beginnings of Christianity*, Part I, Vols. IV and V. (Macmillan.)
- Romans*, by KARL BARTH (translated by SIR EDWYN HOSKYNs.) (Oxford Univ. Press.)
- Ephesians*, by ARMITAGE ROBINSON. (Macmillan.)
- Colossians, Philemon and Philipians*, by J. B. LIGHTFOOT. (Macmillan.)

Thessalonians, by G. MILLIGAN. (Macmillan.)

The Pastoral Epistles, by SIR ROBERT FALCONER. (Oxford Univ. Press.)

Hebrews : *The Epistle of Priesthood*, by A. NAIRNE. (T. & T. Clark.)

St. James, by J. B. MAYOR. (Macmillan.)

1 *Peter*, by F. T. A. HORT. (Macmillan.)

1 John : *The Tests of Life*, by R. LAW. (T. & T. Clark.)

INTERPRETATION : HISTORY : BIBLICAL THEOLOGY

J. WEISS : *History of Primitive Christianity*. (Macmillan.)

HOSKYNs and DAVEY : *The Riddle of the New Testament*. (Faber.)

C. H. DODD : *The Apostolic Preaching and its Developments*. (Hodder.)
— *History and the Gospel*. (Nisbet.)

G. W. WADE : *New Testament History*. (Methuen.)

M. DIBELIUS : *Gospel Criticism and Christology*. (Nicholson & Watson.)

B. S. EASTON : *Christ in the Gospels*. (Scribner.)

R. H. LIGHTFOOT : *History and Interpretation in the Gospels*. (Hodder.)
— *Locality and Doctrine in the Gospels*. (Hodder.)

E. F. SCOTT : *The Validity of the Gospel Record*. (Ivor Nicholson & Watson.)

A. C. HEADLAM : *Life and Teaching of Jesus the Christ*. (Murray.)

M. GOGUEL : *Life of Jesus*. (Allen & Unwin.)

R. BULTMANN : *Jesus and the Word*. (Nicholson & Watson.)

C. E. RAVEN : *Jesus and the Gospel of Love*. (Hodder.)

T. W. MANSON : *The Teaching of Jesus*. (Cambridge Univ. Press.)

B. T. D. SMITH : *The Parables of the Synoptic Gospels*. (Cambridge Univ. Press.)

C. H. DODD : *The Parables of the Kingdom*. (Nisbet.)

— *History and the Gospel*. (Nisbet.)

R. OTTO : *The Kingdom of God and the Son of Man*. (Religious Tract Society.)

BACON : *Jesus and Paul*. (Hodder.)

A. H. MCNEILE : *The Pauline Epistles*. (Cambridge Univ. Press.)

H. N. BATE : *Life and Letters of St. Paul*. (Longmans.)

ANDERSON SCOTT : *Christianity According to St. Paul*. (Cambridge Univ. Press.)

W. M. RAMSAY : *St. Paul the Traveller and the Roman Citizen*. (Hodder.)

A. DEISSMANN : *St. Paul : A Study in Social and Religious History*. (Hodder.)

A. H. MCNEILE : *New Testament Teaching in the Light of St. Paul's*. (Cambridge Univ. Press.)

E. F. SCOTT : *The Fourth Gospel*. (T. & T. Clark.)

J. MOFFATT : *Theology of the Gospels*. (Duckworth.)

H. H. KENNEDY : *Theology of the Epistles*. (Duckworth.)

VII
SYMBOLIC THEOLOGY

by

H. L. GOUDGE, D.D.

Regius Professor of Divinity in the University of Oxford

‘The Creeds give us the faith of the millions. The test of our understanding is the use that we make of them in our Christian life and worship.’

Page 250.

VII

SYMBOLIC THEOLOGY

By symbolic theology is meant the theology of the Church as expressed in the Catholic Creeds. There are truths which for our human minds can only be expressed by symbols, or representations, drawn from material things. But the word *Symbolum*, which we translate by 'Creed,' has no reference to these; and its original meaning is uncertain. In later days, when the legend had grown up that each of the twelve Apostles had contributed a clause to the Apostles' Creed, the word came to be interpreted as meaning an 'epitome' of the Apostles' faith. But probably the original meaning was that of a sign or password of orthodox belief as admitting to Christian fellowship and the Christian salvation.

The use of the Creeds has been twofold. First, there has been the individual use in connexion with baptism. The Creed was not at first committed to writing. But, when the Christian convert had received his instruction, the Creed was 'delivered' to his keeping; and before his baptism he was required to 'give it back' by publicly repeating it. It is, as we see by the way in which the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds are divided, in close connexion with the formula of baptism. Secondly, there has been the corporate use, both in the services of the Church, and as tests of orthodoxy. In the Church of England the Apostles' Creed is used at Matins and Evensong, and the Nicene Creed at the Eucharist. But there is no suggestion implied that a fuller faith is required for communion than for baptism; in both Creeds the same faith is expressed. The Apostles' Creed is the old Roman Creed, going back, almost as we have it to-day, to about the beginning of the second century, and from Rome spreading to the whole Church of the West. The Nicene Creed is the Creed of Jerusalem, guarded and

completed by the language adopted in the fourth century by the Church to exclude the Arian heresy. It is primarily the Creed of the East, as the Apostles' Creed is the Creed of the West ; and we do not find it used in the services of the Western Church much before the end of the sixth century. The so-called Athanasian Creed has a different character. It is Athanasian only in the sense that it embodies the truth for which St. Athanasius fought and suffered ; and it is not, strictly speaking, a Creed, but an exposition of the Church's faith. Its frequent use in the services of the Church is an Anglican peculiarity. It is little used in the Roman Church, and not at all in the Eastern. It is, however, of great value, not only by the way in which it states the doctrine of the Incarnation, but still more by its careful guarding of the unity of God in stating the doctrine of the Trinity.

In the following essay account will be taken of all three Creeds ; and its purpose will be to explain the truth which they declare without going much beyond it. The Creeds give to us the faith of the millions, rather than the elaborated, and often somewhat speculative, faith of the theologians. They are in close connexion with the Apostolic Gospel, as we see if we compare the old Roman Creed with the sermons of St. Peter and St. Paul in the Acts of the Apostles. They are essentially practical ; and the test of our understanding of them is the use that we make of them in our Christian life and worship. In England to-day, where we are called anew to the work of evangelisation, the Creeds should prove invaluable. They show us, not only much to put into our Gospel preaching which we too often leave out ; but much to leave out which we too often put in.

Two facts are obvious when we look at the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds. First, just because they are so closely connected with the formula of baptism, each of them falls into three parts ; and secondly they are largely concerned with historical facts. Christianity is a historical religion. It is the historical facts of the life and work of Jesus of Nazareth which lead us to believe in Him in the same sense as that in which we believe in God, to give to Him our trust, our self-surrender, and our worship. It is the historical facts of the work of the Holy Spirit in the Church which lead us to believe in Him also just

as we believe in God. But beyond that these Creeds do not carry us. They no more explain the doctrine of the Trinity than the Apostles explained it in their evangelistic Gospel, and there is no need for the simple Christian much to concern himself with the intellectual problems which it involves. The simple Christian who believes in one God, and yet in his life and worship regards Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in the same way, believes the doctrine of the Trinity, though he may not be able to put his belief into words. Nor did the unknown author of the Athanasian Creed think otherwise. He offers us no explanation of the mystery, but only a statement of it. 'The Catholick Faith is this: that we worship'—not understand, but worship—'one God in Trinity, and the Trinity in Unity.'

I

We turn then to the first section of the Apostles' Creed. 'I believe in God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth.' To this the Nicene Creed makes two additions. It speaks of 'one' God, thus emphasising the divine unity; and, by adding 'and of all things visible and invisible,' it guards against the thought that there can be any form of existence which does not find its source in God. Originally the old Roman Creed also had the word 'one,' and it is not certainly known how it came to be omitted.

Now the Apostles in their evangelistic Gospel never attempt to prove the existence of God. God so bears witness to Himself in nature and in conscience that there are few who do not in some sense believe in Him. The existence of God cannot be proved in the ordinary sense of proving; rather it proves itself to all who are capable of recognising it. But it is not clear to all men that there is but one God: to primitive peoples the world appears to be a welter of conflicting forces. Better knowledge and reflection, however, put the matter beyond doubt. Neither the man of science, who finds order everywhere, and every part of the universe related to every other part, nor the thinker who seeks to understand reality as a whole, will tolerate the thought of more gods than one. 'God,' like 'universe,' is a word which has no plural; a being whose power is limited by that of any other being is not God

at all. It was not, however, in this way that God's people Israel had come even in Old Testament days to believe in the unity of God : it was rather through their experience of Him. At first, it would seem, their God was to them but their national God, and they hardly doubted the equal reality of the national gods of other peoples. But Yahweh, their God, showed Himself so wonderful in His redeeming power and in His mastery of human history, that other gods faded into nothingness, and Yahweh stood out in solitary majesty as the only God. The Lord when He came set His own seal to this truth ; and it is of the first importance still, not only in the evangelisation of the heathen world, but for Christians themselves. No confidence can be reposed in any but the only God ; no other can claim our full devotion, or be the object of a worship worthy of the name. Thus, in any statement of the doctrine of the Trinity, we must be careful to guard first the divine unity. The right order is not ' Three in One, and One in Three,' but ' One in Three, and Three in One.' If our Lord is God, and the Spirit God, they have one and the same Godhead ; and not (so to say) *replicas* of it. It is God, and no one less than God, who comes to us in Christ, and dwells in us by His Spirit. Neither provides any refuge from God ; each brings God closer to us.

We are not, however, yet concerned with the Lord or with the Spirit, but with God the Father Almighty ; and both Fatherhood and Omnipotence need to be explained. There is a sense in which God is the universal Father ; every other fatherhood, as St. Paul teaches, derives its character from its share in the Fatherhood of God. We do not call God our Father, because in some ways He is like a human father ; but we call our human fathers by that name because in some ways they are like God. But this universal Fatherhood is not prominent in Scripture, and it is doubtful whether the Creeds have it distinctly in mind. Rather they speak of God as Father in relation to the Lord as His Son, and in relation to all those who share the Lord's Sonship as faithful members of His body. It is true that the Lord has taught us to believe in the Father's universal goodwill ; there is not one whom He has made whom He does not desire to receive into His family. But sonship is not so much our natural heritage as a blessing to be gained ; what the Lord has brought us is the ' power to

become ' His sons. Our Lord never speaks of all men alike as sons of God ; at worst we may be ' children of the evil one.'

Equally must we guard the thought of the divine omnipotence. To say that God is almighty is to say that He is sovereign over all that He has made ; that all might is His alone, of whatever kind that might may be. It is to say that it is He who preserves as well as He who creates ; without Him all would sink back into nothingness. It is to say that all remains continually under His control, and is actually controlled to the fulfilment of His eternal purpose ; that no situation can arise with which He is unable to deal, no temptation or difficulty assail us from which He is not able to deliver. But it does not mean that God can ' do anything,' or that men have no share in the shaping of events ; and both these points are of importance.

First then, as Hooker says, ' the being of God is a kind of law to His working,' and He cannot do what it is contrary to His nature and purpose to do. He cannot, for example, ' lie ' or deceive, since that would be to ' deny *Himself*.' Just as all power is God's power, so all truth is God's truth, and He cannot set it aside. Thus He cannot make things to be and not to be at the same time, or two and two to be five, or beings who possess freedom of choice not to be responsible for the choices that they make, or bestow the holiness which results from faithfulness under temptation upon those who have not endured temptation. These things are not, strictly speaking, ' things ' at all ; they are but arrangements of words destitute of meaning. Indeed, there is more than this to say. God ' is not a God of confusion,' but of order ; and, since the methods He had chosen for the fulfilment of His purpose are the right methods, He would ' deny *Himself*,' if He set them aside. To say this is not to limit the divine freedom. The order of the world, we believe, is not a mechanical order but the order conferred by the unity of the divine plan. If we men can act freely in the world that God has made, still more can He. If the new and startling can do more for the forwarding of His purpose than the old and customary, the new and startling we shall expect to see. But we must not suppose that God can, if He so wills, answer any prayer that we may like to offer. When the Lord said ' If it be possible, let this

cup pass from me,' He meant 'if it be consistent with Thy purpose': and in fact it was not. Prayer is not a trouble-saving appliance, but a means of active co-operation with the divine purpose; and faith is often shown rather by not asking for special divine action than by asking for it.

Secondly, because God is all-sovereign, we must not suppose that there is no activity to be found but His, and that all that takes place is equally the expression of His will. God for the fulfilment of His purpose has made men free. If there were no freedom, there could be no sin; but there could be no holiness either, or the eternal blessedness which holiness will bring. We are free, within the strict limits which belong to our position, to work with God or to work in opposition to Him; and thus much which takes place is contrary to His will. But that is no interference with the sovereignty of God; the freedom of men is one of the things which God all-sovereign wills. Indeed, it is precisely the fact that God is all-sovereign in a world of freedom which gives to His sovereignty its greatest glory. We are here no doubt in presence of a mystery, but not in presence of a contradiction, as a well-known illustration shows. If a beginner plays chess with a master, his defeat is certain; sooner or later, checkmate will come. But within the rules of the game the beginner can make any moves he will, and the moves of the master will depend upon them. That will not, however, affect the final result; and if the beginner goes over the game after it is finished, he will see how the master used the moves which the beginner freely made to forward his own purposes. The purpose of God stands sure, and one day it will be accomplished.

From the omnipotence of God the Creeds turn to the mystery of creation. What do the Creeds mean when they say that God is the Maker of heaven and earth? They mean that all that exists has come into existence simply by His will. From God comes, not merely the shaping of the material, but the material itself. The statement, so strange to our ears, that God 'made the world out of nothing,' means that there is nothing out of which God made the world; there was nothing independent of Himself out of which to make it. There is a sense, no doubt, in which we may ourselves create; the artist and the poet do so. But the material for their action and for

their thought is always a material which is given. Of creation in the full sense we have no experience, and therefore we cannot understand the creatorship of God. Here again, though there is mystery, there is no contradiction; our own minds suggest to us the true conclusion. When we ask for the cause of anything which exists or happens, we are never satisfied by learning the material cause; that in its turn demands explanation. When, however, we have traced what puzzles us to the will of a personal being, we are far better satisfied. That, as by our experience we know, is a real cause, as nothing else can be. Whether God has ever been uncreative we do not know. Even though our world had a beginning, there may have been others before it. What we need to know, that we may live confidently and reverently in the world, is that there is nothing there which does not come from our Father's hand, or which is unable to be used for His purpose. There is much which has gone wrong; but there is nothing which cannot be put right, if only our wills are united with the will of God. We may feel at home in the world everywhere; at bottom it is 'very good.'

But was it necessary for the Nicene Creed to add: 'And of all things visible and invisible'? It was a valuable addition; for 'heaven and earth' might be understood to refer only to the material creation, and not to living beings. There might be invaders in God's world, powers of evil who owe to God neither their being nor their allegiance, and there is much which may suggest that this is the case. Evil, and especially moral evil, cannot be explained away; it is a great fact, the greatest of all obstacles to faith in God; and it is only in the wills of living beings that moral evil can be found. We should like to find for evil beings some other source than God. But there is no road that way, and the Nicene Creed warns us that there is not. If there are 'invisible' evil beings as well as the 'visible' ones we know so well—and experience has generally led men to this conclusion—we must explain their evil, just as we must explain our own: they, too, must have misused the freedom of choice which God their Creator gave to them. Christians should never say that they 'believe in' Satan, for 'believe in' involves trust and worship; we believe, in the full sense of the word, only in God—Father, Son, and Holy

Spirit. But to believe that evil spirits exist involves no more intellectual difficulty than to believe that evil men exist. If the plan of God, and His gift of freedom, involve the possibility of the one, they also involve the possibility of the other.

II

The thought of the divine purpose, and of its accomplishment in spite of the presence of moral evil, leads naturally to the second section of the Creeds ; for the Lord is the centre of the divine purpose, and the instrument for its accomplishment. The Creeds speak of the Office of the Lord, of His Person, of His relation to ourselves, of His human experience, of His glorification through death, of His present rule and its final consummation. Between the two Creeds there are here only two differences of importance. Controversy has led in the Nicene Creed to a much fuller statement of the doctrine of our Lord's Person ; and, while the Apostles' Creed is mainly a record of facts, the Nicene speaks also of the purpose and value for ourselves of what has taken place. It was ' for us men, and for our salvation.'

We begin with the word ' Christ.' ' And in Jesus Christ.' ' And in one Lord Jesus Christ.' What does the word mean ? To ourselves it is often just a proper name, like the holy name of Jesus ; but at first it was not so. The word means ' anointed ' ; and, though anointing was used in many ways by the people of God, ' the Lord's anointed ' had come to mean the King, chosen and empowered by God, for His work. Thus the word came to be applied to the great Deliverer of the people of God and Consummator of their destiny whom God was expected to send. This expectation was not universal among the prophets of Israel themselves, and there was much variation in the beliefs entertained of what the Christ would be and do. But the expectation had grown bright in the age preceding the coming of the Lord ; and it was only natural that the immense impression which the Lord produced should lead men to believe Him to be the Christ. The Lord Himself in His public preaching showed much reserve in claiming the title ; to do so would have been only too likely to lead to insurrection against Rome. But He led His immediate followers to believe in Him as the Christ ; He practically

claimed to be the Christ by His action on Palm Sunday ; He distinctly made the claim in His trial before Caiaphas ; and after His glorification there was no longer need for reserve, and the Apostles proclaimed Him as the Christ wherever they went. That Jesus is the Christ, or (to put it in the form at first more appropriate) that the Christ is Jesus, was at first the central affirmation of the Gospel. It meant that He had come to be the Redeemer and Saviour of the whole people of God, to fulfil the hopes of prophecy, to be the Centre of the divine kingdom that He promised and began to build, and, with the redeemed people whom He was gathering round Him, to carry through God's purpose for the world. When St. Paul said that he 'determined not to know anything among' the Corinthians, 'save Jesus Christ, and him crucified,' he did not mean that the subject of his Gospel was the atoning death of the Lord : he meant that it was the Christship of Jesus, and that he proclaimed it in spite of the fact—'unto Jews a stumbling-block, and unto Gentiles foolishness'—that He of whom the proclamation was made was a crucified man. The Creeds, following the Apostolic practice, begin their teaching about the Lord with His Christship, while they do not directly refer to the atonement made by His death.

But then this amazing position ascribed to Jesus of Nazareth is only intelligible if He has a relation to God which belongs to Him alone ; and the Creeds go on to say that He is God's 'only Son' or 'only-begotten Son.' This title goes back to the vision and audition granted to the Lord at His baptism ; where 'my beloved Son' is almost certainly a mistranslation, and we should substitute for it 'my only Son.' In view of God's universal Fatherhood and the special Fatherhood bestowed upon Israel, the expression is remarkable ; and the language in which the Lord Himself speaks of His relation to the Father only deepens the impression which it makes. This language is not found only in the Fourth Gospel, but goes back to what is probably the earliest source of the first three. 'All things have been delivered unto me of my Father ; and no one knoweth the Son, save the Father ; neither doth any know the Father save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal Him.' We hear this claim to an unique relation to the Father in the earliest recorded words of the Lord, and not

infrequently in the first three Gospels, while in the Fourth Gospel the Lord habitually speaks in the same way. It is His Sonship to the Father rather than His Christship which to the Lord is all-important. He is the Christ because He is the Son rather than the Son because He is the Christ. To say that the Lord is but the Son of God as we all may be and ought to be is to misunderstand His meaning, as even His enemies did not. He never identifies His own Sonship with that of other men, or even says 'our Father.' He distinguishes His own Sonship from that of others as a sonship different, not in degree, but in kind. Indeed, it is perhaps His Sonship as much as His Christship that lies behind the statement of the Creeds that He is 'our Lord,' and the 'one Lord,' and that we owe to Him an absolute obedience.

But how are we to understand this title of God's 'only Son'? The old Roman Creed does not tell us, nor at first did the Eastern Creed as fully as now it does. It spoke indeed of the Lord as 'the only-begotten Son of God, the true God begotten of the Father before all the worlds.' But this might not necessarily mean that the Son possessed the Father's eternity; it might only mean that He was the first of created beings, and created to be the instrument of the creation of the rest; the phrase 'by whom all things were made' was also found in the old Eastern Creed, and it referred not to the Father, but to the Son. Indeed, in the fourth century a great heresy arose, which understood the Lord's Sonship just in that way, and argued that the Son must necessarily be later in time than the Father by whom He was begotten. It was for this reason that the old Eastern Creed received the additions that we find in the Nicene Creed to-day. We now say that the Lord is not only 'Begotten of his Father before all worlds,' but 'God of God, Light of Light, Very God of very God, Begotten, not made, Being of one substance with the Father.' There is indeed an eternal distinction between the Son and the Father; if there were not, there could be neither Fatherhood nor Sonship. There is also an eternal dependence of the Son upon the Father; the little word 'of,' thrice employed, and used in the sense of 'derived from,' makes this clear. If the Son could be separated from the Father (as He cannot be) He would not be God, or Light, or very God at all. 'Light of

Light ' is rather an illustration of the phrase ' God of God ' than a new truth added to it ; but it is a valuable illustration. The light which we see, and which falls upon ourselves, is all derived from the sun. But the sun would not be the sun if it had not its light ; and the light which falls upon ourselves is the sun's own light, and is not lost by the sun which gives it. So with the phrase, ' Very God of very God.' It means ' true God of true God.' It denies that, when we speak of our Lord as God, we are using the great word in a secondary and inaccurate sense. Godhead is what it is and all that it is ; there can be no such thing as a secondary Godhead. If the Lord had been made or created, He could not be God ; but He was ' begotten, not made,' and the begetting is an eternal begetting, an abiding activity of the Father upon whom the Son depends. It is true in our own human relations that the father is always older than the son ; but when we apply the words ' Father ' and ' Son ' to divine relations, we are speaking of relations into which time does not enter, and we use these words simply because they are the best that we possess.

But of all the language here employed the most memorable is the phrase ' of one substance with the Father.' It is of value, not only for the guarding of the truth of the Lord's divinity, but for the guarding of the divine unity also. But in order that it may do this we must grasp the exact meaning to be attached to it. The Greek word translated ' of one substance ' is a philosophical word ; but not one that commits us to a particular form of philosophy. It has nothing to do with substance in a material sense. In the fourth century the word ' substance ' could be used in two ways. It could be used of the common nature possessed by different members of the same class, as when we say that men are all ' of one nature ' ; or it could be used of a single reality, as when we speak of a single human ' being.' Now it was the second meaning which St. Athanasius seems to have had in view, when he led the Church to assert of the Lord that He was ' of one substance with the Father.' He did not mean that the Father and the Lord were two members of the same class, and had the same nature in that sense : he regarded the Godhead as one single reality with unchanging characteristics of its own, and meant that this one single reality was, so to say, the joint possession

of the Father and of the Son. The Father is the fount of Godhead ; the Son depends upon Him, as the Father does not depend upon the Son ; but what he eternally communicates to the Son is not, if we may put it so, a *replica* of His own Godhead, but that Godhead itself. The thought is not an easy one ; and those who feel the mystery which surrounds all that is divine may shrink from statements such as this as going, and that with too little reverence, beyond what we can possibly know. But the reverence of St. Athanasius was certainly no less than our own ; and only in this way, it would seem, can we guard at once the divinity of the Lord and the unity of God. To think of the 'Persons' of the Godhead as members of a class is to believe in three Gods ; and to say, as many of old preferred to say, that the Lord was of like substance with the Father, would lead us in the same direction. Not only is likeness a matter of degree, but we cannot speak even of perfect likeness without again suggesting members of a class. St. Athanasius was not one who had a love of speculation for its own sake ; he was concerned with practical issues. But all great things, if they are to be revealed, must reveal themselves ; only God can reveal God. If the Lord reveals God and redeems man, it must be God, and no one less than God, who comes to us in Him. Necessary, however, as the present language of the Nicene Creed may have come to be, and valuable as it still is to-day, it was not, as we have seen, the original language either of Scripture or of the Church ; and simple Christians, if they find it confusing rather than illuminating, need not concern themselves with it.

One other phrase in this part of the Nicene Creed may need explanation : 'By whom all things were made.' It refers, as already noticed, not to the Father, but to the Son. In modern English we should say 'through' rather than 'by' : the Father is the Maker of all things, both visible and invisible, but the Son is the instrument through whom they were made. 'In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made through him ; and without him was not anything made that hath been made.' This language is at first strange to us, but the Old Testament explains it. In the Old Testament we hear not infrequently of the Word of

God, or the Wisdom of God, as the instrument of the divine action. Our own words and wisdom are generally ineffective enough : what we say and what we know make little difference to the world at large. But with God it is otherwise. He 'speaks, and it is done' ; His word does not 'return to Him void,' but fulfils itself in action ; and what His Wisdom leads Him to do is actually done. So in the Old Testament the Word and Wisdom of God are regarded as living realities, and almost personified. We must not suppose that the divinity of the Lord came to be believed because of this Old Testament teaching ; it came to be believed because of all that the Lord was found to be. But, when the Lord was found to be the Father's instrument in all that He was doing for men, it was natural to use of Him the Old Testament language, and to identify Him with the Word or Wisdom of God. Moreover, we read that our Lord said, 'My Father worketh till now, and I work.' Just as God had shown His Creatorship in the way in which He dealt with the world for His people by His 'mighty Hand and stretched out Arm,' so it was with the Lord : He healed the sick and stilled the storm. It was natural to believe that He whom they found to be the Father's instrument in redeeming the world had also been the Father's instrument in creating it. As Hooker puts it, 'it seemeth a thing unconsonant that the world should honour any other as a Saviour but him whom it honoureth as the Creator of the world.' Whatever God has done, He has done through His Word the Son.

Now it is at this point that we return to the common matter of both the Creeds, and speak of the Lord's incarnate life. 'Who was conceived by the Holy Ghost, Born of the Virgin Mary,' says the Western Creed. 'Who for us men, and for our salvation came down from heaven, And was incarnate by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary, And was made man,' says the fuller Creed of the East. Spatial language such as 'came down from heaven' is unavoidable, since space, like time, is a form of all our thinking. With God there is neither down nor up, neither above nor below ; nor did the thinkers of the Church suppose that there was. But, just as we speak of a man who has held a high position as being ready to serve his country in a lower one, without supposing that space has

anything to do with the matter, so we speak of the Son of God through whom all things were made as coming 'down' to our world of space and time.

But we should here note the difference between the two Creeds. The chief purpose of the Apostles' Creed is to insist upon the reality of the Lord's humanity. To-day we generally take this for granted; it is His divinity that we have to guard. But in the earliest days it was not so. So profound was the impression which the Lord had made, so deep was the Christian sense of the greatness of the work that He had done, that the temptation was rather to the view that the Lord seemed to be a man without really being one, and that His so-called body was but a veil concealing His real nature. Thus the Apostles' Creed insists that the Lord was really conceived by the power of the Holy Spirit, really born of the Virgin Mary; really suffered, and was crucified, dead and buried; really passed, as we must expect to pass, to the realm of the dead; and, without any loss of His humanity, rose from the dead and ascended to God's right hand. The first Epistle of St. John, a book of much the same date as the old Roman Creed, has a similar error in view. The Nicene Creed, on the other hand, thinks rather of the importance of the Lord's 'descent' from heaven for ourselves and our salvation. But of both Creeds it is true that the main point is, not that the Lord was born of a virgin, but that He had a true human conception and birth. In the oldest form of the Eastern Creed there is no mention of the Blessed Virgin.

To say this, however, is not to throw doubt upon the Virgin Birth: we find in the Early Church no doubt about it; and the statements of the Creeds reproduce the language employed in St. Luke's story of the Annunciation. If our Lord was a supernatural Person, and came to be a new starting-point for humanity, it seems peculiarly appropriate that He should have been born of a virgin. In His Birth, as in the life and work that followed it, His humanity and His divinity, His likeness to us and His difference from us, are thus equally marked. But the Virgin Birth of the Lord was at first rather the secret of the Church than part of the evangelistic Gospel; for obvious reasons it could not be proclaimed to the world, and would have been quite incredible before the Lord's supernatural

character had been accepted. In view of the close connexion of the primitive Creeds with the evangelistic Gospel, we cannot confidently assert that in the Creeds the Virgin Birth is asserted because of the importance of the truth for its own sake. What we can truly say is that no one who in other things accepts the Creeds in their true meaning is likely to disbelieve it.

It is then with the Incarnation rather than with the mode of the Incarnation that we are now concerned ; and we have here the central truth of our religion. It involves a profound mystery which we shall not expect wholly to understand ; but we should be clear as to what the mystery is. We believe that ' the Word became flesh ' ; and the implications of this belief are admirably drawn out in the Athanasian Creed. ' The right faith is that we believe and confess : that our Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is both God and man. He is God of the substance of the Father, begotten before the worlds : and he is man, of the substance of his Mother, born in the world ; Perfect God ; perfect man, of reasoning soul and human flesh subsisting ; Equal to the Father as touching his Godhead : less than the Father as touching his manhood. Who although he be God and man : yet he is not two, but is one Christ ; One, however, not by conversion of Godhead into flesh : but by taking manhood into God ; One altogether : not by confusion of substance, but by unity of person. For as reasoning soul and flesh is one man : so God and man is one Christ.' This account of the Person of the Lord, as we shall see, presupposes a view of the nature of man not quite the same as that of St. John. But otherwise it leaves nothing to be desired : we have but to draw out its meaning.

First then, in each of the Creeds the One who is said to have been incarnate is One who had a life of His Own previous to the Incarnation as the only-begotten Son of God. We must not, as we are apt to do, think of the Son of God before His Incarnation as possessing a personal life exactly resembling our own ; but still less must we think of Him as impersonal. Our own lives fall far short of being entirely personal ; much goes on within us of which we know nothing ; and, for one reason or another, our action is frequently little more than a mechanical response to our situation. Personal life in God must be something very different from our own. But it must

be far more truly personal, not less so ; and, in thinking of the Lord before His Incarnation as living and personal, we are thinking upon right lines. Now Godhead is Godhead ; God cannot deny *Himself* ; and, if the Lord before His Incarnation was Very God of Very God, He remains Very God of Very God in His conception and birth, and after them. It is here that we see the meaning of the Church when it says that our Lord had no human personality. That is a statement which in popular teaching to-day we should never make, since it will be understood to mean that our Lord was not a man. When we speak to-day of a man's personality, we use the word as a summary description of all that he has come to be, not only by his inherited nature, but by his environment, his experience, and above all his own conduct : that our Lord has come to be what to-day He is through His human experience, His action and suffering, is a truth particularly emphasised in the New Testament itself. But the language of the Church quoted above in no way throws doubt upon this, for it does not use the word personality as we use it. We may put the matter in this way. When a man says ' I have a human nature,' he says what is true ; and he distinguishes the ' I ' which possesses the nature from the nature which is possessed. The two are in fact inseparable ; there can no more be a nature which no one possesses than an ' I ' which has no nature at all. But the language used is a witness to the reality of the ' I,' and the individuality of the one who so speaks. Now it is this ' I ' which the Church has in view when it says that the Lord had no human personality. There are strange cases of what is called ' split ' personality, but nobody can have two ' I's. There is no contradiction to this in saying that the Son of God became man ; but there would be, if in doing so He assumed not merely human nature, but a new and human ' I ' ; and the Church rightly denies that He did so.

All this is important for understanding what the mystery of the Incarnation is. The experience of Jesus of Nazareth was the experience of One who was God, and it is precisely that which makes the manger of Bethlehem and the Cross of Calvary what they are to us. When we substitute for the language of Scripture and the Church such a statement as that the divine Word dwelt in Jesus of Nazareth so far more

fully than in other men that we may speak of a unique indwelling, or the statement that He was a 'God-possessed' man, we are not explaining the Incarnation, but denying it. Scripture speaks of the mutual indwelling of the Father and the Son, and this language is important for the doctrine of the Trinity; but it never speaks of the indwelling of the divine Word in Jesus. 'The Word *became* flesh, and dwelt among *us*'; for the Word and Jesus of Nazareth are one and the same Person. We do not profess to understand the mystery, but that is what it is; if we do not believe that of Jesus of Nazareth, we are idolaters when we worship Him.

But what are we to understand by 'the Word became flesh'? That He became a man, neither more nor less. Here again explanation is necessary, since the word 'flesh,' like the word 'personality,' is for us misleading. The Hebrews thought of the nature of man differently from the Greeks, and differently from ourselves. The Greeks, as the Athanasian Creed illustrates, thought of man as a reasoning soul inhabiting a body; and, though we ourselves do not lay the same exclusive stress as the Greeks upon reason, but think of the soul as also the seat of emotion and will, we generally think of man much as the Greeks did. But the Hebrews thought of man as a body to which the breath of God gave life. They were profoundly impressed by the difference between the nature of God and the nature of man. God, they said, was Spirit—invisible but irresistible power; man was flesh, or flesh and blood—visible enough, but frail, weak, and unenduring. While the breath of God was in him, he could no doubt think, and feel, and act; but his whole being was flesh, and not Spirit; and, if God withdrew the breath of life from him, he returned to the dust from which he came. Our Lord Himself sometimes speaks of the life of man and the soul of man as if they were the same thing. We may not here exactly agree either with the Greeks or with the Hebrews; but to those who grasp the intimate connexion of soul-life with the body, the Hebrew outlook will seem nearer to the truth than the Greek.

Thus no Hebrew Christian, when he read that the Word became flesh, would suppose that the Word assumed only a human body, all the rest of our human inheritance being supplied by the mind, the emotions, and the will of the Word

Himself. But Greek Christians might easily understand St. John's words in that sense, and many of them did. Indeed, this view, though not openly avowed, is extremely common even to-day among those who desire to be orthodox Christians. St. John's meaning is that the divine Word became a man in all the fullness of manhood. He thought as a man, felt as a man, willed and acted as a man; and above all suffered as a man in all man's weakness and limitation. It is precisely this weakness and limitation which 'flesh' in its contrast with 'Spirit' suggests; and it is not likely that, when St. John said that the Word became flesh, he thought primarily of the Lord's conception and birth. Rather he thought of the Lord's human experience as a whole, including His experience of death; and it was the complete reality of the whole that he desired to emphasise, as it is emphasised in the old Roman Creed. Just as, when we weaken or reject the language in which the Creed asserts the divinity of Jesus of Nazareth Himself, and substitute language which transfers the divinity to God dwelling in Him, we empty the Gospel of its power, so we also empty it when we substitute for 'the Word was made flesh' language which frees the divine Christ from the limitations which full humanity involves. The first course denies that the Lord was Perfect God; the second denies that He was perfect man.

But why should we be disposed to do either? Because our 'reasoning souls' are uncomfortable with mystery, and tend to reject what they do not understand. We are not satisfied with the witness of the New Testament to the full divinity and humanity of the Lord; we want to see how the two can be compatible, and the one fits into the other. But how can we expect to do this, when we understand human nature only so imperfectly and the nature of God so very little? There is nothing impossible in the thought of One who is both God and man; and, though deep waters are near into which we cannot penetrate, we can go a little way towards understanding how it can be.

As the Athanasian Creed says, there is but one Christ; but the unity is not maintained by conversion of Godhead into flesh, and we must not interpret 'the Word became flesh' in that sense. 'The Word became flesh' might, as far as language

goes, bear that meaning ; we say, to take an example, that, if heat is applied, ice ' becomes ' water, and water steam. But we also say that a man ' becomes ' a soldier : he remains all that he was before, but becomes also something which before he was not, and without loss of his personal identity. That he is a soldier is a new characteristic, bringing new powers and new limitations ; and these are ' taken into ' the larger whole of the manhood of the one who receives them. So the Word became flesh ' by taking manhood into God.' Godhead is infinitely greater than manhood ; only a very little of all that God is can be expressed through that vehicle. The Godhead revealed to us in Christ is true Godhead ; in Him we see all of God that we need to know, and are able to understand ; but there is a limitless ocean of being beyond. The relation of the Godhead to the manhood of Christ is that the One is partially revealed and acts through the other. Thus we should never think of the ' I ' in Christ as if it had no characteristics of its own, but possessed two natures, to be used as alternative instruments according to the particular task to be performed. The ' I ' is always ' true God of true God,' but within the incarnate life our Lord seems never to act except through His manhood. The illustration employed by the Athanasian Creed is here valuable : ' as reasoning soul and flesh is one man : so God and man is one Christ.' The soul may possess powers of which we are generally unconscious ; strange conditions may exist in which it can act apart from the body. But normally it cannot do this ; and thus any injury done to the body, and especially to the brain, fetters the activity of the soul. Our Lord's manhood was perfect manhood ; for the work that God sent Him to do it was a perfect instrument ; but the limitations of manhood are profoundly real.

Now it is in this way that we should regard the ' self-emptying ' of which St. Paul speaks. Our Lord did not in advance empty Himself of His Godhead in order to become man, but the self-emptying was involved for the incarnate life by the very fact of becoming man. Within the incarnate life, what man as man could not know He could not know ; what man as man cannot help feeling He could not help feeling ; and, though the whole power of God was ever at His disposal

for the doing of His work, He could only draw upon it as we draw upon it ourselves. To suppose that the Incarnation left the Lord within His incarnate life free from the limitations of humanity is not only to deny the reality of the Incarnation, but largely to deprive us of His human example, and to make Him no longer our brother.

At the same time we should be cautious indeed in stating the limitations which humanity involves, since our own experience is here misleading. Our own humanity is a fallen humanity, maimed in a multitude of ways ; we do not know what may be possible for a humanity which fully corresponds to the divine intention, and fully responds to the divine call. We can set no limit to the illumination it is able to receive, or to the power which it is able to exercise ; and it is most foolish to reject the narratives of the Gospels because of the marvel of the facts which they relate. The Gospels cannot be exempted from historical criticism, but at least they should be exempt from such folly as that. When criticism has done its proper work, we should go to the Gospels with open minds to learn both the limitations which manhood does involve and those which it does not. Just as we cannot reject what the Lord is said to have done on the ground that it is inconsistent with His true humanity ; so we cannot reject the account of any limitation by which the Lord appears to have been bound on the ground that it is inconsistent with His true divinity. The question of His knowledge perhaps affords the best example. On the one hand, He speaks the Father's message with the calm certainty of One who knows that He can neither deceive nor be deceived ; He knows the Father as the Father knows Him ; He has a profound insight, not only into human nature, but into the mind of the individual men with whom He has to deal ; like some of the prophets before Him and of the saints after Him, He possesses ' second sight ' and foresees incidents still in the future. On the other hand, He is capable of being surprised and disappointed ; He asks questions in some cases, it would seem, simply to obtain information ; in matters of science and history, and in His view of the Old Testament literature, He shows no sign of better knowledge than that possessed by others in His day ; He distinctly said that He did not know when the final con-

summation would come. We must take the facts as we find them. That intuitive knowledge of God and man which goes with a perfect surrender to the One and a self-sacrificing devotion to the other the Lord possessed to the uttermost. But neither self-surrender nor self-sacrifice add to our knowledge of the facts of science or of history. Here, it would seem, where the facts were unknown to the Lord, He was capable of being mistaken, as the holiest of men are to-day.

We turn now to His experience. Of the incidents of His life of ministry the Creeds say nothing, for they were not an abiding part of His work of redemption. The Creeds are concerned with His passion and death and the victory to which they led. Two things are specially to be noted: the unity of the Lord's Person, in the fullness of His divinity and humanity, through every stage of His experience, and (in the Nicene Creed) the reference to prophecy.

First, then, the unity of the Lord's Person. *He* suffered; *He* died; *He* was buried; *He* descended into hell; *He* rose and ascended; *He* sits on the right hand of God; *He* will come to judge the quick and the dead. The Hebrews, as we have seen, did not distinguish between the soul and the body quite as we do, nor had they any doctrine of the natural 'immortality of the soul.' That is a Greek doctrine, and one of questionable value; what God created He could surely annihilate. The immortality in which the Hebrews had come to believe was the immortality of the whole man, if united to God, the fountain of life: God is 'not the God of the dead, but of the living.' No doubt, in view of the facts of physical death and dissolution, the immortality of the man involves the existence between death and resurrection of a 'soul' to preserve the continuity of his life; and our Apostles' Creed speaks of the Lord as descending into the abode of the dead. The language employed is natural language, for the Hebrews pictured the universe as three-storied. Above was heaven, the abode of God and the angels; earth was the abode of men; and beneath it was the abode of the dead. But all that the Creed means to assert is that our Lord here as elsewhere shared our human experience; and the oldest Creeds of Rome and Jerusalem did not regard this clause as necessary. But the Lord's burial is found in both our Creeds, and there is

no paradox in saying that the Lord was buried. His body was still the body of the Word, and, as (surely rightly) Hooker says, His divinity deserted neither His body nor His soul.

But the greatest of all facts is that He rose again from the dead ; and, though the Creeds, like St. Paul, do not directly speak of ' the empty tomb,' they unquestionably imply it. The mere survival of the Lord either as the divine Word, or with a ' soul ' assumed by that Word, would have been no resurrection, nor would it have been any victory over death. Death attacks the body ; and, unless the body be restored, there is no victory. So the Lord says, ' See my hands and my feet, that it is I myself : handle me, and see : for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye behold me having.' Do we say that to accept this story is to believe in a ' resuscitated corpse ' ? The Lord's body, incorruptible by the presence of the Word, was never a ' corpse,' but itself, as St. John understood, the source of cleansing and of life. What was needed was that it should be changed and glorified in the glorification of the Lord, who still had ' need of it ' : without it He would not have been ' Himself.' The body is the means of our manifestation to others, and of our activity in this present world ; and our Lord so used it both before and after His Resurrection. The Apostles were still ' in the body ' ; and, while we are so, it is by sense-experience, and not by ' telegrams from heaven,' that knowledge is normally conveyed to us. Why is it sometimes supposed that the Lord might have revealed Himself to the eye or to the ear, but could not have been revealed through the touch or the muscular sense ? Sense-experience is all on the same level ; and, if ' seeing is believing,' much more is grasping. Nothing could have been better evidence of the Lord's reality than to grasp His hand, and feel the bones through the flesh. To say that the Lord's body after the Resurrection was a ' spiritual ' body is true ; St. Paul's account of the spiritual body seems to have been drawn from what he had learnt of the appearances of the Risen Lord. But there is no valid contrast to be drawn between the material and the spiritual ; for ' spiritual ' means ' supernatural ' ; a spiritual body is a body adapted to a supernatural order of life ; it does not mean a body of gossamer, or the body of a ghost. It is reasonable to believe that the spiritual body of the Risen,

Lord had been freed from limitations by which it had been formerly bound, but unreasonable to assume that it could not perform tasks which the 'natural' body had performed with ease: we are far too ignorant of its character to make such an assumption. We may suggest that the reality of the Lord was not apprehended by the Apostles after His Resurrection exactly as it had been apprehended before it; but there is nothing in this suggestion to discredit St. Luke's narrative. If the glorified humanity of the Lord and its powers could be fully understood by us, it would show that they belonged not to a new and supernatural order, but to the present one. Negative statements as to its powers are as little in place as positive ones.

Secondly, the reference to prophecy. 'According to the Scriptures,' says the Eastern Creed; and the words refer, not to the Resurrection only, but to the Lord's redeeming experience as a whole, as the New Testament parallels show. The witness of Scripture is borne not only by such passages as the twenty-second Psalm, or the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah, but far more widely. When the veil was taken away from the Jewish heart, the Church found the Christ, and His experience foreshadowed not only in the words of psalmists and prophets, but in the sacrificial system, in the experience of the deliverers and saints of the past, and even in the experience of the chosen people themselves. The path of sacrifice at the call of God had ever led to victory, to abiding power and fruitfulness; and the great Christ 'fulfilled' the experience of all the lesser Christs who had gone before Him.

But the Creeds do not stop short at the Resurrection, but go on to speak of the Ascension, the Heavenly Session, and the Return in glory. We do not find the Apostolic Gospel exactly distinguishing between the Resurrection and the Ascension as stages in the glorification of the Lord Himself; such mysteries lie beyond our ken. But, had it not been revealed to the Apostles that no further appearances of the Risen Lord were to be expected, they could hardly have gone quietly about their work. The story of the Ascension speaks of just such a revelation. The 'cloud' assuredly was not the passing cloud of a summer day. To those acquainted with the Old Testament it was the familiar symbol of the divine presence, like the cloud which rested on the Mount of Transfiguration.

Only, while there the cloud passed away, and left the Lord with the Apostles, now He passed away with it. 'I go to the Father, and ye behold me no more.' But, though we know not when or how, one day He will be seen again. He sits at the right hand of the Father, sharing His sovereignty, still acting as His instrument for the fulfilment of His purpose; and it is He who will come to 'judge the quick and the dead.'

Now, in the sitting at God's right hand, and in the coming to judge the quick and the dead, we have examples of symbolic language. Symbol differs from metaphor. In metaphor we compare two things, each of which is known to us; and we can see how far the resemblance goes. But with symbol it is otherwise. When St. Stephen, 'being full of the Holy Ghost . . . saw the glory of God, and Jesus standing on the right hand of God'; or, when the seer of the Apocalypse 'saw the dead, the great and the small, standing before the throne; and books were opened,' realities were shadowed forth too great for human minds to understand, or for human words to express. We cannot say, this is to be taken literally, and that is not. Rather we should enquire what the symbolism would have meant to those to whom it first was given, and then surrender ourselves to the impression which the symbols make, and let them have their way with us. Specially is this so with those pictures of the last judgment to which the Creeds refer. Expectation of judgment to come is a necessary element in all true faith in God. The reward of righteousness and the punishment of sin, as we see them in this world, though profoundly real, are wholly inadequate to vindicate the divine righteousness; and no teacher has ever warned us as the Lord has done that this full vindication will come. There are many judgments in the world's history, and some have been far-reaching; but there must also be a last judgment, when the present order reaches its end. 'Judge nothing before the time, until the Lord come, who will bring to light the hidden things of darkness, and make manifest the counsels of the hearts; and then shall each man have his praise from God.' The Apostles were mistaken in thinking that the end was near; but there is nothing strange in that. When men believed that all earlier ages of the world's history came but to four thousand years, they naturally expected the final age,

the age of the Spirit, to be short ; we ourselves, who know how vast are the ages which lie behind us, naturally have a different expectation. But a world which is to possess a meaning must necessarily have an end ; since it is only in view of the end attained that we can fully understand what has gone before. Just as reasonable, if rightly understood, is the Christian belief in the Second Advent of Christ. If ' all things have been created through Him and unto Him ' ; if He is Himself the centre of history and the revelation of its goal ; the end, when it comes, must be a manifestation of Him, and nothing can be judged apart from Him. ' Behold, he cometh with the clouds ; and every eye shall see him, and they which pierced him.' Where can we find symbolism which will take us nearer to the heart of the reality ? Christianity is the religion of truth embodied in visible fact ; and, as the truth of the destined union of God with man found its embodiment at Bethlehem, and the truth of atonement through sacrifice its embodiment at Calvary, so the truth of judgment to come must in time find its outward embodiment, though we may as yet as little foresee what it will be as we foresaw the manger and the Cross. Then the Lord, having overthrown all the forces which challenge the rule of God, will deliver up the kingdom to the Father that God may be all in all. Even then, as the Nicene Creed says, ' His own ' kingdom will have no end ; for, as all that is His is the Father's, so all that is the Father's is His.

III

We pass now to the third section of the Creeds. The clauses here are less closely connected, and this is specially the case with the Apostles' Creed. Indeed, it is not until the eighth century that we find our Apostles' Creed in exactly its present form. But every clause is found in some form of the Creed centuries earlier, and their connexion is closer than at first appears. The third section deals with the Church's life, present and to come, and all rests upon the work of the Holy Spirit. Moreover, all which here appears, like all which appears in the earlier sections, is in close connexion with the Gospel which the Apostles preached. Baptism for the remission of sins and the gift of the Holy Spirit stand in the fore-

front of that Gospel : ' Repent ye, and be baptised every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ unto the remission of your sins ; and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost.' Now baptism brings with it membership in the Holy Catholic Church, and it is there that the Communion of Saints is found. Yet more. Though here and now it is the work of the Spirit to transform the soul rather than the body, that limitation is only for a time ; we look for the Life Everlasting for body and soul alike. The same connexion is found in the clauses of the Nicene Creed, though its scope is wider. It refers, as the Western Creed does not, to the work of the Spirit in creation and in Old Testament prophecy, and to His relation to the Father and the Son, and thus goes behind the Spirit in the Church to the Spirit as an eternal element in the life of God.

The doctrine of the Spirit, though prominent in the New Testament, was somewhat neglected in the early centuries of the Church's life ; and that doctrine of His Person which we find in the Nicene Creed is due to the later expansion of the Creed of Jerusalem. It was the doctrine of the Lord's Person to which attention was first directed, for it was this which error first endangered ; and, when the ' right faith ' was established there, the right faith in the case of the Spirit soon followed. That the Lord must be distinguished from the Father as possessing a personal life of His own no one could doubt who read the story of His earthly life. But with the Spirit it was otherwise. The Spirit of God has a great place in the Old Testament as ' the Giver of life ' in all the forms which life assumes, but He is never with any clearness there distinguished from the Father : the Spirit is just God in action, and indeed is often so regarded in the New Testament itself. When, for example, the Lord contrasts blasphemy against Himself with blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, He means by the latter blasphemy against the redeeming activity of God manifested in the works of mercy which the Father enabled the Lord to do. Moreover, in the early centuries, while the conception of ' the Word ' was in varying forms familiar to many of the Gentiles as well as to the Jews, and was useful in explaining the doctrine of the Lord's Person, there was no corresponding conception to help in explaining the doctrine of the Spirit. Thus there is truth in the suggestion

that Christians in the early centuries were often 'Binitarian' in their outlook rather than Trinitarian. The Holy Spirit, being out of sight, was too often out of mind. What the great teachers said about Him was true, as far as it went, but it did not go far enough; and the doctrine of the Spirit is somewhat neglected even to-day.

When, however, the full divinity of the Lord had been established, and the witness of Scripture to the Spirit recognised, it was seen that the arguments which proved the Lord to be of one substance with the Father proved the same of the Holy Spirit. Specially important here was the teaching of the Lord as found in the Fourth Gospel. There the personal character of the Spirit and the greatness of His work are clearly taught; and the relation of the Spirit to the Lord is seen to correspond to the relation of the Lord to the Father. In view of all this, the teachers of the Church found little difficulty in recognising with our Nicene Creed that the Holy Spirit is not only 'the Giver of life' in nature and in grace, but 'the Lord'; and that 'with the Father and the Son,' though not as One with an independent divinity, He is to be 'worshipped and glorified.' The Godhead is still one reality, but belongs jointly to the Three. The difficulty for the mind lies in holding at the same time to the unity of God and to personal distinctions within the Godhead; but, that difficulty having been overcome in the case of the Lord, no fresh difficulty arises in the case of the Spirit; and clearly the Spirit, like the Lord, does for us what only God can do. No one not of one substance with the Father could fill the Lord's place, or be to the Church and to the individual Christian what the Spirit has been found to be, and in the New Testament is described as being the Guide unto all the truth contained in the Person, the experience, and the work of the Lord; the Restorer of the spirit of sonship which gives confidence in our access to God; the Deliverer from the slavery of sin which renders impossible the keeping of His law; the Source of the Christian character in its unity and breadth, and of those gifts of the Spirit by which the natural gifts of men are consecrated and enhanced for the service of the Church. As all that has come to us by the Lord comes to us from the Father who sent Him, so all that comes to us from the Spirit comes from the Father

through the Son ; but the Holy Spirit is their willing instrument.

But a difficulty arises if we ask whether the Spirit ' proceeds from ' the Father only, or from the Father and the Son : Eastern Christendom has taken the former view, and Western Christendom the latter. The words ' and the Son ' in the Nicene Creed were not found in the original Creed, and were first introduced in the sixth century, without consultation with Eastern Christendom. The Christians of the East object first, that the Western doctrine has no scriptural authority ; secondly, that it suggests that there are two sources of the Godhead ; and thirdly, that the innovating action of the West was wholly unjustified. Their position is a very strong one.

But there is much to be said in excuse. When in the Western Creed we speak of the Holy Ghost, no reference is made to His work in nature or in prophecy : and we naturally think of Him as the Spirit of Pentecost and of His work in the Church to-day. Now it was the Lord, and not the Father only, who sent the Spirit to us ; and it is His teaching in St. John's Gospel which reappears when St. Peter says of Him ' Being therefore by the right hand of God exalted, and having received of the Father the promise of the Holy Ghost, he hath poured forth this which ye see and hear.' This ' temporal mission '—or mission in time—of the Spirit from the Father and the Son is fully recognised by the Eastern Church ; and the West does not seem to have noticed that, by inserting ' and the Son ' into the Eastern Creed which refers to the activity of the Spirit in nature and prophecy, the eternal being and activity of the Spirit is made to depend upon the Son as well as upon the Father, and not only His temporal mission. There is no Scriptural authority for this, and the Lord speaks of the Spirit as proceeding from the Father. It is true that no Western theologian has ever thought that there are two sources of the Godhead : the Godhead of the Lord is as dependent upon that of the Father as the Godhead of the Spirit Himself. It is also true that the eternal relation of the Son to the Father as the instrument of His activity is such that the Spirit should be regarded as proceeding from the Father through the Son ; and this the best Eastern theologians do not deny. But, if that is what in the West we mean, that is what we should say ;

and that, we may hope, is what we shall come to say. We English Christians have simply followed the Western custom, and are apt to be impatient with the Eastern objections as tiresome insistence upon a matter of no importance. But the West is in the wrong; and the sooner we put the matter right the better. Meanwhile, when we say the Nicene Creed with our Western interpolation, we should direct our thoughts to the temporal mission of the Holy Ghost, and not to His eternal being; otherwise we are asserting more than we know.

Now, as we have seen, the temporal mission of the Holy Ghost is closely connected with the remaining articles of the Creed: and the Nicene Creed in its English form draws distinctions in our attitude towards them. In the Apostles' Creed, the words 'I believe in' are carried forward from 'the Holy Ghost' to the subsequent articles; we 'believe in' them all. But it is otherwise in the Nicene Creed. There we 'believe in' the Holy Ghost, as in the Father and in the Lord. But we 'believe' one Catholic and Apostolic Church; we 'acknowledge' one Baptism for the remission of sins; and we 'look for' the Resurrection of the dead, and the Life of the world to come. These distinctions have their value, though the original Greek speaks of believing *in* one Catholic and Apostolic Church; it is perhaps better to keep 'believing in,' the faith which is expressed in trust and self-surrender, for God alone.

We turn now to the Church—one, holy, catholic, and apostolic. The Apostles' Creed mentions only the second and third characteristics; the Nicene mentions them all, for the omission of 'holy' in our English Prayer Book is due to an error about the original text. What is the Church, and on what grounds do we believe in it?

When in the Creed we speak of the Church, we mean the Christian Church. But the Church was not, strictly speaking, founded by the Lord; it was founded by God when He called Abraham to leave his home and become the foundation upon which the Church was built. In the Old Testament it is Israel which is the Church of God; and the Church of God has one continuous life from Abraham's day to our own. No New Testament writer takes any other view. The Christian Church has not taken the place of Israel. It is itself Israel, redeemed by the Christ for whose coming it had looked, endowed

with His Spirit, and thrown more fully open to the world. Those who were once members of Israel, but have rejected their Redeemer, have been cut off from Israel, and believing Gentiles have taken their place. Thus all the titles, the blessings, the promises, the responsibilities of Israel before the Lord came, now belong wholly to the Christian Church ; and our use of the Psalms and prophecies of the Old Testament, and of the Gospel canticles, presupposes this.

The doctrine of the Church is of the first importance. It is a part of the Gospel, not something to be contrasted with it. In the Old Testament, next to the doctrine of God, it is of all doctrines the most prominent ; and it has in no way lost its importance in the New. The doctrine of God has now become the doctrine of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit ; but next to it in the Creeds stands the doctrine of the Church. To suppose that Church questions are merely questions of ' organisation ' is to go altogether astray.

What then, from the first, is the Church ? It is a body chosen by God out of the world to be the instrument of His purpose ; a body by Him redeemed and consecrated, possessed of a special revelation of Him, of special privileges and promises and so of special responsibilities ; a body called to set forth the glory of God and to attract the world to Him, from the first, by the manifest blessing which rests upon its life, and, when the Christ has come, by its corporate witness and evangelistic activity. The Church, as its purpose demands, is always a visible body, and should stand out sharply against the background of the world : an ' invisible Church ' of true believers is a conception unknown to Scripture, though of course within the Church there is an invisible life. It is on this visible body that the divine calling rests ; we must be members of it, if we wish to share its divine salvation and calling ; and it is never justifiable to separate from it, however corrupt it may be at the moment. That corruption is often terrible ; the divine judgment has often had to fall with such severity that only a ' remnant ' was left ; it may have to be so again. But the divine purpose holds. On the ' remnant ' God always builds His Church again, and sends it once more to perform its mission.

It is in view of this abiding purpose of God that we ' believe

in ' the Church. It is to the Church, not to the individual as such, that the divine salvation and calling belong ; the individual shares in both by faithful membership in the body. In the New Testament no difference is to be discovered between membership in Christ and membership in the Church, though a world of difference between a living membership in both, and a membership formal, destitute of fruit, and doomed to pass away. Living membership, in the Church, though not membership, depends upon self-surrendering faith ; but not to the exclusion of baptism into it, or of that loyal adherence to it in which faith finds a part of its expression. Faith is essentially practical. There is no more difference between faith and doing what faith demands than there is between honesty and paying our debts. The belief, so common since the sixteenth century, that religion is a purely individual matter, that union with Christ is consummated by individual acceptance of His salvation, and that we may then link ourselves with any association of Christians which we may prefer, and again dissolve the link at our pleasure, is a belief totally opposed to the New Testament teaching.

There are four characteristics of the Church of which the Creeds speak. The old Roman Creed speaks only of Holy Church ; the old Creed of Jerusalem speaks of one Holy Catholic Church ; the word ' Apostolic ' was added in the enlarged Eastern Creed which we now call the Nicene.

The first in order, though not in importance, is unity. The old Roman Creed omits it ; and the Nicene Creed probably attaches the word ' one ' to the Church, as it attaches it to God, to the Lord, and to baptism, simply to mark the fact that there is one Church, and only one. We hear in the New Testament of ' the Churches ' as well as of ' the Church ' ; but the reference is to the bodies of Christians in different places, all members of the one Church, all under the same Apostolic authority, and all in communion one with another. The modern use of the plural to denote rival Christian communions is unknown in the New Testament.

Now the unity of the Church is primarily an inward unity ; but one which, so far as it is real, is sure to find outward expression. Even before the coming of the Lord, the unity of the Church was remarkable. Israel was one people, not

many. Its members had bonds of union in their common relation to the one true God, in their remembrance of His redeeming activity in the past, in their common hopes for the future, in their common faith and worship, and above all in the law by which their lives were guided. Israel remained one people in spite of the division between North and South Israel, and in spite of the later 'Dispersion' in the Gentile world. Great prophets were sent both to North and to South Israel, and both sections made contributions to the Old Testament Scriptures. In the Church, since the Lord came, even closer bonds exist, and St. Paul enumerates seven of them.

But among these 'one Spirit' and 'one Lord' are found; and in the Lord through the Spirit the unity of the Church to-day should be a far deeper unity than any known before. The unity for which the Lord prayed was a unity like the unity between the Father and Himself, and one in close connexion with that holiness of the Church for which He also prayed. If it existed as it ought, this inward unity would produce an outward and visible unity most effectual for the conversion of the world. But God leaves us our freedom; not even the prayer of the Lord overrides it; and here as elsewhere the purpose of God has been thwarted by human sin. Just as the old Israel became divided into Northern and Southern Israel, so the Church has been divided into Eastern and Western Christendom, not to speak of the 'Dispersion' of the sixteenth and later centuries. The Church has not lost the whole of its intended unity; deep bonds exist between its members still; but it is, in fact, divided both inwardly and outwardly, and its unity has to be recovered. A merely outward unity, produced by submission to a common visible authority, bears no resemblance to the unity for which the Lord prayed and is hardly worth what it costs. It is a conception of unity derived from the Roman Empire into which the Church merged itself in the fourth century; and is no more really Christian than the conception of authority with which it is associated, and which is also derived from the Empire of Rome.

The second characteristic of the Church is holiness, or consecration; and this—the only one mentioned in the earliest Creed—is the fundamental characteristic. The

primary meaning of holiness, as we see in the Old Testament, is separation for a divine purpose ; it acquires its moral content from the moral holiness of God for whom the separation is made. ' Be ye holy, for I am holy.' It is this upon which the prophets everywhere insist far more than upon unity. Outward unity does little for holiness ; while holiness, so far as it exists, brings the other characteristics of the Church in its train. But this, as we have seen, does not mean that separation from the Church is justified by the prevalence of sin within it : that error has been fruitful of disaster in many ages of the Church's life. God's purpose for the Church is an abiding purpose ; His gifts and calling are ' without repentance.' The Church and its means of grace and truth do not lose their holiness because the wickedness of men profanes them ; and the saints of God, both before and after the Lord's coming, though they separate themselves from the Church's corruption, do not separate themselves from the Church itself. They remain within it ; bear witness against its corruption ; and accept, if it must be so, the martyrdom that follows. Isaiah and Jeremiah are noble examples here, and they have had their followers in the Church of after days. Of course, the corrupt Church may ' cast out their names as evil,' and expel them from its fellowship ; but to the Church they will belong still. To believe in the holiness of the Church is to fix our minds upon the holiness of the divine purpose for it, and the holiness of everything that He has given to it that His purpose may be realised ; to use to the uttermost all that is divine in it ; to make no terms with evil in ourselves or in others of its members ; and then to wait upon God for its purification, if not by the appeal of His love, by the fire of His judgment.

The remaining notes of the Church have never attained one exact and recognised meaning. The original force of the word ' catholic ' was apparently ' universal.' The universal Church may be contrasted either with the local churches comprised in it, or with heretical or schismatical bodies separated from it ; and it is the second meaning which in the West has prevailed. But other thoughts enter in. We may think, with St. Cyril of Jerusalem, not only of the wide extension of the Church, but of the different nations and classes which it con-

tains ; of the fullness of the teaching that it gives, and of the gifts with which it is endowed ; or again of the completeness of the remedies it possesses for the treatment of every kind of sin. But in the Christian East, catholicity seems to be little, if at all, connected with the thought of wide extension. It stands rather for the ' Togetherness,' the corporate character, of the Church and of all its activity. It speaks of the way in which all its members, saints and sinners, those on earth and those who have passed away, are bound in the bundle of a common life ; in which the distinction between clergy and laity has none of the hardness which it often presents in the West, and the guarding of the faith belongs to the whole body of the faithful rather than to a class within it. The Christian East has much to teach us here.

Almost equally comprehensive in meaning is the word ' apostolic.' The Church is apostolic by its divine mission to the world—apostolic in the wholeness of its corporate life. But the primary thought seems to be of its connexion with the Apostles upon whom it is built, and whose preaching and teaching it perpetuates. ' Neither for these only do I pray, but for them also that believe in me through their word.' Moreover, there is also the thought of the Apostolic succession of the Ministry, and of the commission of the Lord to the Apostles which lives on in those who have in due order succeeded to their work. The doctrine of the Ministry is thus made a part of the doctrine of the Church, as it always ought to be.

In close connexion with the doctrine of the Church is that of the Communion of Saints. There is again an ambiguity, due to the fact that both in Latin and in Greek the word for ' saints ' may be either masculine, or neuter. We may interpret the phrase either of the communion of the holy people of God one with another, or of their common sharing in holy things, especially in the Sacraments ; and it has been interpreted in both these ways. But the former is the better view ; and, if it be accepted, the doctrine lies close to that of the catholicity of the Church, as Eastern Christendom understands it. It is only in the Western Creed that the Communion of Saints is found, and even there it is a later addition. But it is a doctrine of far horizons, and in the West the necessary complement to

that of the Church. In Scripture the Church, the body of Christ, seems always to refer only to the visible company of God's people : like His human body in His earthly ministry, it is the visible means of His manifestation and activity, as the faithful departed are not. But in the language of the Church this limitation has not been observed, and the faithful departed, who 'sleep in Jesus,' have been thought of as members, not only of the heavenly Jerusalem, but as still members of the Church. The Communion of Saints refers to the communion one with another of the faithful of all times and places. In Christ all are still one in the unity of His divine life, in their common devotion to the fulfilment of the divine purpose, and in forwarding it by prayer, and whatsoever other means of activity God may bestow upon them. The living and the departed do not forget one another. The people of God even before the Lord came had learned to pray for their departed, and to think of Jeremiah as their great intercessor in the world unseen. As far as we know, there was never a time when Christians did not pray for the faithful departed ; in Eastern Christendom we even find prayer for Mary herself. Moreover, requests for prayer addressed to the faithful departed are found very early in the catacombs, and probably were offered from the first. These early invocations had, however, a local and domestic character : they were made to martyrs at their tombs and to departed relations. In later days, when a distinction was recognised between saints and ordinary Christians, prayers to the saints, by no means confined to requests for their prayers, came to fill a large place in Christian thought and practice. This was, however, due to the way in which devotion to particular saints took the place of devotion to the heathen gods and goddesses : the saints were now supposed to have the same powers of hearing prayer everywhere as had belonged to their predecessors. We cannot, however, say that in the Apostles' Creed the Communion of Saints refers to the later practice, or that in saying the Creed we commit ourselves to it.

Of 'the Forgiveness of sins,' or of 'one Baptism for the remission of sins' little need here be said. The doctrine is the same in both Creeds ; and this article in one form or another is found in every developed Creed-form from the first.

The Creeds are closely connected with baptism ; and it would be difficult to exaggerate the importance attached to baptism both in the New Testament and in the mind of the early Church. In view of St. Paul's teaching it is probable that the reference to the burial of the Lord in both our Creeds is connected with baptism. It is by baptism that the believer is incorporated into Christ and His body the Church, dies to sin, and rises to new life. Remission of sins is far more than the passing over of past sins, or the remission of their penalty. In its full Christian sense, it is the restoration to sonship to God in Christ, to the life of fellowship with Him and His people, and to that personal indwelling of the Holy Spirit upon which all Christian life and service depend.

Moreover, by the gift of the Spirit, it leads forward to the Resurrection of the body, and the Life Everlasting. We 'look for the Resurrection of the dead, and the Life of the world to come.' Here again there is no difference in meaning between the two Creeds, nor is there any, if with their earliest forms, we speak of the Resurrection of the flesh. We should like to think that this primitive form is connected with the Hebrew outlook according to which flesh stands for human nature as a whole. But the evidence does not support this view. The emphasis falls, not upon the restoration of men as living wholes, but upon the restoration of that of which death robbed them. The resurrection of the body was from the first interpreted in more ways than one. The simple millions interpreted it in a material way ; they thought that the power of God would gather together 'the noble dust of Alexander' even though it was 'found stopping a bung-hole.' But St. Paul did not think that 'flesh and blood' could thus inherit the kingdom of God ; the 'spiritual,' or supernatural, body of the future could not be just a reproduction of 'the body of our humiliation.' In the case of those alive to greet the Lord on His return He would 'fashion it anew' to conform it to His own risen body ; and that, St. Paul thought, would be the ordinary experience. But, if Christians died before the Lord's return—and it was a shock at first to find that they died—they would have bodies glorified none the less, and these bodies would be none the less their own. When the farmer sows his seed, of whatever kind it may be, it does not itself rise again, but it

determines the harvest. The body of the future will not be materially identical with the body of our low estate here ; we look for it from God, not from 'God's acre ; we shall be ' sons of God,' being sons of the Resurrection. But it will be the complement of the soul, no longer ' unclothed,' as the earthly body has been ; the man will again be a living whole. It may be that the soul will be the instrument of reconstruction :

' Of the soul the body form doth take,
For soul is form, and doth the body make.'

Even here the soul stamps its own character upon the body. Pride, ill-temper, moral weakness, on the one hand, gentleness, kindness, resolution, on the other, become clearly legible there. In the body of the resurrection the correspondence, we may believe, will be complete, and mutual recognition far easier than here. So far from death and dissolution being a hindrance, in our case they are necessary. The body of the Lord, the body marked by the wounds, ' saw no corruption,' for it needed none. It had never known sin ; it was the record, as it had been the instrument, of the Lord's lifelong devotion to the Father's will and of His final sacrifice. With our own bodies it is otherwise. Death and corruption are their due, for they record our indevotion and refusal of sacrifice. If by the grace of God we are not now the men that once we were, the old bodies would be libellous, and new bodies are imperatively required.

But the great point is this. The Christian hope corresponds to our true desire—not the immortality of a shadowy something which we call the soul, but our own immortality, and that of the men and women whom we know and love. However sad present experience may be, no one desires to be any one but himself ; and those whom we love we love as living wholes. Their souls shine out upon us through their bodies, and their bodies manifest the sweetness of their souls ; and, when the scorpion death comes with its sting, it is to their bodies that we chiefly cling. We have but to think of Rizpah with her sackcloth on the rock, or of Mary Magdalene with her bitter cry ' They have taken away my Lord, and I know not where they have laid him.' What we desire is

' the touch of a vanished hand
And the sound of the voice that is still.'

If it is urged that this is to cling to the old material world instead of rising in our thoughts to the spiritual world, the answer is that the spiritual means the supernatural, and is not to be contrasted with the material in any way. Just as we look for new bodies, we look for a new environment, a new heaven and a new earth, as part of the divine purpose, and see no need in our thought to volatilise any one of them. If God intends us to think of these things, He must intend us to think of them on the lines of our present experience, for He has so made us that we cannot otherwise think of them at all.

So with the Life Everlasting. The joy which it will bring we can only know in so far as our present experience of eternal life enables us to do so. 'Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath entered into the heart of man the things which God hath prepared for them that love him.' But, when we quote those words, we should continue the quotation: 'But God hath revealed them unto us by his Spirit.' We do in some measure know them, for we have the earnest of them in the gift of the Spirit; but not as we shall know when the Spirit has transformed us in body and in soul, and all that hinders our entrance into the joy of the Lord has passed away. We can go almost all the way with the splendid realism of Bernard of Morlaix; we can even believe that there are elements in the heavenly life best described as

'The shout of them that triumph,
The song of them that feast.'

But Bernard does not carry us beyond the seventh chapter of the Apocalypse; and the music of our Version, as it speaks of the great multitude standing before the throne and before the Lamb, clothed with white robes, and palms in their hands, and ascribing to God and to the Lamb the salvation which they enjoy. Eternal life lies in the knowledge of the Father and of His Son, Jesus Christ, and it is in the Cross and the victory to which it leads, that the knowledge is found. The Cross and the beatitudes which prepare us for the Cross may well have been in the mind of the seer throughout. 'They rest from their labours, and their works do follow them.' 'They are before the throne of God; and they serve him day and night in his temple.' 'They shall hunger no more, neither thirst any more; neither shall the sun strike upon them, nor any heat. For the

Lamb which is in the midst of the throne shall feed them, and shall lead them unto living fountains of waters : and God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes.' The words speak of ' our perfect consummation and bliss, both in body and soul ' in God's ' eternal and everlasting glory ' ; there is no true and right desire for beauty and truth and goodness that will be left unsatisfied. But the rest is not the lotos-eaters' rest, but rest after toil endured and work accomplished ; the worship is the sacrificial worship of the temple ; the satisfaction is for those who have known hunger and thirst, and the burden and heat of the long day of service ; and tears can only be wiped away from eyes that have been filled with them. The Lamb is the Way ; He leads along the road which He has traversed to the place which He has reached : that is where the fountains are.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- ISAAC BARROW : *Sermons on the Apostles' Creed* (in his *Theological Works*). (Cambridge Univ. Press.) This seventeenth-century work is still of great value.
- B. F. WESTCOTT : *The Historic Faith*. (Macmillan.)
- C. GORE : *Belief in God*. (John Murray.)
- *Belief in Christ*. (John Murray.)
- *The Holy Spirit and the Church*. (John Murray.)
- W. TEMPLE : *The Faith and Modern Thought*. (Macmillan.)
- O. C. QUICK : *Doctrines of the Creed*. (Nisbet.)
- A. E. BURN : *An Introduction to the Creeds and Te Deum*. (Methuen, 1890.)
- T. ZAHN : *The Articles of the Apostles' Creed* (Eng. trans.). (Hodder & Stoughton, 1890.)

VIII
THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE

by
NATHANIEL MICKLEM, D.D.
Principal of Mansfield College, Oxford

‘ The dogmatic theologian presupposes the faith. His task is to elaborate into a system of thought the implications of the Christian revelation.’

Page 292.

VIII

THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE

THERE are many admirable text-books on the history of dogma. It is not my purpose here to summarise these summaries nor further to desiccate the theologians. Making no attempt to fill in as many details and names as space and ingenuity might permit, I offer a rough contour-map of a vast country. Maps have their uses, but, as the study of maps is no substitute for travel, so this outline, were it perfect of its kind, would be no substitute for the reading of the great theologians, some of whose more important works, as they are available in English, are set forth in the bibliography.

As the text-books are misleading except as introductions to the great theologians, so the theologians themselves are not to be understood in isolation. Every living theology springs out of, and reflects, the worship of the Church. The theology of St. Athanasius, for instance, is not to be understood apart from the liturgy of Bishop Sarapion, his friend, and this in its turn is hardly intelligible apart from some experimental knowledge of the worship of the Eastern Church to-day. So also the theology of St. Thomas Aquinas may seem mere arid logic-chopping unless it be read in the light of the hymns which he wrote and the service he composed for Corpus Christi. Anglican theology finds its origin and explanation in the Book of Common Prayer. When the theology of the Church is isolated from the Church's worship, it must always be misunderstood.

But neither the worship nor the theology of the Church is intelligible apart from some degree of that which is vaguely termed 'Christian experience.' The Christian faith rests upon the conviction that a momentous event has occurred, for 'God hath visited and hath redeemed His people.' The man whose heart and mind do not in some degree answer to this conviction

has not the key to understand theology. Dogmatic theology is, indeed, no mere branch of psychology, as if the theologian were concerned only to explicate the religious states of himself and other people; on the other hand, it cannot be written or even understood apart from the experience of redemption. In other words, dogmatic theology springs out of the Church's life and has no meaning outside the Church.

Herein it is distinguished from the philosophy of religion and apologetics. The philosopher and apologist may seek to show the reasonableness or even the necessity of the Christian faith. The dogmatic theologian presupposes the faith and seeks to explicate its implications.

By the preaching of the Gospel, by the administration of the Sacraments, by the organised life of its fellowship the Church is linked in unbroken succession with the little company to whom the Risen Lord appeared. Its theology is first its own self-explanation of itself to itself; it is only secondarily an explanation of all other things in the light of its own experience.

I.

The task of the dogmatic theologian is to elaborate into a system of thought the implications of the Christian revelation. In this connexion it is immaterial whether we speak of revelation or of Gospel or of creed. What is that Word of God to which Scripture bears witness: what is the Good News which Christians proclaim: what is the faith which the Church professes? These questions for our present purpose are identical in meaning.

No human language can be adequate to express the divine self-revelation; no definition can be complete and final. But happily there is no serious dispute as to the substance of the Christian message. The Council of Trent laid it down in its third session that the so-called Nicene Creed is the faith's 'one sure foundation against which the gates of hell shall not prevail.' The official representatives of all other churches, met in Conference at Lausanne in August of 1927, agreed in the declaration:

'we are united in a common Christian Faith which is proclaimed in the Holy Scriptures and is witnessed to and safeguarded in the

Ecumenical Creed, commonly called the Nicene, and in the Apostles' Creed, which Faith is continuously confirmed in the spiritual experience of the Church of Christ.'

The Church's faith rests upon the testimony of the Prophets and Apostles. Professor C. H. Dodd has shown how closely the Apostles' Creed summarises and reflects the original apostolic message as this is recorded in the Scriptures. But in itself the Church's faith is never a mere assent to certain propositions. It is the adoring confession of a saving Name. It may take the form of a series of statements, but it is essentially the confession of faith in a Person. It is not possible to distinguish between our Lord and His message. He not merely proclaimed the Kingdom, He brought it; nor had His proclamation any validity apart from His bringing of it. He proclaimed reconciliation between God and man because He reconciled them, nor had His proclamation any validity apart from its fulfilment through Himself. He and His message are one.

Therefore the Christian faith could be summed up in His Name. 'I determined to know nothing among you,' wrote St. Paul to the Corinthians, 'except Jesus Christ—and Him crucified'; and the most primitive form of Christian baptism seems to have been 'in the Name of Jesus Christ' (Acts ii. 38). But when the question was raised, what is signified by this Name, an answer could not be given without reference, first to the preparation for the Lord's coming recorded in the Old Testament, second to His birth and life and teaching and death and Resurrection; nor could the Resurrection be fully recorded without reference to the coming of the Holy Ghost which followed from it; nor could the coming of the Holy Ghost be separated from the arising of the Christian Church, which is both the work of the Spirit and the witness to the Spirit.

The Apostles' Creed and the 'Nicene' Creed are themselves the product of theological reflection, not its source; but, though their phraseology may not be regarded as fully adequate or infallible, they may be taken for practical purposes as not misleading summaries of the apostolic Gospel which is the starting-point of theological reflection.

II. THE EARLY PERIOD AND EASTERN CHRISTIANITY

The Christian Church arose within the womb of Judaism. The terms of its theology, therefore, such as 'Messiah,' 'Kingdom of Heaven,' and '*Parousia*' or 'Arrival,' were Jewish and not clearly intelligible to the Gentile world. As the first period of Church history covers the spread of the Church over the Graeco-Roman world, so the first period of theology marks the translation of the Christian message from its earliest Aramaic vocabulary into the thought-forms and language of the wider culture.

The process of translation began as early as the Gentile Mission. The Greek element in St. Paul himself was superficial in comparison with the fundamental Judaism of his mind and heart. But the exigencies of his apostolate led him to a relative neglect of purely Jewish terms and, it would seem, to the deliberate use of expressions (such as 'kyrios' in the sense of 'divine Lord' or 'gnosis' meaning 'theosophy' or 'teleios' in the sense of 'initiate'), which would be familiar, though in a very different context, to his Greek-speaking hearers. In the Fourth Gospel the predominance of such terms as 'the Word,' 'Light,' 'Eternal Life,' which are not characteristic of the Synoptic Gospels, gives further proof of a gradual and deliberate attempt to acclimatise the Gospel on foreign soil.

But theology developed quite as much under stress of controversy within the Church as from the stimulus of its evangelistic task. It was notorious that in the earliest years there had been a sharp conflict between St. Peter and St. Paul at Antioch: how far, if at all, was the Law of Moses binding upon Christians? This issue provoked the first Church crisis. The so-called 'Council of Jerusalem' (Acts xv. 4 ff.) records a temporary understanding, but the question was settled rather by the march of events than by argument or theory. Judaism as a whole repudiated the new faith; the Jewish Christians, rapidly outnumbered by the Gentile churches, were soon a dying sect, unless, indeed, we may say that they were destined centuries later to reappear in the strange form of Islam outside the Christian fold.

Several urgent issues presented themselves to the Church

in the first two centuries. There was an apparent discrepancy between the righteous and awful God of the Old Testament and the merciful, all-provident Father of the New. Does the Bible, then, proclaim one God or two Gods? The 'end of the world,' so eagerly and immediately expected by the first disciples, had not come. How far did the postponement of the end alter in substance or in balance the Christian message? St. Paul had taught the Church to rely upon the guidance and inspiration of the Spirit. But when many and diverse spirits made themselves manifest in the Church, by what norms was the divine to be distinguished from the human? St. Paul, again, had taught that the Christian man is free and subject to no law. Was Christianity, then, a form of 'lawlessness'? Were not the sayings of the Master binding? Owing to contingencies of history the first presentation of the Gospel had been in a Jewish form and in Jewish terms. When the Gospel was declared to the Gentiles, might not all that was specifically Jewish be omitted or transformed?

It is not surprising that the efforts of the first theologians, such men as Valentinus and Basilides, brought up in Greek ways of thought and concerned first to set forth Christianity in a dress accommodated to the Greek mentality, were unsuccessful. These were the 'Gnostic' heretics. The soil of Palestine and the Jesus of history disappear, to be replaced by the idea that the material is intrinsically evil and by the concept of a subsidiary Redeemer-god between man and the Most High. The Church decisively and rightly repudiated such ideas; yet, wrote F. C. Burkitt,

'as I understand it, what is commonly known as "Gnosticism" was a gallant effort to reformulate Christianity in terms of the current astronomy and philosophy of the day, with the Last Judgment and the Messianic Kingdom on earth left out.'

The history of doctrine is much misunderstood if 'heretics' are regarded merely as perverse and unbelieving men. In many cases they were learned, serious, devout theologians who erred not through unbelief but through human infirmity. Progress owes much to them.

What we call the 'divinity' of Christ was not at first in question; it was for His true humanity that the earliest

Fathers must contend against all speculations which would make His earthly life a mere appearance and no reality.

'Shut your ears, therefore,' said St. Ignatius (martyred between A.D. 98 and 117), 'whenever any one speaks to you apart from Jesus Christ, who was of David's race, who was of Mary, who was truly born; yes, He ate and drank; He was truly persecuted in the time of Pontius Pilate; He was truly crucified; He really died, yes, in the sight of those above and those on earth and those below. He also was truly raised from the dead, His Father raising Him' (Trall. ix. Cf. Smyrn. i., Eph. vii.).

It was the pressure of dangerous speculations, of undisciplined phantasies, of sectarian perversions, and of grave moral perils that led, if not to the actual composition of many of the books of our New Testament, yet at least to the gradual selection of these books as canonical and possessing an unique authority. These same influences led likewise to the tightening of the Church's discipline, more particularly through the development of the monarchic episcopate, and of its authority as guardian of the apostolic tradition, and to the closer definition of the Church's creed.

All so-called 'Docetist' tendencies, which made the humanity of our Lord an unreality, were repudiated because His coming 'in flesh and blood' was felt to be integral to the Christian Gospel. On the other side, the Church contended with an equal vigour against those 'Adoptionist' views which represented our Lord as a deified man, not God made flesh; for here, again, it was felt to be vital to the Gospel that in Jesus Christ we apprehend very God come down for our salvation.

The earliest accepted doctrine of the Person of our Lord was that which represented Him as the Logos or Word of God. In some parts of the Old Testament and in certain extra-canonical writings the Word or Wisdom of God (the two terms are interchangeable), whereby the world had been made, and whereby it was sustained and ordered, and whereby the saints had been made 'sons of God and prophets,' was regarded as having a quasi-personal and quasi-independent existence. The author of the Fourth Gospel had written that 'the Word became flesh.' Our Lord, therefore, was the Wisdom or Word of God incarnate.

A man's word is, as it were, the objectification of his thought;

moreover, when it is uttered, it passes out beyond him, yet still remains within him and an essential part of him as his own thought. Here, it seemed, was an analogy whereby the relation of Jesus Christ to God and man might find illumination. To Origen of Alexandria (A.D. 185?-254) we owe the first systematic attempt to expound a philosophical doctrine of the Holy Trinity. The Son, as the Word of God, is eternally generated by the Father, and the Holy Ghost originates from the Father through the Son. God is One in Three, yet the Father is superior to the Son as the Son is superior to the Spirit, who dwells only within the saints. Origen, himself the son of a martyr, died as the result of tortures undergone in the Decian persecution. In later years some of his daring, pioneer speculations were seen to be inconsistent with the creed for which he suffered (*magni passus sed extra viam*), and he fell under the reproach of heresy.

The persecutions of the Church from Decius to Diocletian (A.D. 250-313) raised in an acute form the question of the true principle of unity within the Christian body. The roll of martyrs had been long, but hundreds of Christians had denied Christ with their lips or by their actions, if not in their hearts. When later many of these sought readmission to the Sacraments, the Church was bitterly divided as to the right policy. Some were for more rigorous, others for more lenient measures. The schism that followed was due, not to diversities of theological expression, but to differing conceptions of true churchmanship. The Council of Arles (A.D. 314) recognised the distinction between heresy and schism, but its findings, being disregarded later by St. Augustine, had little influence upon Church policy in coming centuries. Moreover, no clear solution was found to the question, what constitutes the unity of the Church. When there is a severance between Christians upon a matter not of theology but of churchmanship, does one party leave the Catholic Church, or does the Catholic Church continue henceforth in a state of schism? Is the unity of the Church constituted by communion with the Church of Rome or by the 'Apostolical Succession' or by the profession of the Catholic faith and the administration of the Christian Sacraments? The controversy which first raised this issue did little towards its settlement.

If Origen first treated systematically the doctrine of Christ's Person, St. Irenaeus (A.D. 230?-300?) first expounded in careful form a doctrine of His Work. This was the famous 'Recapitulation' theory. It rested upon the view that persons are not mere individuals but are linked together by the possession of one common nature in such a way that whatever affects human nature in one case affects it also in every other. All humanity 'in Adam' is alienated from God in sin and impotence and futility; but when the divine Son of God took to Himself our human nature, he thereby raised it to heaven, 'divinised' it, and undid the work of the Fall by destroying the power of sin and restoring immortal life to man. This view may be expressed religiously in the form that man's salvation rests upon the fact that the Son of God has called us brethren. It can, however, be misrepresented as if all mankind were saved by the bare fact of the Incarnation. That this latter view is far from the mind of St. Irenaeus appears both from his insistence upon the victory of Christ Crucified over all the powers or forces of darkness and from the intimate connexion of his doctrine with the administration of the Christian Sacraments whereby the salvation made possible through the work of Christ is brought home to the individual believer.

No sooner was the age of persecution over (A.D. 313) than a chapter of acute Christological controversy opened—'on each hand slaughter and gigantic deeds.' First came the Arian struggle, in which Arius and St. Athanasius were the two protagonists. Arius was no Unitarian in the modern sense. Christ, he taught, was the divine Son of God but not one with God Himself; rather, He was a created, divine being, not God but godlike, and the instrument of man's salvation under God. This view, essentially mythological, opened the door to polytheism; it avoided the immeasurable intellectual difficulties in the supposition that the Man of Nazareth was in some way very God Himself, but at the expense not only of the true divinity of Christ but also of His true humanity, since Arius maintained that in Christ the place of the soul was taken by the Logos. Thus Arius' doctrine endangered monotheism, made unreal the historical figure of the evangelists and cut the nerve of the Christian Gospel. The Church repudiating Arianism declared that Jesus Christ is at once true man and true God,

the Son of Mary and the Son of God ; He is neither a god-like man nor a man-like demi-god, but ' of one substance with the Father.' Our so-called ' Nicene ' Creed is the enduring monument of this great struggle.

But, if Christ be very God and very Man, how is the unity of His Personality to be conceived ? The tendency of the school of Alexandria was so to stress His divinity and His unity as to jeopardise His full humanity. The theologians of Antioch, on the other side, so emphasised His humanity and the double nature of His Being as either to minimise His divinity or to ' divide His Person.' In the long years of controversy that followed, many were condemned as heretics for their views whose hearts, so far as we can judge, were not heretical.

In particular, three answers to the problem had to be set aside. The followers of Apollinarius of Laodicea (A.D. 310?-390?), modifying and developing his doctrine, taught that, although our Lord assumed a human body and human soul, the place of a human mind was taken in His case by the Word of God. This meant, said the Church, that He was not verily and truly Man. The next great controversy, in which Nestorius (*ob. circ.* A.D. 451) and St. Cyril (*ob.* A.D. 444) were the protagonists, suggests the old saying that it is possible to hold the Catholic faith in an heretical spirit and an heretical faith in the Catholic spirit. The dispute raged round the question whether or not the Virgin Mary might properly be called Theotokos, Mother of God. Nestorius disliked this term because it was un-Scriptural, because it went well with the theology of those who in effect denied the full humanity of Christ, and because he would avoid the danger of making the Virgin Mary into a goddess. The Church retained the name, already endeared through liturgical use, on the ground that to refuse it to the Virgin Mary was, in effect, to deny the full divinity of Christ. It is, however, an open question whether Nestorius' views were technically heretical by later Chalcedonian standards. Next, Eutyches of Constantinople (A.D. 378-454?) declared that, though Christ was in origin both God and Man, yet after the Incarnation He possessed but one single divine-human nature. He was answered in the famous *Tome* of St. Leo (Pope from A.D. 440-461), and the Church declared its mind in the Definition of Chalcedon (A.D. 451), which laid it down that our Lord

is to be 'acknowledged in two Natures unconfusedly, unchangeably, indivisibly, inseparably.'

This famous Definition, which was accepted both in the east and the west, lays down authoritatively and once for all that our Lord is very God and very Man. It prescinds all views that would qualify either His full divinity or His full humanity. It states with admirable clarity the data for the theological problem, but offers no solution of it. While in word and intention it asserts the unity of the Personality of Christ, its strict separation between His human nature and His divine seemed to many in effect to represent Him as not one but two. The 'Monophysite' heresy, which in various forms maintained that the incarnate Lord being one undivided Personality must therefore possess one single 'nature,' still continued and lingers yet in some of the ancient churches of the East. Not till St. John of Damascus with his doctrine of the 'enhypostatic union,' derived from Leontius of Byzantium (A.D. 485-543), did the Chalcedonian theology find adequate expression.

St. John (A.D. 675?-54?) was the last of the great Fathers venerated in East and West. For conscience' sake he abandoned his high position under the Khalif; he was writing his great summary of Christian doctrine about the time when Charles Martel defeated the Saracens at Tours, and France and Western Europe were freed from the terror of a Moslem invasion; he died, it seems, as a martyr to the cause of Christian symbolism.

He expounded the doctrine of the Holy Trinity in systematic terms. The Deity must be conceived as existing in three subsistent determinations (*hypostaseis* or 'Persons'), the Father, the Word and the Spirit, yet one God. As in a man we may logically distinguish the thinker from his thought and both from his emotion in relation to his thought, yet personality is one and indivisible, so Father, Word and Spirit constitute one only God; but in God we must conceive that the three 'Persons' are really, and not merely logically, distinct.

Jesus Christ is the Incarnation of the Word of God. This means that He has the 'nature' of God and the 'nature' of man, yet He is one undivided Personality. By the assumption of human nature St. John understands that our Lord had a

human body, a human mind, a human psycho-physical organism. But, whereas with us the ultimate and mysterious centre of our personality is a fallen, human individuality, the ultimate and mysterious centre of His personality is the Word of God. Whereas our particularity or that subsistent determination (*hypostasis*) which makes us different from each other is that whereby we are called Peter or Paul or James, His particularity or subsistent determination is the Word of God.

In St. John the doctrines of the Trinity and of the Person of Christ receive logical exposition in terms of 'nature' and 'particular determination.' Along this line it does not appear that human thought can proceed much further. But this theology can only be judged final, if finality be ascribed to the categories in which it is set forth.

The rest of St. John's theological system is for the most part less closely knit. His doctrine of the Cross, which he expresses in lyrical and often mythological terms, is not intimately related to his doctrine of the Incarnation. His passionate affirmation of free will is not fully harmonised with his sense of man's bondage to the powers of darkness nor related to the Providence of God. A foundation has been sublimely laid, but much of the superstructure has still to be erected.

III. ST. AUGUSTINE AND THE WESTERN CHURCH

We must go back. St. Augustine (A.D. 354-430) is the father of Western Christian thought. At the time when the Roman Empire was breaking up under the hammer-blows of the barbarians, and Europe was about to enter 'the Dark Ages,' he wrote his philosophy of history concerning the two cities, 'the one of which, the Babylon of the earth, has made her false gods of mortal men . . . but the other, the heavenly Jerusalem, has kept to the only and true God, and is His true and pure sacrifice herself.' Not till the end of the world shall these two cities be disentangled from their 'confused progress.' St. Augustine, the saint and philosopher, ascribed a place in the City of God even to such heathen as the Sibyl, but St. Augustine, the ecclesiastic, in the bitterness of controversy became the patron of all the later persecutions which have besmirched the Church's name.

St. John of Damascus, herein truly representing the East, laid great stress on free will ; St. Augustine also wrote a book *de libero arbitrio*, but his deep sense of guilt and of the corruption of human nature made him later not merely the theologian, *par excellence*, of grace, but also the fountain-head of the doctrine of determinism. In his famous controversy with Pelagius he stood nearer than his predecessors to the evangelical theology of St. Paul.

C. Bigg claimed St. Clement of Alexandria as the true father of Christian Neoplatonism, but it was St. Augustine who expounded the whole Christian faith in the terms of the Neoplatonic philosophy and therein profoundly influenced all later European thought. In distinction from those who, underlining the defects of the human reason, have taught that the great doctrines of the Christian religion are available to faith alone, St. Augustine held that Christian doctrine, given the fact of the Incarnation, is simply the highest Reason. In 'certain books of the Platonists translated from Greek into Latin,' he says, he found 'not indeed these precise words, but precisely the same truth fortified with many and diverse arguments,' that 'in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God,' indeed, all the prologue to the Fourth Gospel except only that the Word was made flesh and dwelt amongst us, 'that I found not there.'

For half a millennium after St. Augustine the Church was concerned with the reconstruction of society and the conservation of its intellectual and spiritual inheritance. Theological advance on a large scale was not to be expected. In the eleventh century St. Anselm of Canterbury (A.D. 1033-1109) wrote two treatises which have profoundly influenced later theology in the West, the *Proslogion* or *Address to God Concerning His Existence*, and the *Cur Deus Homo*. In the former he argued that God is that than which no greater can be conceived, that God, therefore, must exist, since, did He not exist, a greater, namely an existent God, could be conceived. The argument, as set forth by St. Anselm, has not won general acceptance, but it has been argued that in spite of formal rejection it was later restated in another dress both by St. Thomas Aquinas and by Kant ; and his fundamental contention, that what man is compelled to think cannot be a false

guide to what really is, remains an ever fruitful idea in human speculation. His second treatise, which argued that God became Man because only so could man's infinite debt to the offended majesty of God be paid, dominated Western thought for some eight hundred years. If to-day it is much criticised, this is not because of any lack of spiritual depth, but because the categories of 'debt' and 'offended majesty' and of the mediaeval penitential system have been felt inadequate to set forth the mystery of Christ's redemptive work.

St. Anselm's younger contemporary, Peter Abailard (A.D. 1079-1142), in his commentary on St. Paul's epistle to the Romans, interpreted the work of the incarnate and crucified Lord rather in terms of its effect upon the hearts of men; he may thus be considered the father of all later theologies of 'experience' as distinct from theologies of abstract reasoning or ecclesiastical authority. On the purely intellectual side Abailard's *Sic et Non*, which put in juxtaposition the differing opinions of authorities, introduced a critical method into the treatment of the Christian tradition which became the foundation of the later great scholastic systems. Abailard was condemned for a heretic, but many of his ideas as well as his method were adopted and became a standard of orthodoxy in the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard (ob. A.D. 1160), the first great systematic theologian of the Middle Age.

It is popularly supposed by Protestants that the Middle Age was a period of intellectual stagnation and mere ecclesiastical authority. On the contrary, in that age Christian thought was free, profound and comprehensive; the great problems of the faith were explored and set forth in such detail and with such system, that by comparison most later theologising seems jejune and occasional and merely critical. The amazing intellectual fertility in the thirteenth century gathers round the rediscovery of Aristotle. First, there was the philosophy of the Greek sage himself, subtle, all-inclusive, massive, pagan. Second, there was the new theology which the Moslem scholars had erected upon the basis of Aristotle; this was Deistic, fatalistic, and inconsistent with a Christian valuation of personality. Third, there was the immense scientific interest and curiosity associated inevitably with the name of St. Thomas' teacher, St. Albertus Magnus (A.D. 1193?-1280), 'the universal

doctor.' Since the fourth century there had been no such fecundity of Christian thought.

The Franciscan, St. Bonaventura (A.D. 1221-1274), 'the seraphic doctor,' the pupil of Alexander of Hales, was at once mystic and systematic theologian. In sharp contrast with the newly discovered philosophy of Aristotle he expounded and systematised the Neoplatonic tradition of St. Augustine, suffusing all with the glow of his devotion. His contemporary and friend, St. Thomas Aquinas (A.D. 1224?-1274), 'the angelic doctor,' travelled by another path, boldly claiming the philosophy of Aristotle for Christ and building up a majestic system of Christian theology in these new forms. This system of St. Thomas is one of the supreme intellectual achievements of the Christian Church. It is composed of four main strands, first the Bible, as interpreted by the Church, which gives it its matter, second the philosophy of Aristotle which gives it its form, third the Neoplatonic mysticism of Pseudo-Dionysius (? fifth century) and John Scotus Erigena (A.D. 810-877), which gives it much of its emotional colour, and fourth the classical writings of St. Augustine.

St. Thomas distinguished sharply between Reason and Revelation, though many truths are to be known through both. That God is, that He is good, and that man stands in need of grace—such truths may be known by the light of human reason. Other doctrines of the Christian creed, such as the Holy Trinity, the Incarnation, and Transubstantiation are revealed to faith alone and must be accepted on the authority of the Christian Church. The solemn argument whereby St. Thomas proves the existence of God and all that follows therefrom moves majestically forward with a logic that (upon his presuppositions) is not to be gainsaid. In the course of this he fills up the gaps in the theology of St. John of Damascus by his doctrine of Providence which finds room alike for necessity and freedom, for law and for contingency, and by his philosophical development of St. Augustine's doctrine of evil as being not an entity in itself but a privation.

But even this system, which in its sweep and grasp makes most of the moderns look like children, is no final answer to our problems. Refusing to take religious experience into account when he argues philosophically, St. Thomas must sharply

distinguish Reason from Revelation and assert the latter in the form of doctrines sent down from heaven. The weakness of this position appears from the inclusion in the category of revealed truths of the doctrine of Transubstantiation which was a relative innovation in Church teaching and certainly no part of the *depositum fidei*. Moreover, in the last analysis, while he asserts all those propositions (of necessity and freedom, of likeness to God and unlikeness, of God's presence and His mediation) which Christians are bound to aver, it is a question whether in more than form he welds them into an harmonious system. A greater system we may never see, but can the Christian religion be set forth in systematic form?

The great systematic Dominican was succeeded by the great Franciscan critic, Oxford's most distinguished theologian, Duns Scotus (A.D. 1266-1308), 'the most subtle doctor.' Sceptical of St. Anselm's confident proofs of the logical necessity of the death of Christ, and far less confident than St. Thomas or the Neoplatonist theologians of the happy coincidence of dogma and philosophy, Duns held by the tradition of the Church. The idea of the will, akin to that of personality and individuality, was dominant in his thought. This led him to give to faith a more intimate and personal interpretation than St. Thomas, to point the way to a more psychological approach to the mystery of Christ's Person, to criticise the notion of transmitted 'original sin' which the Western Church inherited from St. Augustine, and thus to propound as a theory the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mother.

The break-up of the great scholastic synthesis was still further advanced by another Oxford scholar, William of Occam (A.D. 1290-1349?). His scepticism about the possibility of knowledge pointed forward to Kant, as indirectly it later influenced Locke, Berkeley, and Hume in England; he denied that analogy of being between the divine and the earthly which had been a pillar of St. Thomas' construction, and he denied the possibility of a rational, systematic presentation of theology. His anti-rationalism and his assertion that acceptance as a child of God is theoretically alone sufficient for justification paved the way for Luther.

The Reformation brought new life to the Christian Church, and the modern world has posed new questions, but for grasp

and depth and range the Middle Age is still the greatest period of systematic Christian thought.

IV. THE REFORMATION

The close of the Middle Age was a period of moral corruption and intellectual pedantry in the Western Church. All serious men cried out for reformation. The tragedy is that, when the reformation came, it was accompanied by schism. This was due to lack of spiritual insight and lack of moral courage on the part of the reigning Pope and to the hasty, turbulent and Promethean force of Martin Luther.

That part of the Church which maintained the Roman obedience reformed itself at the Council of Trent (A.D. 1545-1563). It rejected what it deemed the excesses and errors of Protestant doctrine but marked little positive advance. The Roman reformation, indeed, was ethical rather than theological. The post-Tridentine Roman Church, quickened by the influence of the Jesuit Order, has been fruitful in the development of the spiritual life as, for instance, in the enormously elaborated cultus of our Lady, in the devotions of the Sacred Heart of Jesus, in the dissemination of the piety associated with St. Theresa of Lisieux, in the vastly developed science of interior prayer; but theologically it has been in the highest degree conservative. Two additions have been made to dogma, both in spite of strong opposition within the Church, the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin and the doctrine of Papal Infallibility. The former declares that the grace which in baptism wipes out the taint of original sin was granted to the Mother of our Lord from the moment of her conception. This doctrine has no clear warrant in Scripture or catholic Christianity before the schism and rests solely upon the *ipsa dixit* of the Roman Church. The doctrine of Papal Infallibility is rather of ecclesiastical than theological importance; it marks the increasing centralisation of the Church's discipline, but, since it is not clear that the Pope infallibly knows when his utterances are infallible, the doctrine is of no great speculative importance.

From the point of view of the Roman Church Martin Luther (A.D. 1483-1546) was a heretic, but, as Dr. Heiler has pointed

out, he was a heretic of an almost unique kind. He seized upon, or was seized by, one element in the Catholic faith which had been so overlaid as to be virtually forgotten, and he proclaimed it to the exclusion of all else. His prophetic message came to him through his own volcanic experience. As a monk he had done all that man can do to commend himself to God and win religious peace—in vain. As he read St. Paul's epistle to the Romans, it came to him that no man can ever establish his own righteousness or win his own acceptance with God; all that is required of him is that he trust utterly to the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ who died for him and, dying and rising again, has triumphed over death and sin, the devil and the law. Thus 'faith' is central to Luther's Gospel. By faith he means much more than a virtue of the intellect whereby we accept as true that which it has pleased God to reveal. Rather, faith is the 'wedding-ring' that unites the soul with Christ. Through faith all our sins are forgiven, by faith we are made the children of God, reconciled to our Father and free from bondage to any law.

Luther was no superlative theologian, as is shown in his controversy with Erasmus (A.D. 1466-1536) on the freedom or bondage of the will. He was anti-intellectualist, and, little as he himself intended to alter anything in the life of the Church which was not inconsistent with his sovereign emphasis on grace, his doctrine tended to an individualist and esoteric type of piety. None the less, his virtual rediscovery of the experience of forgiveness and free acceptance through the grace of God, as St. Paul had taught these before him, while it added nothing new to Christian doctrine, set almost all theological and religious issues in a forgotten light.

The great theologian of the Protestant movement was John Calvin (A.D. 1509-1564). He was in the strictest sense a reformer because he sought to remodel the Church after the pattern of the early catholic Church upon the basis of Holy Scripture. His Puritan spirit was not in itself distinctive of Protestantism, and his doctrine of predestination neither was a theological innovation nor was it as central to his thought as has often been supposed. The importance of his theology lies in its basis in Scripture rather than in tradition and in its doctrine of the Church. Protestantism represented a great and

needed simplification of theology. Dogma and the Church, the ministry and the Sacraments all rest upon that Word of God which was declared in Scripture, was incarnate in Jesus Christ, and was defined in the great creeds of the Church. The task of theology was to work out the implications of this Word; the Church was constituted by the faithful preaching of the Word, its obedient reception, and by the administration of the Sacraments; the authority of the ministry was derived from the Word which it was divinely commissioned to declare; the efficacy of the Sacraments was that of the living Word of which they, like preaching, were at once the expression and the vehicle. Thus preaching and the Eucharist as Communion became once again central in the Church's life. Calvin was a churchman rather than a speculative theologian.

The principle of the Word was essentially catholic, but Protestantism on its Lutheran side has been identified with a somewhat esoteric piety and often with anti-intellectualism, while on its Calvinist side it has been rigidly Puritan in temper. It has rejected, therefore, in one way or another much of the great tradition which it might well have carried over. The Church of England was most successful in holding the new with the old in somewhat unstable equilibrium, but at the expense of consistency of theology and inner unity.

The Reformation is connected in several ways with the Renaissance, but Luther and Calvin stand nearer to the old world than the new. Erasmus of Rotterdam who, remained in the Roman communion, and his disciple the Swiss Reformer, Huldrych Zwingli (A.D. 1484-1531), point the way through humanism to the modern age.

V. THE MODERN PERIOD

The modern period begins, not with the Reformation, but with the *Aufklärung* or Illumination, a movement of which the philosopher Immanuel Kant (A.D. 1724-1804) is the outstanding representative. It is critical, individualistic and anti-authoritarian in tendency, and in the sphere of religion is represented by many attempts to rest the Christian faith upon some other basis than the apostolic testimony accepted as revelation.

It is inevitable, then, that this section is almost entirely concerned with Protestantism ; but if the Roman and Eastern churches have taken little theological initiative and have been slow to accommodate themselves to new intellectual conditions, there are notable signs that, with the passing of the particular crisis of the *Aufklärung*, their relative intellectual caution and devotion to tradition will enable them to make very important contributions to the reconstruction to which at present we are only looking forward.

The Illumination was kindled by the critical humanism of the Renaissance, and before its full emergence formal Protestantism had been challenged on the one side by Socinus (A.D. 1525-1562), the father of modern Unitarianism, and on the other both by the great Dutch theologian Arminius (A.D. 1560-1609) who revolted against the rigour of the Calvinistic system, and by the gentle and persuasive spirit of the Cambridge Platonists (A.D. 1633-1688), who, accused in those hard days of Latitudinarianism, pleaded for tolerance and comprehension and a reasonable faith.

Duns Scotus had done much to loosen the bond which in St. Thomas Aquinas united philosophy with dogma. When the Christian faith ceases to offer itself as the true philosophy, and revelation, dissociated from reason, is based on authority alone, there will not be lacking those who will declare that revelation must be abandoned. Lord Herbert of Cherbury (A.D. 1581-1648) was the author of that movement which in English-speaking countries was called Deism, but had its French parallel in the work of Voltaire (A.D. 1694-1778) and the Encyclopaedists. The spread of Deistic ideas was not unrelated to the first introduction of the teaching of the Chinese sage, Confucius, to European thought (A.D. 1724). The Deists offered a rational, non-supernatural, universal and necessary faith, the religion of all wise and good men ; reason, they said, requires us to believe that God is, that it is man's duty to worship Him, that the practice of virtue constitutes His proper worship, that God does not intervene in the affairs of the world He has created, and that reward or punishment is to be expected after death. The interest of the Deists is confined to Natural Theology ; they mark the tendency of the modern age to reduce the concrete Gospel to a general philosophy.

Greatest of Deists is the German, Kant. By his criticism of the human mind as an instrument of knowledge and his proof that the transcendental is wholly beyond man's range of knowledge he conceived himself to have destroyed the old scholastic dogmatism. Only through the categories of the ethical is man in touch with the divine. He believed, however, that implicit in man's sense of absolute obligation to the ethical imperative were the great dogmas of God, Freedom and Immortality. Unlike many writers on ethics Kant had a deep sense of the radical evil in human nature. In his great book on *Religion within the limits of pure Reason* he has worked out magnificently the implications of that sense of awe which he felt in contemplation of the moral law within. It is much to be regretted that he did not analyse and develop along parallel lines his sense of awe in the contemplation of the starry sky. The implications of Kant's critical philosophy as a whole for theology were later considered by Dean Mansel in his justly famous Bampton Lectures on *The Limits of Religious Thought*.

Kant had supposed himself to be doing the work of an apologist and a defender of faith. With a like motive Friedrich Hegel (A.D. 1770-1831) attempted to restate the Christian faith, this time not in terms of will but of idea. In the majestic sweep and Titanic daring of his thought Hegel, as the spectator of all time and all existence, interpreted the whole vast panorama, logically as the expression of the principle that, one idea evoking its opposite, the clash produces a higher synthesis, and metaphysically as Spirit's gradual attainment of consciousness of its own self. Hegel asserted the ultimate identity of the ideal and the real and the ultimate coincidence of necessity and freedom as of all other opposites. He regarded the dogmas of the Christian faith as pictorial and popular representations of true philosophical ideas. In two directions he profoundly influenced later Christian thinkers: positively he proffered a theology in terms of a purely immanent Spirit—to the neglect of the transcendent in religion; negatively he raised in an acute form the problem of the significance of history for faith, a problem earlier posed by Lessing (A.D. 1729-1781) in his observation that one cannot prove necessary truths of thought from contingent facts of history. Hegel's most powerful critic has

been the witty and searching philosophy of Sören Kierkegaard (A.D. 1813-1855).

As Kant set will and Hegel mind each at the foundation of his theology, so Schleiermacher (A.D. 1768-1834) is the protagonist of feeling. But herein he has been much misunderstood. Schleiermacher was essentially philosopher and theologian, not mere psychologist. His concern was to explicate the theological implications of the religious experience of men not as mere individuals but as members of the Church. St. Thomas Aquinas had demonstrated the existence of God from the relativity and dependence of all things in the world upon that which must be beyond the world. Schleiermacher interiorising this conception vindicated religion from man's sense of utter dependence upon that which is not himself. A misinterpretation of Schleiermacher has fostered the individualism and extreme subjectivism which for a time largely overwhelmed Protestantism, but his insistence upon the place of 'experience' in theology marks one of the most notable advances in Christian thought.

The most influential theologian of the nineteenth century was Albrecht Ritschl (A.D. 1822-1889). Schleiermacher had been the theologian of the romantic age, Ritschl in a period when the faith was harassed from many sides strove to vindicate religion's independence of metaphysics. More deeply at one than Schleiermacher with the evangelical experience of Luther and not less concerned with the Christian Church as the community of faith Ritschl availed himself of the philosophy of value of which his contemporary, Hermann Lotze (A.D. 1817-1881), was the great exponent. The service of Ritschl to his generation is inestimable. By starting from, and ever returning to, the revelation of God in Christ, he recalled Protestantism to its central witness, and vindicated the faith against mysticism on the one side and barren intellectualism on the other; by introducing into theology the 'judgment of value' he seemed to set the Christian faith above the assaults of historical criticism or modern science. But his rigid separation of metaphysics and religion led many to acquiesce in the view that religion is but one department of life, and the 'judgment of value' tended to subjectivism and has proved inadequate to the expression of the historical element in the Christian faith.

The last hundred years, which has witnessed an amazing expansion of the Christian Church, has called apologists to defend the faith from a great number of simultaneous attacks, and theologians to accommodate Church doctrine to a new outlook in several directions.

In the nineteenth century it seemed to many that modern science, especially as influenced by Charles Darwin, was sapping the foundations of the faith. That storm has died down, partly through an increasing recognition of the limitations of their knowledge and method on the part of scientists, partly by the Church's clearer apprehension of the nature of revelation in the Bible. The present scientific attack on the faith is chiefly in respect of the Christian ethic or from the side of psychological or economic determinism.

Scientific methods of literary and historical criticism when first applied to Christian Scripture raised difficult problems for the theologians, both with regard to the Canon itself and the content of the revelation. Seeley's (A.D. 1834-1895) *Ecce Homo* and Harnack's (A.D. 1851-1930) *What is Christianity?* are monuments of the earlier radical constructions. Schweitzer's (born A.D. 1875) *Quest of the Historical Jesus* not only disproved all merely humanitarian and optimistic exegesis of the Gospels but led to a profounder study of the concept of 'the Kingdom,' which is likely in time to affect the whole field of Christian doctrine. In the past Eschatology has been little more than an appendix to doctrinal systems; in the future it is likely to be central.

The mass of material collected in recent years by students of non-Christian religions and the rise of the comparative study of religions has led some to suppose that Christianity is but one faith among many or at most the crown and fulfilment of all. Theologians are being required to see the Christian faith in a wider setting than before and to define with greater care what in the Christian Gospel is integral and distinctive. The rise of indigenous churches in Asia and Africa as the result of Christian missions and the need to present the faith in a different context from the European sets theologians a relatively new task. In particular, the formulation and explication of the relation of the Christian Gospel to the historic events which are the occasion and medium of revelation is a crucial issue of the day.

At the present time the two most vigorous theological movements are the Barthianism of much Continental Protestantism, and the Neo-Thomism developed chiefly in the Roman Church. In strong reaction from the individualism, subjectivism and Immanentism of 'Liberal' Protestantism Professor Karl Barth (born A.D. 1886) lays all stress upon the Transcendence of God, sounds again the old trumpet-calls of the Reformation—*sola fide* and *solī Deo gloria*, and repudiates as involving a contradiction the idea of a Christian philosophy or of a Christian civilisation. Neo-Thomism, on the other hand, asserts a *philosophia perennis*, at once consistent with the Gospel and a necessity for thought. Its appeal lies partly in the deliverance which it offers from the disintegration of science and religion which may be traced back to the influence of Descartes (A.D. 1596–1650). These two movements, widely though they differ, seem to suggest that an age that has been chiefly critical is ending and that a period of reconstruction is in sight.

The *Aufklärung* or Illumination that brought many new problems with it is proving in the end to have contributed much to Christian thought. Its chief peril lay in that it led some to seek a basis for the Christian faith other than the apostolic Gospel; this peril is most clearly seen in the heresy of Herr Rosenberg, who, professing a 'positive' Christianity, would find the source of religion for Germans in the depths of the German soul and would raise a theology upon the conceptions of Race and Blood and Soil retaining from the Christian inheritance only so much as may be in accord with his first principles. The gains of the period, already beginning to appear, would seem to be a more satisfactory conception of the Bible as the standard and rule of faith, a more personal and experimental approach to the problems of theology, a clearer sense of the limitations of dogma, a more critical distinction of that which is peculiar to the Christian faith, a deeper appreciation of the eschatological element in the teaching of our Lord, and a more satisfactory distinction between the saving acts of God and human theories about them.

It was inevitable that in a critical and questioning period there should be deep divisions between Christians. In the nineteenth century the theologians of the Lutheran and Genevan traditions with the Roman 'Modernists' were the

pioneers in the work of theological emancipation and of relating the Christian faith to new ideas. The Anglican Oxford Movement, which was closely related to the fear of 'Liberalism,' was the most impressive and influential of various illustrations of passionate loyalty towards the old tradition. Both attitudes had their perils. Some 'Liberals' virtually denuded Christianity of the supernatural, and some on the other side did not escape the correlative dangers of mere authoritarianism and obscurantism. But the influence of the Barthian movement amongst Protestants and the recent theological works of the 'Anglo-Catholic' and Neo-Thomist schools seem to point to a better understanding, a more stable equilibrium and, in due course, as we hope, a synthesis. Meanwhile, the simultaneous persecution of the Church in various parts of Europe, Asia and America induces in the divided Christian communions a deeper sympathy with one another and an ever more vivid sense of their fundamental unity.

Dogmatic theology is the offspring of hope ; it can never know finality ; we may apply to it the fragment of Gerard Manley Hopkins :

Hope holds to Christ the mind's own mirror out
 To take His lovely likeness more and more.
 It will not well, so she would bring about
 An ever brighter burnish than before
 And turns to wash it from her welling eyes
 And breathes the blots off all with sighs on sighs.
 Her glass is blest but she as good as blind
 Holds till hand aches and wonders what is there ;
 Her glass drinks light, she darkles down behind,
 All of her glorious gainings unaware.

.

I told you that she turned her mirror dim
 Between whiles, but she sees herself not Him.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

This bibliography, which might be indefinitely extended, is confined to books available in the English language.

TEXT-BOOKS

- Text-books may be of great value if they be read with caution and subject to the proviso that 'what the soldier said is not evidence.'
- C. H. DODD: *The Apostolic Preaching and Its Development*. (Hodder.)
- A. VON HARNACK: *History of Dogma*. (Williams & Norgate.)
- J. F. BETHUNE-BAKER: *An Introduction to the Early History of Christian Doctrine*. (Methuen.)
- J. K. MOZLEY: *The Beginnings of Christian Theology*. (Cambridge Univ. Press.)
- F. CAYRÉ: *Manual of Patrology*. (Coldwell.)
- H. R. MACKINTOSH: *History of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ*. (T. & T. Clark.)
- S. CAVE: *The Doctrine of the Person of Christ*. (Duckworth.)
- R. S. FRANKS: *History of the Doctrine of the Work of Christ*. (Hodder.)
- S. CAVE: *Doctrine of the Work of Christ*. (University of London Press.)
- C. C. J. WEBB: *Studies in the History of Natural Theology*. (Oxford Univ. Press.)
- E. GILSON: *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy*. (Sheed & Ward.)
- W. P. PATERSON: *The Rule of Faith*. (Hodder.)
- W. R. INGE: *The Platonic Tradition in English Religious Thought*.
- J. OMAN: *The Problem of Faith and Freedom*. (Hodder.)
- *The Church and the Divine Order*. (Hodder.)
- H. R. MACKINTOSH: *Types of Modern Theology*. (Nisbet.)
- J. BURNABY: *Amor Dei*. (Hodder.)

TEXTS

The Early Period

- TERTULLIAN: *Apology*.
- ORIGEN: *On First Principles*. (S.P.C.K.)
- JUSTIN MARTYR: *Apology*.
- ST. IRENAEUS: *Against the Heresies*. (S.P.C.K.)
- ST. CYRIL: *Letters to Nestorius II and III*.
- *Letter to John of Antioch*.
- ST. GREGORY OF NYSSA: *The Great Catechism*
- ST. BASIL OF CAESAREA: *The VIIIth Letter*.
- ST. LEO: *Letter to Flavian*.
- The Chalcedonian Definition.
- The 'Athanasian Creed.'
- ST. JOHN OF DAMASCUS: *On the Orthodox Faith*.

St. Augustine and the Western Church

- ST. AUGUSTINE: *Confessions*. (Methuen.)
- *On the City of God*. (Dent.)
- ST. ANSELM: *Proslogion*. (Methuen.)
- *Cur Deus Homo*.

ABAILARD : *Ethics*. (Blackwell.)

ST. BONAVENTURA : *The Franciscan Vision (Itinerarium mentis in Deum)*. (Burns, Oates & Washbourne.)

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS : *Summa Theologica*. (Burns, Oates & Washbourne.)

—— — *Summa Contra Gentiles*.

The Reformation

LUTHER : *Christian Liberty*.

—— *Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians*.

—— *On the Bondage of the Will*.

CALVIN : *Institutes of the Christian Religion*.

HOOKE : *Ecclesiastical Polity*.

PASCAL : *Pensées*. (Dent.)

The Modern Period

H. MORE : *An Explanation of the Grand Mystery of Godliness* (1708).

M. TINDAL : *Christianity as Old as the Creation* (1730).

J. BUTLER : *The Analogy of Religion* (1736).

I. KANT : *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781).

—— *Principles of the Metaphysic of Ethics* (1785).

—— *Critique of the Practical Reason* (1788).

—— *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* (1793). (Open Court Co.)

F. SCHLEIERMACHER : *On Religion* (1799). (Paul, Trench, Trübner.)

—— *The Christian Faith* (1821). (T. & T. Clark.)

F. HEGEL : *Philosophy of Religion* (from lectures delivered between 1823 and 1827).

S. T. COLERIDGE : *Aids to Reflection* (1825). (Bell.)

S. KIERKEGAARD : *Philosophical Fragments* (1844). (Oxford Univ. Press.)

MCLEOD CAMPBELL : *The Nature of the Atonement* (1856).

H. L. MANSEL : *On the Limits of Religious Thought* (1858).

H. BUSHNELL : *The Vicarious Sacrifice* (1866).

A. RITSCHL : *Justification and Reconciliation* (1870-1874). (T. & T. Clark.)

J. H. NEWMAN : *Essay in Aid of the Grammar of Assent*. (Longmans.)

V. SOLOVYEV : *God, Man, and the Church*. (James Clarke.)

W. HERRMANN : *Communion of the Christian with God* (1886). (Williams & Norgate.)

C. GORE : *The Incarnation of the Son of God* (1891). (Murray.)

R. C. MOBERLY : *Atonement and Personality* (1901). (Murray.)

C. TYRRELL : *Mediaevalism* (1908). (Longmans.)

P. T. FORSYTH : *The Person and the Place of Jesus Christ* (1909). (Independent Press.)

J. OMAN : *Grace and Personality* (1917). (Cambridge Univ. Press.)

F. VON HÜGEL : *The Mystical Element of Religion* (1923). (Dent.)

—— *Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion* (1921). (Dent.)

- W. MORGAN : *The Nature and Right of Religion* (1926). (T. & T. Clark.)
P. ROUSSELOT : *The Intellectualism of St. Thomas* (1924). (Sheed & Ward.)
A. E. TAYLOR : *The Faith of a Moralist* (1930). (Macmillan.)
E. BRUNNER : *The Mediator* (1927). (Lutterworth Press.)
N. SÖDERBLOM : *The Living God* (1933). (Oxford Univ. Press.)
R. S. FRANKS : *The Atonement* (1934). (Oxford Univ. Press.)
K. BARTH : *Credo* (1935). (Hodder.)
S. N. BULGAKOV : *The Orthodox Church* (1935).

ANTHOLOGIES

1. *Documents illustrative of Early Church History*, edited by B. J. KIDD. (S.P.C.K.)
2. *An Augustine Synthesis*, edited by E. PRZYWARA. (Sheed & Ward.)
3. *Selections from Medieval Philosophers*. (Scribners.)
4. *St. Thomas Aquinas*, edited by FR. M. C. D'ARCY. (Dent: a new number in Everyman's Library not yet published.)
5. *Selections from the Literature of Theism*. CALDECOTT and MACKINTOSH. (T. & T. Clark.)
6. *Reformation Writings*. LUTHER. (Lutterworth Press.)
7. *Anglicanism (17th Century)*, edited by MORE and CROSS. (S.P.C.K.)
8. *Religious Thought in the 18th Century*, edited by CREED and BOYS SMITH. (Cambridge Univ. Press.)
9. *The Oxford Movement*. (Scott.)

IX
ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY

by

A. HAMILTON THOMPSON, C.B.E., D.Litt., F.B.A.

Professor of History in the University of Leeds

' Ecclesiastical History is concerned with the history of the Church of Christ—a kingdom not of this world, but manifesting itself in the world as an institution with a concrete and fully organised existence.'

Page 321.

IX ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY

I

ANY attempt to deal with the study of Ecclesiastical History is beset by the difficulty of defining the limits of the subject. Ecclesiastical History is concerned, in the general sense of the term, with the history of the Church of Christ—a kingdom not of this world, but manifesting itself in the world as an institution with a concrete and fully organised existence. As such, the Church is closely in contact with secular political systems on whose forms its outward organisation is in no small degree moulded. From the recognition of Christianity by Constantine the Great as the official religion of his empire, the relations between Church and State have presented constant problems in which both institutions are equally involved and have provoked contests in which the overlapping of temporal and spiritual interests on both sides has obliterated any clear distinction between the things of Caesar and the things of God. The importance of ecclesiastical leaders in temporal affairs, inevitable during the centuries in which the Church stood in the van of civilising agencies and provided the learning and trained intelligence which no other element of society could furnish, had its permanent effect upon the internal history of the Church. Not only did political events in the outside world find their reflection in divisions within the Church itself, but still more strikingly did disputes of ecclesiastical origin invade the field of secular politics and furnish rival parties in the State with watchwords.

From the earliest centuries of the Christian era this has been so. The Arian controversy was no mere struggle between theologians over an abstract theme of the highest importance from the purely religious point of view. The points at issue in this

and subsequent doctrinal contests which originated in the East were used for the benefit of political factions in a society for which metaphysical discussion had a peculiar charm. The controversy extended to the whole Empire and accentuated the growing alienation between the East and the orthodox West. Barbarian invaders who adopted the Arian form of Christianity in their progress across Europe endeavoured to impress it by arguments of force upon the subjects of the states which they founded. The conversion of the Frankish monarch Clovis to orthodox Christianity is one of the most momentous events in history, for it secured permanence for the monarchy which he founded and guided the destinies of its two branches which were to dispute the supremacy of mediaeval Europe and carry on their perennial quarrel into a far later period.

There is a tendency to regard ecclesiastical history as especially connected with the early centuries of the Church and with the period of the great ecumenical councils, the age in which problems of Christology were at issue and heresies were abundant. It was an age fruitful in theological and controversial literature, the age of the Fathers. At its end the last of the great Latin fathers, Gregory the Great, opens a new epoch. It is now that the confusion of the sacred with the profane becomes obvious, that from the internal dissensions of the Church and the victory of orthodoxy we turn to the strife of the Church with the world, its contests and its compromises with spiritual wickedness in high places. It is during this period that the papacy acquires its strength. Disputes from all parts of Europe come for settlement before its tribunal, and with its spiritual supremacy its political power increases. Its revival of the Western Roman Empire by the gift of the crown to Charlemagne was the culminating point of a political alliance which it used to shelter its development and round which there grew the attractive idea of empire and papacy as partners under God in a divinely ordered scheme of earthly government. Side by side with this the rift between the Eastern and Western Churches becomes deeper, their differences more irreconcilable ; and their final breach is almost contemporary with the beginning of the strife between papacy and empire.

That strife lasts for more than two centuries, during which

political and ecclesiastical history are inextricably mingled. The rise of the papal monarchy under Gregory VII, its climax under Innocent III, and its fall under Boniface VIII, are inseparable from the general history of Europe. But the age has its distinction from another point of view. It is an age of literary and artistic activity in the service of the Church, the age of the great churches and cathedrals in which Romanesque solidity of construction gradually gave place to Gothic lightness and economy of material, the age of theologians, philosophers and lawyers, of Abailard, Peter Lombard and Gratian in its earlier stages, of Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventura and the Decretals in its later. And it is during this epoch that monasticism, active in missionary work during the previous period, strengthens its stakes and fences and the religious community, in its various orders and congregations, meets its constitutional problems. If the Crusades do not come strictly within the limits of ecclesiastical history, they are a sign at any rate of the power of religious emotion to affect human purposes and give them an ideal object, however chimerical, and no ecclesiastical historian can fail to give them the attention which they deserve as signs of the times.

With the fourteenth century another epoch begins. In the political world the European national states take shape ; in Italy the spirit of the Renaissance is abroad ; everywhere mediaeval society is gradually undergoing economic changes which herald the coming of a new age. The crusading spirit is dead or is to be aroused only in ignoble forms : the Turk has entered Europe and the taking of Constantinople marks the end of that age-long monarchy which was the true inheritor of the Roman Empire. Meanwhile, the quarrel between empire and papacy loses its importance and its bitterness is transferred to the region of academic discussion. The centre of the ecclesiastical world is at Avignon, and no sooner is the papacy restored to Rome than the Great Schism breaks out, followed by the epoch of conciliar reform and the strife between pope and council in which the obstinate determination of the pope won its way against divided opinions.

But the period at the end of which the papacy, freed from schism, confines its energies and ambitions to the consolidation of a temporal monarchy in Italy, has certain remarkable

features which the student of Church history cannot overlook. The activities of the Church are largely secularised : in England political and absentee bishops are as common as they will be in the eighteenth century. But, with formality and indifference in high places, popular devotion is strong : the foundation of chantries is very frequent, religious guilds and confraternities abound, parish churches are freely rebuilt and furnished with works of art and craftsmanship. Further, reform is busy in the religious orders with a call to personal piety which is a contrast to the prevailing formalism. New monastic congregations come into being with new methods of devotion : monastic reformers work at their task with an energy that recalls the patriarchs of the orders, and there is a popular awakening to the spiritual side of life to which the rulers of the Church, with their own interests preoccupied with worldly affairs, give at any rate their conventional approval.

Of the period of the Reformation, with its bewildering cross-currents of political and religious activity, there is no need to speak in detail. While to a certain extent it led to a strong differentiation between the secular and the religious aspects of life, it nevertheless converted creeds into badges of political party. The fervour of belief which was common to the adherents of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation became bitter fanaticism when they were matched in conflict in political assemblies and on fields of battle. The wars of religion in France, the Thirty Years War in Germany, were the outcome of the fierce opposition engendered by the revolt from the mediaeval Church. There had been wars between Christians in the Middle Ages provoked by heresy or in which heresy was made an excuse for aggression : popes had given the title of crusade to war waged on the supporters of anti-popes. But in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Christian world, for the first time since the Arian controversy, found itself split into two parties whose enmity was based upon two opposed and irreconcilable conceptions of the Christian faith. Owing to the growing richness of material provided by collections of letters, biographies and memoirs, it is possible for the historian to confine himself to ecclesiastical matters in these later centuries more closely than at an earlier date, yet these matters are not divorced from the general history of the day. The

Laudian period in English Church history is of as much importance to the State as to the Church: it was the attitude of the Church of England which precipitated the fall of James II, in France the Jansenist controversy was no mere theological squabble and on the acceptance of the bull *Unigenitus* the most important political consequences depended.

II

It is an interesting point that the historian from whom we derive most of our knowledge of the early history of the Church in Gaul called his work simply *Historia Francorum*. Although Gregory of Tours was himself an ecclesiastic and a bishop, he was also closely connected with affairs of State, and his familiarity with the courts of the Merovingian kings qualified him specially for writing about them and the political intrigues of which they were the centre. On the other hand, the work which is the earliest authentic narrative of the history of our own nation bears the title *Historia Ecclesiastica Gentis Anglorum* and was written, not by a man of affairs in close contact with the secular life of his day, but by a scholar whose days were spent in the routine of the cloister. Their methods and their style are utterly different. Gregory handles his materials freely and casually. Dealing with his own day, he abandons chronological treatment to select and dwell upon episodes which occur to his memory, and in this he is the precursor of the crowd of writers of *mémoires* whom his country has produced. His vivid and vivacious presentation of his scenes is the fruit of a literary power superior to his command of grammatical Latin: the language which he uses is a colloquial medium heedless of inflections and concords. Bede, on the contrary, although several of the personages of whom he wrote had been known to him, and in spite of his capacity for writing a tale with a direct simplicity in excellent Latin, was composing a history upon a definite scheme and was proof against temptations to digress from his main subject, although he might dwell upon incidents that struck his imagination and interpolate pious anecdotes in his text. Yet in both Gregory and Bede the same interest in the two sides of history is visible. Not only does Gregory bring out clearly, with that wealth of detail and suggestion which renders the *Historia Francorum* an

inexhaustible storehouse of facts, the part played by the Church in the life of his day, but his tale is freely interspersed with stories of saints and bishops. And, while Bede's subject was the growth of the Church in England from the coming of Augustine to the writer's own day, its conflict with paganism and its part in the work of civilisation, it was a subject which involved the narrative of the rise and fall of kingdoms and the political strife which had its natural influence on the progress of the Church ; and Bede used his record of political vicissitudes with admirable clearness as a background to his main picture.

It is thus impossible for the student of ecclesiastical history to isolate himself from the political history of his chosen period. Even if his subject is one which may seem at first sight to be concerned with spiritual affairs, such as for example the formation of early dioceses, political circumstances will be found to contribute a very important part to its study, for the extent of a diocese is liable to alteration with changes of political boundaries, and in the organisation of the Church in European countries the correspondence of ecclesiastical and civil divisions, if subject to variations, is habitually close. Nowhere is this more conspicuous than in the dioceses of Gaul, corresponding to the Roman *civitates*, and in process of time divided into archdeaconries established in the *pagi* or rural districts. Although at long intervals new dioceses were formed and a few sees added to those which enjoyed metropolitan rank, the Gallo-Roman system of dioceses prevailed, with these minor changes, until the French Revolution. A large number of sees were then permanently suppressed, but in the restoration of the Church under Napoleon the general principle adopted, with a few exceptions, was that each of the new departments should constitute a diocese of which in nearly every case one of the old see-towns was the capital and in a majority of cases was the *chef-lieu* of the department as well.

So far as the mediaeval period is concerned, the connexion between ecclesiastical and secular affairs is strongly emphasised by those chroniclers who, recording the events of their time within their monasteries, dealt with both sides of history indiscriminately. Few of these were literary artists of the type of Bede, with a power of selection and a sense of proportion. For the most part they were annalists, noting down the events

of each year in more or less consecutive order, dwelling upon those of which special details had come under their notice, and digressing freely to incidents affecting their own houses. Some have outstanding merits. Ordericus Vitalis, an authority essential to the history of the Norman Conquest, was no mere annalist. He indulged, as many others did, in a long narrative of the history of the Church from the Christian era, lingering over the Apostolic age, and proceeding rather hurriedly through centuries of emperors, popes and other rulers, to the period of William of Normandy. At this point his *Historia Ecclesiastica* of England and Normandy has its true beginning, and its division into books serves the purpose, as far as possible, of keeping the two strains of the narrative parallel and distinct. Ordericus's main interest lay in the Norman abbey to which he belonged and in the family of its founders, and these formed the root from which his history developed. As a picture of the part played by the Church in feudal society the value of the work is outstanding, and the writer, born in England of a French father and English mother, had ample opportunity of obtaining the information necessary for his task.

The most famous of English mediaeval chroniclers, Matthew Paris, whose *Historia Major* covers the greater part of the reign of Henry III in great detail, followed conventional lines, working as an annalist in continuation of the previous St. Albans historian, Roger of Wendover. But, if his work has, in common with most of its species, no scientific plan, it is nevertheless the production of an historian who not only worked upon material which lay to his hand, but who made special collections of documents for his purpose. The appendix to his chronicle, as it stands, forms a series of *pièces justificatifs* transcribed by him from originals, and is an unusual example for its day of a practice which became part of the regular armoury of historians in a more critical age.

The mediaeval chronicler, however, was first and foremost a general historian in whose work ecclesiastical affairs take a prominent but not an exclusive place. It is natural that his view of the course of events should be coloured by ecclesiastical sympathies in general and by his devotion to the interests of his order and the privileges of his monastery in particular. Where ecclesiastical authorities come into collision in that conflict

of jurisdictions which is so large a part of the internal history of the mediaeval Church, his account of such incidents cannot fail to be that of a partisan. Further, from Bede onwards, the narrative of the monk-historian is freely sprinkled with stories of miracles and portents whose simplicity, in an age less ready to accept the physical intervention of the supernatural in human affairs as a fact in life, has been taken to detract from the credibility of his witness in other respects. Yet, from such tales, in their circumstantial setting, the general picture of contemporary life is augmented and enriched, and the hand which introduced them into matter-of-fact surroundings is not therefore disqualified from describing historical events with approximate accuracy. And it must be remembered that miracle-stories in chronicles were simply a result of the general mentality of the age, and their truth was accepted by those who read or heard as implicitly as by those who recorded them in writing.

III

In the work of the chronicler, the student has to deal with individual temperament subordinated to the temperament of the particular body to which the individual belongs, and a just decision on events is bound to take account of this and pronounce accordingly. But the need which Matthew Paris felt of collecting evidence from original sources in the light of which to test the statements of historians and fill in, so far as may be, what they have left uncertain and unexplained, is felt with increasing urgency. With the demand, supply has increased, and, during the past half-century, the printed material for ecclesiastical history has become exceedingly copious, both at home and abroad, while the curiosity of students has opened the treasures of diocesan and other archives to searchers whose opportunities were formerly extremely limited. In England, it is true, we have long depended on certain miscellaneous collections of documents in which, again, the interests of Church and State are indiscriminately mingled. The huge series of diplomatic documents extracted by the industrious Thomas Rymer from the public records, at a time when they were ill-kept and without any system of classification, and known under the general title

of *Foedera*, includes, for example, a very large number of the letters patent relating to appointments to bishoprics through the various stages of *congés d'élire*, significations of the royal assent to elections, and orders for the restitution of temporalities to the newly made bishops. Rymer's habit of transcribing and printing such letters in full involves an immense amount of repetition of common forms with trifling variations; but the mediaeval employment of common form was an art, and variations, however trifling, may nevertheless be introduced for definite purposes which the student cannot neglect and which it is part of his duty to discover.

Within the last half-century, the rolls of Chancery, which furnished Rymer with so much of his material, have been calendared under the direction of successive Masters of the Rolls. The work, forming part of a scheme which has made steady progress with other departments of the public records, is not yet complete, but printed calendars of the whole series of rolls of letters patent from the reign of Henry III to that of Edward VI are now available, and to these in particular the ecclesiastical historian must constantly refer. Not only do they contain abstracts of such documents as Rymer included when he came across them, the study of which is of great importance to the history of the relations between the Church, the Crown, and the papacy. Apart from the rights of patronage which he exercised in the case of episcopal sees and the monasteries which were recognised as of royal foundation, presentations to ecclesiastical benefices, prebends in cathedral churches, rectories and vicarages of parish churches, were constantly in the king's hands owing to vacancies of sees or of the headships of religious houses, to the death of lay patrons and the minority of their heirs, or to the forfeiture of their estates. The enrolment of letters of presentation is one of the commonest features of the Patent Rolls, and in more than one way is useful to the historian. It illustrates the control which the Crown had obtained over ecclesiastical benefices by the legislation of Henry II which had transferred advowsons from the province of canon to that of common law. It enables the biographer to trace the early careers of prelates and dignitaries who were clerks in the king's service and whose advancement was marked by their preferment to the benefices that were

his to bestow. It further reflects the influence of external events upon ecclesiastical affairs, not only of such catastrophes as the pestilences of the fourteenth century, during which the number of presentations was vastly increased, but of minor disturbances. Thus the rebellion of Archbishop Scrope and his execution in 1405 were followed by royal presentations to a large number of prebends in York Minster which had been held by his followers. It is true that presentations were made carelessly and without sufficient information, that they were sometimes granted to more than one candidate simultaneously, and that they very often had no effect ; but for all that they cannot be overlooked.

The Patent Rolls, again, remind us how the growth of ecclesiastical property was regulated by the statute of Mortmain in 1279. It was a period at which the foundation of new monasteries in England was a rare event, and when the endowment of chantries or of colleges of chantry priests in parish churches was gradually taking its place. But gifts of property were made to old and new foundations alike, for which the only return required was in the form of prayers and masses ; and, if such a form of repayment was profitable to the soul of the donor, it made a difference to his worldly means and to those of the superiors to whom he owed rent and service. Shortly after 1279 licences to alienate property for this purpose, the necessary consequence of the statutory check upon the practice, begin to form frequent subjects of enrolment. In this way the Patent Rolls are invaluable sources for the history of monastic property, not only in its later but in its earlier stages, for they contain letters inspecting and confirming early charters of some of which the text exists only in this form or upon the Charter Rolls specially devoted to the record of confirmations of this kind. Equally important are the entries of licences for the appropriation of parish churches to religious corporations, and for the foundation of chantries by individuals or by guilds, which of course came under the provisions of the prohibitory statute. It is interesting to notice how, at a period when, after the pestilence of 1349 and the economic troubles which followed it, observance of the statute had become relaxed, its re-enactment in 1390 was succeeded by the issue of a long series of licences, most of which probably were

applied for in order to put unlicensed foundations upon a regular footing.

Thus records drawn up for secular purposes, whose main object is the safeguarding of the royal interests in a society in which they could easily be overlooked or suffer damage, are of more than ordinary importance to the ecclesiastical historian. Apart from this, there are probably few city and borough archives, few collections of manuscripts in the possession of private owners, which are without miscellaneous documents of ecclesiastical origin. In fact, wherever the student goes and whatever his purpose, whether it be to write the history of a parish or of some larger ecclesiastical area or to discuss some more general aspect of the history of religious life and thought, he is faced with the prospect of unexpected finds whose interest is by no means confined to one side of Church life.

Of documents of a primarily ecclesiastical character, relating to the Church in England, one great printed collection exists, the *Concilia Magnae Britanniae*, edited by David Wilkins, librarian at Lambeth Palace from 1715 to 1718. This consists of a chronologically arranged series of extracts from all kinds of sources from the fifth century to the period of the Bangorian controversy. Wilkins, a Prussian by birth—his actual surname was Wilke—had the great advantage of constant access to the archiepiscopal registers at Lambeth, and an important feature of his work is the liberal use which he made of them. He made collections from the records of other dioceses which supplied him with matter of incidental value, and his volumes contain much which is not connected directly with his main purpose, the publication of the proceedings and decrees of episcopal synods and of the Convocation of the province of Canterbury. His treatment of his material, however, was highly cavalier. The records of Convocation in the Lambeth registers are for certain periods very full and long. The punctilious insertion of numerous official documents, especially the recurrent mandates from the archbishop to the bishop of London, as dean of the province, or to a deputy in his absence, enclosing the royal writ for the summons of Convocation and ordering its execution, lengthens them considerably and involves much of the usual repetition of common form. Wilkins, instead of imitating his contemporary Rymer and

printing everything in full, cut down and telescoped his material with complete freedom, omitting passages which narrate the progress of proceedings from day to day, frequently summarising long passages in Latin of his own and inserting such summaries without marking any distinction between them and the rest of the text. The result of his labours is thus incomplete and unsatisfactory. Its earliest portion has long been obsolete and was superseded by the exact scholarship of the *Concilia* of Haddan and Stubbs, and of recent years efforts have been made by a committee of specially equipped scholars to continue the task of revision. Wilkins, however, had the gift of selecting such passages for fuller treatment as have a special interest of their own apart from their formal value, and as a miscellany of historical documents the four volumes of *Concilia* form a notable landmark in the exploration of the sources of English ecclesiastical history.

The rich treasures of episcopal registers, preserved in diocesan centres, upon which Wilkins drew so freely are now no longer unexplored. Throughout the nineteenth century scholars made use of them, and the nature of their contents was revealed in the publications of such institutions as the Surtees Society, in which two editors of wide learning and with the gift of attractive expression, the Raines, father and son, constantly introduced into their works illustrative quotations of documents from the series at York and the imperfect series at Durham and Carlisle. The younger Raine, indeed, printed the earliest of the York registers, and his example has been followed by editors at York and in most other English dioceses, while the Canterbury and York Society, founded for this purpose, has for nearly forty years steadily advanced with what is necessarily a slow task. In the possession of such a source of information we are remarkably fortunate, and no other country can show anything of a similar kind to compare with it. But a zeal for episcopal registers has its dangers. The fact that their contents abound in documents relating to monasteries has done much to promote it and create the impression that the registers were an official repository for records of diocesan business of all sorts. So, in a sense, they were, but the business was the bishop's personal business, and the reason why monastic affairs loom so largely in them is that such monasteries as were

not exempt from diocesan jurisdiction were under the direct supervision of the diocesan bishop, and no other local ordinary, e.g., the archdeacon, could intermeddle with them save as his commissary. And, while the episcopal registers provide us incidentally with details which, if carefully pieced together, give a fairly complete view of diocesan administration and its *personnel*, yet, where registers of deans and chapters still exist, much may be added to the picture, and, did the registers of archdeacons survive in any quantity, there would be much more to know.

It may be said here that the popularity of episcopal registers as a field of study, and their consultation by persons with more enthusiasm than experience, are fraught with a further danger. Not only are they regarded as capable of supplying more than lies within their scope, but individual documents are treated as affording evidence for subjects of enquiry with which they have in fact no connexion. In these registers, it is true, are not peculiar. There is a constant temptation in the way of the student which suggests that his documents may occasionally have more to say than they were intended to convey in the first instance. A case in point is the employment of charters in order to obtain evidence for the dates of the buildings by or to whose inmates they were granted. Such charters do now and then refer definitely to building operations, but they are as a rule concerned with acquisitions of property, and, if from time to time some item in them may afford a hint or provide a detail by which the architectural student may benefit, this is a happy accident. While the research which accidents of this kind encourage is undoubtedly a fascinating pursuit, it is no less dangerous and demands some training and experience in diplomatic science if it is to bring a fruitful result.

In the case of episcopal registers it must be remembered in the first place that they are the product of the bishop's chancery. Their contents are official and impersonal. In some there occur a few personal letters from a bishop, inserted probably as models of correspondence, which tell us something of his character and ways of thinking. The dates of their documents are of great assistance to our knowledge of a bishop's movements, and the itinerary which can be compiled from them is

important material for his biography. Where, as in some of the earlier registers at York, the domestic expenses of a prelate are included in his register, we have a solid foundation for some knowledge of his habits and tastes. This, however, is exceptional. The ordinary mandate or decree which is the staple content of such books, whatever the special information which it may convey, was moulded in a familiar and formal shape by the bishop's clerks. So far as regards the man himself, it would be as useful to deduce the character of a modern bishop from the printed circulars and forms which emanate from diocesan registries as to search for personal traits in the letters drawn up by the staff of secretaries which followed his mediaeval predecessors. Further, while the register is an official record of acts and other matters proper to the bishop's office, in his absence from his diocese it becomes the register of his vicar-general without any change of tone or style.

This formal character increases as time advances. Up to the middle of the fourteenth century the register was used as a reservoir for official correspondence on a large variety of topics. Many of these were of ephemeral interest, but they were recorded in the register so as to provide precedents for use in case of their recurrence. Such a wealth of precedents was thus brought together that later registrars had no need for more, and after the period indicated the register tends more and more to become an act-book, in which memoranda of institutions to benefices, formal documents relating to the elections of heads of religious houses, licences for private oratories, matrimonial licences, grants of letters dimissory and lists of ordinees form the principal entries. The extreme of formality is reached when the vicars-general in several dioceses practically supersede bishops who are engaged in affairs of State and are almost permanent absentees.

After the Reformation a tendency, common to all classes of records, grew to subdivide the business of a diocesan registry into special departments. The memoranda of institutions and licences which had formed so large a part of the mediaeval episcopal register were now transferred to separate act-books, or duplicated in them, and eventually disappeared from the register. The student of English Church history after the Reformation has a much wider collection of sources on which

to depend than the student whose interests are mediaeval. Although, so far as diocesan registries are concerned, his material before the Commonwealth is somewhat imperfect and often scanty, the Restoration was followed by a reorganisation of their resources and by an exemplary care as regards departmental registration. The official register was no more, as it had been in the Middle Ages, a receptacle for miscellaneous documents which constantly provide surprises for the searcher : it was usually reserved for the evidences of proceedings which it was desirable to keep on record, diocesan and provincial synods, consecration of chapels and churches and so on. Thus for the early history of Church Extension in the north of England there is no official source of information more useful than the registers of Archbishop Harcourt (the first of which is known under his original name of Vernon) at York. The second of these, an enormous folio of nearly a thousand leaves of parchment, is interleaved with maps, plans and drawings illustrating the formation of new parishes and the building of new churches.

It would take too long to attempt any classification of the contents of the registries of dioceses, nor would it be altogether possible to give a general account of them which, despite their similarity, would completely cover their various aspects. As centuries have advanced, miscellaneous letters and papers of all kinds have found their way into these repositories and have remained there, often in confusion, affording a wide field of research for the future historian. In addition to this, the registries of cathedral corporations and of archdeaconries contain a vast amount of unexplored material of this kind. This is naturally more plentiful for the later than the earlier centuries, and it must be admitted that in the correspondence of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there is a more human and more personal note than in the official records of the Middle Ages. More than this, no books are more useful for an estimate of the state of the clergy and of Church life at any period than the visitation books of the local ordinaries, bishops and archdeacons. Although mediaeval examples of such books remain, they are not common, and it is only in the Elizabethan period that they begin to be abundant or continuous. The value of visitation records is obvious : they

form, for example, our most trustworthy guide to the internal history of English monasteries during the three centuries before the Reformation. But there is probably, outside this confined field, no more striking an illustration of their usefulness than the returns to the questionnaire sent out to the incumbents in the diocese of York by Archbishop Herring before his visitation in 1744. Not only do these afford grounds for statistics bearing upon all features of diocesan and parochial life, but they give means of ascertaining much with regard to the private life and character of the clergy of the day that is at once diverting and to some extent edifying.

The material for English Church History to which we have referred is in the main unpublished or printed as raw material for the student's use with introductions defining its character. As we draw nearer our own day, the circumstances of ecclesiastical documents become more familiar and we are less likely to make mistakes. Egregious mistakes, it must be owned, have been often committed by students of mediaeval documents, very possibly because they cannot conceive of the pre-Reformation world as being anything but entirely different from our own in its ways of life and habits of thought. Common sense, however, played quite as much part in the mind of a mediaeval clerk as it does in that of his modern successor in diocesan offices, and, if he was often disappointingly reticent upon points in ecclesiastical administration and procedure of which we would fain know more and which actually arise from our study of his work, we have to remember that, within the limited purpose which his compositions were intended to serve, he was under no obligation to explain for the benefit of posterity allusions and apparent omissions which to himself and his contemporaries needed no explanation.

IV

The documents on which the ecclesiastical historian has to depend are in great part of a legal nature. Councils and synods, with their legislative action, take an extremely prominent part in Church history. With their decrees the fortunes of the Church are bound up. Their acts, recorded in the great collections of Labbe and Mansi and in such localised collections as those of Wilkins and Haddan and Stubbs, are *monumenta*

juris, as we are reminded in the title of the late C. H. Turner's edition of the documents relating to the earliest Councils of the Church. It is in the observance or the breach of the laws thus made that the mass of material contained in the archives of bishops and of ecclesiastical corporations takes its origin. In an epoch in which personal documents such as private letters are rare, and biographers and chroniclers are more concerned with wonders and portents than with giving accurate pictures of their times or portraits of their heroes as they lived, our sources are mainly legal. To the mediaeval mind, for example, a bishop was not so much a father in God as *judex ordinarius*, the 'ordinary' whose court was the natural tribunal for the punishment of spiritual offences and the resort for litigants in spiritual causes within the area under his jurisdiction. When he went out on visitation, it was as a judge. In the churches and monasteries which he visited he sat 'judicially as a tribunal'; the injunctions which he issued after visitation were decrees to be inviolably observed. In this way his register is a collection of legal documents and instruments entered by clerks whose education and attitude to the business of their offices was entirely legal.

The ecclesiastical historian must thus know something of the elements of ecclesiastical law at the period with which he deals. The *judex ordinarius* with whose sessions and mandates he is in contact—and bishops are not the only ordinaries—is engaged in administering the common law of the Church, canon law as distinct from civil or Roman law and from the common law of the realm. Canon law rests fundamentally upon a series of texts, decrees of councils and synods, formulas embodied in patristic utterances, papal pronouncements *ex cathedra*. As these multiply, endeavours are made to form them into collections for purposes of reference. Of such collections the most complete and authoritative was the *Concordantia Canonum* of Gratian, compiled with a running commentary by the compiler in the first half of the twelfth century. But, bulky as this work was, its appearance preceded an epoch of extreme importance to ecclesiastical legislation, the age of Innocent III and the Lateran Council of 1215, and it soon needed a supplement. In 1237, at the order of Gregory IX, the five books of Decretals were produced, consisting

almost entirely of papal interpretations of law. To these the *Liber Sextus* was added at the end of the thirteenth century by Boniface VIII, and subsequently John XXII, the second of the Avignonese Popes, published the *Constitutiones Clementinae* issued by his predecessor Clement V at the Council of Vienne (1311). The supplementary constitutions or *Extravagantes*, corresponding to the *Novellae* of the civil law, were added by John XXII and later Popes.

The *Corpus Juris Canonici*, composed of Gratian's and these later compilations, found an army of commentators ready to expound its text and not infrequently to darken counsel with words. Some of these commentaries obtained almost equal authority with the text: the lawyer who practised in the ecclesiastical courts and could cite the wise saws and modern instances of Gratian and the Decretals with remarkable facility added to his repertory a necessary acquaintance with the glosses of such masters of the subject as the Bolognese lawyers, the archdeacon Guido di Baiso and Giovanni di Andrea, 'Rabbi doctorum, lux, censor normaue morum.' Modern English writers from Maitland onwards have insisted upon the essential identification of the common law of the Church with papal law and have abandoned the old standpoint from which the *Ecclesia Anglicana* of the Middle Ages was regarded as subject to the provincial constitutions of its primates and the codes of local synods, and as paying a merely polite attention to papal authority which it was always prepared to resist. That this theory is untenable is clearly shown by a study of the *Calendars of Papal Letters*, which contain enough matter from the papal registers of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries to disclose the actual relations between the English Church and the Holy See. The most famous work on ecclesiastical law by a mediaeval Englishman, the *Provinciale* of the fifteenth-century canonist Lyndwood, is now seen in its true light as interpreting the constitutions of English metropolitans by demonstrating their conformity with the common law of the Church, and it is rather surprising that any other view of it could ever have been taken.

Although the Reformation involved the severance of English Church law from the dominance of the papal law, yet so little alteration took place in the machinery of Church government,

so little check was applied to customs now regarded as obsolete abuses, that law was administered in the ecclesiastical courts much in the old fashion and after the time-honoured precedents. Whatever change the Reformation brought about in thought and doctrine—and the far-reaching character of that change cannot be denied—yet, so far as the administration of ecclesiastical business was concerned, the old bottles were used for the new wine without fear of consequences. In this respect the ecclesiastical legislation of the Reform Bill era wrought a revolution which the Reformers had never attempted to effect in a state of things to which the Commonwealth had merely brought temporary eclipse. It is interesting to notice that the age which produced such collections as those of Rymer and Wilkins, in which the continuity of the history of the *Ecclesia Anglicana* was so amply demonstrated—the first three decades of the eighteenth century—produced also such worthy followers of Lyndwood's *Provinciale* as John Johnson of Cranbrook's *Constitutions and Canons of the Church of England*, Ayliffe's *Parergon*, and Gibson's *Codex Juris Ecclesiae Anglicanae*. And, if Lyndwood's dependence upon papal decretals and the commentaries of papal lawyers was a thing of the past, Gibson in 1679 had published an admirable edition of the *Provinciale* and the Legatine Constitutions which showed that the *dicta* of mediaeval jurists were of something more than antiquarian interest in a reformed but highly conservative Church.

v

The present writer, whose personal studies have brought him more intimately into connexion with the history of the English Church than with that of the Church in other European countries, has necessarily illustrated his remarks by examples drawn from England. It may also be said that, so far as the internal life of the Church is concerned, for such matters as diocesan administration and its effect upon the moral and spiritual life of the Christian community, original sources in England are more plentiful than in any other country. There are gaps in our diocesan and episcopal archives, but the amount of material which has escaped the ravages of time and survived the carelessness of man affords abundant opportunity for research and presents itself to the student in a compact form

very different from the scattered character of the sources available for the foreign historian.

At the same time, if plentifulness and compactness are the outstanding qualities of the material contained in local ecclesiastical archives in England, it does not follow that there are not other documentary sources of equal value. A study of the publications of any record society which from time to time prints and publishes ecclesiastical documents will show how various and how ubiquitous are the sources from which these can be obtained. While the general disappearance of episcopal registers abroad probably renders it impossible that such a work as Miss Churchill's treatise on *Canterbury Administration* could be compiled with equal fullness for a foreign see, yet a reference to general bibliographies of topographical history like Chevallier's *Répertoire* proves the frequency with which monographs appear on some aspect of the ecclesiastical history of Continental towns and districts. In France, and other European countries cartularies of monasteries and large collections of miscellaneous ecclesiastical documents which survived epochs of war and revolution have been preserved in public libraries and among departmental archives.

In most countries also there exist great collections of printed material which illustrate the history of the national or provincial Church and its dioceses. Most of these works belong to the age which in England produced, as we have seen, the collections of Rymer and Wilkins. In England, however, we have no work which exactly corresponds to *Gallia Christiana*, initiated in 1716 by Denis de Ste-Marthe, one of the great Benedictines of the congregation of St. Maur whose learning and the diligence with which they used it were alike immense. The method of this work is uniform. The dioceses, arranged in provinces, are described in brief historical introductions, which are followed by detailed catalogues of bishops and accounts of monasteries with similar lists of abbots and priors. There is an appendix of documents for each diocese. As the work advanced, the treatment became more minute. The first volume included no less than five ecclesiastical provinces, containing thirty-two dioceses; but this summary treatment was soon abandoned, and the volumes devoted to the provinces of Paris and Reims were each divided into two. The scope

of the work goes beyond France to the Rhine, taking in the three Rhenish archbishoprics and the province of Malines. The thirteenth volume was published in 1785, when all but three provinces were completed. These were supplied in three volumes, edited by Hauréau, and published between 1856 and 1865, since which time *Gallia Christiana Novissima*, begun in 1899, has produced further documentary material for dioceses imperfectly treated in the earliest volumes of the work.

It is unnecessary to pay detailed attention to further volumes of the same kind. The scope of the earlier undertaking of the Abate Ferdinando Ughelli is limited, as its title, *Italia Sacra sive de episcopis Italiae*, shows, to biographical catalogues of bishops prefixed by brief accounts of their sees. Formidable as the attempt was, it was finished quickly before Ughelli's death in 1670, and it was recommended by Cardinal Mazarin as a model to the editors of *Gallia Christiana*. The elaborate *España Sagrada*, begun under the editorship of H. Florez, in 1747, and completed, after a long interval, by the publication of the fifty-second volume in 1918, was more miscellaneous and leisurely in its methods. It opens with an ecclesiastical geography, proceeds after a chronology of the history of Spain to an account of the preaching of the Apostles and a dissertation upon the early history of the mass: it is not until the fourth volume that the origin and progress of the Spanish bishoprics is reached, and the series of provincial and diocesan descriptions beginning in the fifth, is frequently interrupted by incidental excursuses.

In England we possess no great comprehensive work covering the ground of *Gallia Christiana*. The *Monasticon Anglicanum*, indeed, of which more elsewhere, corresponds amply, with all its drawbacks, to its historical accounts of monasteries. Its catalogues of bishops have to some extent their counterpart in Wharton's *Anglia Sacra*, a *recueil* of material from mediaeval chroniclers, in Bishop Godwin's *De Praesulibus Angliae*, and in the lists in Browne Willis's accounts of cathedral churches. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the co-operation of English with foreign scholars to produce work on a given subject with such uniformity of method as diversity of material allows was impossible. Yet it is on the voluminous collections of those days, despite their inequalities of surface and their

other shortcomings, that all subsequent work has been founded ; and their compilers were pioneers in the scientific treatment of history which has made such advances in our own day.

As regards the present age, it is faced in the field of ecclesiastical, as of other branches of history, with a mass of material which makes attempts to rival such collections unattainable, and endeavours to revise and amplify them possible only in a limited, and a narrowly limited, field. Let us take one example. It may be thought an easy and possibly not wholly useless task to compile lists of the canons of one of our cathedral churches, distinguishing them under their respective prebends. Owing to the richness of the contents of episcopal and capitular registers in England, this task, to be performed with any thoroughness, is peculiarly fitted to an English student, who also has a foundation to build upon in the lists printed in Hardy's edition of Le Neve's *Fasti Ecclesiae Anglicanae*. But those lists, when compared with original documents, present so many inconsistencies and inaccuracies that they need constant correction. The registers of bishops and of deans and chapters have to be compared for dates of collations and installations. Names of early canons are constantly discovered in charters of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries which appear nowhere else. Royal grants of prebends, not always effective, must be traced ; papal provisions, often traversing episcopal and royal collations and involving long litigation, complicate the smooth course of succession. There are, too, omissions for which it is difficult to account save by assuming that they are due to imperfect registration. In fact the work which at first seems trifling demands an amount of research which can make the compilation of lists for a single cathedral church the work of years.

Ever since the documents of the Vatican were laid open to scholars by Pope Leo XIII, their inexhaustible riches have been well recognised. To British students the publication of the *Calendars of Papal Letters*, with extracts from the long series of registers covering the three centuries before the Reformation, has been invaluable, not only as a record of relations between England and the papacy, but as containing innumerable references to features of Church life of which we should otherwise be ignorant. Their contribution to the Church history

of Ireland and Scotland in the fifteenth century is in particular very abundant. At the same time, the information which they afford is necessarily of an incidental kind, which requires corroboration and augmentation from other sources, and in England we are peculiarly fortunate in possessing local collections of ecclesiastical records by which they may be tested. We may also remember that in Italy and in other Continental countries there is still a mine of such treasures awaiting exploration, and that it is only upon local foundations that a really adequate account of the history of a church or diocese can be built.

VI

The history of the Religious Orders forms a branch of ecclesiastical history to which a vast amount of attention has been given. Although many monasteries were subject to the jurisdiction of diocesan bishops, from which some English Benedictine houses as important as Glastonbury, Peterborough and St. Mary's, York, never managed to free themselves, yet a larger number were exempt, the monasteries of the Orders of Cluny and Cîteaux, the houses of the Orders of Prémontré and Sempringham, the Charterhouses and the houses of friars. For monastic history in England the chief general source is the *Monasticon Anglicanum*, originally published in three volumes under the names of the great antiquary Sir William Dugdale and Roger Dodsworth, to whom is due at any rate the greater part of the documents obtained principally from cartularies in the Cottonian Library and many other collections which have disappeared in later times. A second edition of this work, six volumes in eight, was published in comparatively recent times, under the editorship of John Caley, Sir Henry Ellis, and Dr. Bulkeley Bandinel, representing the Public Records, the British Museum, and the Bodleian Library respectively. While adding English introductions, containing much additional matter in the form of documents, extracts from chronicles and lists of the contents of cartularies in footnotes, they added but little to the main series of documents, and most unfortunately left those already printed without any attempt at revision.

Something of the same kind was achieved for the principal French monasteries in *Gallia Christiana* in the form of cata-

logues of heads of religious houses, with copious references and appendices of supplementary documents. In the natural course of things the chief resort of the English and French editors alike were monastic cartularies and registers, those manuscript volumes into which were copied the charters which were the title-deeds of the properties acquired by a convent ; and thus most of the documents selected and printed refer to the growth of property and the relations between monasteries and the outside world. But cartularies frequently open with narratives in which the origin and early history of the monastery to which they belonged is told, often graphically and with considerable detail, and few forms of mediaeval literature are so attractive as these monastic chronicles, several of which were printed by Dugdale and Dodsworth.

The literature of monastic history is very large. It was naturally the object of the Benedictine scholars of the eighteenth century to examine and publish the history of their Order. At their head stands the name of Jean Mabillon, the great student and historian of Benedictine antiquities. The general *Histoire des Ordres monastiques*, edited in eight volumes by Pierre (Dom Hippolyte) Hélyot, whose name did not appear on the title-pages, is still of much use to those who cultivate an interest in the development of the religious life and especially in the impetus given to the rise of religious congregations in the later Middle Ages and at the period of the Counter-Reformation. For modern purposes, however, it has been superseded by other compilations, which bring the history of the orders up to date and supply additional information on points that were outside Hélyot's scheme. Of these the fullest is the highly condensed *Orden und Kongregationen* of Dr. Max Heimbucher, a work of reference to which no parallel exists in English. Add to these the volumes devoted to the history of various Orders and taking various forms, such as *Bibliotheca Cluniacensis*, a collection of literature proceeding from and relating to the order of Cluny, *Nomasticon Cisterciense*, a *corpus* of constitutional documents of the order of Cîteaux, and the monumental *Origines Cistercienses* of Janauschek, a *catalogue raisonné* of Cistercian monasteries which can never be superseded.

Histories of individual monasteries are plentiful in England as well as in other countries, and the general standard of such

works has greatly improved of recent years. No branch of ecclesiastical history has provoked so much dispute as this. The dissolution of the English religious houses in the sixteenth century has been condemned and defended from two opposite points of view with equal violence, with the result that the student of monastic history is constantly faced by irreconcilable statements. In this field, into which so much that is alien to the temper of the historian has been introduced, the example of the French Benedictines of the eighteenth century, to whom reference has been so often made, may well be kept in mind, who, regarding themselves as the champions of all that was good in their own order and realising the services of monasticism to religion and civilisation, did not hesitate to admit its periods of decline and the recurrent need of reform.

VII

The importance of chronology to the historian needs no demonstration, and chronology is no easy matter. The dating of documents is an essential part of diplomatic science, the science which deals with the formal composition of historical documents and provides tests for determining their validity. In the case of secular charters the habit of dating did not begin early, and the number of twelfth-century charters which can be fixed as issued on a certain day in a certain year is comparatively small. It was not until the beginning of the fourteenth century that the example set in this particular by the royal chancery was generally followed in ordinary life. Of exact dating, however, papal bulls provided elaborate models from an early period, and it was in documents of ecclesiastical significance which required solemn attestation that the practice first became common. But methods of dating were not uniform. The beginning of the year was reckoned differently in different places and dioceses. As a rule, for legal purposes it was reckoned from March 25, a practice which continued in England until the tardy adoption of the Gregorian calendar in 1753; but this by no means holds good for the earlier centuries of the Middle Ages. Further, like a king, a mediaeval bishop dated the beginning of the legal year from the anniversary of his accession, usually reckoned from his consecration or his translation from one see to another, and it is necessary

to ascertain this date accurately before dealing with the records of his episcopate, otherwise we may go sadly astray.

The common method of dating charters and legal instruments by saints' days is very familiar and requires a fair knowledge of the Church's calendar. On the other hand, in the official documents of a bishop's register, the dates given are habitually those of the day of the month. The Roman way of reckoning by calends, nones, and ides, was maintained generally in English episcopal chanceries until the middle of the fourteenth century, but was abandoned gradually in favour of our ordinary method. The advantage of sedulous attention to the dating of documents is obvious, and, although slips may be found in any large series, the well-trained clerk in episcopal service was remarkably accurate in his habits. More than this, the habit of giving, in addition to the date, the place of issue, has the great merit of enabling us to follow the movements of a prelate from place to place and so helping us to estimate the degree of diligence with which he administered his diocese. This is true only of a limited period, for before the end of the fourteenth century the issue of official letters and mandates had been largely delegated to central offices, and long absences of bishops from their dioceses had left their authority in the hands of vicars-general and officials who were usually resident in the see-cities.

Some of the complications of chronology are indicated here. Many people have probably developed an interest in it through the tables which accompany the calendar in the Book of Common Prayer, with their incentive to calculation. Fortunately for the historian, there are numerous manuals which clear the way to the verification and identification of dates without demanding too much of mathematical faculties which he may not possess. The industry of eighteenth-century Benedictines, so active in every department of learning, produced the monumental *Art de vérifier les dates*. Almost as monumental and largely founded on it is Mas Latrie's *Trésor de chronologie*, with its lists of sovereigns, princes, nobles, cardinals and French bishops, and literary and geographical tables. But there are smaller works which, for strictly chronological purposes, are more easy to consult and have been compiled with excellent judgment. Though published

nearly a century ago, Sir Harris Nicolas's *Chronology of History* still holds its own with the English student, and among other more recent volumes the Italian *Cronologia* of A. Cappelli may be specially mentioned for the excellence and handiness of its 'perpetual calendar.'

VIII

An interest in geography—or, considering the wide interpretation which is put upon the word geography at the present time, of topography—is essential to the student of history, and, while much has been done for him in the way of atlases and maps, it must be owned that ecclesiastical topography has been much neglected. Such maps of England divided into dioceses as exist are confusing or inadequate: so far as the present writer knows, it would be entirely left to students to find out for themselves the limits of archdeaconries and rural deaneries, were it not for the coloured maps in the Records Commission edition of the *Valor Ecclesiasticus*. But, while these maps hold good for boundaries which had held their own since the reign of Henry VIII and, save for the creation of new dioceses to which archdeaconries and deaneries were transferred *en bloc*, since the first half of the twelfth century, they are entirely obsolete for our own day. The growth of new dioceses and the restless impermanence of local boundaries during the last hundred years demands a record whose compilation will be a laborious task, not without difficulty. As for those peculiar jurisdictions whose affairs take up so large a part of mediaeval Church history, the student, for the most part, has to make his own map of them.

Similarly, the maps of provinces in *Gallia Christiana* are useful to-day only as defining in a vague way the limits of the dioceses under the system which came to an end at the French Revolution and whose place was taken by the Napoleonic rearrangement of dioceses. Here, again, the general accounts of dioceses do not always specify the names of archdeaconries, still less of rural deaneries. While on these and their origin a great deal can be obtained from such works as Longnon's *Géographie de la Gaule au sixième siècle*, from the diocesan *Pouillés* or lists of benefices printed in the volumes supplementary to Bouquet's *Recueil*, and from the incomplete

Topographic ecclésiastique contributed by Jules Desnoyers to various *Annuaire*s of the Société d'histoire de la France—a work is still needed which is a complete guide to them. In other European countries, too, those volumes of general surveys in which the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were prolific leave much to be desired in this respect.

Confining ourselves to English material, we may say that the lists of parish churches, their revenues and patrons, arranged under dioceses, archdeaconries and rural deaneries, in Ecton's *Thesaurus* and in a work founded on it, Bacon's *Liber Regis*, afford a most useful conspectus of ecclesiastical topography, less cumbrous than the volumes of the *Valor Ecclesiasticus* which were essential to their compilation. More than half a century ago Mr. Geoffry Hill's *The English Dioceses*, an unpretentious book written with unsparing pains and with solid learning, provided an account of their origin and limits, thereby achieving a most difficult task, full of problems, with no small success. Much also may be gathered from the series of Diocesan Histories published about the same period and for some time afterwards by the S.P.C.K., books, however, of very unequal merit. Appendices to the chapters on ecclesiastical history in the volumes of the *Victoria County History* deal with geographical arrangements in some detail, although in most instances alterations have taken place since they were written. It is, however, a great pity that in all English dioceses the example of George Lawton, an official of the provincial court of York, was not followed. His *Collections for the Dioceses of York and Ripon*, at the time of the formation of the latter, brought together a most useful series of miscellaneous historical notes from original documents, systematically arranged under parishes and chapelries within their deaneries and archdeaconries, and supplying much necessary information with regard to peculiar jurisdictions.

IX

The history of doctrine inevitably takes its place among the subjects with which ecclesiastical history deals. The growth of dogma and the controversy between orthodoxy and heresy, if they do not absorb the internal history of the Church, are no small part of it: moreover, they have their profound

influence upon the outer world. This is specially true of the age of the great Councils which, with their definitions of doctrine, form landmarks in the progress of a Church as yet undivided in spite of the growing discord between Rome and Constantinople. Histories of this period are numerous, and the questions at issue and their bearing upon the general life of the day have received classical treatment in Gibbon's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*. His detached and ironical attitude to dissensions over what to him were trivial matters enabled him to present a picture which, if unsympathetic, is free from partisan passion. The ecclesiastical historian is not necessarily a theologian, but he needs at any rate to be able to present doctrinal points clearly and dispassionately and demonstrate their importance, both with respect to the organisation of ecclesiastical polity and to the inward and spiritual growth of the Church. And it may be said of Gibbon that, while he was thoroughly conscious of the Christian Church as a power in worldly affairs, his conception of its spiritual functions and their significance in human life was very limited. It is not necessary, again, for an ecclesiastical historian to be a Christian, but, even though his interest in Christianity is, as Gibbon's was, merely objective, we may demand of him some consciousness of those inner forces which guided the Christian life and gave special emphasis to its piety and devotion.

This aspect of ecclesiastical history is so obvious that little stress need be laid upon it. One famous example will serve to illustrate our meaning. It is quite possible to treat the most remarkable, and indeed the dominant feature of mediaeval Church history, the growth of the power of the papacy and the doctrinal system from which it is inseparable, as the result of fortuitous political circumstances in which the popes were able to take advantage of their position as guardians of the traditions of imperial Rome to build up a monarchy and develop ambitions for dominion over the temporal power founded upon the positive assertion of dubious claims and the production of forged documents. So deeply rooted is human impatience of anything that tends to control freedom of thought that from such premises formidable arraignments can be and have been constructed. From the point of view of an age in

which historical criticism is infinitely more advanced than it was in the Middle Ages, it is easy to discover weak points in papal claims and methods and to discern the influence of overwhelming ambition in the system of Christian dogma which was pronounced as the faith of the Church by Innocent III at the Lateran Council of 1215. Yet the study of the history of the development of that system shows that it cannot be explained away by a simple formula, but that with it is associated closely the progress of civilisation and social order and of ideals and standards of conduct which meet the needs of the human heart unembarrassed by selfish aims. One of the objects of history, and especially of ecclesiastical history, is to trace the efforts of man, in that phrase of Bishop Wilson's which Matthew Arnold made familiar, 'to make reason and the will of God prevail,' and from those efforts the early mediaeval papacy can no more be excluded than any of those organisations or individuals whose spiritual enthusiasm has in later ages been less entangled with political objects.

The discussion of doctrine on its own merits is the business of the theologian. On the other hand, the cardinal doctrines on which the great religious bodies of the world found their beliefs and their constitutions can never be wholly dissociated from history: their proclamation and their modifications are determined by and in their turn go far to determine the course of religious history. The contest between the predestinarian and the advocate of free will, the controversy that has raged round the Sacrament of the Altar, are no mere academic discussions. They have deeply affected the life of the Church, and for this reason they are of importance to the historian.

It has been possible in these pages to touch only the fringe of a great subject and to deal with it from what is necessarily a limited point of view. Christian archaeology and liturgical study might well be added to the subjects with which the historian should be conversant, and from these the way to the special study of ecclesiastical art and architecture is obvious. As the discovery and publication of sources proceeds, the field grows wider and wider, the intimate relation between its various parts is more apparent, and, the less manageable the material becomes, the more it demands of the student. We live in an

age when the results of past scholarship are being scanned with microscopic minuteness, when dictionaries and encyclopaedias are summing up the fruits of such examination. It is an age in which the comprehensive narrative histories of the past are beyond the power of single writers and in which the patient worker is obliged to concentrate himself upon some limited area of research which he may hope to make all his own. But, whatever his special line may be, the methods by which he approaches it are the same, and there are certain general considerations which the student of ecclesiastical history must bring to his special work and certain general groups of sources which he is obliged to consult.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

GENERAL CHURCH HISTORIES

- BARONIUS, C. : *Annales Ecclesiastici*. 19 vols. Lucca, 1738-46. Continued after 1198 to 1565 by RAYNALDUS, O. 15 vols., ed. MANSI, G. D. Lucca, 1747-56. From 1565 to 1572 by LADERCHI, G. 3 vols. Rome, 1728-37. From 1572 to 1585 by THEINER, A. 3 vols. Rome, 1856.
- BAUR, F. C. V. : *Geschichte der christlichen Kirche*. 5 vols. Tübingen, 1853-62.
- DEANESLY, M. : *History of the Mediaeval Church, 590-1500*. 1925.
- DUCHESNE, L. : *Histoire ancienne de l'Église*. 5th edn., 3 vols. 1911-24. English trans., 3 vols. 1912-24. Followed by *L'Église au sixième siècle*. 1925.
- HAUCK, A. : *Kirchengeschichte Deutschlands*. 4 vols. and Vol. 5, Part 1. Leipzig, 1896-1911.
- HERGENRÖTHER, J. (Cardinal) : *Handbuch der allgemeinen Kirchengeschichte*. 4th edn., 3 vols. Freiburg-im-Breisgau, 1902-9.
- KIDD, B. J. : *History of the Church to A.D. 461*. 3 vols. Oxford, 1922. Supplemented by *Documents illustrative of the History of the Christian Church*. 2 vols. Oxford, 1922-3.
- MILMAN, H. H. : *History of Christianity*. 3 vols., new edn., 1867.
- *History of Latin Christianity*. 9 vols., 4th edn., 1867.
- MOELLER, W. : *History of the Christian Church* (trans. RUTHERFURD, A., and FREESE, J. H.). 3 vols. 1892-1900. (Vol I, A.D. 1-600; Vol II, Middle Ages; Vol. III, Reformation to 1648.)
- MOSHEIM, J. L. V. : *Institutes of Ecclesiastical History* (trans. MURDOCK, A., and SOAMES, H., 2nd revised edn., 4 vols., 1850).
- ROBERTSON, J. C. : *History of the Christian Church*. New edn., 8 vols. 1874-5.

DICTIONARIES AND ENCYCLOPAEDIAS

Dictionary of Christian Antiquities, ed. SMITH, W., and CHEETHAM, S. 2 vols. 1875-80.

Dictionary of Christian Biography, Literature, Sects and Doctrines, ed. SMITH, W., and WACE, H. 4 vols. 1877-87. (From the Apostolic Age to the Age of Charlemagne.)

Dictionnaire d'archéologie chrétienne et de liturgie, ed. CABROL, F., and LECLERCQ, H. Vols. 1-13. Paris, 1903-38.

Dictionnaire d'histoire et de géographie ecclésiastiques, ed. BAUDRILLART, A., etc. 1912, etc.

The Catholic Encyclopedia. 17 vols. New York, 1913-22.

MIGNE, J. P.: *Encyclopédie théologique*. Sér. I, 50 vols.; Sér. II, 52 vols.; Sér. III, 66 vols. 1844-66.

MANUALS OF CHRONOLOGY, ETC.

L'art de vérifier les dates, ed. SAINT-ALLAIS and others. Vols. 1-5, 1818-19. Continuation from 1770 to 1837. 4 vols. 1821-38.

BRESSLAU, H.: *Handbuch der Urkundenlehre für Deutschland und Italien*. 2nd edn. 2 vols. 1889-1915.

CAPPELLI, A.: *Cronologia, Cronografia e Calendario perpetuo*. 2nd edn. Milan, 1930.

COLLINS, W. E. (Bishop of Gibraltar): *The Study of Ecclesiastical History*. 1903.

GIRY, A.: *Manuel de diplomatique*. 2 vols. Paris, 1925.

JENKINS, C.: *Ecclesiastical Records* (in S.P.C.K. *Helps to History*). 1920.

MAS LATRIE, J. M. J. LOUIS DE: *Trésor de chronologie*. Paris, 1889.

NICOLAS, SIR H.: *Chronology of History*. 2nd edn., 1838. (Still the best English handbook of this kind, with lists of popes and councils, feasts of saints, etc.)

POTTHAST, A.: *Bibliotheca historica medii aevi*. 2nd edn. 2 vols. Berlin, 1896.

COLLECTIONS OF ECCLESIASTICAL LITERATURE

MIGNE, J. P.: *Patrologiae Cursus completus*. (a) *Patrologia Latina*, 217 vols. Paris, 1844-55. Vols. 218-21, containing indices, 1862-4. (b) *Patrologia Graeca*, 161 vols. in 166. Paris 1857-1904. (These collections contain the works of the Fathers and of theologians and historians up to the year 1215.)

In addition to this definitely ecclesiastical collection, many ecclesiastical works of importance are included in such series as the *Monumenta Germaniae Historica*; BOUQUET, M.: *Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France*, 23 vols., Paris, 1738-1876, and MURATORI, L. A.: *Rerum Italicarum scriptores*.

See also—

ACHERY, L. D': *Spicilegium, sive Collectio veterum aliquot scriptorum qui in Galliae bibliothecis delituerant*. 3 vols. Paris, 1723.

- BALUZE, E. : *Miscellanea novo ordine digesta et aucta op.* MANSI, G. D.
4 vols. Lucca, 1761-4.
MARTÈNE, E., and DURAND, U. : *Thesaurus novus anecdotorum.* 5 vols.
Paris, 1717.
Acta Sanctorum Bollandiana. Brussels, 1643, etc. (Present edn. in
progress. 68 vols. Brussels, etc. 1863-1925.)

ECCLESIASTICAL COUNCILS

General History

- HEFELE, C. J. v. (Bishop of Rottenburg, 1869-93), continued by HERGEN-
RÖTHER, J. (Cardinal), *Conciliengeschichte*, Vols. 1-9 in 10.
Freiburg-im-Breisgau, 1855-90. English trans., Vols. 1-5,
1871-96. The French trans., ed. LECLERCQ, H. Vols. 1-9 in
18, and Vol. 10, Part 1, Paris, 1907-38, is also intended to be
a continuation of the work.

For a compendious account and summary of the proceedings of
general and other councils, see LANDON, E. H. : *A Manual of Councils
of the Holy Catholic Church.* Edinburgh, new edn., 2 vols., 1909.

Collections of Texts

- LABBE, P., and COSSART, C. : *Sacrosancta Concilia.* Vols. 1-21. Venice,
1728-33. Supplement, ed. MANSI, G. D. 6 vols. Venice,
1748-52.
MANSI, G. D. (Archbishop of Lucca, 1764-69) : *Sacrorum Conciliorum
nova et amplissima collectio.* Vols. 1-31, 1758-98. New edn. with
continuation (ed. MARTIN, J. B. and PETIT, L.) from 1438 to
1870. Vols. 1-53. Paris and Leipzig, 1901-27.
TURNER, C. H. ed. : *Ecclesiae Occidentalis Monumenta Iuris antiquissima.*
2 vols. in 5 parts. Oxford, 1899-1913. (Latin texts of the
acts and canons of the Council of Nicaea and other early fourth-
century Councils.)

British Councils

- SPELMAN, SIR H. : *Concilia. Decreta, Leges, Constitutiones in re ecclesiarum
orbis Britannici.* 2 vols. 1639-64.
WILKINS, D. : *Concilia Magnae Britanniae et Hiberniae*, 446-717.
4 vols. 1737.
HADDAN, A. W., and STUBBS, W. : *Councils and Ecclesiastical Documents
relating to Great Britain and Ireland, edited after Spelman and
Wilkins.* 3 vols. in 4. Oxford, 1869-78. (Takes the place of
the earlier collections for England as far as the Norman Conquest,
for Scotland and Ireland to 1188, and for Wales to 1295.)

THE PAPACY

- BARRACLOUGH, G. : *Papal Provisions.* Oxford, 1935.
CREIGHTON, M. (Bishop of London, 1896-1901) : *History of the Papacy
during the period of the Reformation.* New edn., 6 vols., 1897.

- GREGOROVIVS, F.: *Geschichte der Stadt Rom im Mittelalter*. 4th edn., 8 vols. Stuttgart, 1886-94. English trans. by HAMILTON, A. 8 vols. in 11. 1894-1902.
- GRISAR, H.: *Geschichte Roms und der Päpste im Mittelalter*. Freiburg-im-Breisgau. Vol. I, 190. English trans. 3 vols. 1911-12.
- MANN, H. K.: *Lives of the Popes in the Middle Ages*. Vols. I-XV. (Vols. I-XX, 2nd edn.) 1925-9. (Goes down to 1276.)
- NIELSEN, F. K. (Bishop of Aarhus): *History of the Papacy in the Nineteenth Century*. English trans. 2 vols. 1906.
- PASTOR, L.: *Geschichte der Päpste seit dem Ausgang des Mittelalters*. Vols. I-XVI, Part iii. Freiburg-im-Breisgau. 1886-1933. English trans. by ANTROBUS, F. I., and others. Vols. I-XXIX. 1891-1938.
- RANKE, L. V.: *Die römischen Päpste, ihre Kirche und ihr Staat im 16 und 17 Jahrhundert*. 3 vols. Leipzig, 1834-36. English trans. by FOSTER, E. 3 vols. 1847-53.
- Liber Pontificalis*, ed. DUCHESNE, L. 2 vols. Paris, 1884-92.

Biographies of individual Popes are numerous. Of those which deal fully with the relation of their subjects to the life and history of their day outstanding examples are DUDDEN, F. H.: *Gregory the Great*, 2 vols., 1905, and LUCHAIRE, A.: *Innocent III*, 6 vols. Paris, 1906-11.

PAPAL DOCUMENTS

- Magnum Bullarium Romanum*, 8 vols. (to 1730). Luxemburg, 1727. Continued to 1757, 11 vols. in 8. Luxemburg, 1730-58. Continued to 1835, 19 vols. in 13. Rome, 1735-57.
- JAFFÉ, P.: *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum ab condita Ecclesia ad a. 1198*. 2nd edn. by WATTENBACH, W., and others. 2 vols. Leipzig, 1885-8.
- KEHR, P. F.: *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*: (a) Italia Pontificia, Vols. 1-8, Berlin, 1906-35; (b) Germania Pontificia, Vols. 1-3, 1911-35.
- POTTHAST, A.: *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum (1198-1304)*. Berlin, 1874-5.
- THEINER, A.: *Codex diplomaticus domini temporalis Sanctae Sedis. Recueil de documents, etc., extraits des archives du Vatican*. 3 vols. Rome, 1861-2.

The correspondence of most of the early mediaeval Popes, including many bulls and official documents, will be found included in MIGNE: *Patrologia Latina* (see Collections of Eccles. Literature) and MANSI: *Concilia* (see Ecclesiastical Councils). The Registers of certain Popes are in process of publication: see *Régistres de Grégoire IX*, ed. AUVRAY, L., 2 vols., Paris, 1896-1907; *Régistres de Nicolas III*, ed. GAY, J., fasc. 1-3, Paris, 1898-1916; *Régistres de Clément IV*, ed. JORDAN, E., Vol. I, 1893-1912.

HISTORY OF CHURCH OF ENGLAND

General History

- STEPHENS, W. R. W., and HUNT, W., ed. *A History of the Church of England*. 9 vols. Vol. I. HUNT, W.: From its Foundations to the Norman Conquest (597-1066). 1899. Vol. II. STEPHENS, W. R. W.: From the Conquest to the Accession of Edward I (1066-1272). 1904. Vol. III. CAPES, W. W.: In the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries. 1900. Vol. IV. GAIRDNER, J.: From the Accession of Henry VIII to the Death of Mary (1509-1558). 1904. Vol. V. FRERE, W. H.: In the Reigns of Elizabeth and James I. 1904. Vol. VI. HUTTON, W. H.: From the Accession of Charles I to the Death of Anne (1625-1714). 1908. Vol. VII. OVERTON, J. H., and RELTON, F.: From the Accession of George I to the end of the Eighteenth Century (1714-1800). 1924. Vols. VIII, IX. CORNISH, F. W.: In the Nineteenth Century. 2 vols. 1910.
- WAKEMAN, H. O.: *Introduction to the History of the Church of England*. 5th edn. 1898.

Organisation, Institutions, etc.

- CHURCHILL, I. J.: *Canterbury Administration*. 2 vols. 1933. (A study of provincial and diocesan administration, founded upon the archiepiscopal records at Lambeth.)
- GEE, H., and HARDY, W. J.: *Documents Illustrative of English Church History*. 1896.
- HILL, G.: *The English Dioceses*. 1900. (A carefully documented account of the formation and limits of dioceses up to the end of the nineteenth century.)

A useful series of *Diocesan Histories*, somewhat varying in value, but with some excellent volumes, was published by the S.P.C.K. from 1881 onwards, including separate histories of most of the English and Welsh dioceses.

- LE NEVE, J.: *Fasti Ecclesiae Anglicanae*, ed. and augmented by HARDY, T. D. 3 vols. Oxford, 1854. (Lists of bishops and dignitaries and canons of English and Welsh cathedral churches. The lists for several churches are incomplete, chiefly as regards the pre-Reformation period.)
- STUBBS, W.: *Registrum Sacrum Anglicanum*. 2nd edn. Oxford, 1897. (A register of consecrations of English and Welsh bishops, arranged chronologically with names of consecrators. To the 2nd edn. are added similar details of the consecrations of colonial and missionary bishops.)

To this section may be added the two surveys of benefices, both published by the Records Commission.

- Taxatio Ecclesiastica Anglie et Wallie, c. 1291*, ed. ASTLE, T., AYSCOUGH, S., and CALEY, J. 1802.

Valor Ecclesiasticus, temp. Henry VIII, ed. CALEY, J., and HUNTER, J. 6 vols. 1810-34.

See also ECTON, J.: *Thesaurus rerum ecclesiasticarum*, 1742, reprinted and somewhat augmented by J. BACON, with the title *Liber Regis*, 1786. (Lists of benefices arranged in dioceses, archdeaconries and rural deaneries with valuations from the *Valor Ecclesiasticus* and information with regard to patronage, impropriations, etc.)

Collections of Documents, Chronicles, etc.

The Rolls Series of *Chronicles and Memorials* is as valuable for ecclesiastical as for secular history, containing many volumes which deal with the history of special churches and monasteries. A good example is *Historians of the Church of York*, ed. RAINE, J., 3 vols., 1879-94, the third volume of which is a collection of documents, chiefly from local sources.

Much ecclesiastical information can be gained from the various series of Calendars of Rolls and State Papers in the Public Records. The *Calendars of entries in the Papal Registers referring to Great Britain and Ireland*, in progress, are of the utmost value for the light which they throw upon the relations between the English Church and the Papacy before the Reformation. The *Calendars of Patent Rolls* contain constant records of licences for the appropriation of churches, foundation of colleges and chantries, presentations to benefices, proceedings in connexion with vacant sees and dignities in religious houses, etc., which make them an indispensable source of consultation where the relations between the Church and the Crown are concerned. For the Reformation period the great series of *Letters and Papers* of the reign of Henry VIII are equally indispensable. Further, such collections of miscellaneous documents as RYMER'S *Foedera*, while giving full texts of letters patent, etc., are otherwise useful for ecclesiastical purposes.

Among the publications of Record Societies and the Archaeological Societies of various counties editions of ecclesiastical documents take a large part. An interesting variety, for example, may be found in the publications of the Surtees and Camden Societies. One special feature of recent progress has been the advance made in the publication of episcopal registers, a purpose for which the Canterbury and York Society has been in existence for nearly forty years, and to which other societies have made substantial contributions.

Works dealing with Special Subjects and Periods

ABBEY, C. J.: *The English Church and its Bishops, 1700-1800*. 1887.
— and OVERTON, J. H.: *The English Church in the Eighteenth Century*. 2 vols. 1875. New edn., 1896.

BLUNT, J. H.: *The Reformation of the Church of England, its History, Principles and Results (1514-1662)*. 2 vols. 1869-82. New edn., 1896-7.

BRIGHT, W.: *Chapters of early English Church History*. 3rd edn., Oxford, 1897.

- BURNET, G. (Bishop of Salisbury, 1689-1715): *History of the Reformation*, ed. POCKOCK, N. 7 vols. Oxford, 1865.
- CUTTS, E. L.: *Parish Priests and their People in the Middle Ages*. (An excellent popular but learned account of Church life, founded on material taken from original sources.)
- DIXON, R. W.: *History of the Church of England from the abolition of the Roman Jurisdiction*. 6 vols. 1878-1902. Vols. V and VI were posthumous, ed. GEE, H.
- DODD, C. (TOOTELL, H.): *Church History of England from the year 1500 to the year 1688*, ed. TIERNEY, M.A. 5 vols. 1839, etc. (A history of the Reformation from the Roman Catholic point of view, with copious appendices of original documents.)
- FOX, J.: *Acts and Monuments*, ed. CATTLEY, S. R., with dissertation by TOWNSEND, G. 8 vols. 1837-41. 4th edn. with introduction by STOUGHTON, J. 1877.
- FULLER, T.: *Church History of Britain*, ed. BREWER, J. S. 6 vols. Oxford, 1845.
- GASQUET, F. A. (Cardinal): *Parish Life in the Middle Ages*. 1898.
- HOOK, W. F.: *Lives of the Archbishops of Canterbury*. 12 vols. 1860-76. (From St. Augustine to William Laud.)
- A series of Lives of the Archbishops of York, under the title *Fasti Eboracenses*, was begun by DIXON, W. H., and edited by RAINE, J., but did not proceed beyond the first vol. (1863), covering the period 625-1388.
- LECHLER, G.: *Johann v. Wiclif und die Vorgeschichte der Reformation*. 2 vols. Leipzig, 1873.
- A more recent English work on the same subject is by WORKMAN, H. B.: *John Wyclif, a study of the English Mediaeval Church*. 2 vols. Oxford, 1926.
- OVERTON, J. H.: *Life in the English Church, 1660-1714*. 1885. See also ABBEY, C. J.
- SHAW, W. H.: *A History of the English Church during the Civil Wars and under the Commonwealth, 1640-1660*. 2 vols. 1900.
- STRYPE, J.: *Memorials of Cranmer*. 1694. New edn., 2 vols. Oxford, 1840.
- *Life of Sir John Cheke*. Oxford, 1821.
- *Life of Aylmer*. Oxford, 1822.
- *Life and Acts of Matthew Parker*. 3 vols. Oxford, 1821.
- *Life and Acts of Whitgift*. 3 vols. Oxford, 1822.
- *General Index*. 2 vols. Oxford, 1828.
- SYKES, N.: *Church and State in England in the Eighteenth Century*. Cambridge, 1934.
- WAKE, W. (Archbishop of Canterbury, 1716-37): *State of the Church of England*. 1703. (Answer to Atterbury's *Rights, etc.*, of Convocation. 1700.)
- WHARTON, H.: *Anglia Sacra*. 2 parts. 1691. (A collection of chronicles and biographies of English archbishops and bishops to 1540.)

CHURCHES OF SCOTLAND AND IRELAND

- BELLESHEIM, A.: *Geschichte der katholischen Kirche in Schottland*. 2 vols. Mainz, 1883. English trans. by BLAIR, D. H. 4 vols. 1887-90.
- *Geschichte der katholischen Kirche in Irland von der Einführung des Christenthums bis auf die Gegenwart*. 3 vols. Mainz, 1890-1.
- COTTON, H.: *Fasti Ecclesiae Hibernicae*. 5 vols. and supplement. Dublin, 1848-78.
- DOWDEN, J. (Bishop of Edinburgh, 1886-1910): *The Bishops of Scotland*. Glasgow, 1912.
- PHILLIPS, W. A., ed. *History of the Church of Ireland*. 3 vols. 1933.
- STORY, R. H.: *History of the Church of Scotland*. 5 vols. n.d.

HISTORY OF DOGMA, PHILOSOPHY, ETC.

- CARLYLE, R. W., and A. J.: *History of Mediaeval Political Theory*. 6 vols. 1903-36.
- HARNACK, C. G. A.: *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*. 3rd edn. 3 vols. Freiburg-im-Breisgau, 1894-7. English trans. 7 vols. 1899.
- HAURÉAU, B.: *Histoire de la philosophie scholastique*. 2 vols. in 3. Paris, 1872-80.
- LOOFS, F.: *Leitfaden zum Studium der Dogmengeschichte*. 4th edn. Halle, 1906.
- POOLE, R. L.: *Illustrations of mediaeval thought in theology and ecclesiastical politics*. 1884. 2nd edn. revised 1920.
- TIXERONT, L. J.: *Histoire des dogmes dans l'antiquité chrétienne*. Vols. 1-3, latest edns., Paris, 1928-31.
- DE WULF, M.: *History of Mediaeval Philosophy*, trans. MESSENGER, E. C. 2 vols. 1926.

ECCLESIASTICAL LAW

- Corpus Juris Canonici*, ed. FRIEDBERG, E. Vol. I, *Decretum*; Vol. II, *Decretales Greg. IX, Liber Sextus, Constitutiones Clementinae, Extravagantes*. Leipzig, 1879-81. (Revised and augmented edition of that by RICHTER, E. I. 2 vols. Leipzig, 1839.)
- LYNDWOOD, W. (Bishop of St. David's, 1442-6): *Provinciale . . . cui adjiciuntur Constitutiones legatinae Othonis et Ottoboni*. Oxford, 1679. (The provincial constitutions of the Archbishops of Canterbury, with commentary, first printed, 1496, supplemented by the legatine constitutions of 1237 and 1268 with the commentary of JOHN OF AYTON.)
- GIBSON, E. (Bishop of London, 1723-48): *Codex Juris Ecclesiae Anglicanae*. 2 vols. 1713. 2nd edn. Oxford, 1761.
- JOHNSON, J.: *Collection of the Laws and Canons of the Church of England*. New edn., 2 vols. 1850-1. (Originally published, 1720. Translations from originals.)
- MAITLAND, F. W.: *Roman Canon Law in the Church of England*. Cambridge, 1898.

See also BROOKE, Z. N.: *The English Church and the Papacy*. Cambridge, 1931. (A detailed study of the period 1060-1200, from the point of view of Canon Law.)

MAKOWER, F.: *Constitutional History of the Church of England*. 1895. (English translation from German, well annotated and documented.)

Most valuable for the history of ecclesiastical law in general and in detail is the great German work of HINSCHIUS, P.: *Das Kirchenrecht der Katholiken und Protestanten in Deutschland*. 5 vols. and Vol. 6, Part 1 (unfinished). Berlin, 1869-97.

LISTS OF BISHOPS, ABBOTS, ETC.

EUBEL, C.: *Hierarchia catholica medii [et recentioris] aevi*. 4 vols. Münster, 1898-1935. (From 1198 to 1667, lists drawn from the papal registers and other archives. Vol. IV, ed. by GAUCHAT, P.)

GAMS, P. B.: *Series episcoporum Ecclesiae Catholicae*. Ratisbon, 1873. Supplement, 1886.

See also sub-tit. Churches of Scotland and Ireland, COTTON, DOWDEN; Church of England, LE NEVE, STUBBS.

UGHELLI, F.: *Italia Sacra, sive de episcopis Italiae et insularum adjacentium*. 9 vols. Rome, 1644-62. This work formed the model, on the advice of Cardinal Richelieu, for the similar but more inclusive *Gallia Christiana in provinciis ecclesiasticis distributa*. 16 vols., Paris, 1715-1865, of which the first 4 vols. were ed. by STE-MARTHE, D. DE, Vols. 5-13 by monks of St. Maur, and the last 3 vols. by HAURÉAU, B.

Collections of this sort exist for several European countries and provinces, but on no uniform principle. *España Sagrada*, ed. FLOREZ, E., RISCO, M., and others, 51 vols. in 52, 1754-1879, contains, in addition to biographical lists, elaborate dissertations on the origin and history of certain dioceses with other miscellaneous subjects.

THE EASTERN CHURCH

BURY, J. B.: *History of the later Roman Empire from Arcadius to Irene (395-800)*. 2 vols. 1889. New edn. (395-565). 2 vols. 1923.
— *History of the Eastern Roman Empire from the fall of Irene to the accession of Basil I (892-861)*. 1912.

FORTESCUE, A.: *The Holy Orthodox Eastern Church, 1911*. (Written from the Roman Catholic point of view. A most useful compendium of information, supplemented by the same author's *The Lesser Eastern Churches*. 1913.)

GIBBON, E.: *History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ed. BURY, J. B. Latest edn., 7 vols., 1909-14.

HERGENRÖTHER, J. (Cardinal): *Photius Patriarch von Konstantinopel*. 3 vols. Ratisbon, 1867-9.

NEALE, J. M.: *History of the Eastern Church*. 5 vols. 1847-73.

PITRA, J. B. F. (Cardinal): *Juris ecclesiastici Graecorum historia et monumenta*. 2 vols. Rome, 1864-8.

THEINER, A.: *Moumenta spectantia ad unionem Ecclesiarum Graecae et Romanae*. Vienna, 1872.

MONASTICISM

BUTLER, C.: *Benedictine monachism, studies in Benedictine life and rule*. 1919.

COULTON, G. G.: *Five centuries of Religion*. Vols. I-III. Cambridge, 1923-36.

DUGDALE, SIR W. (and DODSWORTH, R.): *Monasticon Anglicanum*. 3 vols. 1665-73. New edn. by CALEY, J., ELLIS, H., and BANDINEL, B. 6 vols. in 8. 1817-30.

HEIMBUCHER, M.: *Die Orden und Kongregationen der katholische Kirche*. New rev. edn. 2 vols. Paderborn, 1933-4.

HÉLYOT, P., and BULLOT, M.: *Histoire des Ordres monastiques, religieuses et militaires*. 8 vols. Paris, 1714-19.

JANAUSCHEK, P. L.: *Originum Cisterciensium*, tom. I. Vienna, 1877.

MABILLON, J.: *Annales ordinis S. Benedicti*. 6 vols. Paris, 1703-39. (Continued by MASSUET, R. and MARTENE, E.)

MABILLON, J., and ACHERY, L. D': *Acta sanctorum ordinis S. Benedicti (500-1100)*. 9 vols. Paris, 1733-8.

MARRIER, M., and DUCHESNE (Quercetanus), A.: *Bibliotheca Cluniacensis*. Paris, 1614. New edn., Mâcon, 1915.

MONTALEMBERT, C. F. R. DE: *Les moines d'occident depuis Saint-Benoît jusqu'à Saint-Bernard*. 7 vols. Paris, 1860-77. English trans., with introd. by GASQUET, F. A. (Cardinal). 6 vols. 1896.

PARIS, J., ed. *Nomasticon Cisterciense*. Paris, 1664. New edn. by SÉJALON, H. Solesmes, 1892.

SACKUR, E.: *Die Cluniacenser in ihrer kirchlichen und allgemeingeschichtlichen Wirksamkeit bis zur Mitte des XIten Jahrhunderts*. 2 vols. Halle, 1892-4.

VACANDARD, E.: *Vie de Saint-Bernard*. 2 vols. Paris, 1895.

LITURGY

BATIFFOL, P.: *Histoire du bréviaire romain*. 3rd edn. Paris, 1911. English trans. by BAYLAY, A. M. Y. 1902.

BISHOP, E.: *Liturgica historica: papers on the liturgy and religious life of the Western Church*. Oxford, 1918.

CABROL, F.: *Introduction aux études liturgiques*. Paris, 1907.

DUCHESNE, L.: *Origines du culte chrétien: étude sur la liturgie latine avant Charlemagne*. Paris, 1889.

X
MORAL THEOLOGY

by
KENNETH E. KIRK, D.D.
Bishop of Oxford

‘ In a world in which most people think anything is allowable to them, the Puritan’s voice is scarcely noticed. But the moral theologian, who has scrutinised carefully every argument in favour of relaxing a precept and then says, “ Nevertheless, it may not be relaxed,” can meet them on their own ground.’

Page 368.

X

MORAL THEOLOGY

I

MORAL theology, in the broadest sense, is the study of Christian conduct : the exploration of its principles, and the application of those principles to the problems of duty with which from time to time we are all faced. It is based upon the example and teaching of our Lord and the running commentary upon that teaching contained in the books of the New Testament, and gradually draws a picture of the Christian character, with all its gifts and graces, to which a man may turn for guidance and inspiration wherever he finds himself in need or at fault.

If this were all, however, moral theology would obviously be identical with Christian ethics. Originally, in fact, the two must have been one study. But what is technically known as moral theology took a peculiar turn of its own at a very early date, and gained a distinctive character which has set it over against Christian ethics as an allied but special study. It is all-important to appreciate this point fairly, as otherwise all text-books of moral theology will be misunderstood, and, indeed, will take on a sinister and suspicious appearance which they do not really deserve. The simplest way of describing this distinctive characteristic of moral theology is to say that it is concerned not so much with the highest standards of Christian conduct (that is perhaps the special province of Christian ethics) as with the *minimum* standard to which conduct must attain if it is to be adjudged worthy of the name 'Christian' at all.

To many people this whole idea of there being a minimum standard of Christian conduct is horribly repellent. There can only be one standard, they say, and that the highest. This has been the Puritan watchword throughout history,

and it is the reason why Puritanism has never flourished for long except in the form of obscure and tiny sects. For in practice we must have minimum standards as well as maximum ideals. The missionary does not wait to baptise his converts until they have achieved the heights of sanctity. He baptises them as soon as they have conformed to certain definite principles (as, for example, the abjuring of polygamy) and show some promise of persevering in good works. Similarly, in those churches in which the public discipline of the believer still survives, it is not to be assumed that everyone who has not been excommunicated is a perfect Christian. But we can say for certain that those who are excommunicated have been adjudged (rightly or wrongly) to have fallen below even the minimum degree of moral worth which is compatible with the name of Christian. There may be a good many others who have only escaped excommunication by a narrow margin. But for some reason or other their pastors have thought them worthy of another chance ; whilst to the excommunicate they have refused that chance, at all events until manifest signs of repentance have been exhibited.¹

What the missionary and the pastor want to know is, where is the line to be drawn which is to separate the unbaptised from the baptised, the excommunicate from the communicant ? Moral theology is the study which attempts to guide them in the task. It is, therefore, a severely practical study. But it often happens that neither the missionary nor the pastor has any choice in the matter, because the legislative authority of the Church to which they belong has already laid down very clear directions. These directions appertain really to the province of canon law ; and therefore moral theology consists in part at least, of reproducing the precepts of canon law. Of course, the moral theologian may quarrel with the decisions of canon law on any particular subject. If so, there is material for reopening the discussion ; and it will depend upon the degree of awe with which the missionary and the pastor regard

¹ This is the ultimate basis of one of the most famous and yet most perplexing distinctions of moral theology—that between ‘counsels’ and ‘precepts.’ I have dealt with the various forms, valid and invalid, which this distinction can take in my *Vision of God* (complete edition), and must refer any reader who wishes to know more of the matter to my treatment of it there.

the authority of the canon law whether they will listen to a moral theologian's arguments in the opposite sense. All that matters for our purposes is that text-books of moral theology will constantly be found to overlap with text-books of canon law.

At the same time, there are many points upon which moral theology does not draw from the canonist. Law can only deal with overt actions, but such actions constitute only a small part of what we call Christian conduct. Canon law can tell the missionary not to baptise anyone who by his actions or words exhibits hatred of some one else. But it cannot very well forbid him to baptise anyone who in fact hates his neighbour, but does not betray his hatred as yet by any such words or actions. That would be to lay an impossible task upon the missionary ; for how should he know for certain what is in the heart of another ? Hence canon law very rarely goes into niceties of this kind ; it contents itself with stigmatising actions. But the missionary may have a candidate for baptism who admits that he hates his neighbour, though he has never shown his hatred in any open way, and does make a certain effort to overcome it. Is he to be baptised or told to wait ? Canon law will not help here ; moral theology at all events attempts to do so.

All the more is this the case in those branches of the Christian Church in which resort is made on a large scale to the confessional. The priest's duty is to give absolution where true penitence is manifest. But what are the tests of true penitence ? There have always been heretical or semi-heretical sects which have said that nothing less than public acknowledgement of guilt will suffice. But even if we were to grant this simple-minded proposition as a general rule, we should still ask whether in certain cases—those, for example, in which public confession by A would involve B in great distress or danger—some lesser test would not be adequate, and thereby entitle him who passed it to receive absolution. Once again, canon law rarely professes to deal with such problems, at all events if the offence or offences concerned are not overt in character. It is to his moral theology that the confessor looks for guidance.

What has been said suggests that moral theology, if its distinctive mark is that of attempting to decide the minimum

standard of conduct which can legitimately be called Christian, is of use only in the legalistic atmosphere of churches whose disciplinary side (whether public or private, or both) is highly developed. But it is important to observe that this is not the case. The fact is that all of us, without exception, give a good deal of attention to this task of establishing the minimum standard; all of us, therefore, have something to learn from moral theology strictly so-called.

For most of the moral problems which we have to solve for ourselves, or upon which others ask us to advise them, exhibit a common form. There is something I want to do; I know (perhaps from canon law) that in a good many cases I ought not to do it; but is it not possible that in this particular case (because of something unusual in the circumstances) I might be allowed to do it? Thus the question presents itself in the form 'Can I . . . ?' or 'May I . . . ?' do so and so; or even 'Need I . . . ?' do the opposite. What we have to notice is that none of these questions asks what is the highest or most heroic thing that I might do. They all imply that what I really want to know is whether I can do the thing I want to do consistently with the minimum obligations I recognise as a Christian.

Now it may often, of course, be very wrong for me to put the question in this form at all. But only the Puritan will say I ought *never* to put it thus. For we all recognise a range of actions which, without being our duty, we call 'innocent' or 'legitimate' or 'harmless.' It cannot often be my *duty* to play tennis on a Sunday afternoon. But most people think it may sometimes be harmless or legitimate; and in that case the question 'May I play tennis this afternoon, as I have been to Church this morning?' is not in itself an unchristian one to ask. That is not to say that the proper answer is 'Yes.' It might quite well be the case that I have promised to take someone else's Sunday School class for them, but have momentarily forgotten it. In that case the question would still be one of which I need not be ashamed; but the answer would be 'No: you must keep your promise.'

This illustration, of course, is a very trivial one; but it serves to show how natural we find it to ask questions which in effect demand a determination of the minimum standard of

Christian conduct in this direction or that. Tennis on Sunday afternoon would, as we have said, rarely be regarded as the Christian's highest duty. Tennis every Sunday afternoon might for some people be definitely sinful. The question is, Will it be (if not my highest duty) at all events not sinful *this* Sunday afternoon?

It must be confessed that a multitude of questions such as these leave a bad taste behind them. They suggest that we are more eager to establish our rights than to discern our duties; that we are likely to be content with the minimum standard instead of pressing on to the highest; that we are preoccupied rather with the idea of avoiding sin than with that of realising ideals. Yet often enough such questions have to be asked. Thus, there may be no time in which to decide what my actual duty is; or there may not be enough evidence upon which to reach a fair decision. In either of these cases something will be gained if I know that at all events such-and-such a course (though perhaps if I had time to think the matter out, and evidence enough to go on, I should discover that it was not the best I could take) will not be positively wrong—that I *may*, or am not absolutely forbidden to, take it. No doubt we ought to habituate ourselves to think far more in terms of what is our duty, and far less in terms of what is allowable, than we do. But what matters at present is that we recognise that sometimes, and perhaps, often, we can only think in terms of what is allowable—of the minimum, in fact.

The distinctive fact about moral theology, as I have said, is that it concentrates on this method of approach to problems of conduct. It may be discussing justice, or temperance, or unselfishness, or meekness, or any other Christian virtue or the vice opposed to it. But although it starts from the same definition as Christian ethics does, it commonly aims at reaching conclusions in the form of 'The least that can be asked of the Christian (or, the most that can be allowed to him) is such-and-such.' I do not for a moment say that this is the whole aim of moral theology—indeed there are others of immense importance to which I shall refer shortly. But it is the feature which most forcibly strikes the eye; and it is very apt to mislead the inexperienced reader. He forgets that his study is primarily concerned with *stating* minimum standards; and

he tends to think that it is *commending* them, or representing them as all that the Christian ought to aim at. Thereby he not merely finds a ground of offence against all moral theologians, but also deprives himself of the possibility of obtaining real help and guidance from them.

For it is obvious that when the moral theologian, after considering as many different kinds of extenuating circumstances as he can, says 'Such-and-such a course of action is never allowable to the Christian', he is saying something of tremendous importance; something whose importance is doubly underlined because it is *he* who says it, and not the Puritan. In a world in which most people think anything is allowable to them, the Puritan's voice is scarcely noticed. But the moral theologian, who has scrutinised carefully every argument in favour of relaxing a precept and then says, 'Nevertheless it may not be relaxed,' can meet them on their own ground. For this reason alone his study ought to be taken seriously. It is not one into which the amateur or inexperienced can intrude light-heartedly. They must remind themselves at every turn what are the scientific limitations of the subject. But once they have taken steps to safeguard this, they may find moral theology, by reason of the frequency with which it refuses to make exceptions beyond certain clearly defined limits, as inspiring a subject of study as Christian ethics itself.

One other preliminary consideration deserves mention. Modern moral theology grew up in the counter-Reformation, at a time at which Jesuits, Dominicans and others were attempting not merely to recapture the Protestant world for Rome, but (perhaps even more earnestly) to reintroduce Christian standards into a Latin world, which had very largely given way to paganism. Their main weapon was, of course, the confessional. Thus the modern text-book of moral theology is not merely, in form, addressed to confessors, but it also retains traditional elements dating from the early post-Reformation period. These are accidental features which have to be discounted if the subject is properly to be understood. Every text-book on moral theology contains, for example, a section on hearing confessions. But there is no real reason (other than tradition and no doubt convenience) why it should; the art of hearing confessions is quite different from the study of Christian conduct.

Again, the mission-preachers of the counter-Reformation, just like a missionary to one of the few surviving child-races of to-day, had in many respects to pitch the minimum standard very low, if the world's perverse and perverted conscience were to be brought back under the aegis of Christianity at all. For this reason some of the traditional 'opinions' which still find a place in the text-books must strike us as terribly lax. If, however, we remember that they are to a large extent merely traditional; and that in any case they never represent a norm, far less an ideal, but only an irreducible minimum which may perhaps sometimes be allowed if all else fails (a truth which Pascal most conveniently forgot when he wrote the *Provinciales*) we shall not come to much harm by them.

II

The subject-matter of moral theology is Christian conduct. But the word 'conduct' covers more than is often supposed. It opens the door to unlimited psychological and philosophical problems, and we must try to avoid them as much as we possibly can. Let us say, then, that in all 'conduct' there are four things to be considered—the action; the intention (purpose, aim, or end); the motive; and the temper. If we consider how these four things are to be defined in themselves, and also to be distinguished from one another, we shall have collected a useful quantity of material for the purposes of our study.

(a) An *action* is a putting forth of energy. But quite commonly we include in the idea of the action some of the results of the putting forth of energy, especially if those results normally follow. So when I press the button of an electric bell I naturally say that I am 'ringing the bell,' though as a matter of fact my energising stopped when I pressed the button home, and the bell-ringing is the result of certain devices prepared for me by the electrician with a view to securing just this effect. Similarly I can speak of 'killing a rabbit' as an action, though my energising actually stops with the pressing of the trigger.

Now obviously the logician has a fine field for argument here. He can point out on the one hand that my energising covered a great many more things than just pressing the trigger—

inserting the cartridge for example, raising the gun to my shoulder, taking aim and so on ; and he can ask me on what grounds I group all these separate actions together and call them one action. And on the other hand he can protest that the death of the rabbit was no doubt the result of my action, but ought not to be included in the action itself ; for exactly the same amount and kind of energising may fail to achieve the rabbit's death, and indeed, with bad shots, very often does. I do not deny that the exact moral theologian ought to consider all these points. Indeed, as we shall see later, it is often impossible to decide whether an action is right or wrong without considering the circumstances in which it takes place, including of course its probable and actual results. But complicated though these considerations are, they do not affect the distinction which we are trying to make at the moment. We can still distinguish actions from intentions.

(b) By *intention* I mean the state of things which I consciously desire to produce in the end by my action, and which will justify me (if it is produced) in putting a stop to my energising in that direction, at all events for the time being. Thus I may shoot the rabbit in order to have something which can be cooked for supper ; and, if it does not crawl down a hole to die, my intention will be satisfied or fulfilled by its death. Or I may shoot it in order to be able to say that I have shot more rabbits than my brother has, or to assure myself that I can hit a running target at that distance, or to give myself the pleasure of having shot something living to-day, or so on. The question ' Why did I shoot the rabbit ' ? will normally reveal my intention, and once the intention is separated off in this way, there seems no harm in grouping all the preliminary energising together as the ' action.'¹

The same distinction is often expressed by using the words ' means ' and ' end '—the action is the ' means ' by which we attain (or try to attain) a particular ' end.' We shall have to come back to this distinction later ; all that matters at the moment is this. If by ' end ' we mean exactly the same as

¹ On the other hand, we are not bound to do this. We can call the ' action ' either ' pressing the trigger ' or ' shooting the rabbit ' ; and the intention (e.g., to get something for supper) will be the same. It is only when we come to consider the rightness or wrongness of the action that we must be careful to enumerate all the relevant circumstances.

'intention' (and very often we do not), it is doubtful whether in any given context the words 'means' and 'end' can ever denote exactly the same thing. A child often presses the button of an electric bell merely, as we say, 'to make the bell ring.' Here, if we call 'ringing the bell' the action, it would almost seem that he rings the bell with the intention of ringing the bell, and no more; 'means' and 'end,' 'action' and 'intention' seem to be identical. Yet I think that closer examination would show that the child rang the bell in order to have the pleasure of hearing the bell ring; thus the obtaining of this pleasure is his 'end' or 'intention,' and ringing the bell is the means or action by which he set out to obtain his end.¹ Once more we reach the conclusion that we can safely distinguish between 'actions' and 'intentions.'

(c) But what do we mean by using the word 'motive' as distinct from 'intention'? Here let me say at once that I am not concerned with the technical uses of words, either as the psychologist or even as the moral theologian uses them. I am only trying to draw practical distinctions between the various aspects of conduct with which moral theology has to reckon. Both psychologists and moral theologians are inclined to be shy of this word 'motive'; and for what I am trying to express the former would probably prefer to use 'instinct,' 'sentiment,' 'complex,' or one of many other words, and the latter 'habitude.' For that reason alone it is convenient to use a word about which neither of them cares very much—it helps to show that there is a community of meaning underlying the different words which appeal to each of them respectively.

By *motive* then let us say that we mean a more or less formed (though very often unconscious) state of mind influencing, and on occasion revealed by, a man's actions and intentions. He has shot a rabbit, and his expressed intention may be to get it for supper; having got it, his intention is fulfilled or satisfied. But suppose him to have shot it on someone else's land: we call him a poacher, and discover that among his 'motives' must be numbered dishonesty. It is

¹ This does not by any means mean, as some philosophers have supposed, that *every* action is aimed at securing pleasure. The most it can mean in this direction is that if we are examining the possible 'ends' of a man's actions, the securing of pleasure for himself must not be ignored.

quite possible that on this occasion he had no formed intention of poaching. He may not even know that poaching is dishonest; and the fact that the rabbit he has shot does not belong to him may give him no satisfaction at all. In that case, the dishonesty of the action was in no sense part of his intention, aim, or purpose. Nevertheless, it is *there*, among the influences which led or allowed him to shoot (or stifled any tendency he might otherwise have had to refrain from shooting) a rabbit belonging to another man; and we are entitled to say that he is a person whose motives on occasion may include a dishonest one.

Again, we may discover, as the result of observing him on several occasions, that he habitually poaches on Mr. A's land, but never on Mr. B's. This will lead us to include among his motives not merely dishonesty, but also malevolence towards Mr. A. It is true that, in this case, it is not likely that he will be unconscious of the malevolence. But even this is possible, for on examining one's actions carefully one does sometimes discover that one habitually behaves more unkindly to one person than to another ('without knowing why,' as we say; that is, without any formed intention of doing so). The only possible explanation of this fact is that one is malevolently disposed or motivated towards the first person, but not towards the second.

I have tried to show that what I am calling 'motives,' though commonly among the influences which lead us to do this action rather than that, are not the same as 'intentions' or 'ends.' The difference between them is partly that 'motives' may be unconscious, while 'intentions' never are; partly that motives are abiding characteristics, whilst intentions are always *ad hoc*; and partly that, although any one action will probably have only one intention (or at best one or two only), it may well exhibit quite a number of different motives all at work simultaneously.

(*d*) I come now to another word which I have had to impress for the purpose of this essay—the word *temper*. It is not a very satisfactory word in this connexion. But once more it has the advantage of not being used to any extent either by psychologists or moral theologians, though the latter are very closely concerned with the matter to which I am attaching it.

Briefly, then, I shall say that when a man performs an action with absolute clarity of conscience, reached after mature and serious enquiry into the rights and wrongs of the matter, he is acting in a 'conscientious temper'; whereas if he has not bothered to enquire into the morality of what he does, or even believes that it is or may be wrongful, he is betraying an unconscientious temper.

At first sight it might appear that conscientiousness and unconscientiousness could be called 'motives'; and that it is unnecessary to put them in a separate category, and use the word 'temper' for it. Superficially, there is something to be said in favour of this view. For, just as we say that a man would not poach unless he gave way (from time to time) to dishonest motives, so it would seem that we might also say that he would not poach unless from time to time he were capable of acting against his conscience. Yet this very parallel discloses a flaw in the argument. 'Dishonesty' is an objective fact: poaching is dishonest, whether the poacher knows it or not. But unconscientious is a subjective fact; a man cannot disobey conscience, or do what he believes to be wrong, without knowing that he believes it to be wrong, and that he is doing it in spite of this belief. It is, in fact, untrue to say that a man would not poach unless he were capable of disobeying his conscience: for we do not know whether he has ever learnt that poaching is wrong. There may have been a hiatus in his moral education on this point; and in that case, whilst his poaching evinced, of course, a dishonest motive (in the sense in which we are using that word) it did not prove him in the least to be unconscientious.¹

But the real reason why conscientiousness and unconscientiousness cannot properly be included in the same category as motives is as follows. As we are about to see, motives may

¹ Scholastic theology maintained that there were certain first principles of the natural law of which no man could be ignorant. If this were true, and the wrongfulness of poaching were one of these principles, then a poacher could not but be unconscientious. But no agreement was ever reached on the question of which ethical principles were of this character. The truth probably is that everyone has, in some rudimentary form, a sense of the distinction between right and wrong; but that it attaches itself (in different cultures and stages of culture) to such varied matters that it is impossible to speak of any universal principles of the natural law of which no man whatsoever can be ignorant.

either be approved or deplored ; and (to anticipate for a moment what is to follow) we will speak of the motives of which we approve as virtuous and of those which we deplore as vicious. But, if we consider the matter carefully, it appears that we do not *praise* a man for possessing virtuous motives, nor *blame* him for possessing vicious ones. He was born with them, as natural assets or liabilities. If we praise him in this connexion we praise him for fostering his virtuous motives by free acts of will because he recognises them to be virtuous. That is to say, we praise him for being conscientious ; and, if he has fostered the virtuous motives in the face of strong temptation not to do so, we praise him very highly. And, on the other hand, if he has taken no steps to repress his vicious motives, although he knew them to be vicious, he has disobeyed conscience, and we are unanimous in blaming him for it.

Thus the particular kind of approval and condemnation which we call 'praise' and 'blame' never attaches to what we have called motives, as such, but to conscientiousness and unconscientiousness alone. This justifies us in putting conscientiousness and unconscientiousness in a category by themselves, and calling them 'tempers.' But it also brings us to the threshold of the most important truth in moral theology. For it will appear that praise and blame never really attach either to actions or intentions as such (any more than to motives), though (again as with motives) on other grounds we may have plenty of reason for approving or deploring them. But before we consider the grounds and the consequences of this conclusion it would be well to enlarge our vocabulary a little further.

III

We have just seen that it is a human characteristic to approve some of our actions, intentions, motives, and tempers, and to deplore others. Moral theology, therefore, or the study of Christian conduct, sets out to select those members of each category of which it approves, or which it regards as conformed to the pattern and teaching of our Lord, and to hold them up for commendation. It does this by means of certain pairs of adjectives :— 'Christian' and 'un-Christian,' of course ;

'right' and 'wrong;' 'virtuous' and 'vicious;' 'moral' and 'immoral;' 'good' and 'bad,' and so on. It would, I believe, help to clearness of thought if one of these pairs of adjectives were reserved for exclusive use with each of our four categories. I propose to follow this suggestion as far as possible; and I will speak of 'actions' as either 'right' or 'wrong'; of ends or intentions as either 'moral' or 'immoral': of motives as either 'virtuous' or 'vicious'; and tempers, of course, as either 'conscientious' or 'unconscientious.' There is one famous word, the word 'sinful,' which I have not employed at all in making up this vocabulary; the reason for this I will give later.¹

With these adjectives attached, it is comparatively easy to discover where each of our main questions is discussed in the conventional text-books of moral theology. Those text-books fall into certain well-recognised sections; and although some of them cannot be dealt with here, it will be found that the principal ones correspond with the four sections into which I have tried to map out the subject. Thus what I have called 'tempers' (conscientious or unconscientious) are treated in the books in the section on Conscience; 'motives' are the subject-matter of the section on 'Virtues and Vices' (always the longest in the book); the principles connected with acts and ends are considered in the section 'On Human Acts'; whilst the discussion of particular acts and ends is very largely included, with 'motives,' in the section on 'Virtues and Vices.'²

¹ I have also discarded 'good' and 'bad'—a couple who have been the authors of great confusion. For not only have they, like 'right' and 'wrong,' been used indiscriminately of actions, intentions, motives and tempers, they have also been used in the sense of aesthetic and economic approval, and so have lent themselves to the terrible theory that what we call 'morality' is not a separate concept or subject of study at all, but merely a synonym for aesthetics or economics. There is no battle so continuous as the one in which we strive to show that the rightness of an action cannot necessarily be reached by counting up the amount of happiness it will convey.

² A curious fact, which has not attracted as much attention as it deserves, is that most text-books of the traditional pattern include a long section on the seven Sacraments. Underlying this there seems to be the following history. It is logical that the study of *what man ought to do* should be followed by a study of *the means by which God enables him to do it*—i.e., of grace and the Sacraments. But the theology of grace is so deeply embedded in the scheme of Christian doctrine as a whole that it has not for a very long

The next point to notice (and it is a very puzzling one indeed) is that there seems to be no organic relation, in any particular case, between the commendability or otherwise of these four aspects of conduct. On any given occasion, we may find ourselves commending either the action itself, or the intention, or the motive (or motives) involved, or the temper, or any two or three of these. But it does not follow that the remainder are commendable. Any combination or permutation is possible. An action may be wrong, but the intention moral; the motive virtuous, but the temper unconscientious; or again the action may be right and the intention moral, the temper conscientious, but the motive vicious. I have not time to illustrate all of these possibilities, but the pages which follow shall deal with some of them.

We can clear the ground a little, however, by observing two things. First, conscience is often mistaken, so that a man may genuinely believe his actions, intentions, and motives to be admirable, when as a matter of fact some or all of them are the reverse. Similarly, he may condemn all or any of these other factors, and yet be wrong in his condemnation. Hence the reprehensibleness of the three other factors has nothing to do with conscientiousness of temper—a man may do what is wrong because he believes it to be right, or refuse to do what is right because he believes it to be wrong.¹ Second, disobedience

now been closely associated with moral theology. We might have expected the same to have happened in the case of the Sacraments. Sacramental theology is obviously a part of Christian doctrine; whilst the rules for the administration of the Sacraments belong to the sphere of canon law. On this basis, one modern writer of high standing, Tanqueray, does indeed sketch out a scheme for a text-book on moral theology which would omit the sacramental section, though he personally retains the section in his own manual. The reason for its almost universal retention seems to be twofold. In the first place, spiritual preparation for the worthy administration and reception of the Sacraments obviously presents a great many moral problems. In the second place, as the text-books are primarily intended for clergymen in their capacity of advisers of souls, there is a certain convenience in having bound up with them a handbook of guidance for their other great task—that of the administration of the Sacraments. This may be the final explanation of the phenomenon; nevertheless expert research into its origins might conceivably be interesting and valuable.

¹ Where a man differs from me on a point of ethics (whether concerned with actions, intentions or motives) as to which I am conscientiously convinced that I am right, I speak of *his* conscience as being 'in ignorance' or 'error.' If, furthermore, it is clear that he is at least as conscientiously convinced of his view as I am of mine, and that no argument I can use will sway him, I add

ence to conscience is one of the commonest factors in conduct ; hence what a man does may in fact be right, though he believes it to be wrong, and does it in defiance of conscience.

If then we grant that the commendability or otherwise of actions, intentions and motives is independent of the question of whether a man does what he does in a conscientious temper, we may proceed to ask whether there is any relation between the three former factors. And at once it appears that in most respects, at least, there is none. Men constantly do wrong actions with moral intentions (as when I take money which does not belong to me to give it to a deserving charity). Again it may sometimes be right to kill a tyrant in order to set his people free, but most of us think that often at least it is wrong to do so ; in this case also we have an example of a wrong action with a moral intention. There is, indeed, a problem here to which we must come back—the problem implied in the words, ‘ The end justifies the means,’ but that must wait for a moment. On the other hand, men sometimes do right actions with immoral intentions ; as when I tell the truth to someone who has the right to know it, not because I want to do justice to his right, but in order to get someone else into trouble.

Take now a case when both the action is right and the that his ‘ ignorance ’ or ‘ error ’ is ‘ invincible.’ Many people find it difficult to believe that those who differ from them can do so on the basis of a conscientious conviction as deep and strong as their own ; they put the difference down to stubbornness, prejudice, secret sin, or the like biassing their opponents’ view. But such a judgment is mere hardihood ; and technical moral theology has no difficulty in recognising the frequency of ‘ invincible error,’ subject to certain rather academic limitations as to the first principles of the natural law (*supra*, p. 373 n.1.). Yet there *are* cases in which the conscientiousness on one side is not balanced by equal conscientiousness on the other ; thus it becomes important to discover what tests (if any) can be applied to secure that, when the authority of conscience is claimed for a particular view, it is legitimately claimed. I have dealt with this question of the tests of conscientiousness in *Ignorance, Faith, and Conformity*, p. 34 f. ; and in *Conscience and its Problems*. It remains only to add that if a conscience is genuinely ‘ in invincible error,’ its possessor cannot be blamed (or is ‘ inculpable ’), but rather ought to be praised, for obeying it (*infra*, p. 378 f.). There is also such a thing as ‘ vincible error ’—i.e., error which can be dissipated by argument or exposition of facts not otherwise known ; this may be either ‘ culpable ’ or ‘ inculpable,’ according as the person concerned could or could not have known the truth if he had wished. The less technical phrase ‘ in good faith ’ is the equivalent of ‘ inculpable error,’ whether the latter is ‘ vincible ’ or ‘ invincible.’

intention moral, but where it can reasonably be inferred that a vicious motive is involved. No one can quarrel with me for giving my own money to help forward a deserving charity : the action is right, the intention highly moral. But if I do it ostentatiously, talking about it continually, and making sure that it is duly noticed by the newspapers, it will betray a vicious motive—that of conceit. I may be entirely unconscious of the fact that I am conceited—most conceited people are ; but that makes no difference to the facts. Admittedly, conceit is not the only motive which the action exhibits. I might have gratified my conceit in far less creditable ways, and the fact that I chose a benevolent intention and satisfied it by an honest action proves that I am not lacking in benevolent and honourable motives. But I have betrayed *one* vicious motive ; and if the ostentation with which I surrounded the action was out of all proportion to the size of my subscription, then it is clear that conceit is a dominant motive in my character—much more dominant, in all probability, than benevolence.

It follows from examples such as these, that when we pass judgment upon a piece of conduct, we must consider the action, the intention, the motive and the temper entirely independently of one another ; just as in considering the worth of a piece of music we take the air, the harmony, and the rhythm one by one, and evaluate each of them without considering the others. This is a truth which people commonly fail to see. They ask, ‘ Did So-and-so do the right thing ? ’—using the word ‘ right ’ not perhaps as we are using it, but in the general sense of ‘ commendable,’ and expecting a ‘ Yes ’ or ‘ No ’ answer. And they are naturally annoyed when we begin to make distinctions, saying, for example, ‘ The action in itself was a right one, but the intention was, in part at least, immoral ; some of the motives involved were vicious ; but the man himself believed the action to be right, discerned no immorality of intention or viciousness of motive, and so must be adjudged to have acted in a fully conscientious temper.’ Yet unless we are prepared to make distinctions of this kind we have not begun to understand the intricacies of human conduct.

We may round off this part of our subject by resuming the discussion of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness which

we interrupted a few pages ago. As between tempers and motives, we discovered, praiseworthiness and blameworthiness attach wholly to the first and not at all to the second. If we approve a motive, we do so without praising its possessor ; if we deplore it, we do so without blaming him. Now in this respect actions and intentions are in exactly the same situation as motives. If we approve them (calling them ' right ' and ' moral ') we do so without necessarily implying praise of the person who performs the action or frames the intention ; if we deplore them (calling them ' wrong ' and ' immoral ') we do so without necessarily attaching any blame to him. Praise and blame, in fact, are due wholly and solely to tempers—to conscientiousness and to unconscientiousness—and to nothing else in the world.

Many people find this a highly surprising doctrine ; but its truth can be proved by a very simple chain of argument. Take an action which we call ' right,' and ask ' Why did the man do it ? ' The answer is obviously, ' To forward such-and-such an intention.' Let the intention be a ' moral ' one, and ask again, ' Why did he entertain it ? ' Here there can be two answers. The first is : ' Because it was the spontaneous outcome or expression of such-and-such a motive.' If that is the true answer, then no praise can attach either to action or intention ; for (as we have seen) praise is never attached to any motive as such, and therefore cannot be attached to any spontaneous outcome of a motive.

The other possible answer is, ' Because the man saw the intention to be a " moral " one, and therefore set out to fulfil it by means of an action which at the same time he recognised as right.' Here praise does undoubtedly come into the question, particularly if the man framed the intention and performed the action in the face of strong motives tending in the opposite direction. But once more he is praised not in any sense for the action, or even the intention, but solely for the conscientiousness with which he embarked upon a course which may well have presented him with the severest difficulties and struggles. And in exactly the same way men are no more to be blamed for their actions and intentions than for their motives ; what we blame them for is performing an action, entertaining an intention, or fostering a motive which

they themselves hold to be 'wrong' or 'immoral' or 'vicious'—that is to say, we blame them for failing to obey conscience, and for that alone.

The consequences of this doctrine we shall see at a later stage, and especially, when we come to consider the words 'sin' and 'sinful.' In the meantime, we must assert that although when we approve an action, intention, or motive, that does not mean that it is in any sense worthy of praise, as such (for only 'tempers' deserve praise or incur blame), nevertheless to approve and to deplore (by using the adjectives with which we are now familiar) is anything but meaningless. An action in itself cannot be praiseworthy, but it can be approved in other respects; and it is when we approve it in these other respects that we call it right.

IV

We come then to the question, by what test (other than praiseworthiness, of course, which has been ruled out) are actions, intentions and motives approved or deplored? One truth becomes manifest at the very outset of this enquiry: whatever the test upon which we ultimately decide, it will apply indifferently to all three. Let us say, for the sake of argument, that obedience to the Ten Commandments is our chosen test. Then we shall call an action which conforms to the Ten Commandments a right action, and an intention which conforms to them a moral intention; whilst a motive which promotes or is manifested in habitual obedience to them will be a virtuous motive.

Once more, there will be no necessary link of quality between the three. The action may be wrong though the intention is moral, and the dominant motive associated with them both can be either virtuous or vicious. A man might steal in order to clothe his father decently. The action as such would be wrong (as breaking the eighth commandment), the 'intention' moral (as fulfilling the fifth). But the motive could still be either virtuous or vicious; virtuous, if it appeared that the son's habitual state of mind was to honour his parents; vicious, if on inspection of his other actions we discovered that he rarely made any attempt to honour them, except when to do so would get him a reputation for filial affection. And this

tendency to worship his own reputation, or to make it his God, might well be regarded as a motive in contravention of the first commandment of all.

Whatever the test adopted, it will not be very difficult to pass judgment upon intentions and motives. But with actions the case is altered, and a good deal of confusion enters in. The difficulties may be tabulated somewhat as follows :

(a) If we define an action as a piece of energising, it will often be impossible to decide whether it is to be called 'right' or 'wrong' without introducing other considerations. I see a man taking money from a drawer, and ask myself whether he is doing right or wrong. But the answer depends entirely upon such questions as whether the money belongs to him, and whether (if it does not) he has permission from its owner to take it. This implies that the rightness or wrongness of an action cannot always be considered apart from its circumstances ; until the relevant circumstances are known the action can only be called 'neutral.'¹

What then do we mean by 'relevant' circumstances ? Apparently those which are necessary to enable us to give a considered judgment as to the rightness or wrongness of the action. But how shall we know when we have ascertained *all* the circumstances necessary for such a decision ? I do not think there is any answer to this question : we are bound to conclude that our judgments of the rightness and wrongness of many actions must be provisional only. We collect as much evidence as we can, and then pass judgment, but it is always possible that the most critical piece of evidence has escaped us.

(b) But even when we know everything relevant among the circumstances of the action, it may still appear to us to be morally neutral or colourless. We see a man walking down a street. We know that he has no other call upon his time, and that the street is free for all to walk in. We observe that he is walking in a perfectly law-abiding, non-aggressive fashion. But, if we are faced with the question 'Is he doing right in walking down this street ?' neither 'Yes' nor 'No' seems to be a reasonable answer. In these cases many people are

¹ Unless of course it is one of the actions which people speak of as 'always wrong'; *infra*, pp. 384 ff.

tempted to introduce considerations of intention and motive. They will say, 'He is doing wrong, because his object is to murder the gentleman in No. 27,' or 'He is doing right because he is going to visit his aunt ; and the motive which this fact betrays is an altruistic one.' This procedure, however, though very attractive, seems to me to be unwise ; for we have had good reason for observing that there is no necessary connexion between the rightness of actions, the morality of intentions, and the virtuousness of motives. It seems better to say that many conscious actions (as of course all unconscious ones) are by nature neutral, and consequently are not susceptible to judgments of right and wrong.

(c) The tendency, however, to mix up the morality of intentions with the rightness or wrongness of actions goes deeper ; and brings us, in fact, to one of the most difficult problems of all. There are many actions which we agree to be normally wrong (such as lying) which on occasion we seem to approve because they have been done with a moral intention. Two phrases are familiar here—'The end justifies the means,' and 'Let us do evil that good may follow.' Each of these aphorisms has met with the strongest possible condemnation, and that rightly ; for taken without qualification they are capable of doing infinite harm. It is certainly not the case that *any* moral end can justify *any* means whatsoever that may be employed to bring it about ; nor can it be right to do a *great deal* of evil to bring about a *very small quantity* of good. But once we have entered this caveat, it is clear that common sense does within limits applaud these maxims. Yet they appear to fly in the face of our principle that the morality or otherwise of the end has no bearing upon the rightness and wrongness of the actions undertaken to bring that end about.

The difficulty here is eased if we draw a distinction between *results* and *intentions*. Among the circumstances of an action must be numbered its results (probable or certain), and these results do affect the rightness and wrongness of the act. Take the moral problem which has probably been discussed more often, and for more centuries than any other in the world—the question whether I may lie to a pirate in order to save the lives of his captives. Among the circumstances of this particular lie is this, that if I tell it the lives of a certain number of

innocent people will probably be saved ; and most of us would agree that, in these circumstances I ought to tell it ; because its results seem likely to be so exceptionally happy. I am pretty certain that almost all, if asked for the grounds of their conclusions, would say, " Well, but look at all the lives which are going to be saved. They alone justify the action."

My intention, however, does not enter into the matter at all, so far as the rightness or wrongness of the lie is concerned. No adviser would say to me, ' It is right for you to lie in these circumstances if you intend thereby to save your friends' lives, *but not otherwise.*' I might have quite a different intention in the matter—as, for example, to win the affection of a lady who wished the captives' lives to be saved. I might tell the lie with this sole intention in view, rather regretting that incidentally certain lives would be saved by it. In these cases a good deal might be said in criticism of my intention, and also probably of my motive. But the people who thought it right for the lie to be told that the lives might be saved would not think it wrong to tell it because I was telling it for some other purpose. It would still be the right thing to do, even though my intention in doing it were faulty, frivolous, or openly immoral.

We see then that in cases where the maxim, ' The end justifies the means, ' appears to be justifiable, its interpretation must be ' The probable results of the action justify us in performing it.' The intention of the person so acting has nothing to do with the matter, except in so far as he actually intends what we have called the probable results and nothing else. Even then, what ' justifies ' is the probable result itself, and not the fact that the man who does the action intends to produce that result.

The correct form of the maxim, in fact, is ' Circumstances alter cases.' And this is obviously true. An act which is right in some circumstances may be wrong in others ; and it is one of the primary duties of the moral theologian to tell us in what kind of circumstances any particular action will probably be right, and in what wrong. In considering this question he will constantly find himself obliged to consider the probable or certain consequences of the action ; but, so far as the rightness of the action alone is concerned, it will not matter in the least

whether the production of these consequences is a part of the intention of the person who does or proposes to do the action. That question is of primary importance when we come to consider the morality of his intention, or the virtuousness of his motive ; but it has no bearing on the rightness of the action.

(d) Granted then that circumstances (including, as we have seen, the probable consequences) do affect the rightness and wrongness of actions, are there any actions so universally wrong that no conceivable set of circumstances can make them right ? It is the almost invariable tradition of moral theology that there are, and constant attempts have been made to enumerate them. But one or two cautions must be noticed. The chief difficulty is that, in any formulated system of morality, there could only be one action which was ' always wrong ' ; for if a man found himself so circumstanced that he had to make a choice between two such actions, there would be no right thing that he could do. And if we are liable to be so placed that there is no right thing for us to do, because whatever course we choose will be as wrong as any other, the attempts of practical moralists to tell us what actions are right and what are wrong become nonsensical.

Imagine a state of society in which it is held to be ' always wrong ' to break a promise, and ' always wrong ' to marry someone whom you do not love, and conceive the unfortunate position of a young man who discovers that he no longer loves the girl whom he has promised to marry, and that she refuses to release him from his promise. I doubt if any one of us would say to him, ' It doesn't matter what you do ; whether you marry her or break your promise, you will be doing the wrong thing.' We should evaluate the argument on both sides, and say : ' The position is obviously a very regrettable one, but on the whole we believe the right course of action in the circumstances is for you to break your promise ' (or ' to marry the lady '—according as we decided).

Now in saying this we imply that the course of action we commend is, in the circumstances, not wrong ; and therefore it cannot be called ' always wrong.' It may be *almost* always wrong, but we have discovered at least one principle disobedience to which is (at all events on occasion) even more heinous ; and where the two are in collision, it is *right* to do what we have

described as 'almost always' wrong. With a little ingenuity the process could be so extended as to envisage collisions between every one of the principles which we conventionally say it is 'always wrong' to disobey, and in each case we should find ourselves attempting to decide which of the two it was right to disobey in the circumstances—thereby confessing that we refuse to accept the dictum that both could be always wrong.

Admittedly, imagination flinches before the task of constructing instances to cover every such possible collision, especially where the current list of actions 'always wrong' is extensive. But the fact that, in all such cases, real or imaginary, that come before us, we instinctively attempt to discover which line of action will be the 'lesser evil,' and so the right course in the circumstances, shows how completely we reject the view that a man can be so placed that nothing he can do will be right. And this involves the admission that in every fully formulated code of ethics there can only be, at most, *one* action of which it can be said that it is always wrong.

In spite of this, the tradition that there are some actions which are always wrong is very deep-rooted. It may be, of course, that the tradition is simply a false one, and that we ought to throw it overboard without more ado. Even so, we should have to find some reason for its curious tenacity; errors do not flourish for centuries without some element of truth behind them. Once more we come back to the distinction between actions and their circumstances. There are a certain number of words (such as 'murder,' 'arson' and so on) which refer not merely to actions, but to actions *in circumstances which make them wrong*. Murder, for example, is the deliberate killing of a man in circumstances in which it is wrong to kill him; arson is setting fire to something which it is wrong of you to set fire to. Thus to quote 'Murder is always wrong,' 'Arson is always wrong,' to prove that some actions are always wrong, is illogical. 'Murder is always wrong' merely means 'Homicide is wrong in circumstances in which it is wrong' and so forth.

It is possible, no doubt, in these cases to define with some precision the circumstances which make the action wrong, at all events negatively. Thus we might say of an act of deliberate homicide that it approached more nearly to murder

according as it did not take place in fair fight or in self-defence, and as the person committing it had no warrant from constituted authority to commit it, and so on. I doubt if it would ever be possible to enumerate the circumstances so completely and so satisfactorily as to include all 'murders' which reasonable men would regard as such, and to exclude all acts of homicide which all reasonable men would say were not murderous, so that every murder could be recognised as such at once without exception. Attempts have been made to do something of the kind by the very large number of moralists who have tried from time to time to enumerate species of lying which can be recognised at once as 'always wrong'; but none of the attempts has met with very wide acceptance.

Now I think that in cases where the Christian tradition has held most rigorously to this view that an action is always wrong, what it has really done is, either by definition (as in the case of murder), or explicitly, to include in the idea of the action some at least of the circumstances which made it wrong. It is widely held, for example, that 'marriage' with a second partner during the lifetime of the first is always wrong. Now it is obvious that the words *during the lifetime of the first partner* point to a circumstance which (in the view of the moralists concerned) makes the marriage wrong; if the first partner were dead the marriage would be legitimate, at all events so far as this aspect of it were concerned. 'Marriage' is the real action; *during the lifetime of a former partner* is one of the circumstances (though not of course by any means the only one) which makes marriage wrong.

Still, I shall be told, here you have a case in which an action, when surrounded by certain circumstances, is always wrong; and there is no difficulty in recognising the exact circumstances which make the difference, as there might be in the case of 'murder.' And this I am bound to admit, even though I make the reservation that there might be a case (though I cannot at the moment imagine one) in which I had to choose between such a marriage and some action (or inaction) even more wrong, either *per se* or in the circumstances; so that in that case it would be right for me to choose the marriage. But the important point is this, that the more we are concerned with actions apart from their circumstances, the more chary

we should be of saying that they are always wrong. We may say, if we think it true, that they are almost always wrong, or wrong in all normal cases, or wrong except in the most unusual circumstances imaginable. But beyond this it is rarely safe to go.

V

We have now obtained some idea of the various factors which have to be taken into account before we can begin to say of any action that it is either right or wrong. But a very natural criticism must be faced here. 'After all,' it may be said, 'if conscientiousness is the only thing which can earn praise, and unconscientiousness the only one which can incur blame, it does not much matter whether my actions are what you call right or wrong. All that really matters is that I should prove my conscientiousness by always doing what I believe to be right and always avoiding what I believe to be wrong.'

For the purpose of considering this criticism we can bracket acts and intentions together; for although, as we have seen, they can be clearly distinguished from another, yet in proposing an action or entertaining an intention, we are setting out upon a course which will produce a new state of things. Put briefly, then, the criticism may be phrased: 'It does not matter in the least what changes you produce in the state of things, so long as you yourself believe those changes worthy of being produced.'

There is little to be said in support of this view, popular though it seems to be.¹ It implies, of course, that God is interested in nothing except human conscientiousness. In this there is no doubt a considerable element of truth. But it does not lead in the least to the desired conclusion. That the conditions under which men live must affect their conscientiousness either for better or for worse is a truism; as a whole, men are less likely to obey conscience when faced by war, rapine, anarchy and starvation, than when living in conditions of relative peace and stability. Hence any change of conditions which will make for greater peace and stability must be dear to God's heart, if on no other ground than that it will

¹ Its popularity is to be observed in the familiar yet nonsensical dictum: 'As long as a man believes that he is doing right, he is doing right,' and many others which all ultimately reduce to the same meaning.

foster human conscientiousness on the whole ; whilst any change in the opposite direction will be displeasing to Him. And, so far as this is concerned, it would not be in itself any the less displeasing because the individual who brought it about believed his action to be right and his intention moral, and so was acting in all good conscience.

Indeed, there have been very many cases where men, obeying their own consciences, have produced such a widespread and long-continued state of anarchy, that the gain to the world by their conscientiousness must have been far more than offset by the disastrous resultant increase of unconscientiousness in others. In such cases we might even be so bold as to say that God would have preferred one man to disobey his conscience than by his own conscientiousness to have introduced conditions which tended to undermine the conscientiousness of millions.¹

Clearly, then, it is all important that we should attempt to discover what changes in human conditions are in accordance with God's will. In other words, we must do our best to learn what actions are right and what intentions moral ; for obviously what we mean by the rightness of actions and the morality of intentions is simply that they tend to produce those changes which please God. However highly we rate conscientiousness, we must rate right action and moral intentions very highly too. And this will perhaps suffice in answer to the criticism we have been considering. But a very similar one arises naturally in the mind, and because it approaches the matter from a new angle, it must be taken into account.

'You need not worry much about the rightness of your actions or the morality of your intentions, so long as your motives are virtuous,' is the form which this second criticism takes. It means, in effect, that the man who is dominated by a strong motive to honesty, is not very likely to perform a dishonest action even to fulfil a moral intention, still less is he

¹ We may put the case : If the only possible way of preventing a world war were to bribe someone to refrain from doing something which he conscientiously believed he ought to do (e.g., to throw a bomb at a dictator), might it not be right to press the bribe upon him ? If so, then there are conceivable circumstances in which it is right (i.e., as we are using the word, in accordance with God's will) to instigate a person deliberately to disobey his conscience.

likely to entertain a dishonest intention itself. That is true enough, but it does not follow that on any one of the complicated occasions with which life so often confronts us he will recognise by virtue of the strength of his motive only which of two or more possible courses is the truly right (i.e., in this case, honest) one. Many different issues may be involved and many different interests at stake ; he will need careful thought before he can decide which action is the right one in the circumstances.

Again, on any occasion two virtuous motives may be found influencing him in opposite directions. Benevolence urges him to give to every casual mendicant ; prudence sets its veto on indiscriminate charity. What is he to do, then, in the case of *this* particular beggar ; will it be right to give him money or not ? Benevolence says ' Yes ' ; prudence says ' No '—and they cannot both be right. And when we remember that disastrous consequences to the world at large may follow the performance of a wrong action, it becomes evident that, however excellent our motives may be, we shall still constantly have to ask ourselves, ' Is such-and-such a course of action right or not ? '

The point becomes clearer still if we take the case of quite a number of amateur moralists, who say that the whole of Christian excellence consists in being dominated by the single motive of love for God. That, again, is a statement with which no one will quarrel. But it gives us no help at all when we have to decide which of two alternative courses our love for God requires us to take. For the answer is obviously ' whichever of them will please God most ; and, once more, as in the case of conscientiousness, we shall find ourselves obliged to enquire what change of conditions God wishes us to attempt to bring about by means of our actions and intentions. However much we try to escape from the task of deciding what actions are right, it makes itself felt as a necessary one in the end.

For all these reasons the true moralist will never allow us to speak slightingly of right action. And although he will not neglect motive and intention, he will attempt to secure right action as well. A millionaire may say ' I think of giving five hundred thousand pounds to build a much-needed hospital ; but I hesitate to do so because by careful introspection I have discovered that my motive is simply to spite my relatives, who

are expecting to inherit my fortune.' The inexperienced moralist might well reply: 'Your motive is so vicious that you must not gratify it in any way, and so it will be wrong to build the hospital. After all your character is far more important than providing for the well-being of a certain number of sick people.' But the wise adviser will say, 'Of course it is right to build the hospital, and you must do it; but frustrate your motive by reducing your style of living so drastically that your relatives will inherit as much this way as they expected to do the other.'

This example is no doubt an extreme one. Nevertheless, in minor matters we constantly find people hesitating to do what they think is right because they suspect their motives. They have to be taught that if an action is right it is to be done; the question of motive must be dealt with, if necessary, by further actions of a remedial character.¹

I have, I am afraid, rather laboured this point about the importance of a man's considering the rightness or wrongness of his actions (and similarly, of course, the morality or otherwise of his intentions) however conscientious he may be and however virtuous his motives. But the truth is so often misunderstood, that the emphasis laid upon it is not unnecessary. We must add, however, that virtuous motives, though they cannot guarantee right action and moral intentions, do beyond question help considerably to promote them. That is why every text-book of moral theology contains a certain number of passages (which really belong more to the subject-matter of pastoral or ascetic theology) giving valuable advice on the various methods of cultivating virtuous motives and of disciplining vicious ones—or, in other words, of inculcating virtuous habits and eradicating vicious ones. In fact we are not in a position to say that the knowledge of what actions are right and what intentions are moral is *more* important than the power to discern whether our dominant motives are virtuous or not. It is better to attribute equal importance to all these, and leave the matter there.

All this means, as was said before, that we need a definite test or standard to apply to our actions, intentions and motives.

¹ To make the picture complete, we should have to consider a type of moralist who says: 'After all, the question of right action is unimportant; what matters is that our intentions should be moral.' But this is merely to say, 'The end justifies the means' without qualification; and that, as we have already seen, is a view which no sane moralist would support.

Two such standards have been suggested above—the Ten Commandments, and the promotion of universal conscientiousness. But countless others are in use among moral theologians—‘the glory of God,’ ‘the vision of God,’ the hastening of Christ’s kingdom, the example of Christ, the Beatitudes, the cardinal and theological virtues, and so on. Human ingenuity is not easily baffled in its search for phrases to express the ideal, and some at least of the apparent complexity of text-books of moral theology is due to the fact that traditional theology has been loth to surrender any of these time-honoured schemes, and so has had to fit them all into a vast super-scheme in which there are many redundancies.

But we notice that these expressions are, after all, mere phrases—forms without content—and what matters for our purpose is not so much the form as the content. The content is usually expressed by means of lists of virtuous motives, right actions, and moral intentions, and their opposites. Many people object to these lists; but I am inclined to think that they do so because (perhaps unconsciously) they cherish one or other of the two heresies, ‘Nothing matters except conscientiousness’ or ‘Nothing matters except virtuousness of motive.’ For my own part I do not quite see how we can manage without such lists. The common-sense practice, by which we do not merely call a motive vicious or an intention immoral or an action wrong, but proceed to classify its viciousness, immorality or wrongness, as ‘dishonest,’ ‘jealous,’ ‘selfish,’ ‘mean,’ ‘lascivious,’ is surely a practice which helps us both to appreciate the full range of the Christian ideal, and also to discover how far and in what directions we fall short of it.

The greatest difficulty, as has been said, occurs in the case of actions. It is fairly easy to decide whether a motive or intention is commendable or the reverse. They are simple straightforward things; but actions are not. So long, of course, as we hold that any particular action falls into the category of ‘actions always wrong’ there is no trouble. But, as we have seen, the fewer actions we find ourselves obliged to put into this category the better. And for all other actions we have to consider circumstances and probable results, and strike a balance. I am inclined to tell a lie in order to save my grand-

mother the pain of discovering that my brother is not as good as she thinks he is. To tell a lie is normally wrong ; to save people pain is normally right. Here are two important considerations for me, but they do not help me much as they stand, because they cannot tell me whether to tell *this* lie to save *this* person from *this much* pain is right or wrong.

Moralists who attempt to discover further principles to help us in these cases of perplexity are known as casuists, and the art of applying the principles to particular cases is called casuistry. Casuistry has obtained a bad reputation, partly because it has never proved so great a help as people would like it to be ; and partly because some of its ' rules ' have on occasion led (not necessarily by evil intention on anyone's part) to conclusions which few serious Christians would applaud. It is here, more than elsewhere, that we have to remember the preoccupation of moral theology with minimum standards, and recognise that the casuist is more concerned to identify those actions which cannot by any stretch of imagination be called Christian than to illustrate actions or states of mind of outstanding saintliness.

It is certain that no casuistical rules can be at once so definite and so water-tight as to produce absolutely unquestionable decisions of right and wrong. But they are not without value on that account. They indicate to us the kind of consideration we ought to take into account in attempting to decide what is the right action in any particular set of circumstances ; they help us to be certain that we have not overlooked anything which ought not to have been overlooked. There can be no doubt that a painstaking study of a number of the discussions which are embodied in handbooks of casuistry helps materially to make a man a wise and discriminating judge of right and wrong. But it cannot make him infallible.

The truth is, of course, that the capacity to consider a moral problem impartially, to collect and sift the necessary evidence, to marshal the arguments on both sides, to examine analogous problems for any light which they may throw upon the matter, and finally to strike the balance and reach a conclusion which will at least have real weight behind it, is very much of the nature of an art. Some have a great talent for it, others very little—that is why we habitually go to some people for advice

but do not worry very much about the views of others. But however small a man's natural talents in this direction may be, use and experience will develop them to a very considerable degree, if they are wisely and earnestly applied. In so far as the moral theologian has a practical end in view (apart from such matters as the confessional, and the discipline of motives and so on to which allusion has already been made) it is to help people to clarify their minds on these subjects, with a view to using whatever talents they may have in this direction to the best advantage.

So we come back to the word which above all others belongs to the sphere of moral theology—the word 'conscience.' Conscience is not some mysterious eighth sense, as many people suppose; ¹ it is simply a shorthand expression for the mind of man when it is attempting to reach greater certainty in regard to right actions, moral intentions and virtuous motives, either in general, or with reference to some particular case. No more in this than in any other matter can the mind claim infallibility either for the most stubborn of its natural intuitions or for the most definite of its considered conclusions. But so far as it reaches convictions, they are authoritative for their possessor until new light is thrown upon them in such a way as to necessitate revision. Until such time they are the only safe guide for him to walk by, and if he disobeys their monitions, he can expect nothing but blame.

The practical aim of the moral theologian, strictly so-called, may therefore be described as the education of conscience. His text-book will set out as fully as possible his scheme of right actions, moral intentions and virtuous motives. He will attempt to show on what authority or combination of authority he bases each definition which he puts forward—whether that of Scripture, or of the Church, or of reason, or of two or three of these combined. To do this, he must, of course, have some philosophy of authority in reference to

¹ Conscience is often defined as the 'voice of God speaking to the soul.' The definition is an unhappy one, because it implies an idea of the infallibility of each man's 'conscience,' and makes it seem a kind of miraculous and oracular special sense. If we said 'conscience is the soul listening to the voice of God enunciating moral truths, but often hearing what is said very inadequately and imperfectly' we should have put the epigram into its true form.

these three sources of moral principle and the degree of insight which is to be attributed to each of them. But in setting forth this philosophy he will be writing more as a dogmatic theologian or exponent of Christian doctrine, than as a moral theologian. On matters of this kind he will assume a common ground between himself and his readers. This also is a fact which we have to bear in mind when we attempt to read the classical text-books of our subject. The majority of them have been produced on the basis of a philosophy of authority which is much more congenial to the Church of Rome than the Church of England. That is no reason why the Anglican should not study them with profit ; but he must bear in mind throughout that the premises upon which they are built up are in many respects very different from his own.

VI

Everything we have said so far is gravely complicated by the use of the words ' sin ' and ' sinful ' in ethical discussion. ' Sin ' is, of course, habitually used for some violation of the standard which we employ when we call an act right, an intention moral, a motive virtuous. But it is also used whenever we find ourselves obliged to condemn a man for unconscientiousness of temper. The main problem created by the words arises out of this last fact. It is difficult in any case to use the words ' sin ' and ' sinful ' without implying guilt or blame. And, as we have seen, a man is never really to blame unless he is doing something he believes to be wrong (or whose possible wrongness he has refused to consider seriously) or refusing to do what he believes to be right. Consequently, when the words ' sin ' and ' sinful ' are used of actions, intentions, or motives, without reference to temper, we have to perform the difficult and unnatural operation of eliminating from their meaning all idea of guilt or blame. This we very often fail to do, and so common is our use of the words ' sin ' and ' sinful ' that we often find ourselves thereby implicitly blaming a man for doing a wrong action, even when, after the most earnest scrutiny, he himself believes it to be absolutely right.

Moralists have for centuries recognised this danger, and attempted to meet it by drawing distinctions between ' blame-

less' and 'blameworthy' sins. Unfortunately, two such attempts have achieved popularity; and since they do not both approach the problem from the same angle, they have in many ways increased the difficulty instead of mitigating it.

(a) The simpler distinction of the two, though it came later in time, is that between 'formal' and 'material' sin. 'Material sin' is the phrase used of any action, intention or motive which in fact contradicts our ideal standard (i.e., which hinders the development of human conscientiousness, tends to frustrate God's purposes, infringes the Ten Commandments, or, in general, is condemned by the particular formula in which we choose to express the ideal), but is not blameworthy. The principal reason for its not being blameworthy is of course that the person concerned thought the action right or the intention moral, or was honestly unaware of the viciousness of his motives. But there are other causes which help to make something sinful material, even though the person in question is aware that what he does is contrary to God's purposes. We blame him less if he has been the momentary victim of fright, for example, or intimidation, or passion, or sleepiness. Formal sin, on the other hand, implies deliberate and conscious defiance of conscience, without the excuse of any of these agencies which tend to throw the will off its balance.

This distinction is easy and understandable. The word 'sin' could always be qualified by the adjective 'material' or 'formal,' and the question, 'Does the mention of "sin" in this case imply blame or not?' would automatically be settled. But the distinction was not made until the period of the Schoolmen; and another one, in part with the same reference, in part with a different one, and thereby paradoxical even in itself—had already been in the field for centuries. The resulting confusion has never wholly been cleared up.

(b) This second (though earlier) distinction is that between 'mortal' and 'venial' sin. Its early history is wrapped in some obscurity. But when it reaches the full light of day it is seen as a distinction between sins for which penance and absolution are necessary, and those for which they are not. We are once more crossing the border-line between canon law and moral theology. Now (rightly or wrongly) law is always concerned with the objective side of offences, as well as the

subjective side. It considers degrees of blameworthiness, it is true; but it also considers the magnitude of the offence. A man who steals a million pounds is always more severely punished than a man who steals a shilling, though the latter may be no less conscious of the wickedness of theft than the former. Thus 'mortal' sin has always been distinguished from 'venial' sin by 'gravity (as distinct from "parvity") of matter.' This gives it quite a different turn from the distinction between formal and material sin. The latter is wholly concerned with the subjective side of sin; the former has never been able to rid itself of preoccupation with objective considerations.¹

Nevertheless, the progressive character of Christian moral theology is shown by the fact that by the time that the distinction between 'formal' and 'material' sin had matured, the distinction between 'mortal' and 'venial' had been greatly modified in the same direction. 'Parvity of matter' was still a characteristic of venial sin, but so also were inadvertence, conscientiousness, want of deliberation and so on. 'Gravity of matter' was also normally a characteristic of 'mortal' sin, but there were occasions when sin 'in a grave matter' could be regarded as venial on account of conscientiousness or inadvertence. Hence came an astounding confusion of terminology. 'Venial sin' often meant practically the same as 'material sin'; but there could also be such a thing as 'formal venial sin' ('formal' because deliberate, 'venial' because of parvity of matter). And again, not all 'material' sin could be called 'venial'; for on account of gravity of matter it might still have to retain the title of 'mortal' though the 'sinner' was scarcely if at all to blame. Furthermore, mortal sin could on occasion be called 'material' only, by reason of conscientiousness or inadvertence; but almost the same result would be secured by saying that on this occasion it had been reduced to the rank of 'venial sin,' and perhaps even of 'material venial sin.'

So deeply are these two traditions rooted that I doubt whether the resultant confusion will ever be cleared up; and

¹ I leave out of account here, for simplicity's sake, the distinction between mortal and venial sin, which attributes to the first the character of 'aversion from God as our last end,' and the consequence of 'loss of sanctifying grace; the death of the soul; and eternal punishment in hell.' This distinction belongs really to dogmatic and not to moral theology.

I am led towards the conviction that the best course for a moral theology which does not feel itself tied to historical terminology would be to avoid the words 'sin' and 'sinful' altogether. But the beginner in moral theology will find himself obliged to use books phrased in the terminology that has become conventional: and it may be sufficient for the moment to warn him that whenever he meets the words 'sin' and 'sinful' (as he will, of course, on every page), he must pause and ask himself exactly what is meant by them in the context. Still more is this the case when the adjectives 'mortal' and 'venial' are attached.

VII

There is another famous use of the word 'sin' which, by its paradoxical character, emphasises still further the dangers involved in its employment, and at the same time illuminates our subject by clearing up the conception implied by the word 'motive.' As we have been using it, motive has meant 'a tendency to perform actions or to foster intentions of a particular kind.' A man of strong patriotic motive, for example, will habitually study his country's interests, and will voluntarily offer his services at moments of crisis without waiting for any particular call. We must remind ourselves, of course, that he will often need careful thought before he can decide what is the patriotic thing to do, otherwise he may do as much harm as good, and will expose himself to the machinations of evilly disposed persons who will persuade him that such-and-such a thing is for the good of the country, when, as a matter of fact, it is not. The mere possession of virtuous motives is not in itself enough.

Motives, of course, cannot be seen, they can only be inferred. In fact, we cannot really say that any such thing exists; for the inference itself involves a vicious circle. A man does a number of 'patriotic' things, and we infer a 'patriotic' motive behind them. The basis of the inference is simply, 'He would not have done so many patriotic things merely by accident, there must be an underlying cause for them all; and this cause is what we call his motive.' But, as a matter of fact, it may be a mere accident that he has done so many patriotic actions; or we may have overestimated their number in relation to the

whole total of his actions because *we* are specially interested in actions of that character. We are moving in country in which scientific certainty is unattainable. The best we can say, perhaps, is that philosophers and psychologists no less than moral theologians are agreed to postulate these habitual tendencies as forming, in some way or another, the raw material of human action.

Setting this problem aside, therefore, let us look further into these so-called motives. We have classified them, generally, as either virtuous or vicious; and we must assume agreement with the proposition that motives which sway a man towards the performance of actions which we call 'right' (whether he thinks them right or not) shall be called virtuous, whilst those which make him tend to do actions which we call wrong (even though he himself thinks them right¹) shall be called vicious.² Now, a question of some importance presents itself at once. How did the man come into possession of these two opposed classes of motives? Was he endowed with a certain number of each at birth? Or are they reducible to a common denominator?

The general answer, both of psychology and of theology, is that they *are* so reducible. The theologian stands on the firm ground of faith: God, who is all good, could not have endowed man with motives whose necessary and only tendency would be to undermine His own purposes. Yet because God creates, not machines of perfect moral correctitude, but men and women with freedom of will, our motives are capable of being perverted to purposes other than divine; and in actual fact, so weak of will are we, that they are constantly and in large part perverted in their manner. It is in such circumstances that they tend towards the production of wrong actions and the cherishing of immoral intentions, and therefore earn the title 'vicious.'

We may say, for example, that we have a motive towards worship. But with it we may worship either God or mammon. If our worship is wholly directed to God, it is wholly virtuous;

¹ But regardless of the questions as to whether he does them *because* he thinks them right: to introduce this question would be to confuse the problem of 'tempers' with that of 'motives.'

² Thus adhering to our principle that no idea of praise or blame goes with our use of the words virtuous and vicious.

if wholly to mammon it is wholly vicious. If we worship God a little, but mammon very much, then it is fair to say that we have divided our motive into two parts—a weaker part directed to God, and a stronger part directed to mammon ; or, less formally, that we have a weak motive of worship towards God, and a very strong one of worship towards mammon.

This perversion of motive, which turns what was or might have been wholly virtuous into something partly or entirely vicious, can take place without recognition or responsibility on our part. It can be induced in us by external forces—education and environment—before we reach the age of conscious action ; it may even be the result of heredity. We are responsible, and consequently blameworthy, only if conscience recognised the danger, and nevertheless we refrained from taking effective action to deal with it. The technical term for it is *inordinatio* : the motive has ‘ got out of the ranks ’ somehow, and needs to be brought back. The term is a valuable one, because it suggests clearly the two different ways in which a motive can on occasion be regarded as ‘ vicious.’ In some cases it is ‘ out of rank ’ because it takes a quicker step than others, or is more dominant than it ought to be. Thus benevolence takes on some of the qualities of a vice if it is exercised without discrimination towards all and sundry, and stifles the voice of prudence and experience. In other cases a motive is ‘ out of rank ’ because it is not marching in the proper direction ; so worship becomes a vice if it is directed towards money instead of towards God.

Once more we see the importance of attempting to instruct ourselves as to what are right actions and moral purposes. In our classification of aspects of conduct in general, ‘ zeal ’ or ‘ enthusiasm ’ will rank as what we have called a motive. So, if I examine myself as to my possession of zeal, my first question will be, ‘ Am I zealous enough about anything, or do I suffer from a psychological lassitude in all that I do ? ’ But even if I decide that I am not lacking in zeal in general, I still have to ask myself, first, ‘ Is my zeal tempered, as it should be with discretion ? ’ and second (and most important of all), ‘ Is it directed towards the fulfilment of God’s purposes, or not ? ’ And this latter question obviously can only be

answered if I know something as to what God's purposes are.¹

The very first step of all, then, in moral theology would seem to be the enumeration of the normal 'motives' of mankind—those tendencies which lead towards recognisable action of this kind or that. All these motives are God-given, and so far are virtuous in themselves, and minister to God's purposes. In some happy individualists they seem rarely to fall into disorder, but retain their virtue as by nature. But cases of this kind are few and far between. For the most part, our motives are already in considerable disorder when we first become alive to them; it is one of the crowning mercies of the grace of God that it enables the human will to order them once more towards the fulfilment of God's purposes.

So far back as moral theology can be traced, there are recognisable attempts at such an enumeration. But that characteristic tendency of our branch of study to concern itself with sin, which we saw to be inherent in the interest which it has always shown in the minimum standard of good conduct, forced it to think of these essential tendencies to action of every kind as *roots of sin*—roots from which sins would spring unless they were carefully watched and tended. From the idea of 'roots of sin' to that of 'root sins' is a very short step; and the enumeration I have mentioned appears fully fledged in Christian history as the list of seven (or occasionally eight) 'root' or 'capital sins.'² One of the principal tabulations of traditional moral theology is concerned with the dividing up of all conceivable sins into seven groups, each sprung from a different one of these ancestors.

¹ Readers of moral theology might well be tempted to ask, is not the idea of an *inordinate motive* identical with that of the *habitual sin* (opposed to *actual sin*) spoken of in the text-books? Linguistically it might well be; in actual fact there is no connexion whatsoever (another example of the confusion surrounding the word 'sin'). *Habitual sin* is a phrase, rare in use and delicate in meaning. It refers to the state (*habitus*) of the man who has committed a mortal sin, and has not repented of it; it is the *result* of sin, and not (as an 'inordinate motive' would be) the basis or raw material of it. It includes the 'loss of saving grace' and 'liability to eternal punishment' and is therefore a theological rather than an ethical conception. The term seems to be relatively modern, and Prümmer speaks of it as 'non felix innovatio.'

² It is wholly erroneous and misleading to speak of the 'seven deadly (still worse, "mortal") sins.'

Nothing can be more certain than that the monks of the Egyptian desert, who first devoted themselves to the scientific study of the 'capital sins,' knew perfectly well that they were not really dealing with sins at all, but only with tendencies which were in essence God given, and so virtuous, but were capable of falling into disorder and so becoming vicious.¹ The lists of primary instincts, which in each particular individual are worked up into the more complicated 'sentiments,' given by modern psychologists, have still a great deal in common with the seven *capitalia*; and the fact that the monastic enumeration is the shorter of the two is not so much the result of lack of observation (for both lists are frankly empirical) as of the monks' respect for the mystic number seven.

Here, then, the use of the word 'sin' is perhaps more confusing than anywhere else. It is attached to instinctive tendencies, which, as God given, are more deserving of the title of 'virtue' than of that of 'vice,' and under the power of grace can grow in the quality of virtue as readily as, without that power, they may degenerate into vice. To think of them, even for a moment, as 'sins' in any sense whatsoever, is to distort the whole picture which the formulation was originally intended to present.

VIII

It remains only for me to remind the reader that this essay is in no sense an attempt to summarise the principles or conclusions of any particular school of moral theologians. I have tried simply to tell him what moral theology is about—what questions he may expect to find discussed or answered in any ordinary text-book of the subject. One of the best of modern text-books outlines the study under the following headings, the bracketed words in italics being alternative headings which may help to bring them into line with the vocabulary we have been using hitherto:

- (1) of man's last end and the norm of morality (*the Christian's ideal*);

¹ On the 'capital sins' see my *Vision of God* (large edition), pp. 200, 201; *Some Principles of Moral Theology*, pp. 265, 266; with footnotes in each case.

- (2) of human acts (*actions, their circumstances and their results*) ;
- (3) of laws (*the meaning and importance of right action, moral intentions, and virtuous motives ; and the problem of authority*) ;
- (4) of conscience (*and conscientiousness*) ;
- (5) of sins and vices (*a review of wrong actions, immoral intentions, and vicious motives mainly under the classification of the seven capital sins*) ;
- (6) of virtues in general ; (7) of the theological virtues ;
- (8) of the moral virtues, or the Ten Commandments ;
- (9) of the precepts of the Church ; (10) of justice and contracts ; (11) of the obligations of persons in various specified states of life (*an analogous review of right actions, moral intentions, and virtuous motives, on the basis of numerous different classifications*).

It will be seen at once that this scheme, though one of the best in use, has suffered considerably from deference to traditional material. The confusion is at its highest in the last six sections (on virtues), which is composed of accretions of various dates and from various sources, and exhibits no kind of logical order. But the difficulties extend further ; for, although in all a great many ' sins ' are dealt with in paragraph 5 as ' descendants ' of the seven root sins, a great many more occur in the various sections (7-11) on ' virtues,' as ' vices opposed ' to the virtue which is being discussed at the moment. An expert reader will very soon be able to find his way about such a text-book ; but the beginner cannot hope to avoid a certain bewilderment, and will wonder from time to time whether it would not be better to simplify the treatment by jettisoning some of the traditional classifications, and starting on a new and more logical basis.

My own belief is that this both could and ought to be done ; but it would be a labour of great magnitude. At all events, no such text-book exists at present ; and my object has been more to clear away the difficulties which beset the tyro who opens one of the existing books than to write a preface to a book which does not as yet exist. It is with this in view that I have experimented with a vocabulary which differs in many respects from the traditional one. The experiment may

be adjudged a failure ; but if it has helped to clear up some of the ambiguities of such words as 'end,' 'intention,' 'result,' 'motives,' 'virtues,' and so on—and above all the almost incredible confusion surrounding the words 'sin' and 'sinful'—it will have served its turn.

Finally, I must admit that if it is considered as a formal introduction to the subject, the balance of the essay is very faulty. But this again, I think, is a necessary fault. There are many questions—especially those connected with the idea and importance of 'right action'—which the modern mind tends to treat as all but irrelevant to the appreciation of 'conduct' at its true worth. I thought it better to attempt to show why, in my view, the concern of moral theology with these questions is a vital one, than to assume that the reader must necessarily see eye to eye with tradition in the matter. If this has been a waste of time, I must ask forgiveness. My only excuse is that for many years I failed to discover the relevance of such questions myself, and experienced a consequent impatience with the text-books which I now see to have been mistaken.

It is because others may feel the like impatience that I have given so much attention to this aspect of moral theology, at the expense of that treatment of particular problems of immediate importance—problems, for example, such as those connected with marriage, peace and war, the ethics of commerce, and so forth—which the reader perhaps had a right to expect. But on this point I am firmly convinced—that a full understanding of first principles is necessary before any discussion of such problems can be fruitful ; and this essay must be taken for what it is, as no more than a very modest contribution towards such an understanding.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Note.—A bibliography of moral theology is, in one sense, very easy, in another, very difficult to compile. It is easy, because there are innumerable Roman Catholic books (the majority in Latin, but a certain number in English) all drawing upon the *Prima et Secunda Secundae* of St. Thomas Aquinas, but with greater or less dependence upon St. Alphonso Liguori as well. Moral theology and casuistry also occupied both Anglican and Reformed theologians up to about the end of the seventeenth century ; but they cannot be said to have

left any trace upon the thought of their several communions, and remain in effect (though often well worth reading for their wisdom) no more than historical curiosities. There have been in the last eighty years a number of non-Roman Catholic writers (almost entirely Anglican) who have handled the subject; but its highly specialised technique and its relative unpopularity outside the Roman Church (due to the suspicion with which, by virtue of its association with the confessional, it was regarded in the nineteenth century) have kept the number of such writers very small, and have endowed their efforts with a very tentative character.

The difficulty of making a selection from such a field lies in the strong similarity which all the Roman Catholic books bear to one another—a similarity due, of course, to their dependence upon the two classical authorities I have mentioned, as also to their necessary respect for the canon law and the decisions of the different Congregations. This difficulty would be increased were I to include 'ethics' and 'Christian ethics' in the sphere of this bibliography; for once again the number of writers is incalculable, and the similarities between them often very great.

I have decided, therefore, to keep the bibliography as short as possible. In the first section ('Classical') I have included two great Anglican writers whose work should still command attention. In the second ('Modern') I have given what I hope is a representative selection of Roman Catholic writers, including several of the most recent; and have added such modern Anglican books as have come my way. Some of the latter are unfortunately out of print, but can be procured second-hand with comparative ease. Books in Latin are marked with an asterisk. For bibliographies of allied subjects of study (Ethics and Christian Ethics, Penitential Theology, Ascetic Theology, Pastoral Psychology, etc.) I may perhaps be allowed to refer to my *Principles of Moral Theology*, and to no. vi of the *Annotated Lists of Books on Religion and Theology*, published by Messrs. Mowbray & Co.

I. CLASSICAL

*AQUINAS, ST. THOMAS : *Summa Theologica*, Part II (Prima et Secunda Secundae). (Many editions.)

— — — English trans. by the Dominican Fathers of the English Province. (Burns, Oates, & Washbourne.)

*LIGUORI, ST. ALPHONSO : *Theologia Moralis*. (Many editions.)

*SANDERSON, BP. R. : *de obligatione Conscientiae Praelectiones decem*. (English trans. by BP. C. WORDSWORTH, *Lectures on Conscience and Law*, out of print.)

TAYLOR, BP. JEREMY : *Ductor Dubitantium*. (Various editions.)

II. MODERN

(a) Roman Catholic

DAVIS, H. : *Moral and Pastoral Theology*. 4 vols. (Sheed & Ward.)

*GURY, J. P. : *Theologiae Moralis Compendium*. (Various editions.)

- *LEHMKUHL, A.: *Theologia Moralis*. (Friburg, Herder: various editions.)
- KOCH, A., and PREUSS, A.: *Handbook of Moral Theology*. 5 vols. (Herder.)
- McHUGH, J. A., and CALLAN, C. J.: *Moral Theology*. 2 vols. (Herder.)
- *MERKELBACH, B. H.: *Summa Theologiae Moralis*. 3 vols. (Paris, Desclée de Brouwer.)
- RICKABY, J.: *Aquinas Ethicus*. 2 vols. (Burns & Oates.)
- SLATER, A.: *Manual of Moral Theology*. 2 vols. (Burns & Oates.)
- *Cases of Conscience*. 2 vols. (New York, Benziger.)
- *TANQUEREY, A.: *Synopsis Theologiae Moralis*. 3 vols. (Various editions. Paris, Desclée.)
- *PRÜMMER, D. R.: *Manuale Theologiae Moralis*. 3 vols. (Various editions. Friburg, Herder.)

(b) *Anglican*

- ELMENDORF, J. J.: *Elements of Moral Theology*. (New York—out of print.)
- KIRK, K. E.: *Some Principles of Moral Theology*. (Longmans.)
- *Conscience and its Problems*. (Longmans.)
- HALL, F. J., and HALLOCH, F. H.: *Moral Theology*. (Longmans.)
- SKINNER, J.: *Synopsis of Moral and Ascetical Theology*. (Kegan Paul—out of print.)
- WEBB, W. W.: *The Cure of Souls*. (Out of print.)

XI

CHRISTIAN WORSHIP AND LITURGY

by

E. C. RATCLIFF, M.A.

Lecturer in Liturgiology in the University of Oxford

‘ For Protestant as for Catholic, for heretic as for orthodox,
for the modern as for the ancient Christian, the worship
characteristic of Christianity is public or common worship.’

Page 409.

XI

CHRISTIAN WORSHIP AND LITURGY

INTRODUCTORY

THE purpose of man in worshipping God is to render Him a due service and honour. The service and honour have been variously conceived in the history of Religion according to the beliefs about God entertained by the worshippers. They have been variously conceived also within the Christian Religion ; but upon one point the Christian Churches have been agreed, however widely they have differed with regard to the nature and ordering of worship. For Protestant as for Catholic, for heretic as for orthodox, for the modern as for the ancient Christian, the worship characteristic of Christianity is public or common worship.

From the Church of the Old Testament, the Church of the New inherited the doctrine of the People of God and accepted the notion of 'corporate personality' which that doctrine implied. Conceiving itself first to be within, and then to be, that People, the early Christian society believed the relations between God and its members to be given and maintained through the society. The Christian unit was the Church, not the individual. Therefore, whatever the duty of the individual to render private worship for the divine benefits accorded him, the society as God's People had the duty of offering to God a corporate worship for His redemptive acts in bringing the members of the society 'out of darkness into His marvellous light' ¹ and in constituting as His People them 'which in time past were not a people.' ² In the *λειτουργία* of the early society are the origins of the liturgy of the Church. If a society is to worship in common, a method of procedure is necessary. If themes of thanksgiving, praise, and prayer are

¹ Peter ii. 9.

² *Ibid.* ii. 10.

constant, the language expressing them tends to become formalised and ultimately to be fixed ; so that, whether or not the worshipping body recites the forms in common, it knows them and the forms are the corporate possession. The ancient ideal of the Christian People is summed up in the expression 'one body.'¹ The one body should be of one heart and one mind, and its liturgical worship is the one voice, which with one mouth it utters to the glory and honour of God.

As Christian worship was prompted early by the thought of redemption through the Lord's passion and death, it came as early to be associated with the Eucharist, which, by the Lord's words at the Last Supper, as recorded in the tradition received and transmitted by St. Paul and the Gospel narratives, was linked intimately with the death. The history of Christian worship, therefore, is in the main the history of the Eucharist and of the Eucharistic liturgy. Throughout the greater part of the Church's life, the Eucharistic liturgy has been the principal vehicle of the Church's worship in practice ; and though the Reformation modified practice, the Eucharistic rite continued to be in theory the most solemn act of worship in the Reformation churches.²

In the following pages an attempt is made to indicate the course of development and change in Christian worship, with special reference to England in the post-Reformation period.

I. WORSHIP AND SACRAMENTS IN THE NEW TESTAMENT.

The original Christian society at Jerusalem was a Jewish *αἵρεσις*, or sect, distinguished from other Jews by its belief that Jesus was Messiah. This belief did not at first constitute a heresy, involving expulsion from the Jewish Church of those who held it, with consequent forfeiture of the spiritual privileges enjoyed by the People of God. The original Christian society itself had no thought or desire of being other than Jewish. It did not set out to found a schism, with a new theology and a new worship. The Temple and the Temple cultus formed the background of its worship ; and within the traditional context

¹ Cf. Eph. iv. ; 1 Cor. x. 17.

² E. Underhill, *Worship* (London, 1937), provides an admirable introduction to, and survey of, the subject.

of Jewish worship, the Christian society taught and expressed its distinctive tenets and practised its particular customs. When the society expanded, or rather when new societies were formed, outside Jerusalem, first in Palestine and then in the larger Graeco-Roman world beyond, there was no need to change the principle of worship as accepted at Jerusalem, although of necessity there was a change in practice. Outside Jerusalem, the synagogues replaced the Temple as the cultual background of the Christian societies, and the synagogue services performed the function discharged at Jerusalem by the Temple worship. For the most part, the earliest converts to Christianity in the Hellenic world appear to have been non-Jews who were adherents of Judaism and were attached to the synagogues, and were therefore already familiar with the synagogue tradition. For such, as for the Jewish Christians of Jerusalem, there was no question of inventing a new mode of worship.

Too strong a contrast is sometimes drawn between Temple and synagogue. To the Jews who attended the latter, it was in some sense a lesser Temple. In the worship both of the Temple and the synagogue, the Law was central. The *pietas Judaica* consisted in devotion and obedience to the Law. The sacrificial system itself formed but a part of, and was secondary to, the Law which ordained it. If in the Temple only could the Law be obeyed in the matter of sacrifice, devotion to the Law as a whole could be faithfully rendered in the synagogue. The reading of the Law, therefore, constituted the heart of the synagogue order of worship. It is impossible to determine exactly what were the elements of a synagogue service in the first Christian century. Yet with some degree of certainty we may say that the reading of the Law was preceded by the prayers, or benedictions of God, known as *Yotzer*¹ and *Ahabah*,² and by the *Shema*,³ though not in the full forms now used. At

¹ For the modern form, see I. Abrahams, *Annotated Edition of the Authorised Daily Prayer Book* (London, 1914), pp. 128 ff. For a discussion of the synagogue service and its development, see W. O. E. Oesterley, *The Jewish Background of the Christian Liturgy* (Oxford, 1925), and the authorities therein cited.

² Abrahams, *op. cit.* p. 131 f.

³ So called because it opens with Deut. vi. 4, 'Hear, O Israel.' For the modern form, see Abrahams, *op. cit.* p. 132 f.

this period, the Decalogue seems to have been attached to the *Shema'*. After the *Shema'* came the *Ge'ullah*¹ and a shorter form of the benedictions known to-day as 'The Eighteen.' Attached to the benedictions was the *Kedushah*,² or Sanctification of God's Name, which included the *Sanctus* (Isa. vi. 3). A reading from the Prophets followed that from the Law, and instruction and exhortation followed the Scripture lessons.³ Confession of sins and intercession for the Chosen People, with a petition for rulers, found a place in the prayers.

Some part of this service was derived from the worship of the Temple; a very considerable part of it was drawn from the Old Testament. If the Temple cultus was believed to be divinely ordained, the worship of the synagogue was to a large extent expressed in forms which were believed to have been divinely given. In the minds of those who offered it, synagogue worship was no mere humanly devised substitute for the divinely instituted order of the Temple. It was a true worship, inspired by God, according to His will, and pleasing to Him. Thus was it regarded by the early Christian converts from Judaism; and very little adaptation was required to make it express Christian ideas. Its characteristic note was (and continues to be) praise and thanksgiving to God for His great redemptive acts. This note was further emphasised in the synagogues of the Dispersion, which, unlike those of Palestine, made some use of the Psalms in worship. The attitude of Hellenistic Judaism to worship is well expressed by an elder contemporary of St. Paul. According to Philo, thanksgiving (*εὐχαριστία*) is chief among the virtues, and can be properly offered to God, not with material gifts, but with hymns and praises poured out by the invisible and wholly pure mind.⁴ An approximation to this thought was reached also in Palestinian Judaism. 'In the time to come,' Rabbi Menaḥem of Galilee is reported to have said, 'all other sacrifices will cease, but the sacrifice of thanksgiving will not cease. All other prayers will cease, but thanksgiving will not cease.'⁵ The recitation of the

¹ I.e. 'redemption, 'on account of its theme. Abrahams, *op. cit.* p. 134 f.

² Abrahams, *op. cit.* p. 137 f.

³ Cf. Acts xiii. 14, 15.

⁴ *De Plantatione Noe*, 30.

⁵ See C. G. Montefiore and H. Loewe, *A Rabbinic Anthology* (London, 1938), Extract 930, p. 350. R. Menaḥem belongs to the fifth Tannaitic period (A.D. 165-200), but the thought ascribed to him may well be a century older.

Decalogue served to keep the worshippers in mind of the ethical implications of their worship.

The references to worship in the New Testament are slight and allusive, but are sufficient to indicate that the note of thanksgiving and praise for the saving acts of God was taken up by the early Christian societies. The Apocalypse preserves several hymns and fragments of hymns, current in certain Christian circles and probably derived from Hellenistic synagogue usage¹; for the Hellenistic synagogues not only drew upon the Psalter, but also included in their services hymns modelled on the Psalms. Other hymns in the Apocalypse, while modelled on the same pattern, are of Christian composition.² One of the principal stumbling-blocks presented by Christianity to the Jews was belief in a Messiah who had been put to death; and the Christians themselves did not immediately understand the humiliation of crucifixion as glory. It is noteworthy that one of the hymns in the Apocalypse offers praise to the Lamb that was slain.³ With these Christian psalms in the Apocalypse, we may class *Magnificat*, *Benedictus*, and *Nunc dimittis*. In 1 Timothy iii. 16 we have a fragment of a christological hymn. The same document makes reference to ἀνάγνωσις, i.e., public reading of the Scriptures, and to exhortation and instruction; and also requires prayers, intercessions and thanksgivings to be made for all men, including the emperors and those in high place.⁴ Again, the Lord's Prayer in the Matthaean text⁵ has the appearance of being arranged for liturgical recitation. Its Jewish cast is marked. Scanty though the clear references to worship in the New Testament may be, they reveal the kinship in spirit existing between the worship of the Christian societies and that of the Hellenistic synagogues.⁶

Nevertheless, it would be erroneous to suppose that early Christian worship never departed from the Jewish pattern. Christians converted from paganism were drawn from a religious

¹ iv. 8, 11; xi. 15-18; xiv. 7; xv. 3-4.

² v. 9-10, 12; xii. 10-12; xix. 1-2, 5, 6-8.

³ v. 9, 12.

⁴ iv. 13; ii. 1-2.

⁵ Matt. vi. 9-13, cf. Luke xi. 2-4.

⁶ A collection of N.T. passages with any possible bearing upon worship will be found in Cabrol and Leclercq, *Reliquiae Liturgicae Vetustissimae* (Paris, 1900), i, 1-51.

environment profoundly different from that which had surrounded either Jewish converts or those non-Jews who had been adherents of Judaism. Neither the religious inheritance of converted pagans nor their religious presuppositions were such as to attune them readily to synagogue worship; and unless they were required to be Judaised in becoming Christian, it was antecedently probable that they would express their worship more directly and with greater spontaneity than the order of the synagogue allowed. At Corinth, so we learn from 1 Corinthians,¹ certain Christians, not improbably converts from paganism, worshipped after their own fashion. Their worship, inspired (as they believed) by the Spirit, expressed spontaneously, if not intelligibly, the psychological states of those who shared in it. It was, to quote Mgr. Duchesne, 'a Liturgy of the Holy Ghost . . . with a Real Presence and Communion.'² In censuring this procedure, St. Paul implies that he would condemn no worship which was conducted *ἐν σχηµόνως καὶ κατὰ τάξιν*, and which also ministered to edification. We need not think, therefore, that the worship of the Corinthian pagan converts was unique, either for its non-Jewish character or for its disorderly *glossolalia*. On the other hand, we cannot say how frequently parallels to it occurred elsewhere, though possibly parallel occurrences were confined to the Pauline societies. It is easy to understand how 'pneumatic' types of worship yielded place to others of ordered form. It is certainly true that, whether or not ordered forms of a non-Jewish description existed, worship of a Jewish mould finally prevailed. To some extent, perhaps, this is to be explained by the fact that the majority of early Christians could not rightly understand or account for Christianity apart from its Jewish genesis. Though the force of events compelled them to separate themselves from the Jewish Church, they yet believed that they were the divinely appointed legatees of historic Judaism with its corpus of scriptures and other *spiritualia*. In whatever way this belief influenced the details of their worship, the main body of the latter had the synagogues, and in particular the Hellenistic synagogues, for its matrix.

We have now to consider that particular custom of the

¹ xiv.

² *Christian Worship: Its Origin and Evolution* (5th English edn., 1919), p. 48.

Christian societies which has come to be known as the Eucharist or the Lord's Supper. Our earliest reference to the Eucharist is to be found in 1 Corinthians xi. 23 ff. Here St. Paul represents the Lord's Supper as instituted by Jesus, on the night of His betrayal, with the words *τοῦτο ποιεῖτε εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν ἀνάμνησιν*, which are wanting in the Synoptists' narratives.¹ There has been a tendency in some recent criticism of the Gospels to regard Jesus and His disciples as constituting a *ḥābūrāh*, or fellowship of friends, in accordance with the Jewish custom of the time, and to trace the origin of the Eucharist to the religious meal eaten in common by the friends. Whether or no Jesus and His disciples formed a conventional *ḥābūrāh*, they certainly constituted a fellowship; and there are not wanting in the synoptic Gospels indications that a common meal was one of their institutions. Dr. T. W. Manson has lately put forward the suggestion that Luke xxii. 30 may be taken to mean that the fellowship meal was to continue into the Messianic age.² The fellowship meal in this present age, at which Jesus presides, is, therefore, a foretaste of the Messianic banquet; and there was no need for the meal to cease after the bodily presence of Jesus had been removed. The problem before the student of Christian worship and liturgy is to account for the transformation of the fellowship meal into a ceremony commemorating the Last Supper. The transformation is sometimes ascribed to the agency of St. Paul. On the other hand, it is difficult to suppose that so profound a change could have been effected by one man, no matter how creative his genius. The transformation is due, at all events in some part, to a change in Christian thinking with respect to the Crucifixion. In the speeches in the earlier chapters of Acts, the death of Jesus on the cross is an episode reversed by God in the Resurrection. The identification of Jesus with the Suffering Servant of Isaiah liii., however, led to a new evaluation of his death. The Passion came to be understood as central in the life and work of Jesus, and as having a sacrificial and redemptive effect, cosmic in its range. It was inevitable,

¹ For a discussion of Luke xxii. 19, see J. M. Creed, *The Gospel according to St. Luke* (London, 1930).

² See essay, 'The Jewish Background' in *Christian Worship, Studies in its History and Meaning*, ed. by N. Micklem (Oxford, 1936), p. 49.

therefore, that the primitive fellowship meal, which in its cultual aspect was an *ἐνχαριστία* for Jesus, should become an *ἐνχαριστία* for Jesus Who suffered, and should thus become aligned with the Last Supper. It is in this form that the Eucharist appears in 1 Corinthians. Yet in the process of transformation, the original features of the primitive meal have not been lost. The one bread expresses the fellowship of Christians one with another, and also with their Lord. The eschatological reference likewise remains, though now in relation with the death of Jesus. The eating of the bread and the drinking of the cup 'proclaim' that death until Jesus shall come again. At the same time, the Lord's Supper is now no longer a repast.¹ The eating and drinking have acquired a formal and ceremonial character. St. Paul does not state that the Last Supper was a Passover, but the Passover was present to his mind (cf. 1 Cor. vi. 7); and the partaking of the bread and wine is a sacrament of a new deliverance, as the eating of the Passover lamb was a sacrament of an old. Nevertheless, the Eucharist, unlike the Passover, is not said itself to be a sacrifice, although it is represented as a commemoration of a sacrifice. According to Dr. and Mrs. Kirsopp Lake, the Eucharist, as it is presented in 1 Corinthians, differs 'from the Catholic Eucharist little if at all in the significance attached to it.'² If to some scholars this statement will appear to be an over-statement, it cannot be denied that few of the essential elements of the Catholic Eucharist are here lacking. St. Paul, however, nowhere explicitly affirms that the Eucharistic bread and wine are the means of imparting 'eternal,' or supernatural, life to the recipients. This element appears in the Fourth Gospel. In John vi. 32 ff, the Eucharistic bread and wine are identified with heavenly food and drink, which are the flesh and blood of Jesus Himself, and the consumption of which secures eternal life to the recipient and ensures his resurrection at the last day.³ If the Pauline interest is in the action of the

¹ We may reasonably regard the Agape as a continuation of the fellowship meal in its aspect as a repast. For the Agape, see P. Batiffol, *Études d'Histoire et de Théologie Positive, L'Agape* (Paris, 1920), and H. Lietzmann, *Messe und Herrenmahl* (Bonn, 1926), c. xii.

² See *An Introduction to the New Testament* (London, 1938), p. 117.

³ The use of the word *τρώγειν* makes it unlikely that a figurative, or 'spiritual,' eating is intended.

Eucharist, the Johannine interest is in the bread and wine of the Eucharist. John vi. does not permit an unqualified assumption that the ritual context of the bread and wine is a Eucharist of Last Supper type. In the combination of the Pauline interest with the Johannine in a rite of Last Supper type, we have the parent of the Catholic Eucharist. Such a rite, presenting before the worshippers Christ's saving act, and both preserving them within the sphere of that act's operation, and also admitting them to share in eternal life, by means of communion, could not fail to attain pre-eminence in the scheme of Christian worship.

NOTE ON CHRISTIAN SACRAMENTS AND THE MYSTERY RITES.—It is sometimes argued that the Eucharist, together with Baptism, as they appear in 1 Corinthians, betray the influence of pagan mystery cults.¹ The charge is brought on the assumption that the primitive stratum of Christianity, being Jewish, was essentially non-sacramental; whereas Baptism and the Eucharist, in St. Paul's presentation of them, are sacraments. Sacramental Christianity, the argument proceeds, is the creation of St. Paul, whose liberal outlook and travel made it possible for him to view Greek mysticism without a normal Jewish hostility, and even to come to terms with it, if thereby he could win its adherents to Christ. He undoubtedly employs mystery terminology in connexion with Baptism and the Eucharist. Yet this may mean no more than that he is conveying his teaching in language more intelligible and familiar to his readers than a purely Jewish mode of expression would be. The point at issue is whether or not sacramentalism was foreign to Judaism, and consequently excluded from primitive Christianity. A sacrament may be defined as an act, believed to be divinely ordained and involving the use of material means, the purpose of which is to effect or preserve a right relationship with the deity. Preoccupation with the prophetic strain in Old Testament religion has blinded not a few scholars

¹ For a brief account of the mysteries see S. H. Hooke, 'The Way of the Initiate,' in *Judaism and Christianity*, vol. i. *The Age of Transition*, ed. by W. O. E. Oesterley (London, 1937); see also F. Cumont, *Les Religions Orientales dans le Paganisme Romain* (Paris, 1929); and R. Reitzenstein, *Die hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen* (2nd edn., Leipzig, 1920).

to the fact that, on this definition of a sacrament, Judaism itself must be ranked as a sacramental religion. The rite of circumcision, for instance, though it does not make a Jew establishes a right relationship between a Jew and God. The Atonement ritual preserves that relationship. The relationship between God and His people is the context of the Passover. This rite commemorates a redemptive divine intervention, and both reminds the Jew that he is a partaker of blessing and privilege given in and through the intervention, and in some sense also enables him to continue as a partaker. All these acts, the Jew believed, were ordained by God. Their validity and efficacy depended on his due to obedience to divine ordinance. The prophetic emphasis on the ethical did not require, or lead to, the abandonment of these acts. Jewish sacramentalism, when compared with that of the mysteries, is seen to be implicit rather than explicit. It represents a simpler and less-developed form than mystery sacramentalism; but, because it is not so pronounced, it cannot be said to be wanting. There is, therefore, no reason for assuming that Christians of the Jewish tradition would be incapable of attaching a sacramental significance to those acts believed by them to rest upon their Lord's example, if not His precise command, and to bring them into, and maintain them in, a peculiar relationship with Him. Development in Christology involved development of the sacramental potentiality latent in the acts of Baptism and Eucharist. That St. Paul's thinking, as distinct from his terminology, with regard to these sacraments is predominantly Jewish, is seen from his relation of them to the Parousia and the life of the Age to Come. There would seem, at first sight, to be an affinity between pagan sacramentalism and that of the Fourth Gospel. The emphasis on resurrection, however, shows that the writer's thought moves along familiar Jewish paths.

II. THE GENESIS OF LITURGICAL WORSHIP

In the writings of the sub-apostolic period, allusions to worship are hardly less scanty than in the New Testament.

¹ For a discussion of St. Paul's ideas in relation to the mysteries, see S. H. Hooke, 'Christianity and the Mystery Religions,' in *Judaism and Christianity*, vol. i.

The First Epistle of Clement to the Corinthians preserves a prayer (lix.-lxi.), which in theme and style may be taken as representative of the Roman solemn prayer of the end of the first century. This prayer echoes both the thought and the phraseology of Jewish prayers in the synagogue Service, viz., the second Benediction of 'The Eighteen' and the *Ge'ullah* (see p. 412).¹ In another chapter (xxxiv) we have a reference to the *Sanctus* in a form which suggests that it figured in Christian worship as in the synagogue. There is no specific reference to the Eucharist; but we learn incidentally that worship should be conducted at fixed times, in due order and by properly appointed persons. The Epistle assumes that these principles of worship are common to Rome and Corinth. If these churches did not yet possess a liturgy, their worship was liturgical in the same sense that synagogue worship was liturgical, i.e., it was not haphazard, but followed an established order.

The letter of the younger Pliny, Governor of Bithynia and Pontus, written to Trajan c. A.D. 112, contains some references to the worship of the Christians of his province. The latter stated, so Pliny reports, that it was their custom *stato die ante lucem convenire carmenque Christo quasi deo dicere secum invicem seque sacramento non in scelus aliquod obstringere, sed ne furta, ne latrocinia, ne adulteria committerent, ne fidem fallerent, ne depositum adpellati abnegarent*.² The fixed day may be taken as Sunday. The hymn, or psalm, is sung antiphonally, in accordance with Jewish usage.³ It may be that the oath not to commit certain crimes conceals a reference to the recitation of the Decalogue.⁴ If that be so, we have further evidence of close adherence to Jewish tradition on the part of an early Christian community. Pliny further reports that the Christians, having performed this service, dispersed, and

¹ Oesterley, *op. cit.* pp. 114 f., 127 ff., 136 ff.

² *Epistola ad Traianum*, xcvi.

³ Oesterley, *op. cit.* p. 75.

⁴ See C. J. Kraemer, article 'Pliny and the Early Church Service,' in *Journal of Classical Philology* (1934), xxix, 293 ff.; also S. L. Mohler, article 'The Bithynian Christians Again,' *ibid.* (1935), xxx, 167. Dr. Mohler interprets 'carmen' as a Christianised version of the *Shema*. For another view of the 'sacramentum,' viz., that it was a Christian counterpart of a pagan oath, see A. D. Nock, article, 'The Christian Sacramentum in Pliny and a Pagan Counterpart,' in *Classical Review* (1924), xxxviii, 58 ff.

assembled again to partake of food. Attempts have been made to show that there is here a covert allusion to the observance of the vigil and the celebration of the Eucharist. However likely this may be, Pliny's evidence at this point is too vague to justify dogmatic assertion.

It is not until the middle of the second century that we meet with any full account of Christian worship. The *First Apology*¹ of Justin Martyr, addressed to the Emperor Antoninus Pius and his son Marcus Aurelius c. A.D. 150-153, contains a description of Baptism and the Sunday Eucharist. Some additional details may be gathered incidentally from Justin's *Dialogue with Trypho the Jew*, written shortly after the *Apology*. It is probable that the latter was written at Rome, and that the usages it describes represent in general the practices of the Christians of the City. As a writer, Justin lacks clarity and logical sense. He describes the Eucharist first in connexion with Baptism, and again in his account of the Sunday worship. From these two descriptions, the Sunday Eucharist may be schematised as follows :

- i. Lessons are read from the memoirs of the Apostles (i.e., the Gospels), or from the Prophets, as long as time allows (Apol. c. lxvii.).
- ii. The President (*προεστώς*) delivers an instruction on what has been read (Apol. c. lxvii.).
- iii. Common prayers are offered, 'for ourselves, for him who has received illumination (i.e., for the person baptized) and for all others everywhere.' These are said standing (Apol. cc. lxv, lxvii.).
- iv. The Kiss of Peace (Apol. c. lxv.). Justin mentions this only in connexion with Baptism, but while it is omitted in the Sunday account, it is not necessarily precluded.
- v. Bread, and wine,² and water, are brought to the President (Apol. cc. lxv, lxvii.).
- vi. The Eucharistic Prayer. The President 'offers up praise and glory to the Father of all things through

¹ The conventional description is retained for convenience.

² Harnack's attempt to show that the mention of wine is an interpolation is unsuccessful; see *Brod und Wasser: Die Eucharistischen Elemente bei Justin* (Leipzig, 1891).

the name of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and gives thanks (*εὐχαριστίαν*) at length for that we have been accounted worthy of these things by Him' (Apol. c. lxxv). The theme of the *εὐχαριστία* is the creation of the world, and all in it, for man's sake, the Incarnation of Christ, the deliverance of man from sin, and the overthrow of evil through Christ's Passion (Dial. cc. xli, lxx). 'When the President has ended the prayers and the *εὐχαριστία*, all the people present assent, saying "Amen"' (Apol. c. lxxv).

vii. Communion. 'Those who are called by us Deacons give of the bread and wine and water, which have been dedicated with the *εὐχαριστία*, to everyone present, to partake of them; and they carry them also to those not present' (Apol. c. lxxv).

viii. Voluntary contributions of money are made to the President by the more prosperous for the relief of orphans, widows, sick, poor and needy (Apol. c. lxxvii).

By way of explanation, Justin adds that 'this food which is termed by us Eucharist'¹ is not taken as ordinary food and drink, but is believed to be the flesh and blood of Jesus. It is given only to baptized believers, who live in accordance with Christ's precepts.

No one will dispute Mgr. Batiffol's judgment that, in this earliest description of the Eucharistic Liturgy, 'déjà ses traits traditionnels sont reconnaissables, qui se perpétueront dans les grandes familles liturgiques.'² Though the prayers are extemporaneous and though presumably there was no lectionary, the several parts of the rite follow a fixed order and the prayers address themselves to settled themes. Hereafter, we shall find additions to Justin's order and in some cases a rearrangement of its parts, but the broad outline is preserved. It will be noticed that Justin's rite is faithful to the Jewish tradition. §§ i-iii recall the synagogue service for Sabbath mornings and the central action of the rite is praise and thanks-

¹ Justin uses the word *εὐχαριστία* in two senses: (i) of the Eucharistic Prayer, and (ii) of the Eucharistic Elements. He is apparently the first to use the word in the latter sense.

² *Leçons sur la messe* (Paris, 1927), p. vi.

giving. Not less noticeable is the corporate character of the worship. So strong is the corporate sense of the Christian community that communion is extended to those not present, for whatever reason, at the act of worship.

The early third century carries us a stage farther towards fixed forms of prayer. *The Apostolic Tradition*,¹ composed at Rome by Hippolytus, c. A.D. 215, contains a model Anaphora, or Eucharistic Prayer, which may be recited if the celebrating bishop is unable 'to pray suitably with a grand and elevated prayer.' There is no objection, the treatise is careful to state, to the use of a fixed form. The one requisite for the Eucharistic Prayer is that it should be correct and doctrinally orthodox.² Unfortunately the original Greek of *Apostolic Tradition* has been lost. There survives, however, in a manuscript at Verona a Latin³ rendering, which in the main has the appearance of being close to the original; and fragments of the Greek have been incorporated into the *Apostolic Constitutions*, a compilation of the late fourth century. The following is an English translation, made by Fr. Gregory Dix, of the Latin rendering of the Anaphora:⁴

THANKSGIVING.—We render thanks unto thee, O God, through thy Beloved *Child* Jesus Christ, whom *in the last times* thou didst send to us to be a *Saviour* and Redeemer and the *Messenger of thy counsel*; who is thy *Word* inseparable from thee, *through whom thou madest all things* and *in whom thou wast well-pleased*; whom thou didst send from heaven into the Virgin's womb, and who, conceived within her, was made flesh and demonstrated to be thy Son, *being born of Holy Spirit and a virgin*; who, fulfilling thy will and preparing⁵ for thee a *holy people*, *stretched forth his hands* for suffering,

¹ For an account of this document, see E. Schwartz, *Ueber die pseudo-apostolischen Kirchenordnungen* (Strassburg, 1910), and R. H. Connolly, *The So-called Egyptian Church Order and Derived Documents* (Cambridge, 1916). For a critical edition and translation, see G. Dix, *The Treatise on the Apostolic Tradition of St. Hippolytus* (London, 1937).

² Dix, *op. cit.* p. 19.

³ See E. Hauler, *Didascalie Apostolorum Fragmenta Veronensia Latina* (Leipzig, 1900), p. 106 f.

⁴ By kind permission of Fr. Dix and of the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge I am allowed to reproduce the translation in *The Treatise on the Apostolic Tradition of St. Hippolytus of Rome* (London, 1937), pp. 7 ff.

⁵ *Adquirens*, 'procuring,' to which Fr. Dix agrees.

that he might release from sufferings *them who have believed in thee* ; who, when he was betrayed to *voluntary* suffering *that he might abolish death and rend the bonds of the devil* and tread down hell and *enlighten the righteous* and establish the ordinance and *demonstrate the resurrection* :

INSTITUTION NARRATIVE.—Taking bread and making eucharist [i.e. giving thanks] to thee, said: Take, eat: this is my Body which is broken for you [for the remission of sins ¹]. Likewise also the cup, saying: This is my Blood which is shed for you. When ye do this, [ye] do ² my ‘anamnesis.’

ANAMNESIS.—Doing therefore the ‘anamnesis’ of his death and resurrection, we offer to thee the bread and the cup, *making eucharist to thee*, because thou hast bidden us [or found us worthy] *to stand before thee and minister as priests to thee*.

INVOCATION.—And we pray thee that [thou wouldest send thy Holy Spirit upon the oblation of thy holy church] thou wouldest grant to all thy saints who partake to be united [to thee] ³ that they may be fulfilled with the Holy Spirit *for the confirmation of their faith in truth*, that we may praise and glorify thee through thy [Beloved] ⁴ Child Jesus Christ, through whom glory and honour be unto thee with the Holy Spirit in thy holy church now and for ever and world without end.⁵ Amen.

If we could be sure that the original Greek of the Verona Latin version was identical with that which Hippolytus introduced into his text, we could accept without reserve the late Professor F. C. Burkitt’s judgment that this prayer is ‘the oldest surviving form of the Eastern Rite,’ meaning that type of Eastern Anaphora of which the Byzantine may be taken

¹ This clause is wanting in the Latin ; but it appears in the corresponding section of the Anaphora in *Apostolic Constitutions*, viii. (see F. E. Brightman, *Liturgies Eastern and Western* (Oxford, 1896) i. 20) and also of the Anaphora of *Testamentum Domini*, a fourth or fifth century Church Order based upon Hippolytus and surviving only in a Syriac translation (see I. E. Rahmani, *Testamentum Domini Nostri Jesu Christi* (Mainz, 1899), p. 42).

² The Greek is *ποιεῖτε*, which can be taken as either indicative or imperative. *Test. Dom.* renders by the participle, ‘you are making.’ (Rahmani, *op. cit.* p. 42).

³ For the difficult text and for a discussion of the original form of this petition, the reader should consult Dix, *op. cit.* pp. 75 ff.

⁴ Wanting in the Latin, but present in *Test. Dom.* (Rahmani, *op. cit.* p. 44), and probably original.

⁵ A conjectural reconstruction of the Greek of this Anaphora will be found in Lietzmann, *Messe und Herrenmahl*, p. 175. *ἐτοιμάζων* for *adquirens* should certainly be *περιποιθμενος*.

as representative.¹ Yet the prayer is beset with problems.² An examination of it suggests that the Institution-narrative is a later insertion,³ and that the Invocation has been subjected to editing. In other words, it is possible that an editor, subsequent to Hippolytus's day, has worked over the prayer to bring it into conformity with the model with which he was familiar. Nevertheless, we can discern in the Anaphora a stratum which is contemporary with Hippolytus. The italicised clauses in the above English translation occur, or are echoed, some of them several times, in Irenaeus's *Apostolic Preaching*.⁴ Irenaeus may well be quoting from a form known to his reader. It will be seen that the agreements between the two documents occur for the most part in the Thanksgiving, which might also be described as a christological hymn. It is not improbable that Hippolytus's own Anaphora consisted of the Thanksgiving, including therein the thank-offering of bread and cup, and concluding with an Invocation of the Spirit upon the worshippers. Hippolytus's Anaphora does not wholly conform to Justin's description of the Eucharistic Prayer, but Hippolytus states that his tradition had been observed up to his time, and that then 'certain ignorant men' had started to diverge from it. Whatever this latter statement may mean, it is certain that Hippolytus's treatise had but slight influence in Rome and the West, whereas it circulated in Syria and Egypt, and its liturgical connexions are with the churches of those regions.⁵ It is, indeed, possible that the tradition of belief and worship, of which Hippolytus constituted himself the defender, was originally formulated in an Eastern community, and by representatives of the latter, domiciled at Rome,

¹ *Eucharist and Sacrifice* (Cambridge, 1927), p. 21. The student must beware of supposing that the existing similarity between Eastern Liturgies is original and to be explained by derivation from a single sub-apostolic model. The existing similarity is due in most part to the influence of Jerusalem and Constantinople (see *infra*). Such evidence as we have points to diversity in the ancient Eastern liturgical tradition.

² So much so, that it cannot be accepted as it stands for an authentic early third-century example of what a modern consecration Prayer should be.

³ If this theory be correct the opening words of the Anamnesis must be treated as insertion.

⁴ For an English rendering of the Armenian version in which alone this treatise survives, see J. Armitage Robinson, *St. Irenaeus: The Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching* (London, 1920).

⁵ See Dix, *op. cit.* pp. xlvii ff.

was made current among the Christian communities of the City.¹

From other references in *Apostolic Tradition*, we learn that the order of service preceding the Anaphora is closely parallel to that indicated by Justin. There is, however, a new element. Catechumens, i.e., persons who wished to become Christians and were under instruction for Baptism, were permitted to attend that part of the service which was concerned with instruction. Not having been admitted to the Christian fellowship, they were not qualified to share in the prayers of the fellowship, and in the Eucharist which followed them. Accordingly, the catechumens were dismissed from the assembly before the common prayers began. *Apostolic Tradition* provides that the dismissal shall be accompanied by laying-on of hands (in blessing) and prayer.² A formula of distribution at communion is also provided. For the Eucharistic Bread, it is 'Heavenly Bread in Christ Jesus,'³ at the delivery of the cup, it is 'In God the Father Almighty: And in the Lord Jesus Christ: And in the holy Spirit, and in the holy Church.'⁴ The recipient says 'Amen' after each clause, as also after the formula for the Bread. There is no mention of prayer after communion.

NOTE ON THE *DIDACHE*.—Some twenty years ago, there was general agreement in dating the *Didache* c. A.D. 100. Its Chapters ix and x, which provide prayers of εὐχαριστία, and Chapter xiv, which gives direction concerning Sunday worship, were consequently regarded as throwing light on the early history of the Eucharist. The absence of reference to the Last Supper and death of Jesus in Chapters ix and x, and the provision of a prayer μετὰ τὸ ἐμπλησθῆναι, appeared to warrant the interpretation of the observance here enjoined as a simple form of Eucharist, not as yet dissociated from a common meal

¹ For the ecclesiastical situation in Rome during the second century, see G. La Piana, 'The Roman Church at the end of the second century,' *Harvard Theological Review* (July, 1925); cf. also the same writer's 'Foreign Groups in Rome during the first centuries of the Empire,' *ibid.* (October, 1927).

² This usage was not confined to the ante-Eucharistic service; see Dix, *op. cit.* pp. 29, 30; cf. p. 39.

³ Hauler, *op. cit.* p. 112; cf. Dix, *op. cit.* p. 41. Note the echo of John vi. 50 f.

⁴ Hauler, *op. cit.* p. 113; cf. Dix, *op. cit.* p. 42.

or treated as a continuance of the Last Supper. In 1920, the late Dr. J. Armitage Robinson, in his *Barnabas, Hermas and the Didache*, proposed the view that the last-named document is an imaginative reconstruction, by a third-century writer, of the kind of directions which the Apostles might be supposed to have given concerning teaching, organisation, and worship. Dr. Armitage Robinson did not recant his view; and recently Dr. J. Muilenburg¹ and Dom R. H. Connolly have adduced arguments for ascribing the *Didache* to the late second century. Dom Connolly further contends that the document is Montanist in origin²; and he also interprets Chapters ix and x as referring, not to the Eucharist (which he takes to be the subject of the directions in Chapter xiv alone), but to the common meal, continued in dissociation from the Eucharist and known as the Agape.³ Dr. J. M. Creed has made a forceful defence of the once generally accepted view, and has shown strong reason for thinking that the *Didache* should not be dated after the middle of the second century at latest.⁴ For the moment, however, judgment must be held in suspense.

III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EUCHARISTIC WORSHIP : SACRIFICE

The Anaphora of Hippolytus, as an act of worship, not only expresses *εὐχαριστία*; it offers an oblation, *προσφορά* or *θυσία*, of bread and cup. In the popular mind of the ancient world, worship was inextricably associated with sacrifice; and at the time of Justin Martyr, Christians were accused of atheism on the

¹ *Literary Relations of the Epistle of Barnabas and the Teaching of the Twelve Apostles* (Marburg, 1929).

² See article 'The Didache and Montanism' in *Downside Review* (July, 1937).

³ See article, 'Agape and Eucharist in the Didache,' *ibid.* (October, 1937). For the Agape, see *supra*, p. 416, n.1.

⁴ See article 'The Didache' in *Journal of Theological Studies* (October, 1938). The late Canon B. H. Streeter made an able defence of an early date in 'The Much Belaboured Didache,' *ibid.* (October, 1936). Cc. ix, x and xiv are treated separately in two articles, 'The Eucharistic Prayers of the Didache,' by R. D. Middleton, *ibid.* (July, 1935), and 'The Problem of the Liturgical Section of the Didache,' by H. J. Gibbins, *ibid.* (October, 1935). F. E. Vokes in *The Riddle of the Didache : Fact or Fiction, Heresy or Catholicism* (London, 1938), summarises the literature of the controversy, prior to the publication of Prof. Creed's article. Mr. Vokes concludes in favour of Dom Connolly's thesis.

ground (among others) that, offering no sacrifices, they worshipped no deity. In his *First Apology* Justin replies that the Creator of the Universe 'needs no offering of blood and libations and incense,' and that the Christians worship Him by 'being thankful' and celebrate their rites 'with hymns, in speech.'¹ The same thought appears in the *Dialogue with Trypho*.² The anonymous *Epistle to Diognetus*,³ the *Apology* of Athenagoras⁴ and the *Octavius* of Minucius Felix⁵ strike an identical note in condemning animal sacrifice, and agree in asserting the non-sacrificial character of true, and therefore of Christian, worship. For Athenagoras, the worship God desires in place of sacrifice and offering is man's recognition of Him as the Maker of the world and all within it. This view presents a parallel with that of contemporary pagan rationalist philosophers, to whom, no less than to Christians, the institution of sacrifice presented philosophical objections. The Neo-Pythagorean Apollonius of Tyana, for instance, who died during the reign of Nerva, was wont to teach that God, who 'is in need of nothing,' must be approached by the noblest faculty men possess, 'and that faculty is Reason (*νοῦς*), which requires no instrument.' 'We ought not, therefore,' he concludes, 'to sacrifice victims to the Great God who is over all.'⁶ Nevertheless, so we are told by Philostratus, Apollonius was prepared on occasion to offer 'bloodless' sacrifices of honey-cake and incense, as Pythagoras had done.⁷ The 'bloodless oblation' was a useful compromise. It affronted Reason neither in gods nor men by pointless slaughter; and it satisfied the religious impulse of the worshipper to acknowledge the gods with a gift.

For Christians in general the problem of worship could not be settled as simply as Christian rationalist philosophers would have settled it. The Epistle to the Hebrews was not universally received in the second and third centuries. On the other hand, the canonical scriptures of the Old Testament represented sacrifices as of divine appointment; and Malachi in particular anticipated an age when the sacrifices of the Jews would no

¹ C. xiii.² C. xvii.³ C. iii.⁴ C. xiii.⁵ C. xxxii.⁶ Quoted by Eusebius, *Præparatio Evangelica*, iv. 13, from Apollonius *περὶ θουσιῶν*.⁷ Philostratus, *Vita Apollonii*, IV. xi; cf. i, 1.

longer be accepted, and when a *θυσία καθαρά* would everywhere be offered to God among the Gentiles (i. 10-12). Justin sees in the Eucharist the 'pure sacrifice' of this prophecy.¹ That he is not thinking in figurative terms is shown by his interpretation of the flour-offering, enjoined upon the leper in Leviticus xiv. 10, as a type of the Eucharistic Bread. Irenaeus, writing some thirty years later, follows Justin in his exposition of Malachi i. 10-12.² He is, however, more systematic in his treatment of the subject.³ God, he argues, stands in need of nothing that men can give, and His purpose in ordaining the sacrifices of the Old Testament was to teach the Jews to fear and serve Him. The coming of Christ, Irenaeus proceeds, did not abolish sacrifice as an institution; but it introduced a new and superior type of oblation.⁴ Christ appointed the Eucharist as an offering to God of 'the first-fruits of His own creatures, not as though He stood in need of them, but in order that [the offerers] might be neither unfaithful nor ungrateful.'⁵ For the Eucharistic *θυσία* to be truly *καθαρά*, it is necessary for the offerers both to be grateful in spirit towards God, and also to be in love and charity with each other, for (so Irenaeus understands it) Matthew v. 23, 24, applies to the Eucharistic oblation.⁶ Irenaeus concludes his exposition with the doctrine that the altar of the Christian sacrifice, and the Temple, are not on earth, but in heaven, 'as John says in the Apocalypse' (xi. 19), i.e., the Christian altar is real, in contrast with the copies belonging to the old dispensation. Only at the real altar, by means of the pure sacrifice, can man hold assured communion with God. The Eucharist, therefore, as Justin, Irenaeus, and Hippolytus's Anaphora present it, is a thanksgiving not only in word, but also in act. In outward appearance, it has a certain resemblance to the 'bloodless oblation' of the pagans. The Christians did not hesitate, indeed, to describe it as a *θυσία ἀνάλμακτος*. It may be that the resemblance had some part in drawing philosophically minded pagans to Christianity. Notwithstanding, the resem-

¹ *Dial.* xli.

² See *op. cit.* IV, xi-xix.

³ *Op. cit.* IV, xvii, 5.

⁴ *Op. cit.* IV, xviii, 6, cf. the sublime *altare* of the section *Supplices te rogamus iube haec perferri* etc. in the Roman *Canon Missae*, and the *ἐπουράνιον* . . . *θυσιαστήριον* of the Intercession in the Alexandrian Liturgy.

⁵ *Adversus haereses* IV, xvii, 5.

⁶ *Op. cit.* IV, xviii, 2.

⁷ *Op. cit.* IV, xviii, 1.

blance is not more than skin-deep. The basic ideas of the Christian sacrifice, as Justin, Irenaeus and Hippolytus apprehend them, are Biblical in their inspiration ; and the context to which they belong is the further Biblical thought of the People of God. The Christians who offered the Eucharistic sacrifice of bread and cup believed, not that they were presenting to God something clearly more acceptable than an animal victim and at the same time probably less acceptable than a hymn of praise, whether vocal or mental, but that they were acting *divino magisterio edocti et divina institutione formati*.

Irenaeus does not appear to connect the Eucharist with Christ's Passion. Hippolytus's Anaphora, on the other hand, like Justin's extempore prayer before it, is a thanksgiving for the Incarnation in general and for the Passion in particular. The Latin, or mainly Latin, Christianity of North Africa, as represented in the writings of St. Cyprian, came to associate the Eucharist exclusively with the Last Supper and the Passion. For Cyprian, the Passion is 'pour ainsi dire un tout qui comprend la cène.'¹ At the Last Supper, the Lord offered the sacrifice of His Body and Blood. In the Eucharist, the celebrant, acting *vice Christi*, imitates the action of Christ. The sacrifice, therefore, is not a thanksgiving for the Passion ; it is the Passion itself.² From this it follows that the Eucharist must be a careful *imitatio Cenaë*. By a strict use of the elements, acts, and words used by the Lord, the celebrant identifies the action in the church with that in the Upper Room. Any deviation from the Lord's tradition entails a defect in the Church's sacrifice. Cyprian also seems to suggest that the Church, symbolised by the water mingled with the wine in the Eucharistic cup, is offered to God in the Christian sacrifice. However this may be, and different as Cyprian's conception is from that of Justin, Irenaeus, and Hippolytus, the People of God forms the background of his thought as of theirs. Further, how far Cyprian is expressing commonly accepted ideas of his day and church, and how far he is adding to them, cannot be

¹ P. Batiffol, *L'Eucharistie, la Présence réelle et la Transsubstantiation*. Études d'Histoire et de Théologie Positive, 2^{me} Série (Paris, 1906), p. 223. For Cyprian's view, see *Ep.* lxiii.

² *Passio est enim Domini sacrificium quod offerimus*, *Ep.* lxiii, 17. At the same time, Cyprian regarded the bread and wine provided for the Eucharist by the faithful as *sacrificium* and *corban*, *De opere et eleemosynis*, xv.

said with certainty. It is not improbable that his conception of the Eucharist as the offering of Christ's sacrifice is to be understood in relation to the need for finding a solution to the problem of the forgiveness of post-baptismal sins—a problem which the *lapsi* had made acute in North Africa. Cyprian admittedly falls short of describing the Eucharist as propitiatory or reconciliatory in effect, although the notion is implicit in what he says¹; but it must be remembered that even in the document in which he treats of the subject at greatest length, he is not presenting a complete and formal exposition. A century and a half later, the Cyprianic conception of the Eucharistic Sacrifice attains full explication and development at the hand of St. Augustine. Unfortunately no texts of the African Latin Liturgy, or Liturgies, have survived, whether from an earlier or a later period.

It need hardly be said that, whatever the theory of sacrifice expressed in the Eucharistic prayer, participation in the sacrifice was held to involve communion on the part of the worshippers.

IV. EASTERN LITURGIES AND EUCHARISTIC WORSHIP

It has already been observed that the Eucharistic liturgical material in *Apostolic Tradition* has been described as 'Eastern.' The main features of that material can be discerned in the historic Eastern Liturgies; but though in some cases its ideas (including those of Justin and Irenaeus) and in others its phraseology appear in the Liturgies, the latter in general exhibit so many elaborations and developments, when compared with the material in *Apostolic Tradition*, that their relationship with the latter is rather a matter of main structural outline than of detail and content.

To discuss the origins of, and to examine in detail, the Eastern Liturgies, is beyond the scope of the present brief study. In inviting attention to particular features and to important moments in the history of the Liturgies, however, it is possible to indicate the main trend of the development of Eastern Eucharistic worship. Dr. Brightman² arranges the Liturgies in four groups, viz. (1) Syrian, (2) Egyptian, (3)

¹ He alludes to the offering of the Eucharist on behalf of the dead, *Ep. i.*

² *Liturgies Eastern and Western*, vol. i, Eastern (Oxford, 1896).

Persian (i.e., East Syrian), and (4) Byzantine. The classification is convenient for dealing with the existing texts ; but, as both the Persian and Byzantine rites are fundamentally Syrian, the four groups may finally be resolved into two, viz., Syrian and Egyptian.

The principal Syrian liturgy was that of the Church of Antioch. We may suppose that in the Churches dependent upon Antioch, liturgical use approximated in general to that of the primatial Church, but the evidence at our disposal does not warrant us in assuming that the Liturgy of Antioch was rigidly reproduced throughout the Churches of the Antiochene diocese. The crystallization of the Syrian type of liturgy was the result of slow process, in which experimentation was a factor. The Liturgy of Antioch has not survived in its first state. With the aid of the model liturgy in the eighth book of *Apostolic Constitutions*,¹ however, we can reconstruct to a considerable extent both the order and content of the Antiochene rite as it existed in the last quarter of the fourth century. Uncertainty must remain, nevertheless, as to important details, such as the presence or absence of an Institution-narrative² and the form of the Invocation ; for the compiler of the liturgy in *Apostolic Constitutions* viii shows himself to have been influenced both by the liturgical material in *Apostolic Tradition* and also by the liturgical use of the Church of Jerusalem.

Jerusalem played an important rôle in the earlier history of the Eastern Liturgies. Before the recognition of Christianity by Constantine, Jerusalem was an insignificant bishopric, subject to the metropolitan of Caesarea and belonging to the diocese of Antioch, to the liturgical tradition of which it conformed. After Constantine had recognised Christianity, the prestige of Jerusalem rapidly increased.³ As the Holy

¹ See *ibid.* pp. xvii-xlvi, 1-27.

² An Institution narrative is still lacking from MSS. of the East Syrian Liturgy of Addai and Mari, although 1 Cor. xi. 23-5 has been inserted in the edition printed by the Archbishop of Canterbury's Mission Press (Urmi, 1890). For a brief discussion of the East Syrian Anaphora, see E. C. Ratcliff, 'The Original Form of the Anaphora of Addai and Mari : A suggestion,' in *Journal of Theological Studies* (1928), vol. xxx.

³ This prestige was a matter of popular reverence rather than of canonical order. Canon VII of the Council of Nicaea (A.D. 325) gave the Bishop of

City, it drew to itself the pious attention of the Christian world. Ascetics established themselves in and around it ; and pilgrims came from all quarters to visit its sacred sites and to commemorate the sacred events connected with them.¹ Jerusalem developed a 'topographical' piety, making a strong appeal to devout popular imagination. The origins of the liturgical year, with its sequence of feasts and fasts recalling the events of the Lord's life and with its choice of proper lections and psalms, are to be sought in the fourth-century usage of the Church of Jerusalem.² It is little wonder that the accounts of returned pilgrims led, both in East and West, to an imitation of Jerusalem practice.

Of the Jerusalem Liturgy no early text has come down to us. It is possible, however, to make a reasonable conjecture as to the state of the Liturgy in the first half of the fifth century by considering what is common to the Greek Liturgy of St. James³ and the Syriac version of it,⁴ which was presumably in existence before the Monophysite revolt following upon the Council of Chalcedon in A.D. 451. For the earlier period, we have in the fifth *Mystagogic Catechesis* of St. Cyril of Jerusalem, delivered in A.D. 347 or 348, an exposition of the rite from the Kiss of Peace or rather from the washing of the celebrant's hands before the Kiss, to the Thanksgiving after communion. In addition to the Thanksgiving, certain familiar features, absent from *Apostolic Tradition*, have now made their appearance, e.g., the *Sanctus* with its 'Preface,' the Lord's Prayer, the invitation *τὰ ἄγια τοῖς ἁγίοις* with the people's acclamatory response before communion, and the communion-anthem. The correspondences

Jerusalem 'precedence of honour' in Palestine, yet reserving to Caesarea 'its proper dignity.' Bp. Juvenal (c. 420-458) claimed patriarchal authority over Antioch. This was disallowed by the Council of Chalcedon (A.D. 451), but Jerusalem was recognised as having patriarchal jurisdiction over 'the three Palestines.'

¹ The first impetus to pilgrimage seems to have been the discovery of the supposed site of the Holy Sepulchre. The pilgrims wished to see other sites, and these were accordingly identified. For an account of a pilgrimage c. A.D. 395, see the *Peregrinatio Etheriae*. *Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum* (Vienna, 1898), vol. xxxix, of which there is an English translation with notes, *The Pilgrimage of Etheria*, by M. L. McClure and C. L. Feltoe (London, n.d.).

² For a discussion of this topic, see F. Cabrol, 'La Semaine Sainte et les origines de l'Année Liturgique' in *Les Origines Liturgiques* (Paris. 1906).

³ Brightman, *op. cit.* pp. 31-68.

⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 69-110.

between the *Catechesis* and the Greek Liturgy of St. James give us an idea of the extent to which the Jerusalem Liturgy had taken shape by the mid-fourth century.¹ Cyril's exposition is especially valuable in indicating what was regarded as important in his days both as to the interpretation of the rite as a whole, and also as to particular features of it.² In his Eucharistic doctrine, Cyril was a 'conversionist'; he held that the bread and wine are changed into Christ's Body and Blood.³ Justin and Irenaeus were likewise realist in their belief about the Eucharist; but they are silent as to how the elements become the Body and Blood, and as to a formula of consecration. It is otherwise with Cyril. He ascribes the change to the operation of the Holy Spirit, on the ground that 'all that the Spirit touches is consecrated and changed'; and he therefore finds in the prayer invoking the illapse of the Spirit upon the elements the formula of consecration. The Anaphora in *Apostolic Tradition* also contains a petition for the illapse of the Spirit. The intention of the latter, however, is different from Cyril's. It looks for the impregnation of the elements by Holy Spirit, in order that those who partake of them may be filled with Holy Spirit.⁴ A petition of this kind belongs to a class of rite, of which some traces survive in certain Syrian authors, and which conceived the Eucharist as other than a representation of the Last Supper.⁵ The pneumatology of the two petitions is not identical. The conception of the Spirit in the Invocation of *Apostolic Tradition* is of a divine *δύναμις* or power; Cyril's conception is aligned with the developed pneumatology of the fourth century. Cyril's Lecture is the earliest evidence for the existence of that type of Invocation which has come to be called 'the Epiclesis,'

¹ We must beware against assuming that what Cyril does not mention was necessarily present in his rite, e.g. Cyril's allusions cannot be made to mean that *Benedictus qui venit* etc. was attached to the *Sanctus* in his day.

² The Lecture is addressed to the newly baptized, and is an *official* exposition of belief and practice.

³ Cf. *Myst. Cat.* IV, 'Once, by His nod, he converted water into wine at Cana of Galilee; and is it not to be believed that He converted wine into blood?'

⁴ Cf. Lietzmann, *Messe und Herrenmahl*, p. 177.

⁵ See J. Watterich, *Konsekrationsmoment im Heiligen Abendmahl* (Heidelberg, 1896), and E. Bishop's comments in 'The Moment of Consecration,' Appendix VI, of R. H. Connolly, *The Liturgical Homilies of Narsai*, Texts and Studies (Cambridge, 1909), viii, 1,

and which normally follows upon the Institution-narrative and the Anamnesis in the Eastern Liturgies. Whether Cyril's liturgy contained an Institution-narrative and Anamnesis is not clear. His language implies that the Epiclesis was recited immediately after the *Sanctus*.¹ If they were absent in the fourth century, both Institution-narrative and Anamnesis had found their way into the Jerusalem Anaphora by the middle of the fifth. The conversion doctrine, as expressed in the Epiclesis, led to the treatment of the Eucharistic species with the utmost external devotion. No crumb, Cyril warns his hearers, must fall to the ground; and the communicant is to approach the cup 'bowing and in an attitude of devotion.' While 'the moisture' of the latter is still on his lips, he should touch it with his hand, and 'sanctify' his eyes, forehead and other senses. He should also sanctify his eyes 'with the touch of the holy Body.'

In between consecration and communion, the Liturgy of St. James inserts a general intercession for living and dead. This intercession was in existence in Cyril's day. The significance of the intercession is clear from its position in the Liturgy. It is an offering of the sacrifice on behalf of the classes of persons enumerated, the nature of the sacrifice being made plain by the Epiclesis preceding. Thus also Cyril interprets it. It is possible that the introduction of an intercession at this point was a Jerusalem innovation.² The petition for the dead was certainly a novelty at Cyril's time, as his apologia for it indicates. Objectors had asked, How can this petition benefit the dead whether sinful or otherwise? Cyril answers that 'prayer offered when the holy and most awful sacrifice is lying (*sc.* before God on the altar) is of greatest profit to those souls for whom the prayer is offered,' and that 'we are offering Christ

¹ εἶτα ἀγιάσαντες ἑαυτοὺς διὰ τῶν πνευματικῶν τούτων ὕμνων (i.e. the *Sanctus*) παρακαλοῦμεν . . . τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα κτλ. It is probable that the Syrian Liturgy, upon which Theodore of Mopsuestia wrote his commentary, lacked an Anamnesis; see the *Commentary of Theodore of Mopsuestia on the Lord's Prayer and on the Sacraments of Baptism and the Eucharist*, ed. A. Mingana, Woodbrooke Studies, vi, p. 103 (English trans.), and pp. 242 f. (Syriac version). Theodore regards the Eucharistic Prayer as a whole as commemorating the death of the Lord.

² The form of intercession—a series of petitions introduced by *Μνήσθητι Κύριε*—suggests that in origin it was a popular devotion, cf. A. D. Nock, 'Liturgical Notes,' III, in *Journal of Theological Studies* (1929), Vol. xxx, 393 f.

who was slain for our sins, making propitiation to God . . . on their account and on our own.' Whether at this date there was also an intercessory prayer after the lessons and sermon at Jerusalem, as at Antioch, we cannot say. If there were it disappeared early. Both in Cyril's Lecture and in the Liturgy of St. James, the earlier thankoffering of bread and wine is obscured.

We have here evidence of a revolutionary change in worship and in its liturgical expression, arising out of a new type of interest in the sacrament. It is a change so revolutionary as to deprive the Liturgies affected by it of the right to be described as 'primitive'; but it is part of a general change which in the fourth century came over Church life and its several manifestations. Jerusalem set a fashion which spread throughout the diocese of Antioch and beyond. The new note of the 'terrible' and 'aweful' character of the sacrifice, sounded by Cyril and dominant in the Anaphora of St. James, was taken up by later writers; and the Jerusalem conception of the Christian sacrifice and its application became powerful in shaping cultural outlook. Through the Byzantine rite, which (though preserving more of the earlier Eucharistic phraseology than we find in the Liturgy of St. James) is Hierosolymitan in essentials, the Jerusalem standard became normal throughout the East. The congregational aspect of liturgical worship was reduced to a minimum. Curtains were interposed between the clergy in the sanctuary and the worshippers in the nave, 'qui n'ont qu'à s'associer par l'imagination au sacrifice eucharistique et à prendre patience jusqu'à ce qu'il soit terminé.'¹ To occupy them, a deacon stood without the curtain and led their devotions in successive litanies. From the sixth century there is an increasing tendency to recite the Anaphora inaudibly. The rubrics in the earliest manuscripts of the Byzantine rite, belonging to the eighth-ninth centuries, direct that most of the celebrant's prayers be said *μυστικῶς*.

The oldest surviving representative of the Egyptian rite is the collection of prayers known by the name of Sarapion,² Bishop of Thmuis, and friend of St. Anthony and St. Atha-

¹ H. Leclercq, article 'Iconostase' in *Dictionnaire d'Archéologie Chrétienne et de Liturgie*, tom. viii (q.v.).

² The text of Sarapion's Sacramentary, edited by F. E. Brightman, is printed in *Journal of Theological Studies* (1899-1900), vol. i.

nasius. The precise dates of Sarapion's episcopate are unknown, but we shall probably not be wrong if we assign the collection of prayers to the latter part of the first half of the fourth century. The Eucharistic Prayer bears the title *Εὐχή προσφύρου Σαραπίωνος ἐπισκόπου*, which is perhaps an indication, not only that the prayer is Sarapion's own composition, but also that it presents a combination of features individual to Sarapion. If we compare the prayer with the corresponding section of the later Alexandrian Liturgy of St. Mark, we shall find certain correspondences which have the appearance of being Egyptian characteristics, e.g., the prayer is resumed after the *Sanctus* with the repetition of the closing words of the *Sanctus*, and an Invocation of the Father to bless the sacrifice occurs before the Institution-narrative. Yet, if we may judge from the evidence at our disposal, Egyptian liturgical usage was not less diverse, in the early period, than Syrian.¹ Sarapion's own Eucharistic Prayer, indeed, exhibits more than one strand of liturgical tradition. It subscribes to a conversionist Eucharistic theory, similar to Cyril's, except that it conceives the agent of conversion to be the Word or Logos instead of the Spirit. Sarapion's Invocation of the Logos, however, may be a borrowing from the usage of Alexandria where in Athanasius's time a similar Invocation appears to have been known.² Sarapion's Institution-narrative (which immediately precedes his Invocation, there being no Anamnesis), on the other hand, also has the appearance of being consecratory in intention, in that, because of the Lord's action thus narrated, the elements are said to be *δμοιώματα* 'likenesses,' of the Body and Blood. The offering of the sacrifice, which is associated with each of the two parts of the Institution-narrative, is an offering of 'the likeness of the Body' and of that of the Blood, and so is an offering of 'the likeness of the death' of the Lord. For this reason, the Eucharistic Sacrifice is conceived as a means of reconciling God

¹ For some indications of Egyptian diversity, see W. H. Codrington, 'The Heavenly Altar and the Euclesis in Egypt,' *Journal of Theological Studies* (1938), vol. xxxix.

² Cf. Athanasius *Ad nuper baptizatos, καταβαίνει ὁ λόγος εἰς τὸν ἄβρον καὶ τὸ ποτήριον, καὶ γίνεται αὐτοῦ σῶμα* (cited by Eutychius of Constantinople, *De Pascha*.) Some scholars have thought that Justin and Irenaeus knew an Invocation of the Logos, but their phraseology is too vague to establish this or any other deduction as to a formula of consecration at so early a period.

and the worshippers. This conception overshadows the aspect of thanksgiving which receives a brief mention towards the end of the prayer. The influence of Jerusalem is to be seen in a short intercession for living and departed awkwardly inserted between the Invocation of the Logos and the closing petition for acceptance of the people's thanksgiving. A series of intercessory prayers, but excluding mention of the dead,¹ are provided for use before the Anaphora and presumably after the lections and sermon.

Whatever the local peculiarities of Egyptian liturgical usage, the use of the metropolitan see of Alexandria eventually became dominant. The history of the Alexandrian Liturgy is too obscure to be traced with any certainty. The earliest evidence for its ascription to St. Mark belongs to the thirteenth century, to which also belong the earliest manuscripts in which it is contained. The Coptic version of the Liturgy, which represents an earlier stage than the surviving Greek,² connects it with the name of St. Cyril, Patriarch of Alexandria from A.D. 413-444; and we may reasonably conclude that the Liturgy had acquired its main characteristics and outline by the first half of the fifth century. Even so, the Alexandrian Liturgy, as it has been transmitted, is not pure Egyptian. The substitution of the Invocation of the Spirit for that of the Logos had been effected in the time of Peter,³ the successor of St. Athanasius, and a contemporary of Cyril of Jerusalem. The Alexandrian Epiclesis bears a close similarity to that of the Jerusalem Liturgy; and if the Alexandrian Anamnesis is basically a simple Egyptian form of the earlier fifth century,⁴ it has been expanded with Jerusalem phrases to bring it into line with the Anamnesis of the Liturgy of St. James. In the earlier fifth century also the sacrifice offered was the *ἀναίμακτος θυσία*,⁵ as in the Jerusalem Liturgy, and there is no trace of

¹ The only prayer for the dead in Sarapion's collection is entitled 'Prayer for one who is dead and is being carried out' (sc. to burial).

² For the Greek text, see Brightman, *Liturgies Eastern and Western*, i, 113-43; and for an English version of the Coptic, see *ibid.* 144-88.

³ See fragment of a letter of Peter, Migne, *Patrologia Graeca*, lxxxii, 1169.

⁴ Cyril of Alexandria appears to be quoting from an Anamnesis in his third letter to Nestorius ii (Migne, *Patr. Gr.*, lxxvii, 113).

⁵ See Cyril of Alexandria, *ibid.* The words have vanished from the existing texts, but the sacrifice is still one of bread and wine, as being God's gift offered back to Him; cf. the corresponding passage in the Byzantine Rite,

'making the likeness of the death,' as in Sarapion. In respect to the general intercession, the Alexandrian Liturgy displays a curious arrangement. At one time, we may suppose, the intercession followed upon the lections and sermon. If a fragment of the Liturgy, recently discovered,¹ may be taken as a sign-post, in some places trial was made of inserting a prayer for the dead after the Epiclesis. The Alexandrian liturgists, however, were unwilling so to disturb the ancient sequence of communion upon consecration. At the same time, they could not resist the movement to associate the intercession with the Eucharistic Prayer. They therefore clumsily intruded it into the Preface. Both the Coptic and Greek versions of the Liturgy exhibit this arrangement, so that we may presume it to have been adopted before the Council of Chalcedon (A.D. 451), after which the Coptic version was used only by the nationalist Monophysite party, and the use of the Greek was restricted to their Melkite enemies who remained in communion with Byzantium. Greek St. Mark, indeed, underwent a process of gradual Byzantinisation until early in the thirteenth century it was abandoned, in the interests of the Byzantine ideal of uniformity,² for the pure Byzantine Rite.

The Byzantine Rite finally drove its competitors from the field, and became the sole rite of the Orthodox Eastern Church. Translated into many vernaculars, it has constituted the worship and guided the spirituality of the national Churches in communion with the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Though the claim to have preserved a tradition of worship unvarying from the apostolic age cannot be sustained, yet a certain conservatism in the Orthodox has resisted developments which to the Western mind have appeared logical and ineluctable. The celebration of the Byzantine Eucharist may not be congregational, but it is still communal. There is no

¹ See *Catalogue of Greek and Latin Papyri in the John Rylands Library*, edited by Colin Roberts, vol. iii. Theological and Literary Texts, No. 465 (Manchester, 1938).

² Cf. the statement of Theodore Balsamon, once Librarian at Constantinople and Patriarch of Antioch, who died in 1204, that the Byzantine Rite should be followed to the exclusion of all others on the ground of 1 Cor. i. 10, 'I beseech you . . . that ye all speak the same thing'; see *Responsa ad interrogationes Patriarchae Alexandriae*, Migne, *Patr. Gr.*, cxxxviii. 953.

private Mass.¹ The Liturgy is not celebrated more than once a day, save in exceptional circumstances, and there is rarely more than one altar in each church.² It is not surprising therefore that the Orthodox clergy have retained the practice, now restricted to rare occasions in the West, of celebrating the Liturgy together as *συλλειτουργοί*.³ For the laity, Eucharistic worship is the worship of Christ, truly and really present, as the Priest and Sacrifice of the Christian People ; but there is no cultus of the Sacrament, and unlike the ikons of the Saints,⁴ the Sacrament, when reserved in the church, is not made an object of reverence or a focus of private prayer.

V. THE ROMAN LITURGY AND LATIN EUCHARISTIC WORSHIP

The Roman Liturgy presents a marked contrast with the Liturgies of the East. The latter, though varying in troparia (i.e. chants) and lections, are unvarying in the celebrant's prayers. In the Roman Mass, with the exception of the Anaphora or Canon,⁵ the celebrant's prayers vary according to the occasion of the celebration. In one of its paragraphs, the Canon itself is subject to slight variation. The Prefaces also vary with the season and with particular solemnities. Even so, the Roman Liturgy is a little less variable than those once in use in the Gallican and Spanish churches. In the latter, the prayers preceding and following the Institution-narrative, which remained constant, were variable also. The variability of the Latin Liturgies may fairly be regarded as the direct legacy of the celebrant's liberty to improvise, which was abandoned in the East earlier than in the West, probably in the interest of

¹ Although something akin to private Mass seems to have been known during the Iconoclastic persecutions ; see J. Pargoire, *L'Église Byzantine de 527 à 847* (Paris, 1905), p. 310 f.

² In certain Russian churches, before 1917, there was more than one celebration on Sundays and Festivals to meet popular needs, and the Russian example has been followed in Rumania. As only one celebration is permitted at one altar *per diem*, this practice has necessitated the introduction of additional altars.

³ See P. de Puniet, 'Concélébration Liturgique' in *Dictionnaire d'Archéologie*, tom. iii.

⁴ See H. Leclercq, 'Images (culte et querelle des),' *ibid.* tom. vii.

⁵ 'Canon' is an abbreviation of *Canon actionis*, 'the rule of procedure,' or possibly of *Canon actionis gratiarum*, 'the prescribed form of Thanksgiving.'

securing doctrinally correct forms. Be that as it may, the greater flexibility of the Latin Liturgies adapted them more easily to meeting new devotional demands (as a glance at the *Missae votivae* of, e.g., the Gelasian Sacramentary will show), as well as to giving fuller and richer expression to the observance of festivals and fasts. The Roman Liturgy retains this flexibility to the present day. The Prefaces proper to the feasts of St. Joseph and to the Mass for the Dead, to take two instances, are of comparatively recent introduction. Further illustration may be found in the various diocesan supplements to the Missal.

The study of the Roman Liturgy is at once easier and more difficult than that of the Eastern Liturgies. It is easier, in that Roman liturgical books dating from the sixth and seventh centuries have been preserved, and that there is evidence for the text of the Canon dating from the late fourth or early fifth centuries. It is more difficult in that the Liturgy presents certain problems which admit of several mutually conflicting solutions, and of which no definitive solution is in sight. The student who approaches the Roman Liturgy from the standpoint of the Eastern Liturgies will be puzzled both by its form and content, and not least by the form and content of the Canon. He will be wise not to judge the Roman Mass, however, by the standards of Antioch, Jerusalem, Constantinople or Alexandria, but, starting from the early Sacramentaries (or books containing the celebrant's prayers), to discern in them what he can of development and modification anterior to the period of the Sacramentaries themselves.¹ The investigation will not be unproductive; and it is likely that the student will form the conclusion that the Roman Mass stands in a class by itself and is not to be treated as a deformed Liturgy originally of Eastern type.

Controversy has now ranged around the Canon of the Mass for several centuries. We find the Canon substantially as it appears in the modern Missal already existing in the Gelasian Sacramentary, the earliest manuscript of which may be assigned

¹ For an account of the Sacramentaries and their dates see E. Bishop, *Liturgica Historica* (Oxford, 1918), chaps. iii and iv; and F. Cabrol, 'Gélasien (Le Sacrementaire),' 'Grégorien (Le Sacrementaire),' and 'Léonien' in *Dict. d'Arch.*, chaps. vi and viii.

to the seventh-eighth centuries. The witness of certain ecclesiastical writers and of Spanish and Gallican liturgical books suggests that the paragraphs or sections *Te igitur*, the *Commemoratio pro vivis*, *Quam oblationem*, *Qui pridie*, *Unde et memores*, *Supra quae* and *Supplices te rogamus* were current, perhaps in a less developed form, by the late fourth or early fifth and certainly in the sixth centuries.¹ Yet certain questions arise. What is the force and significance of *igitur* following upon the *Sanctus* and its pendent *Benedictus qui venit*? Was there an Epiclesis in the Canon? and is not *Supplices te rogamus* not only in the position which an Epiclesis would occupy, but also clearly the relic of an Epiclesis which has suffered removal of its consecratory petition in deference to a different theory of consecration? To discuss the many answers made to these questions would require a volume in itself.² The reader must examine them, and form his judgment as to their value. The present writer must restrict himself to offering certain considerations which are often overlooked by advocates of Eastern reconstructions of the Canon, whether in whole or in part.

There is only one important respect in which the Canon in the earliest Gelasian manuscript differs from the Canon as it is prescribed in the modern Missal. The former lacks the *Commemoratio pro defunctis*. The earliest manuscripts of the Gregorian Sacramentary are also without it. If we follow a hint given by a Gregorian manuscript, the text of which is derived from an early and valuable authority, we shall see in the *Commemoratio pro defunctis* a prayer said aloud by the deacon while the Canon was recited silently by the celebrant.³ When the celebrant was not assisted by a deacon or another priest and himself recited all those parts of the rite normally taken by his assistants, the *Commemoratio pro defunctis* inevitably found its way into the Canon.⁴ For the rest, the Canon is a

¹ See B. Botte, *Le Canon de la Messe Romaine* : Édition critique (Louvain, 1935). This book is indispensable for study of the Canon.

² A convenient summary of some theories will be found in A. Fortescue, *The Mass*, new ed. (London, 1937), pp. 128-71. Further theories will be found in P. Batiffol, *Leçons sur la Messe* (Paris, 1927), pp. 191-275, and W. H. Frere, *The Anaphora, or Great Eucharistic Prayer* (London, 1937), pp. 134-80.

³ See B. Botte, *op. cit.* pp. 67 ff.

⁴ For a discussion of this subject, see E. Bishop, *op. cit.*, pp. 109-15.

unity, and possesses coherence in spite of a clumsy co-ordination of its parts at certain points. To discover the meaning of the Canon, the student must answer two questions. Which is its consecratory paragraph? and What is the sacrifice which it offers? In addressing himself to the first, he will observe that *Qui pridie* and *Simili modo* constitute a single section which is something more than an historical narrative. It is, rather, a dramatic recital or *imitatio Christi*, whereby the celebrant identifies the Mass with the Last Supper, and which in its reference to the Passion (*qui pridie quam PATERETUR*) links the Supper, the Passion, and the Mass into one. In a word, the tradition of consecration in the Canon is that of St. Cyprian. If the student is perplexed by the *Quam oblationem* petition, he will learn that the word *benedictam* and the *ut fiat nobis* clause represent an alteration of the original paragraph. In its earlier form the Canon contained no petition for a consecration of the elements so as to become the Body and the Blood. The elements were consecrated, i.e., became 'the figure' of the Body and Blood in virtue of the celebrant imitating the acts and words of Christ. The alteration of *Quam oblationem* is perhaps due to the influence of Greek ideas which was marked in Rome during the late fifth and sixth centuries.¹ Greek influence can be perceived at Milan at the end of the fourth century in St. Ambrose's view that consecration, i.e., conversion, of the elements is effected by the recital of the Words of Institution.² St. Ambrose's theological ideas were largely Greek, and he appears to be imposing Greek notions of consecration in response to a petition upon a Latin prayer having a different genius. The Canon, it will be observed, is not explicit as to a moment of consecration, and falls short of expressing a doctrine of conversion. Also, neither in its early or its final shape, has it a place for an Epiclesis. There is no evidence that it ever contained such a prayer.³

¹ Cf. J. Tixeront, *Histoire des Dogmes* (Paris, 1919), iii, 375 ff. The relations between the Papal *Familia* and the Byzantine Court, particularly at the time of Justinian, should not be forgotten.

² *De Mysteriis*, ix. Ambrose is in debt both to Cyril of Jerusalem and Gregory of Nyssa.

³ For a contrary view, consult E. G. C. F. Atchley, *On the Epiclesis of the Eucharistic Liturgy and in the Consecration of the Font* (Oxford, 1935), pp. 176-92. But see H. W. Codrington, article cited on p. 436, n.1.

In the matter of sacrifice, the student will notice two paragraphs, one before the consecratory section, viz., *Te igitur* and the other after it, viz., *Unde et memores*, each offering an oblation. How is this reduplication to be explained? If it be remembered that as in the Eastern Liturgies, so in the Roman, the *Sanctus* is an interpolation, *Te igitur* will be seen to carry on the thought of the Preface. The sequence is *Vere dignum et justum est . . . tibi gratias agere—Te igitur . . . supplices rogamus . . . uti accepta habeas . . . haec dona*. The sacrifice is here conceived in accordance with the Irenaeian tradition. The paragraph *Unde et memores* recalls the Anamnesis of Hippolytus's Anaphora (see p. 423). There is an important difference, however, between the two prayers. The Hippolytean Anamnesis offers merely 'the bread and the cup.' The Roman Anamnesis offers *panem sanctum vitae aeternae et calicem salutis perpetuae*.¹ The additional words are to be understood in the light of John vi. and the sacrifice herein offered is the Lord's Passion. In sum, *Unde et memores* is not a reduplication of *Te igitur*. In sacrificial doctrine, therefore, the Roman Canon presents a combination of the Irenaeian and Cyprianic traditions of worship; and in general, it represents a stage of liturgical usage earlier than that of the Rites of Jerusalem and Constantinople. The Roman general intercession has never been associated with the Canon. In conformity with ancient practice, it occurred originally after the lections,² and before its disappearance was transferred to an earlier point of the rite, now leaving its only trace in the Kyries.³

We are fortunate in possessing, in the first *Ordo Romanus*,⁴ a corpus of directions for the solemn Mass as celebrated by the Pope about the end of the eighth century. These directions show some elaboration upon a simpler order possibly dating

¹ Or, according to the older form, *panem sanctum et calicem vitae aeternae*.

² As still in the rite of Good Friday. The intercessory matter in *Te igitur* and the *Commemoratio pro defunctis* are a development of the diptychs: see Batiffol, *Leçons sur la Messe*, pp. 218 ff.

³ See B. Capelle, 'La Kyrie de la Messe et le Pape Gélase' in *Revue Bénédictine*, tom. 46, pp. 126 ff. It is possible that the 'Collect' was in origin the concluding prayer of the litanic intercession introduced by Gelasius I in place of the older *orationes* which survived in the Good Friday rite.

⁴ For a critical text see R. Stapper, *Ordo Romanus Primus* (Münster, 1933), and for text, translation and commentary see E. G. C. F. Atchley, *Ordo Romanus Primus* (London, 1905).

from the time of St. Gregory the Great. Yet even in their elaborated state the Roman ceremonies remain sober and plain. Nothing is done to create an atmosphere of mystery, unless the silent recital of the 'secret' prayer and of the Canon be reckoned as a ceremony. The offering of the bread and wine is congregational in act as well as in word. The people themselves carry up their oblations to the ministers at the altar. Nevertheless, change was destined to come in the realm of ceremonial, however conservative as to text the Roman ecclesiastical authorities might be; and the change when it came was destined to shift emphasis from one element of the Mass to another and eventually to alter its significance for the faithful.

The adoption of the Roman Mass throughout the major part of Latin Christendom inevitably led to a mixture of Roman Rite with non-Roman ceremonial of a kind which, expressing the devotional ideas of the people, the latter were not willing to abandon. New ceremonial fashions also were adopted with freedom in accordance with new devotional interests. The censings of the altar, and of the clergy and people, are one case in point.¹ Textual additions were also made to the Mass in the form of introductory prayers, prayers at the offertory, prayers at communion and concluding devotions.² These new features found their way into the usage of Rome itself. They have survived in the Reformed Missal of Pope Pius V. The most far-reaching change is associated with the elevation of the Host. This ceremony arose out of a desire on the part of the pious to see the Host on account of the blessings which a contemplation of it gained. This desire, manifesting itself about the twelfth century, and intensified by anti-Berengarian feeling, marks a profound change of attitude towards the Sacrament. To see the Host was counted more important, as a means of acquiring grace, than receiving communion.³ In response to the desire, the Host was raised at the moment of

¹ See E. G. C. F. Atchley, *A History of the Use of Incense* (London, 1909).

² For an account of these additions see P. Batiffol, *Leçons sur la Messe*. Their variety and development may be traced in A. Ebner, *Quellen und Forschungen zur Geschichte und Kunstgeschichte des Missale Romanum im Mittelalter* (Freibourg-im-Breisgau, 1896).

³ Cf. Alexander of Hales's discussion in his *Summa Theologica*, IV, li, 5 and 6, *Utrum actus manducandi sit videndo vel masticando vel gustando*.

consecration. About 1200 Eudes de Sully, Bishop of Paris, prescribed that it should not be raised until after consecration, apparently in order to escape the danger of idolatry.¹ The practice became universal. It concentrated the attention of the faithful on the moment of consecration, and in transforming the Mass for them into an Exposition of the Blessed Sacrament, it gave the first impetus to the extra-liturgical cultus of the Sacrament.² The doctrine of concomitance made it unnecessary, and to some extent undesirable, to elevate the chalice. The latter ceremony, nevertheless, followed about a century later. Coincident with the concentration of devotion upon the Host is the withdrawal of the Chalice from the laity.

In the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, we notice the Mass becoming the focus of the devotion to the Passion of Christ fostered by the Franciscans and propagated by their preaching. According to Franciscan spirituality, constant recollection of the Passion was the spiritual exercise most profitable to the Christian, in that it called forth an answering love and thankfulness for Christ's sufferings and so promoted the sanctification of the soul.³ The Mass was easily interpreted in terms of this devotion⁴; and by the fifteenth century stress is laid on its institution by Christ to be 'a perpetual memory of his Passion forto abyde with his peupl.'⁵ The affective spirituality of the Franciscans made a universal appeal. Its very success, however, was an important factor in completing the destruction of the communal aspect of the Mass.

¹ Mansi, *Concilia*, xxii. 682, *praecept.* 28.

² For the whole subject, see E. Dumoutet, *Le Désir de voir l'Hostie et les origines de la Dévotion au Saint-Sacrement* (Paris, 1926).

³ Cf. St. Bonaventura, Prologue to the *Lignum Vitae*.

⁴ For an example see Langforde's *Meditations in the time of Mass*, printed in J. Wickham Legg, *Tracts on the Mass*, Henry Bradshaw Society (London, 1904), pp. 19-29; also the documents collected in T. F. Simmons, *The Lay Folks Mass Book*, Early English Text Society (London, 1879).

⁵ See the Homily 'De Solempnitate Corporis Cristi' in Mirk's *Festial*, ed. by J. Erbe, Early English Text Society (London, 1905), pp. 168-75. This Homily almost ignores the sacrificial aspect of the Eucharist. Its teaching on the remembrance aspect is echoed in the Communion Service of *The Book of Common Prayer*—a fact which seems to have been overlooked in tracing the sources of that service. Mirk presupposes communion only at Easter and at the point of death, the normal occasions of the later Middle Age.

The celebration of the Liturgy was the business of the clergy and the clerks. The devout layman attended in order to make his meditation on the Passion, and in the elevation of the Host he was poignantly reminded of Christ's exaltation on the Cross as his own Saviour. Other factors had already contributed to undermine appreciation of the Liturgy as a corporate act of worship. Among these we may include the private Mass for the dead, which makes its appearance in the sixth century, and which led to an extension of the private principle, so that we find in the mediaeval Missals Masses for such private ends as *pro amico*, *pro eo qui sua peccata confitetur*, *pro praegnante*, etc. The *Regula canonicorum*, of which the older stratum was the work of Chrodegang of Metz, is cognizant of, and condemns, the practice of saying a solitary Mass without any assistant. In the later Middle Age, the Mass was commonly regarded, not in the context of the Christian society, but in relation to the person who was qualified to offer the sacrifice, viz., the priest. The structure, also, of the mediaeval doctrine of sacrifice, by which the Liturgy was interpreted by theologians, was too elaborate for the untrained understanding of the laity. Sacrifice was not now the common phenomenon it had been at the formative period of the Liturgy; and the average mediaeval layman's knowledge of the Bible was not sufficient to acquaint him with the sacrificial ideas presupposed by the ancient text of the Liturgy, even if its translation had been made known to him. The continued use of the Latin language played its part as an obstacle to corporate liturgical worship. That it is not a necessary obstacle, however, is shown by the success of the modern Liturgical Movement on the Continent in promoting congregational Masses and Offices. It must not be supposed that all mediaeval developments and novelties were accepted without remonstrance. Yet once they had won acceptance, the innate conservatism of ecclesiastical authority invariably protected them, with the result that any movement for reform in worship was bound to bring its leaders into conflict with authority, and if the latter proved intransigent, to end in rebellion. The desire for reform in general which characterised the close of the mediaeval period inevitably affected the sphere of worship; and when the desire for reform found active expression, its aims just as inevitably were seen to be more or

less conservative, in accordance with the attitude towards doctrine taken by the reformers. The most conservative reform was naturally that of the Council of Trent. In affirming that in the consecration of the elements the whole substances of the bread and of the wine are converted into the substances of Christ's Body and of His Blood, so as to justify the term Transubstantiation,¹ and that the *cultus latræ*, due to God, is due to the Sacrament,² the Council preserved for the Latin Church what was of the spirit of mediaeval worship. Of the spirit of the traditional worship, also, was the Council's declaration with regard to the Sacrifice of the Mass, that being relative to the propitiatory Sacrifice of the Cross, it is itself propitiatory.³ The spirit being thus preserved, no radical change was necessary in outward expression, whether by way of prayer, ceremony or language. The Council referred to the Pope the task of revising the Missal. The Reformed Missal was promulgated by the Bull *Quo Primum* of Pope Pius V in 1570. Pruned of certain of the ceremonial and ritual exuberances⁴ which local usage had accumulated, the *Ordo Missæ* of 1570 differed in essentials from no one of the mediaeval variants of the Roman Liturgy.⁵ The changes and additions made to the Missal since the time of Pope Pius V have in no way altered its character. It remains a recapitulation of the liturgical and cultural history of unreformed Western Christendom. Its foundation is the early Roman Sacramentaries; the text and ceremonies of its Canon combine the Eucharistic worship of the Middle Ages with that of Christian antiquity; and in its provision for such observances as Palm Sunday and Holy Saturday, for commemorations of the dead and of many of the saints, as well as in its votive Masses, it has admitted generous contributions from non-Roman Latin Christianity. In certain other of its features the influence of Greek Christian

¹ Sessio xiii. cap. iv. ² *Ibid.* cap. v. ³ Sessio xxii, chaps. i, ii.

⁴ E.g., Touching the eyes with the paten, farsing the Kyries, etc. For examples of farsing see J. Wickham Legg, *The Sarum Missal* (Oxford, 1916), Appendix III.

⁵ The mediaeval Uses of Salisbury, York, Rouen, etc., were not distinct rites, but variants of the Roman Rite, as is also the use of Braga, restored in 1924. The Rite of Lyons is derived from that of Rome, and many authorities regard the Rite of Milan as fundamentally Roman. Of the non-Roman Latin Rites, only the Mozarabic has continued in use into the modern period

usage upon Latin is also discernible.¹ The student who proposes to investigate the history of Western Eucharistic worship might do worse than to trace the several elements of the Roman Missal to their respective sources, to note their affinities with other rites, and, after considering the different cultural and devotional outlooks which they reflect, to assess the significance of their presence in the Missal.

VI. WORSHIP AND LITURGY IN THE CHURCHES OF THE REFORMATION

Apart from a common desire to return to the standards of the primitive Church, the leaders of the movements which constituted the Reformation were united only in what they disapproved. The doctrines of Transubstantiation and of the propitiatory nature of the Eucharistic Sacrifice, and the adoration of the Sacrament, were rejected by them all. In practical measures for reform of worship, on the other hand, they differed considerably. They were acquainted only with existing Roman forms; and they possessed little or no knowledge of the origins, history, and principles of Christian worship. The views of the leader and his circle dictated the forms of worship to be used in the several centres. 'The liturgical achievements of the Reformers,' writes a Presbyterian liturgist, 'the Strasbourgers and Cranmer excepted, were largely negative. Both in the Eucharist and the offices they simply omitted what they considered superfluous or incompatible with the new teaching: at other points they made drastic substitutions. Yet, throughout, apart from the new psalmody and hymnody, there was little that was creative.'² No one who has studied the Reformation liturgies will wish to dispute this statement. Nevertheless these liturgies deserve study as much as the Greek and Latin Rites, because they were the means, or in large measure the means, by which Reformation ideas were brought to bear upon the spiritual life of the common people. The purpose of the Reformation liturgies (and the term must

¹ E.g., in the veneration of the Cross on Good Friday, in the Litany of the Saints on Holy Saturday, and in the Kyries and *Agnus Dei* of the Mass: see E. Bishop, *Liturgica Historica*, chaps. vi and vii.

² W. D. Maxwell, *An Outline of Christian Worship* (Oxford, 1936), p. 73.

be extended to include hymnology) was not only to provide forms in which God could be worthily worshipped, but also to mould a *pietas* or spiritual tradition.

It is easy to magnify the breach between the old and the new order in worship, and this has often been done in the interests of religious controversy. Generalisations about the ethos of Protestantism, however, are misleading, because they generally identify Protestantism with the system of Zwingli, and ignore the systems of Luther and Calvin, both of which are strongly contrasted with each other as with Zwinglianism, and both of which preserved a greater continuity with the Catholic past than controversialists on either side have allowed themselves to see. Anglican Protestants in the nineteenth century who contended against the 'six points' of Anglo-Catholic usage as contrary to the spirit of the Reformation forgot that Mass vestments, lights, crucifixes, and altars were long retained in Lutheran churches, where there was a desire to retain them, and that Zwingli continued the use of unleavened bread. Continuity with the past was more than a matter of externals, however. The Reformers were products of mediaeval Catholic piety; and the influence of the latter is to be seen in their systems. In concentrating upon that aspect of the Eucharist which regards it as ordained to keep Christians in mind of the Passion, in urging their adherents to frequent communion and to careful preparation by self-examination and repentance beforehand, they stood in a path of Catholic spirituality down which the Franciscans, and such indubitably Catholic masters as John Gerson and the author of the *Imitation*, had passed before them. Calvin and Luther agreed in rejecting the doctrine of the Real Presence as maintained by Catholic theologians, but both (though in different ways) asserted a Presence of Christ in the Eucharist, different in order from the Presence vouchsafed at other meetings for worship. Zwingli was at variance with them in this. For him the Eucharist was predominantly a remembrance of the Crucifixion; it was more an exercise of sanctified historical imagination than an act of worship. The interpretation of Zwingli's utterances on the Eucharist is surrounded with difficulty. Certainly on occasions Zwingli stated that the communicant receives spiritually and sacramentally the Body and Blood of Christ;

yet he appears to conceive the purpose of this spiritual receiving to be the keeping alive in the communicants' minds the memory of the 'generous act' of their Redeemer.¹ In Zwingli's judgment, therefore, frequent celebrations were unnecessary. He prescribed the use of 'Christ's Supper' only four times a year. This was a departure from tradition in which Luther and Calvin did not join. Both these Reformers desired the Eucharist to be the principal act of worship every Sunday, as it had been in the past, only with this difference, that the Eucharist was to be a communion. As there could not be a Eucharist without communion, and as communicants failed to present themselves except on rare occasions, celebrations of the Eucharist among Lutherans and Calvinists inevitably became infrequent.

If the practice of the taught fell below the standard of the teachers' doctrine, this was probably due, at least in some measure, to an element in that doctrine which is distinctive of Protestant as compared with Catholic theology. The element in question is 'the Word.' The Reformers agreed in conceiving of grace as God's benevolent disposition, in Christ, towards sinners. God's disposition is made known in His Word. The Word is uttered in the Bible; it is declared also and its meaning revealed through the aid of the Spirit by godly men. Preaching, therefore, as the Ministry of the Word acquired a status equal with, if not greater than, the Ministry of Sacraments. 'The Sacraments are *sigilla verbi* signs accompanying, manifesting, and strengthening to us in our weakness, the Divine Word of promise.'² An ideal act of worship would duly correlate Word and Sacraments. The forms of service put out by Luther³

¹ For expositions and discussions of Reformation Eucharistic doctrine, see H. Watt, 'Eucharist (Reformation and post-Reformation period),' Hastings' *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* (Edinburgh, 1912), also A. Barclay, *The Protestant Doctrine of the Lord's Supper. A Study in the Eucharistic Teaching of Luther, Zwingli and Calvin* (Glasgow, 1927), and the chapters on those Reformers in N. Micklem, *Christian Worship*. Zwingli's form of service will be found in B. J. Kidd, *Documents of the Continental Reformation* (Oxford, 1911), No. 206. A presentation of the Reformers' views, mainly by way of extracts from their writings, will be found in Darwell Stone, *History of the Doctrine of the Holy Eucharist* (London, 1909), II. ix.

² J. S. Whale in N. Micklem, *op. cit.* p. 160.

³ For the Lutheran Orders of Service see B. J. Kidd, *op. cit.* Nos. 66 and 95, and J. Smend, *Die evangelischen deutschen Messen bis zu Luthers deutscher Messe* (Göttingen, 1896).

and Calvin,¹ as also by Bucer at Strasbourg, make the correlation. If there cannot be a Eucharist without communion, neither can there be a Eucharist without a proclamation of the Word. The prayer before the sermon in the Strasbourg Order for the Lord's Supper (1537-1539) briefly expresses the importance assigned to the reading and proclamation of the Word: 'Almighty, ever gracious Father, forasmuch as all our salvation depends upon our having truly understood Thy holy Word: therefore grant us that our hearts be set free from worldly things, so that we may with all diligence and faith hear and apprehend Thy holy Word, that thereby we may rightly understand Thy gracious will, and in all sincerity live according to the same, to Thy praise and glory; through our Lord Jesus Christ. Amen.'² Faith is man's proper response both to Word and Sacraments. But in practice the average Protestant found his faith exercised more frequently and with greater liveliness by preaching than by the Eucharist. Whatever the theologians might say, the latter was an anti-climax after the sermon. The sermon became the central point of Protestant worship; and Protestant services came normally to consist of 'Ante-communion.' The Ministry of the Word had triumphed over the Ministry of Sacraments. Calvin protested in vain. The effect of this triumph upon Calvinistic worship was to make it excessively didactic. In order to render the worship intelligible to the worshippers, the minister addressed to them exhortations and explanations, each of which was a lesser sermon. Liturgical prayer was abandoned for extemporaneous. The element of worship, as the ancient Church understood it, was preserved by the use of hymns and metrical psalms; but reverent attention to the Word, both read and preached, was itself the highest activity of a worshipping man. In the Scandinavian churches Lutheran worship retained most fully its traditional and liturgical character.³ The 'High Mass' of these churches

¹ See W. D. Maxwell, *John Knox's Genevan Service Book 1556* (Edinburgh, 1931).

² W. D. Maxwell, *Outline of Christian Worship*, p. 104.

³ For the Norwegian and Danish Liturgies as now celebrated, see H. Holloway, *The Norwegian Rite translated into English, with an Account of its History; with an Appendix containing Translations into English of Danish Services* (London, 1934). For the Swedish Liturgy, see E. E. Yelverton,

bears a close relation to the Catholic Rite. The Collects, Epistles and Gospels follow the liturgical year. As in other Lutheran churches, so in those of Scandinavia, 'High Mass' is commonly 'Ante-communion,' all that relates to consecration and communion being omitted when there are to be no communicants. On some occasions, that part of the rite comprising consecration and communion is recited without 'Ante-communion.'

VII. ANGLICAN WORSHIP: THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER

In England, the traditional worship remained essentially unchanged during the lifetime of Henry VIII. Upon the accession of Edward VI, attacks upon, or denials of, the fundamental ideas of Catholic worship, viz., the doctrines of Transubstantiation, the Real Presence and the Sacrifice of the Mass, began to appear with the approval of the Government. The nation at large, however, though not unsympathetic towards the breach with Rome, was not ready for a rapid change of religion; and popular feeling made it necessary for the Government to proceed cautiously in reforming worship. An Act of Parliament of December, 1547, ordered the administration of communion under both kinds. The first instalment of liturgical reform was the vernacular *Order of the Communion*,¹ issued in 1548 and consisting of exhortations and devotions to be used in the Latin Mass at the administration of the Sacrament. The forms in the *Order of the Communion* were inspired by *The Pious Consultation*,² published by the reforming Archbishop of Cologne, Hermann von Wied, whose assistants in the work were Bucer and Melanchthon. Of the exhortations, that addressed to the communicants immediately before reception constitutes a commentary on the Lord's Supper, the memorial aspect of which alone is mentioned. If we compare this

The Mass in Sweden. Its Development from the Latin Rite from 1531 to 1917, Henry Bradshaw Society (London, 1919), and *The Swedish Rite* (London, 1920).

¹ Printed in *The Liturgies of K. Edward VI*, Parker Society (1844), and in facsimile in *The Order of The Communion*, printed by Richard Grafton, 1548, Henry Bradshaw Society (1907).

² The German original was published in 1543; a revised edition followed in 1544. A Latin version, known as *Simplex ac pia deliberatio*, appeared in 1545. English translations were published in 1547 and 1548. The influence of the book on the Prayer Book of 1549 is marked throughout.

exhortation with the instruction on 'The Sacrament of the Altar' in *The King's Book* ¹ of 1543, the omission of customary Catholic teaching is seen to be significant. The Royal Proclamation promulgating the *Order* gave promise of further 'travail for the reformation and setting forth of . . . Godly orders.' In 1549, the first Act of Uniformity replaced the Latin Rite and its service-books by the first English Book of Common Prayer as the sole use of the whole realm.

In 'The Supper of the Lord and Holy Communion, commonly called the Mass,' the exhortations and devotions of the *Order of the Communion* reappeared with slight alterations.² Otherwise, in general outline, the structure of the new English service adhered to that of the Latin Mass. Its debt to the Sarum Missal for Collects, Epistles, and Gospels, was considerable. Echoes of the Latin Mass sound in the Preface, in the proper Prefaces of great festivals, and in the Canon, which also contained a petition for the dead, though before consecration. On the other hand, apart from introits (i.e., Psalms in whole or part sung originally at the entrance of the celebrant and his assistants) the traditional Psalmody had been removed, the 'offertory' and 'communion' being replaced by a selection of scripture sentences, from which the celebrant made choice at his discretion. The variable 'secret' had likewise been removed, and the variable prayer of thanksgiving had been replaced by an unchanging form. The new Service retained the Mass vestments, with the cope as a permissive alternative to the chasuble. At weekday celebrations, and at times when 'the clerks' were absent, it prescribed an English equivalent of 'Low Mass.'³

The classification of the Liturgy of 1549 was from the first a matter of difference. The Reformer Bucer criticised certain details, but generally approved the rite as 'drawn from the Holy Scriptures.'⁴ Hooper, afterwards Bishop of Gloucester,

¹ See *The King's Book*, ed. by T. A. Lacey, Church Historical Society (1932) pp. 50-7.

² The Prayer Book of 1549 is printed in *The Liturgies of K. Edward VI.*

³ Low Mass is one without assistant ministers and choir, the celebrant himself reading what would have been said or sung by assistant ministers or choir.

⁴ See *Censura Martini Bucevi super libro sacrorum . . . in regno Angliae* in Bucer, *Scripta Anglicana* (Basel, 1577), p. 465.

whose opinions were Zwinglian, condemned the Prayer Book *in toto*, and wrote, 'I neither can nor will communicate with the church in the administration of the supper.'¹ Stephen Gardiner, Bishop of Winchester, an opponent of Reformation ideas, found five points in which the new Service was not distant from the Catholic Faith, as touching Transubstantiation and the Sacrifice of the Mass as propitiatory for living and dead. Gardiner had to make the best of a difficult situation. From his guarded language, it is clear that he regarded the Service as equivocal, and as patient of a reformed interpretation.² An examination of the Rite confirms the impression conveyed by Gardiner. The main points at issue between those who wished for reform and their opponents were, of course, Transubstantiation and the nature of the Eucharistic Sacrifice. The Catholics believed that the former doctrine was expressed in the *Quam oblationem* and Institution-narrative of the Latin Canon, and that the elevation of Host and chalice expressed the doctrine in ceremony. In the English Canon, the Institution-narrative is preceded by the petition 'With thy Holy Spirit and word vouchsafe to bless and sanctify these thy gifts, and creatures of bread and wine, that they may be unto us the body and blood of thy most dearly beloved Son Jesus Christ.'³ That the second clause of this petition echoes *ut fiat nobis nobis*, etc. of *Quam oblationem* and can be interpreted in harmony with conversion doctrine is clear enough. But that a contrary interpretation is equally possible is proved by Cranmer's words, in his *Answer* to Gardiner, 'We do not pray,' he writes, 'that the creatures of bread and wine may be the body and blood of Christ; but that they may be to us the body and blood of

¹ See *Original Letters*, Parker Society (1847), p. 79.

² See *An Explication of the true Catholic Faith touching the most Blessed Sacrament of the Altar*, 1551, printed in Cranmer, *Works*. On the Lord's Supper, Parker Society (1844).

³ The reference to the Holy Spirit has prompted some scholars to think that the influence of the Greek Epiclesis could be detected in this petition. Editions of the Greek Liturgies were certainly available in the second quarter of the sixteenth century. On the other hand, this petition expresses an idea commonly taught with regard to consecration: cf. the Corpus Christi Sermon in Mirk's *Festial*, '... Christ's body that is made in the altar by virtue of the holy words that the priest saith there and by working of the Holy Ghost.' This idea was widely current at an earlier date. The greater part of the Roman Council of 1079 endorsed it: see Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, cxlviii, 809. Cf. Berengar's oath, *ibid.* col. 811.

Christ ; that is to say, that we may so eat them and drink them, that we may be partakers of His body crucified, and of His blood shed for our redemption.' ¹ It should be noticed that the elevation, 'or showing the Sacrament to the people,' is forbidden. The passages relating to the Eucharistic Sacrifice are not less interesting. In the opinion of Catholic theologians, the propitiatory sacrifice was presented in the words *offerimus praeclarae majestati tuae . . . panem sanctum vitae aeternae et calicem salutis perpetuae*. The English parallel runs 'we thy humble servants do celebrate, and make here before Thy divine majesty, with these Thy holy gifts, the memorial which Thy Son hath willed us to make.' Here also two interpretations are possible. The making of the memorial can be taken in contrary senses according as Christ's institution was understood. Later in the Canon there is reference to 'this our Sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving,' and to the offering of 'ourself, our souls, and bodies, to be a reasonable, holy, and lively sacrifice unto' God. The phrase 'Sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving' recalls the *sacrificium laudis* of the Latin Canon, which is of a different order from the 'kind . . . of sacrifice, which doth not reconcile us to God ; but is made of them that be reconciled by Christ, to testify our duties unto God and to show ourselves thankful unto him,' as Cranmer interprets the English phrase to mean.² In one respect the Liturgy stood definitely with the Reformed Rites. It prohibited celebration without communicants. Yet, in general, the Liturgy cannot be classed as belonging to the traditionalist party on one side or to any of their antagonists on the other. It stands by itself ; and though it was an interim rite, intended to prepare the way for another less exposed to Protestant objection, it deserved and has been accorded a permanent place among the documents of Anglican worship, for its skilful combination of old with new unsurpassed in any form produced by a Reformation Church in the sixteenth century.³

¹ Cranmer, *Works. On the Lord's Supper*, p. 271.

² Cranmer, *ibid.* p. 346.

³ For an examination of the history and contents of the Prayer Book of 1549 and for a definite classification of it as non-Catholic, see F. A. Gasquet and E. Bishop, *Edward VI and the Book of Common Prayer*, 2nd edn. (London, 1891). For the sources of the Prayer Book from 1549 to 1662, see F. E.

According to the second Act of Uniformity, the Prayer Book of 1552 explained and made fully perfect that of 1549. It would be more correct to say that it explained and made fully perfect the ideas and intentions of the persons responsible for the direction of English religious affairs. The second Prayer Book and its Communion Service represent the limit to which Protestant reform of liturgy and worship was destined to proceed in the Church of England. The Communion Service of 1552 is *sui generis* among liturgies. It exhibits considerable differences of structure from that of 1549, of which the chief occur where the Canon formerly stood. The elements of the 1549 Canon are for the most part rearranged; some of them are replaced by new forms, and some are abandoned. The intercession now stands after the placing of the elements upon 'the Holy Table' (the term 'altar' is dropped). The consecratory section of the Canon has been transformed into a short prayer in which the petition for the blessing and sanctification of the elements is replaced by one asking that 'we receiving these thy creatures of bread and wine, according to thy Son our Saviour Jesus Christ's holy institution, in remembrance of his death and passion, may be partakers of his most blessed body and blood.' The making of the remembrance is now identified with the act of communion by means of new administration sentences from which is omitted reference to the Body and Blood. The Lord's Prayer follows the communion, and itself is followed by a prayer consisting of those paragraphs of the 1549 Canon in which offering is made of the sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving and of 'ourselves, our souls and bodies.' The Thanksgiving Prayer of 1549 is left as an alternative to that preceding, so that at the discretion of the celebrant mention of sacrifice can be omitted. To describe this new arrangement of prayers as a 'dislocation' of the Canon is incorrect. The arrangement follows a logical order: confession and absolution; eucharistic thanksgiving; communion and remembrance; and oblation, or, alternatively, thanksgiving for the gift received in Communion with prayer to lead a godly life. The Liturgy is now adjusted to the conception of the

Brightman, *The English Rite* (Oxford, 1915). For a study of Cranmer's opinions and their influence on liturgical revision, see C. H. Smyth, *Cranmer and the Reformation under Edward VI* (Cambridge, 1925).

Eucharist expressed in the communion exhortation of the *Order of the Communion* of 1548. A detailed examination of the Service of 1552 shows that all those features of the Rite of 1549, which Gardiner held to be not distant from the Catholic Faith, are obliterated. The Declaration on kneeling at reception, or 'Black Rubric,' appended to the Service, states that no 'adoration is done, or ought to be done, either unto the sacramental bread and wine . . . bodily received, or to any real and essential presence there being of Christ's natural flesh and blood.' It is undeniable that the intention of the compilers of the second English Communion Service was to set English Liturgy and worship definitely in the tradition of the Reformation. Owing to the sudden death of King Edward VI, the Prayer Book of 1552 was short-lived. Whether or not Queen Elizabeth would have preferred to restore the first Prayer Book in 1559, the course was impracticable. The Protestants who had emigrated to the Continent during the reign of Mary were now returned, as strong in their opinions as ever, and unwilling for any concessions to what they regarded as error.¹ To restore a Prayer Book patient of Catholic interpretation would not have been (in the words of the second Act of Uniformity) 'most profitable to the state of this Realm.' Accordingly the third Act of Uniformity imposed the use of the Prayer Book of 1552, with three changes, one of which was the addition of the sentences of administration in the Communion Service of 1549 to those already provided. Another change, not covered by the Act, was the direction, in the 'Ornaments Rubric,' that the minister should 'use such ornaments in the church as were in use by the authority of Parliament in the second year of the reign of King Edward VI.' The vesture prescribed in the Prayer Book of 1549 had been forbidden in 1552, and the use of 'a surplice only'² was enjoined. The alteration in the Rubric had the effect of authorising the traditional vesture at celebrations; but the use of alb and chasuble, revived in Mary's time, was not continued.³ Yet

¹ For the political aspect of the emigrants' influence, see C. H. Garrett, *The Marian Exiles* (Cambridge, 1938).

² A rochet, in the case of bishops.

³ For the question of the Ornaments Rubric and vesture, see H. Gee, *The Elizabethan Prayer Book and Ornaments* (London, 1902), and W. P. M. Kennedy, *Studies in Tudor History* (London, 1916), chap. vi.

another change, not prescribed by the Act, was the omission of the Black Rubric.¹

The action of Sovereign and Parliament in promoting liturgical change calls for some observation. The intervention of the civil power was no novelty in the history of the Church. Justinian had issued injunctions concerning divine worship, and Charlemagne had substituted the Roman for the Gallican Liturgies in the Frankish dominions. Yet in such cases as these no question of doctrine was at stake. In England, the Royal Supremacy, assumed by Henry VIII with the consent of Convocations and Parliament, invested the Crown with a special function in relation to the Church. The circumstances of the reign of Edward VI and of the early years of that of Elizabeth made the discharge of that function a matter of peculiar difficulty. On the one side, the Crown could take no action which was calculated to disintegrate the Church. The theory of 'One Realm, One Church' so corresponded with reality that a disintegrated Church ultimately threatened disruption to the Kingdom. On the other side, if the Crown admitted the necessity of reform (and the persons who exercised its authority between 1547 and 1553 desired change for a variety of reasons), it was faced with the problem of deciding to which wing of reform it would extend its support. If we may believe Bucer and Paul Fagius,² the Prayer Book of 1549 was a temporary measure intended to wean the English gently from their inherited belief and practice. It was doubtless also 'a *ballon d'essai*' (in the phrase of Professor W. P. M. Kennedy)³ with the purpose of testing reaction to change. The reception of the Eucharistic Liturgy was a foretaste of what the Government had to expect, when it had reached a position which it was not disposed to abandon. Insurrection in different parts of the country left no doubt as to the attitude of the conservatives. The rigid reform parties' dislike of the Liturgy was voiced by Hooper. The ecclesiastical events of Mary's reign so far altered the situation, that by 1558 the

¹ The Black Rubric was added by authority of the Council without the sanction of Parliament. Hence doubtless its omission in 1559. It was no part of the Book as imposed by Parliament in 1552.

² See their letter to their friends at Strasbourg, dated April 26, 1549, *Original Letters*, Parker Society (1847), pp. 535 ff.

³ *Op. cit.* p. 83.

conservative cause had lost, both in Parliament and in the country at large, very much of the sympathy which it had commanded some nine years previously. Yet the difficulty confronting Elizabeth and her Council was not less acute, owing to the clear impossibility of devising a new form of worship acceptable to all reform parties. 'One Use' was the Elizabethan, as it had been the Edwardine, corollary of 'One Realm, One Church'; and if the unity of Church and Realm required it, Queen and Council were prepared to enforce conformity with the One Use, not only on the part of conservatives, but also on that of dissident reformists. From the point of view of the time, national unity and security undoubtedly demanded enforced conformity. Less violently at first, but soon afterwards with increasing severity, the Government acted accordingly. In official eyes, the political considerations in favour of the Elizabethan Prayer Book were out of all proportion to the religious.

The fortunes of the Prayer Book in Elizabeth's reign constitute an important chapter in the history of Anglican worship and liturgy. The Book of 1559 started on its career disliked by the most sincere religious elements of the time, viz., by the 'Papists' and by those who later were known as 'Puritans.' Both of these were in opposition to the Elizabethan Settlement; and both, on opposite grounds, found the authoritative forms of worship repellent. To both of them, very few of the men who accepted the Prayer Book appeared to be safe from criticism. The grievance of the conservatives was great; but that of the Puritans was perhaps greater. In the name of reform, the latter were forced to use a liturgy which at essential points deprived them of the gains of the Reform movement. At first they had no intention of seceding from the Church. They remained within it, hoping that Parliamentary action would effect further reform, and that the Church would be refashioned in accordance with their ideal. Their method involved a partial non-conformity, specially in the matter of vesture and ceremony. In 1571 they entertained some hope of success. A bill for the further reform of the Prayer Book was to have been introduced in the House of Commons; but the design was frustrated by the Council at the direction of the Queen. Whatever argument the Puritans advanced for their

case, it was countered by the decisive argument of the Queen's Supremacy. Yet though the Queen's authority could have preserved the settlement and worship of the Church for her lifetime, it was beyond the reach of her Supremacy to reverse the discredit in which the Prayer Book at first was held. That by the end of the reign Anglicanism had acquired a positive character, and that an increasing number of the Queen's subjects were beginning to hold its worship in regard, was due mainly to the work of Jewel and of his protégé Richard Hooker. Jewel's *Apology of the Church of England* was concerned to show that the Anglican settlement conformed to the pattern of the pre-mediaeval Church, which, discernible in the writings of 'the old Catholic bishops and fathers,' had provided the model for, 'not only our doctrine, but also the Sacraments and the form of common prayer.'¹ This line of argument, pursued but not always convincingly, by Cranmer, Jewel made effective with a weight of learning against Roman Catholic controversialists. Hooker's opponents, on the other hand, were the Puritans, who by this time had widened the battle-ground, so as to include the order of the Church and its relations with the State, none of which, they argued, agreed with the Apostles' ordering, as made known in Scripture. As between Jewel and Hooker, the latter had the more powerful and penetrating mind; and able as the *Apology* was, *The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* was more constructive. Starting from the unanswerable premise that 'what was used in the Apostles times, the Scripture fully declareth not,'² and that therefore any alleged apostolic standard is in fact imaginary, Hooker treated of the Church as a visible politic body having a continuous existence from its beginning, and controlled in its ordering and activity by laws adapted to the attainment of its ends. A public prescript form of prayer is dictated in general by such laws; and the particular use of the Church of England is able to bear scrutiny in relation to its purpose. Hooker examined the Prayer Book in detail, defending by reference to patristic writers those customs and usages which the Puritans had condemned as Roman. 'Our conformity with Rome' in matters of liturgy is not necessarily a blemish. 'Where Rome keepeth that which is ancients and better, others whom we much more

¹ *Apology*, Part VI.

² *Ecclesiastical Polity*, Preface iv, 4.

affect leaving it for newer and changing it for worse ; we had rather follow the perfections of them whom we like not, than in defects resemble those whom we love.' ¹

Jewel and Hooker contrived to give the established Church a respect for itself. By justifying its claim to share in the divine title of the original community and by associating it with the Church of the Fathers, the 'patristic' line of defence, as developed by these two men, attached the Church of England to history, and vindicated it as sharing in the historic religious tradition of Western Europe. It taught the serious and educated Elizabethan layman to see in those features of the Prayer Book, which Recusant and Puritan joined in regarding as curiosities, the external signs of an honourable continuity ; and thus (whatever criticisms the modern student may be disposed to bring against it) it was an operative factor in the survival of Anglicanism, both in the uncertainties of the sixteenth century and in the storms of the seventeenth. This patristic interest did not evaporate in the two succeeding reigns. Continued by Lancelot Andrewes, both on account of its intrinsic attractiveness to the scholar and of its use to the anti-Roman controversialist, it was pursued by the Church party of the Jacobean and Caroline periods. It was responsible for the founding of an Anglican school of liturgists, who, forgetful of the circumstances of 1552 and unconscious of the uncompromisingly reformed intention of the second Prayer Book and its Communion Service, interpreted by their patristic standards the form of the latter which they used, and (reversing the historical process) came to suppose that it was explained and made fully perfect in the Liturgy of 1549. The firstfruits of Anglican liturgical study were gathered in the Scottish Prayer Book of 1637,² and particularly in its Communion Office. This Prayer Book, miscalled 'Laud's Liturgy,' was Laudian to the extent that the Archbishop had acted as consultant in its compilation. Its distinctive features were due to two Scottish Bishops, John Maxwell, of Ross, and James Wedderburn, of Dunblane, the latter of whom had read at an

¹ *Ecclesiastical Polity*, V. xxviii, 1.

² See *The Book of Common Prayer . . . commonly known as Laud's Liturgy* (1637) with Historical Introduction and Illustrative Notes by James Cooper, D.D. Church Service Society (Edinburgh 1904).

English University,¹ 'and was mainly instrumental in obtaining the restoration to the Order for the Administration of Holy Communion of portions of the office which had been lost to the Church of England since the first Liturgy of King Edward the Sixth.'²

The Liturgy of 1637 preserved, with some alterations of wording,³ the structure of that of 1552-1559 to the end of the Creed. For the offertory, a new selection of sentences was provided. A new rubric directed that the devotions (i.e., the alms) of the people should be humbly presented before the Lord and set upon the Holy Table, and that 'the Presbyter shall then offer up and place the bread and wine prepared for the Sacrament upon the Lord's Table.' A clause offering 'our alms' was inserted at the beginning of the Prayer for the Whole State of Christ's Church, and to the end of it were attached thanksgivings for the faithful departed and for the Saints, the latter echoing the parallel passage in the Liturgy of 1549. Following upon the Preface and Sanctus comes 'The Prayer of Consecration' (the first appearance of this description in an Anglican Liturgy), consisting of the Institution Prayer of 1552-1559, in which the petition for the sanctification of the elements in the Liturgy of 1549 is dexterously combined with its substitute of 1552-1559, the Oblation, 'Wherefore, O Lord and heavenly Father,' etc. of 1549, and the first post-communion prayer of 1552-1559. The Lord's Prayer and the Prayer of Humble Access precede communion, at which the sentences of administration are those of the Liturgy of 1549. When the Presbyter has covered 'with a fair linen cloth, or corporal, that which remaineth of the consecrated elements,' he recites the second post-communion prayer of 1552-1559, and concludes the rite with *Gloria in excelsis* and the Blessing. Two rubrics deserve notice: the first directing that the Holy Table should be adorned with 'a carpet and a fair white linen cloth,' and 'other decent furniture meet for the high mysteries there to be celebrated, and should stand at the uppermost part

¹ One account says Oxford, another Cambridge.

² G. Grub, *Ecclesiastical History of Scotland* (Edinburgh, 1861), ii, 377.

³ Specially worthy of note is the alteration in the first prayer for the King, 'Almighty God . . . have mercy upon thy holy Catholic Church: and in this particular church in which we live so rule the heart of thy chosen servant . . .'

of the Chancel,' and the second forbidding the removal from the church of any of the consecrated bread and wine remaining from communion, and directing that it should be reverently consumed by such communicants only as the celebrating Presbyter 'shall take unto him.'

The Communion Office of 1637 bears about it the marks of the patristic and liturgical study of Andrewes and his school, and also of their practical interest in the decent performance of divine worship. Its influence is perceptible in the revised English Communion Service of 1662. At an earlier stage of the revision work, of which the existing English Prayer Book is the issue, it seemed likely that the Scottish Consecration Prayer of 1637 would be adopted with some alterations; but that and several other Scottish proposals were abandoned, for no reason recorded except that 'My L.L. (Lords) the B.B. (Bishops) at Ely House ordered all in the old method.'¹ Andrewes' school, however, had already attached a sacrificial significance, in accordance with their patristic standards, to the Eucharistic Service which they used; and it may well have seemed that the existing Office providing what was required to that end, no other change was necessary than to add the title 'The Prayer of Consecration.' The addition to the General Intercession of a petition offering 'our alms and oblations' led to a further patristic gloss upon the Communion Service. The word 'oblations' to the revisers meant money used for other purposes than the relief of the poor²; yet as early as 1667 it is interpreted as the bread and wine, and the sanction of the Prayer Book was thus claimed for the offering of the elements,³ as we find it in the Scottish ceremony of 1637 and as commended by Laud, Wren, Hamon L'Estrange and others. For all their patristic interest the Anglican divines of the seventeenth century never abandoned a reformed position as to the effects of consecration. Their Eucharistic doctrine was mostly Calvinist; and they held firmly to the idea of the permanence of the substances of the bread and wine. If they regarded

¹ From the Durham Book, called 'Cosin's corrected copy, 1640-61' in J. Parker, *Introduction to the Revisions of the Book of Common Prayer* (Oxford, 1877), see p. ccxxii.

² See J. Dowden, *Further Studies in the Prayer Book* (London, 1908), IX, iv.

³ E.g., by Symon Patrick, afterwards Bishop of Ely, in his *Mensa Mystica* (2nd edn., 1667).

Eucharistic worship as the Church's worship *par excellence*, they maintained that no adoration ought to be done unto the Sacrament or unto any Corporal Presence of Christ's natural Flesh and Blood. To secure this position, the Black Rubric of 1552 had been restored, in an amended form, to the Prayer Book of 1662; and the often elaborate ceremonial used in the seventeenth century was not of a kind to suggest that the Black Rubric was forgotten, ignored or repudiated.

Anglican patristic tendencies reached their term outside the established Church. The Non-jurors, or some of them, revived the use of the Communion Office of 1549. In 1718 there appeared *A Communion Office taken partly from Primitive Liturgies and partly from the First English Reformed Common-Prayer Book*.¹ The compilers of this Office were probably Thomas Brett and Thomas Rattray, the latter afterwards a Bishop in the Scottish Episcopalian Church, which had been disestablished in 1689. The Prayer of Consecration was a composite paraphrase of corresponding portions of the Liturgies of St. James and of the eighth book of *Apostolic Constitutions*, and contained an Epiclesis derived from the latter. The Epiclesis was followed immediately by the Prayer for the Whole State of Christ's Church, which, in the compilers' Preface, is said to be 'much the same with that in the first Reformed English Liturgy: but the order is changed by putting it after the Prayer for Consecration. For when the Sacrifice, commemorative of that upon the cross, is finished and God the Father propitiated by the Memorial²; it is then the most proper time to declare the ends of the oblation, and recommend the Church to the Divine Protection.' This explanation summarises the sacrificial doctrine of the 'higher' Non-jurors, both English and Scottish, who were persuaded that the attachment of the name of St. James to the Jerusalem Liturgy and of that of St. Clement to the Liturgy in the eighth book of *Apostolic Constitutions* guaranteed the apostolic derivation of the ideas propounded by Cyril of Jerusalem. It was not until 1764, however, that this type of doctrine was universally accepted, and acquired full and authoritative liturgical expres-

¹ Reprinted in *Fragmenta Liturgica*, ed. Peter Hall (Bath, 1848), vol. v.

² I.e., the Anamnesis.

sion, in the Scottish Episcopal Church. In the early eighteenth century, there had been some use of the Communion Office of 1637. Preferable as they found it to the English Communion Service of 1662, the 'higher' clergy, led by several bishops, were dissatisfied with the arrangement of the Office of 1637, and re-distributed its parts so as to bring it into conformity with Jerusalem usage. 'The Invocation,' or petition for the blessing of the elements, taken to be an Epiclesis on account of its reference to the Holy Spirit, was placed after the Anamnesis; and the General Intercession was recited in between the Consecration Prayer and the Lord's Prayer. Out of a desire to express more definitely the idea of sacrifice, the Anamnesis was supplemented (in the first place, it would appear, on purely private initiative) so as to read, 'we thy humble servants do . . . make here before thy divine majesty, with these thy holy gifts, WHICH WE NOW OFFER UNTO THEE, the memorial thy Son hath commanded us to make.' A work of Bishop Rattray, published posthumously in 1744,¹ gave the sanction of learning to these changes. In 1764, the rearrangement of the Service of 1637, with diaconal biddings before both the offertory sentences and the post-communion Thanksgiving, as Bishop Rattray had proposed, and omitting the second half of the 1637 Invocation, was published under the care of the Primus with the description *The Communion Office for the use of the Church of Scotland*. In 1912 and again in 1929 the Scottish Communion Office was submitted to revision, but the changes then made, so far from altering the character of the rite, have strengthened its affinities with the Greek tradition maintained by the Non-jurors, particularly in the form given to the Epiclesis.

Although the language of the Epiclesis of 1764 was patient of, and indeed would seem to require, a conversionist interpretation, it was not so interpreted by the Scottish Episcopalian divines. These were 'virtualist' in their Eucharistic doctrine. They held that the Words of Institution made the elements to be symbols or antitypes of Christ's Body and Blood; and as such they offered the elements to the Father as the acceptable Sacrifice. The purpose of the Epiclesis was to procure the

¹ *The Ancient Liturgy of the Church of Jerusalem, being the Liturgy of St. James* (London, 1744).

'invigorating' (the word is Rattray's)¹ of the elements, by the Holy Spirit, with the virtue and efficacy of the Body and Blood. In this sense, the Scottish Episcopalian theologians understood Cyril of Jerusalem and the Greek Liturgies. Notions of conversion were abhorrent to them; and while they had no objection to reserving the Sacrament for communicating the sick, their *pietas* had no place for a cultus of the Sacrament. Worship, as they had learned it from Christian antiquity, was *par excellence* the offering of the Eucharistic Sacrifice in union with the Sacrifice which they believed Christ to be eternally offering in Heaven; and as intercession is Christ's continual activity in Heaven, so the Eucharist is the peculiarly appropriate occasion for intercession upon earth. Such a view of worship diverges from that embodied in the English Book of Common Prayer, whether of 1549, 1552 or 1662; but the ancestry of Scottish Episcopalian ideas and of the Scottish Liturgy is predominantly Anglican of the seventeenth century. In applying their patristic standards, the Scottish Episcopalians were more logical and more thorough than their English predecessors in the same tradition.

The nineteenth century saw a revival, in England, of interest in the doctrine of the Eucharistic Sacrifice. The Oxford Movement, which was responsible for this revival, was primarily concerned to recover the doctrine of Church and Sacraments as taught by the 'Fathers of the Holy Catholic Church anterior to the division of the East and West.' The Anglo-Catholic Movement, of which the Oxford Movement was parent, has shown itself to be more practical in its aims. Wherever its influence has been operative, the Communion Service has been made the principal act of Sunday and festival worship, frequently with no communicants beside the celebrant, and a desire has been felt for a Liturgy which should express more adequately the sacrificial aspect of the Eucharist, and correspondingly minimise the Reformation emphasis upon the aspect of remembrance. No group within the Anglo-Catholic Movement desired the authorisation of the Scottish Liturgy. Some Anglo-Catholics have wished for a restoration of the

¹ The principal passages of Rattray's exposition are printed in J. Dowden, *The Scottish Communion Office, 1764*, new edition by H. A. Wilson (Oxford, 1922), p. 231 f.

Service of 1549 as a permissive alternative to that of 1662. The majority have attempted, on private initiative and in defiance of lawful authority, to obtain an equilibrium between doctrine and liturgy by supplementing the Communion Service with prayers and ceremonial drawn from the Sarum or Roman Missal, and in some cases by replacing the Communion Service with the Roman *Ordo Missae*. That some adjustment of liturgy to doctrine was legitimate was implied by the sanction of an Alternative Communion Service in the abortive revised Prayer Book of 1927-1928. In retrospect, it appears curious that there was no attempt to secure the desired adjustment on the basis of the Communion Service of 1637, concerning which a Scottish Presbyterian scholar has justly observed that it combines 'much of the best in the English rites of 1549 and 1552.'¹

A prominent feature of Anglican worship is presented by the Offices of Morning and Evening Prayer. The obligation to recite these Offices daily, either privately, or in public 'that such as be disposed may come to hear God's word and to pray with' them, has been imposed upon the clergy since 1552; and in the Anglican scheme of worship, the Daily Offices correspond to the Breviary of the pre-Reformation Church, likewise of obligatory recitation by the clergy. The Breviary Offices, eight in number, were originally framed to secure the recitation of the whole Psalter in the course of a week.² Of the system of lessons, we have no certain knowledge; but it seems that the rest of the Bible, or the greater part of it, was intended to be read in course, like the Psalter. The Breviary Offices derive from the hours of devotion, which Christians were enjoined, e.g., by *Apostolic Tradition*, to observe privately in the course of the day, and in the night. By the fourth century, private devotion had become public observance. At Jerusalem, so we learn from the *Peregrinatio Etheriae*,³ the hours of prayer were observed with a cycle of Offices, sung in church by clergy, ascetics and 'secular' laity. According to Etheria's information, the Morning and Evening Offices, sung at dawn and sunset,

¹ W. D. Maxwell, *Outline of Christian Worship*, p. 155.

² For a brief history, see E. C. Ratcliff, 'The Choir Offices' in *Liturgy and Worship*, ed. W. K. Lowther Clarke (London, 1932).

³ See *supra*, p. 432, n. 1.

were attended by the largest congregations, and were the occasions of intercession. The old Roman cycle of offices, consisting of Vigil (or Mattins), Lauds, Terce, Sext, None, and Vespers, and the distribution of the Psalter over the week, had been established by the early sixth century. Two offices, viz., Prime and Compline, were later added from monastic usage, the addition necessitating a modification in the original distribution of the Psalter. The revised Roman distribution of the Psalter was the foundation of the mediaeval non-Monastic Breviaries in use in England as elsewhere. The old Roman Offices were simple, if long, and made no provision for the commemoration of saints, other than the Roman Martyrs; and these were commemorated, not in all the Roman basilicas, but only at their burial-places, and by an additional Office, which did not suppress that of the day. In the earlier Middle Age, the Roman Offices were expanded and enriched, under monastic influence; in the later Middle Age, there was an attempt at simplification, in which the Franciscans took the leading part. By Cranmer's time, the ancient structure of the offices had largely been destroyed. Festivals, which, with allocations of proper Psalms, had been allowed to interrupt the weekly course, were of frequent occurrence, so that not only was the whole Psalter rarely recited in the course of the week, but the same Psalms were being constantly repeated. The Scripture lessons had also suffered curtailment; and this, together with the substitution of the legends of the saints, on their festivals, for Scripture lessons, had broken the course of Bible reading. Reform was necessary; and of the revisions of the Breviary made in the sixteenth century, the most famous is that of Cardinal Francisco Quiñonez, published in 1535 with the approval of Pope Paul III.¹ Cranmer's early projects for Breviary revision² were inspired by Quiñonez's work. Cranmer did not pursue his early projects, however, doubtless because he anticipated the introduction of a vernacular service-book. The Breviary was inevitably a clerical service-book, its language being Latin; and the laity, when they wished to

¹ See *Breviarium Romanum Quignonianum*, ed. J. Wickham Legg (Cambridge, 1888).

² For texts and account see J. Wickham Legg, *Cranmer's Liturgical Projects*, Henry Bradshaw Society (1915).

recite Offices, either individually or in groups, read those of our Lady or of the Dead, from the English *Primer*¹. In providing vernacular Offices, in which the laity could join, therefore, Cranmer was not moving along an unfamiliar path. The principles which underlie the Offices of the Prayer Book of 1549 and its successors, are set out in a disquisition,² much of which Cranmer borrowed from Quiñonez's Preface. The principles are few and simple. The Service is to be in English, so that the people can understand it; the Psalter and the Bible are to be read in course; only Scripture (inclusive of the Apocrypha) is to be read as lessons; and all which, in the Breviary, had interrupted the orderly reading of psalms and lessons is omitted. The reduction of the Daily Offices to two necessitated a change from a weekly to a monthly recitation of the Psalter. The reform of the Kalendar was no less drastic. Apart from the greater festivals which could claim New Testament warrant, only the feasts of New Testament Saints and of All Saints were retained. Not all the lessons for these were proper; and, as the festivals with proper Psalms numbered no more than four, the interruption of the course, whether of Bible or of Psalter, was reduced to a minimum.

Cranmer could reasonably claim that his new Offices were 'much agreeable to the mind and purpose of the old fathers.' Yet Cranmer interprets the latter in sixteenth-century terms. To the 'old fathers,' Offices were primarily *officia*, duties, of worship towards God. For Cranmer, they are primarily a Ministry of God's Word to the people, as he explains them in the Preface to the Prayer Book of 1549. This interpretation was corrected in the Prayer Book of 1552, in which the opening sentences, exhortation, confession and absolution were a new feature. The exhortation enumerates acknowledgement of sin, thanksgiving, praise and prayer as the purpose of the Offices. The element of prayer was at first slight, terminating with the Third Collect until 1662, when the addition of the final prayers, and of the occasional prayers and thanksgivings, imparted to the English Offices something of the character of the Morning

¹ See E. Bishop, 'On the Origin of the Prymer' in *Liturgica Historica*; for an account of the English vernacular Primers, see E. Birchenough, article 'The Prymer in English' in *The Library*, Fourth Series (September, 1937).

² The Preface to the Prayer Book from 1549 to 1559, renamed 'Concerning the Service of the Church' in 1662.

and Evening Offices of fourth-century Jerusalem usage. A comparison of the English Offices with those of the Breviary shows that Morning Prayer incorporates elements from Mattins, Lauds, and Prime, and that Vespers and Compline have contributed to Evening Prayer.

VIII. THE PURITANS AND THEIR SUCCESSORS

In spite of the penalties imposed by the third Act of Uniformity and by other Statutes, it soon became clear that the Elizabethan Settlement of worship was a Settlement no more for the extreme Protestants than for the Papist Recusants. To the extreme Protestants, or Puritans, the worship ordained by law was defective in a number of respects, but chiefly in its lack of proper provision for the Ministry of the Word. As the Prayer Book conceives it, the Ministry of the Word is discharged by the reading of Holy Scripture in Divine Service, and by the preaching of a sermon, with the reading of the whole or part of one of the Homilies as an alternative, at the Communion. This meagre provision, as the Puritans considered it, was supplemented in some places by additional sermons or 'lectures,' delivered on weekdays as well as on Sundays. But the Elizabethan Government was not disposed to give greater freedom to preaching than to liturgy. Preaching was forbidden except to those licensed to preach; and in the first half of Elizabeth's reign a subject constantly prescribed by the Government for preachers was the defence of the Queen's supremacy over the Church and the refutation of the Pope's. Neither sermons of this kind nor the Homilies, nor yet the reading of Scripture, was what the Puritan understood by 'the Word.' The Ministry of the Word, as he learned it in the New Testament, was the proclamation of the Gospel of God by a man conscious of an inner calling or compulsion to preach, and unfettered by political considerations in his preaching. Consequently the minister was rather Prophet than Priest; and true worship was primarily prophetic in character. Prayer, though important, was less so than preaching. At prayer, the minister addressed God in the name of the congregation. At the sermon, he spoke to the congregation in the name of God, and declared to his hearers what God had opened

to him. The worshipping Christian congregation was ideally comparable to those faithful Israelites who heard the Word of God by His servants the Prophets and who heard it as from God.

The emphasis upon the Ministry of the Word did not lead the earlier Puritans, who were of the Genevan tradition, to depreciate the Ministry of Sacraments. The Puritan aim in worship was to return, not to the 'order of the ancient fathers,' as the Anglican apologists claimed to have done, but to the practice of the Apostles, as recorded in the New Testament. In apostolic practice, as the Puritans interpreted it, the Sacraments were correlated with the Word. The full Sunday Morning Worship, therefore, should consist of the preaching of the Word followed by the ministration of the Lord's Supper. To disjoin the Lord's Supper from the Word was, conversely, a manifest corruption. Again, the early Puritans were not opposed on principle to the use of liturgical, or set, prayers. Their gravamen against the Prayer Book was grounded upon the alleged unfitness of the liturgical forms provided in it; the collect type of prayer, for instance, they held to be too short, and the part of the people, apart from unison psalm-singing and the saying of the final 'Amen,' they thought should be one of quiet attention to what was recited by the minister. Responses and antiphonal recitations were, to the Puritan mind, distracting. There is much in the Puritan attitude to worship which recalls the outlook and practice of the early Christian centuries. In some respects, early liturgical arrangements among the Puritans resemble those which are reflected in *Apostolic Tradition*. *The Forme of Common Prayers, administration of the Sacraments &c. agreeable to God's Worde and the use of the reformed Churches*¹ contained forms of prayer which either could be recited verbatim or else could be used as models for extemporisation. The *Westminster Directory*,² which superseded the *Forme of Common Prayers* in 1645, was of the same type. In practice, extemporisation was preferred to reading. Nevertheless, at the Restoration, the Puritans who followed Baxter were prepared to accept the Service-Book,

¹ Reprinted in *Fragmenta Liturgica*, ed. Peter Hall (Bath, 1848), vol. i. For an account of the English Genevan Service Book, see W. D. Maxwell, *John Knox's Genevan Service Book*, 1556 (Edinburgh, 1931), and the same writer's *Outline of Christian Worship* (Oxford, 1936), pp. 121-4 and 136 f.

² Reprinted in *Reliquiae Liturgicae*, ed. Peter Hall (Bath, 1848), vol. iii.

known as the 'Savoy Liturgy,'¹ drawn up by him in the hope that it might replace the Book of Common Prayer. Baxter's 'Order of Celebrating the Sacrament of the Body and Blood of Christ' indicates to what extent the Presbyterian school of Puritanism had rejected or had retained the ancient eucharistic inheritance of the Western Church. In structure and outline, the Order corresponds little with the historic Western Eucharistic Liturgy. The ideas to which Baxter gives expression, on the other hand, are in the line of the historic Western tradition. The intention of Baxter's rite is 'to represent and commemorate the sacrifice of Christ's body and blood upon the cross once offered up to God for sin.'² The representation is to be understood in a man-ward sense, no doubt; but in virtue of the sacrifice commemorated, God's reconciliation with the worshippers is sought. In a post-consecration prayer, addressed to Christ, the Minister is directed to say, 'we beseech thee, by thine intercession with the Father, through the sacrifice of thy body and blood, give us the pardon of our Sins, and thy quickening spirit . . . Reconcile us to the Father: nourish us as thy members to everlasting life. Amen.'³ Baxter held that the Communion Service in the Book of Common Prayer was weakened through want of an explicit petition for the consecration of the elements. His Order, therefore, directed the Minister to 'bless them, praying in these or like words, Almighty God . . . Sanctify these thy creatures of bread and wine, which, according to thy institution and command, we set apart to this holy use, that they may be sacramentally the body and blood of thy son Jesus Christ.'⁴ The Institution-narrative taken from 1 Corinthians xi. was to be read either before or after the prayer in which these words appear. Novel though the form of the Savoy rite may be, the spirit animating it is akin to that of the worship of the church of Tertullian and Cyprian, and of Origen and Sarapion. After 1662, worship among the Presbyterians became increasingly non-liturgical, until it was eventually indistinguishable from that of the Independents. In England, as outside it, the Word was magnified at the expense of Sacrament, and the sermon was regarded as the chief and central act of public worship.

¹ Reprinted in *Reliquiae Liturgicae*, vol. iv.

² *Ibid.* p. 57.

³ *Ibid.* p. 70.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 68.

The example of the Independents, who may be taken as the ancestors of the Congregationalists and Baptists, exercised a powerful influence upon English Nonconformist worship from the beginning. They differed profoundly from the Presbyterians in believing that each congregation constituted a perfect Church, having the right to settle the manner of its worship as it pleased. On the other hand, the Independent theory of worship possessed a great attraction for devout Protestant minds of the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and Independent practice was reminiscent of the New Testament. The Independent view of prayer is summed up in the definition of Henry Barrowe as 'a confident demanding which faith maketh through the Holy Ghost according to the will of God, for [the worshippers'] present wants and estate of their hearts or church . . . a pouring forth of the heart unto the Lord.'¹ With such a view liturgical worship is incompatible, since it restrains the freedom of the heart. For the early Independents, each meeting for worship was a Pentecost in which the Spirit descended upon the gathered Church, but in which the minister alone prayed and preached with inspired utterance. Independents were not neglectful of the Lord's Supper. They celebrated it weekly or monthly or quarterly as the local church was moved to decide; and in celebrating it, they reproduced as closely as possible the Last Supper as described in 1 Corinthians xi. so as to render more vivid the remembrance commanded by the Lord.² But they were conscious that the operation of the Spirit and the fervour generated thereby had fuller play in the Word and in prayer than in a sacramental act. Worship, in their understanding of it, was synonymous with extemporised praying and preaching by the minister and by the fervent singing of psalms by the people. Once the early fervour cools, the difficulty of maintaining the quality of worship under the conditions required by the Independents is great, and proved itself to be so within a century of their emergence. Custom asserted itself, phraseology became stereotyped, and mannerisms became fixed. The unction of the preacher, recognised by his Spirit-taught hearers,

¹ Quoted by A. G. Matthews in his essay 'The Puritans' in *Christian Worship* (Oxford, 1936), p. 175 f.

² For accounts see A. G. Matthews, *ibid.*

too often became his desire to say that which would commend itself to a congregation gathered to have a pleasant feeling aroused by the sermon. In general, Independent worship has tended to place too great a burden on the minister, and to leave the congregation too much to the minister's direction, with the result that a ministry and worship, designed to be prophetic, have not infrequently developed features reminiscent of the 'sacerdotalism' against which the Independents made their earnest protest. Yet it must be remembered that the Protestant societies of the sixteenth century could not wholly escape the fashion of the religious world which they wished to transform. The Puritan congregation, whether Presbyterian or Independent, waiting upon the minister at worship is the Protestant counterpart of the Catholic congregation waiting upon the celebrating priest at a Low Mass. Isaac Watts, by his guidance, his own practice and his hymns, both improved the standard of the Independent type of worship during the eighteenth century, and also laid the foundation of a new tradition which continues to be vigorous in the twentieth century. Watts in his *Guide to Prayer*¹ discourages dependence upon 'sudden motions and suggestions,' reliance upon which, to an earlier generation of preachers, was implicit in the Pentecostal outlook. He recommends instead a careful preparation for prayer and preaching alike, and defends the choice of 'grave and decent' language in praying. To ministers of the older tradition, Watt's scheme of prayer, drawn up for a year, elastic though it was, must have seemed a declension from the primitive ideal. The answer which Watts would make to objections of this description is that the grace of the Spirit, given to the minister to enable him to lead his congregation in worship, is not restricted within the actual occasion of worship. Preparation for worship, so far from demanding a closing of heart and mind to the Spirit's prompting, if it is to be effective, requires an opening. If Watts revolutionised the Independent conception of the minister's part in worship, his influence upon that of the people was not less profound. At the beginning of his ministry, the use of hymns was regarded with suspicion in

¹ *Or a free and rational account of the gift, grace and spirit of prayer ; with plain directions how every Christian may attain them* (London, 1715) ; a second edition was published in 1743.

most Independent congregations. The singing of metrical renderings of the Psalms was considered permissible by most, and dubious by some. Following the example of Benjamin Keach, the Baptist, Watts favoured hymn-singing, and proceeded to write hymns for his congregation to sing. Some of his hymns are among the finest in the English language, and are now in general use. In the early eighteenth century, his collection as a whole formed a rich addition to Congregational worship in that it provided a worthy medium for common praise, and made redemption, rather as it is presented in the New Testament than in the Old, the theme of its song. Watts would have agreed with Philo that thanksgiving was the chief among the virtues; and he found in the hymn the most suitable expression of thanksgiving. Of the eighteenth century, in form, in diction and in personal feeling, as his hymns are, they are still akin in spirit to the hymns of the earliest Christian societies. The freedom characteristic of Independency made it possible for Watts' model to be widely imitated, and for a revivifying of the Independent type of worship to result. If the Ministry of Word still belonged to the minister, there now belonged to the people a Ministry of Praise, in which subsequent generations of Congregationalists were to discover the highest reach of worship; so that a modern Congregationalist can write, 'Praise is the supreme act of worship . . . the very act of praise implies a conception of God. It is the most characteristic Christian act of worship. "The craving to be appreciated," it has been said, "is the deepest principle in human nature." It is more, it is a divine principle. If God is love, he takes pleasure in the praises of His beloved. Praise, then, must be an essential note in all our worship. Every service is a Eucharist, and not least the Holy Supper when we call to remembrance God's unspeakable gift. But in ordinary worship the hymn is the medium of praise.'¹ This quotation serves to illustrate the extent to which the ethos of modern Independent worship corresponds with that of the worship of which the Christian rationalist philosophers were apologists in the second century.

¹ K. L. Parry, in his essay 'Prayer and Praise' in *Christian Worship* (Oxford, 1936), p. 239 f. See article 'Congregational Hymnody,' in J. Julian, *Dictionary of Hymnology* (London, 1907).

By the second half of the eighteenth century, the Independent type of Sunday service provided the general pattern of English Nonconformist worship. Latterly there has been movement in a liturgical direction. *The Directory of Public Worship*,¹ the authorised service-book of the Presbyterian Church of England, is in debt both to the Book of Common Prayer and to the Westminster *Directory*. Like the latter, it is, however, rather a collection of models than a liturgy proper. This statement applies also to the *Book of Congregational Worship*, which likewise has been influenced by the Book of Common Prayer. The formation of the Congregational Union of England and Wales has not destroyed or reduced the independence of the congregations, and in some there exists a liturgical worship, which at the Eucharist and Morning and Evening Prayer is modelled upon ancient usage.² To whatever extent the English Nonconformist churches may have adopted liturgical worship, the importance of hymnody remains unaffected. The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries amassed a heritage of hymnody which has become the common possession of Anglicans and Nonconformists alike.³ There are now but few hymnals consisting of the compositions of members of any one religious allegiance; so that to-day it may be said of the hymnody of the English Reformation Churches, as it was said by Bossuet of the Liturgy of the Latin Church, that it constitutes 'le principal instrument de la tradition de l'Église.'

¹ London, 1898; revised edn. 1921. The Church of Scotland has advanced further along the liturgical path than its sister Church in England. The Eucharistic Liturgy in the *Ordinal and Service Book for the use of Presbyteries* (Edinburgh 1931), in its order recalls the rite of Justin Martyr, and in its forms has many points of contact with ancient Eastern usage.

² Cf. W. E. Orchard, *Divine Service* (Oxford, 1926). For other Free Church Service-books, consult Maxwell, *An Outline of Christian Worship*, Bibliography XI, Liturgical Texts and Compilations.

³ For an introduction to hymnody, see C. S. Phillips, *Hymnody Past and Present* (London, 1937); also H. Leclercq, article 'Hymne' in *Dictionnaire d'Archéologie chrétienne*; F. J. Raby, *Christian Latin Poetry* (Oxford, 1927), and L. F. Benson, *The English Hymn: Its development and use in Worship* (New York, 1915).

A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CHRISTIAN WORSHIP AND LITURGY

I. GENERAL

- E. UNDERHILL : *Christian Worship*. London, 1936.
- F. HEILER : *Prayer*. Translated and edited by S. McComb. Oxford, 1932.
- Christian Worship : Studies in its History and Meaning*. By Members of Mansfield College. Edited by NATHANIEL MICKLEM. Oxford, 1936.
- F. CABROL : *Liturgical Prayer : Its History and Spirit*. London, 1922.
- *The Prayer of the Early Christians*. London, 1930.
- *Les Origines Liturgiques*. Paris, 1906.
- Liturgia*. *Encyclopédie Populaire des Connaissances Liturgiques*. Edited by R. AIGRAIN. Paris, 1930.
- J. H. SRAWLEY : *The Early History of the Liturgy*. Cambridge, 1910.
- W. D. MAXWELL : *An Outline of Christian Worship : Its Development and Forms*. Oxford, 1936. (Contains useful bibliographies which should be consulted.)
- H. LIETZMANN : *Messe und Herrenmahl*. Bonn, 1926.
- A. G. HEBERT : *Liturgy and Society*. London, 1935.

II. ROMAN AND OTHER LATIN RITES

- F. CABROL : *The Mass of the Western Rites*. London, 1934.
- *The Books of the Latin Liturgy*. London, 1933.
- L. DUCHESNE : *Christian Worship : Its Origin and Evolution. A Study of the Latin Liturgy up to the time of Charlemagne*. 5th edn. London, 1931.
- A. FORTESCUE : *The Mass. A Study of the Roman Liturgy*. New edition, with a Foreword by Herbert Thurston, S.J. London, 1937. (Valuable for its summary of theories as to the origin and development of the Canon Missae.)
- P. BATIFFOL : *Leçons sur la Messe*. Paris, 1927.
- B. BOTTE, O.S.B. : *Le Canon de la Messe Romaine. Édition critique. Introduction et notes*. Louvain, 1935.
- A. BAUMSTARK : *Missale Romanum. Seine Entwicklung, ihre wichtigsten Urkunden und Probleme*. Nymwegen, 1929.
- E. BISHOP : *Liturgica Historica. Papers on the Liturgy and Religious Life of the Western Church*. Oxford, 1918.
- A. FRANZ : *Die Messe im deutschen Mittelalter*. Freiburg, 1902.
- A. A. KING : *Notes on the Catholic Liturgies*. London, 1930. (Gives accounts of Monastic Rites, and of the Rites of Lyon, Braga, Milan and Toledo.)
- W. C. BISHOP : *The Mozarabic and Ambrosian Rites*. London, 1924.
- J. B. THIBAUT : *L'ancienne Liturgie Gallicane*. Paris, 1929.
- V. THALHOFER : *Handbuch der Katholischen Liturgik*. 3rd edn. by L. Eisenhofer. Freiburg, 1933.

III. EASTERN RITES

- I. RAHMANI : *Les Liturgies orientales et occidentales étudiées séparément et comparées entre elles*. Beirut, 1929.
- J. M. HANSSENS : *Institutiones liturgicae de ritibus orientalibus*. Rome, 1930-2. (Up to date only Vols. II and III, with an Appendix, have been published. These vols. treat fully of Eastern Eucharistic Liturgies.)
- R. JANIN : *Les églises orientales et les rites orientaux*. 3rd edn. Paris, 1937.
- H. HOLLOWAY : *A Study of the Byzantine Liturgy*. London, n.d. Sketches of Eastern worship and liturgy other than Byzantine will be found in—
- A. FORTESCUE : *The Lesser Eastern Churches*. London, 1913.

IV. ANGLICAN WORSHIP

- Liturgy and Worship*. *A Companion to the Prayer Books of the Anglican Communion*. Edited by W. K. LOWTHER CLARKE. London, 1932.
- F. PROCTER and W. H. FRERE : *A New History of the Book of Common Prayer*. London, 1925.
- A. GASQUET and E. BISHOP : *Edward VI and the Book of Common Prayer*. London, 1890.
- J. DOWDEN : *The Workmanship of the Prayer Book*. London, 1899.
- *Further Studies in the Prayer Book*. London, 1908.
- *The Scottish Communion Office 1764. With introduction, History of the Office Notes and Appendices*. New edn., seen through the Press by H. A. WILSON. Oxford, 1922.
- F. E. BRIGHTMAN : *The English Rite, Being a Synopsis of the Sources and Revisions of the Book of Common Prayer*. Oxford, 1915. (The Introduction is indispensable for a study of the Prayer Book.)

V. THE WORSHIP OF OTHER REFORMED CHURCHES

- A brief but admirable introduction to this subject will be found in W. D. MAXWELL : *An Outline of Christian Worship*, Part IV (see above, I. General). *Christian Worship*, ed. by N. MICKLEM, Chaps. viii-xi (see above I. General), should also be studied.
- F. RENDTORFF : *Geschichte des christlichen Gottesdienstes unter dem Gesichtspunkt der liturgischen Erbfolge*. Giessen, 1924. (Lutheran.)
- Y. BRILLOTH : *Eucharistic Faith and Practice, Evangelical and Catholic*. London, 1930.
- E. DOUMERGUE : *Essai sur l'histoire du culte réformé*. Lausanne, 1890. (Calvinist.)
- W. MCMILLAN : *The Worship of the Scottish Reformed Church, 1550-1638*. Edinburgh, 1931.
- W. D. MAXWELL : *John Knox's Genevan Service Book, 1556*. Edinburgh, 1931. (Discusses and interprets the Calvinist tradition as appropriated by the (Presbyterian) Church of Scotland. The liturgical portions of the Service Book are printed.)

- D. H. HISLOP: *Our Heritage in Public Worship*. Edinburgh, 1935.
 D. D. BANNERMAN: *The Worship of the Presbyterian Church*. London, 1884.
 E. R. MICKLEM: *Our Approach to God*. London, 1934.

VI. SOME SPECIAL POINTS

- E. G. C. ATCHLEY: *On the Epiclesis of the Eucharistic Liturgy and in the Consecration of the Font*. London, 1935.
 W. H. FRERE: *The Anaphora, or Great Eucharistic Prayer*. London, 1938.
 (Both the above writers regard an Epiclesis as an ancient and once universal feature. E. BISHOP, Appendix VI, 'The Moment of Consecration' in R. H. CONNOLLY, *The Liturgical Homilies of Narsai* (Cambridge, 1909), presents the contrary case, and deserves careful study.)
 T. W. DRURY: *Elevation in the Eucharist*. Cambridge, 1907.
 E. DUMOUTET: *Le désir de voir l'Hostie, et les origines de la Dévotion au Saint-Sacrement*. Paris, 1926.
 W. H. FREESTONE: *The Sacrament Reserved. A Survey of the Practice of reserving the Eucharist*. London, 1917.
 G. NICKL: *Der Anteil des volkes an der Messliturgie im Frankenreiche von Chlodwig bis auf Karl der Grossen*. Innsbruck, 1930.

The 'Liturgical Comments and Memoranda' of E. BISHOP in *Journal of Theological Studies*, Vols. xi, xii and xiv are invaluable for discussions of the Roman Canon, the Eastern Anaphoras, the Epiclesis, the Intercession, etc. The *Dictionnaire d'Archéologie chrétienne et de Liturgie* (Paris), edited by F. CABROL and H. LECLERCQ, is likewise invaluable.

VII

As eucharistic worship and liturgy cannot be studied in isolation from eucharistic doctrine, the following will be found useful:

- DARWELL STONE: *A History of the Doctrine of the Holy Eucharist*. London, 1909.
 P. BATIFFOL: *L'Eucharistie, la Présence réelle et la Transsubstantiation*. Paris, 1920.
 A. BARCLAY: *The Protestant Doctrine of the Lord's Supper*. Glasgow, 1927.
 M. DE LA TAILLE, S.J.: *Mysterium Fidei de augustissimo Corporis et Sanguinis Christi Sacrificio et Sacramento*. Paris, 1924. (A detailed consideration of the Mass as simultaneously a representation and oblation of Christ's Passion. The writer's own interpretation forsakes the scholastic tradition. His references to ecclesiastical writers and to Liturgies are illuminating, and make his book an important survey of the subject.)
 C. H. SMYTH: *Cranmer and the Reformation under Edward VI*. Cambridge, 1925. (Considers the changes of eucharistic doctrine reflected in the Prayer Books of 1549 and 1552.)

VIII. TEXTS

The works cited above contain references to the best editions of the texts with which they deal. The student, however, will find the following collections convenient for use :

C. E. HAMMOND : *Liturgies Eastern and Western*. Oxford, 1878.

C. A. SWAINSON : *The Greek Liturgies*. Cambridge, 1884.

F. E. BRIGHTMAN : *Liturgies Eastern and Western*. Vol. i, Eastern. Oxford, 1896.

J. QUASTEN : *Monumenta eucharistica et liturgica vetustissima*. Bonn, 1936.

J. M. NEALE and R. F. LITLEDAL : *Translations of the Primitive Liturgies* (Eastern) 2nd edn. London, 1869.

INDEX

- Abailard, Peter, 303, 323
 Adoptionism, 42 f., 73, 296
 Albertus Magnus, St., 64, 303
 Ambrose, St., 43, 442
 Andrewes, Lancelot, 461 f.
 Animism, theory of, 89 ff.
 Anselm, St., of Canterbury, 54, 78, 302
 Apollinarius of Laodicea, 299
 Apostles' Creed, 249 ff., 293
 Aquinas, St. Thomas, 47, 58, 67, 72, 78, 80, 123 f., 126, 291, 302, 304 f., 311, 323
 Archaeology and Biblical criticism, 191, 202 ff.
 Arian controversy, the, 298 f., 321 f., 324
 Aristotle, 3, 66 f., 80 f., 121 f., 126, 133 f., 143, 155 f., 303
 Arius, 298
 Association-psychology, 156, 160 ff.
 Athanasian Creed, 43, 250, 259 f., 263, 265 ff.,
 Athanasius, St., 78, 250, 259 f., 291, 298, 436
 Atonement, Doctrine of the, 7, 12, 15, 22 f., 36, 53 ff., 78
Aufklärung, the, 308 ff.
 Augustine, St., 46 f., 55 f., 61, 63, 72, 78, 123, 128, 130, 133 ff., 145, 170, 194 f., 297, 302, 304, 430
 Barth, Karl, 16, 57, 64, 76 f., 82, 125, 313
 Baxter, Richard, 471 f.
 Bede, 325 f.
 Bergson, Henri, 131 f., 162
 Berkeley, George, 69, 156, 305
 Billot, L., 72
 Borne, Etienne, 139
 Boullaye, Pinard de, 131
 Brunner, Emil, 57, 76
 Calvin, 16, 56, 58, 78, 307 f., 449 ff.
 Cappodocian Fathers, the, 43 ff.
 Causality, Divine, 135 ff.
 Christ, Doctrine of the Person of, 7 f., 12, 22 f., 38 ff., 49 ff., 73 f., 78, 256 ff., 295 ff.
 Christian conduct :
 conscience and, 376 f., 387 ff.
 Christian conduct (*contd.*) :
 considerations in judging, 369 ff.
 minimum standard of, 363 ff.
 sin and, 394 ff.
 Christian Doctrine, 13, 349 f.
 history of, 291 ff.
 Christianity :
 architectonic doctrines of, 7 ff., 15, 20, 36
 basis of, 3 f., 20
 and Hellenism, 22, 31, 37, 39, 43, 49 f., 123, 234 ff.
 and Judaism, 15 f., 20, 22 ff., 31 f., 59, 123, 195, 232, 294 f., 409 ff.
 as a philosophy, 115, 145 f.
 Church, the :
 attitude to Old Testament, 193 f.
 history, 11 f., 321 ff.
 and New Testament interpretation, 243
 origins in New Testament, 219, 239 ff.
 worship and liturgy of, 409 ff.
 Church, Councils of the, 51, 349
 Arles, 297
 Chalcedon, 50, 299 f., 438
 Constantinople, 43
 Ephesus, 50, 56
 Jerusalem, 294
 Trent, 292, 306, 447
 Church, Doctrine of the, 7, 12, 15, 23 f., 57 f., 77 ff., 277 ff., 409 f., 450 ff.
 Comte, Auguste, 87 ff.
 Conversion, psychology of, 170 ff.
 Cook, Stanley, 124
 Cranmer, 448, 454 f., 468 ff.
 Creeds, the, 220, 249 ff.
 analysis of, 251 ff.
 Doctrine of the Church in, 277 ff.
 Doctrine of the Incarnation in, 261 ff.
 Doctrine of the Person of Christ in, 256 ff.
 Doctrine of the Trinity in, 250 ff., 274 ff.
 Eschatology in, 284 ff.
 Critical Orthodoxy, 34 ff., 81 f.
 Cyprian, St., 429 f., 442, 472
 Cyril, St., of Alexandria, 52, 299, 437 f.

- Cyril, St., of Jerusalem, 281, 432 ff., 464
- Dante, 60, 62, 80, 131, 133
- Darwin, Charles, 87, 312
- Dawson, Christopher, 130
- Descartes, 68 f., 133, 139, 156, 313
- Didache*, the, 425 f.
- Divine Kingship in primitive ritual, 103 ff.
- Dix, Gregory, 422 f.
- Dogmatik*, 14, 20, 62
- Dogmatik* of Barth, 64
- Dogmengeschichte*, 14, 20, 46, 48, 60, 62
- method and problems of study, 16 ff.
- Duns Scotus, 305, 309
- Durkheim, E., 94 ff., 154, 175
- Ecclesiastical history, 11 f., 321 ff.
- Empiricism, 70 ff., 78, 81, 140
- Epictetus, 11, 122
- Erasmus, 307 f.
- Eschatology, 7, 12, 15, 24, 30, 32, 36, 59 ff., 77, 80 ff., 284 ff., 312
- Eucharist, the Holy, 410, 415 ff. *See also* Liturgy.
- Form Criticism, 32
- and the New Testament, 29 f., 230
- Franciscans and the Mass, 445, 449, 468
- Frazer, J. G., 90, 98, 113
- Freud, S., 157 ff., 175 f.
- Gibbon, Edmund, 40, 349
- Gnosticism, 77, 194, 235 ff., 295
- Grace, Doctrine of, 7 f., 22, 55 f., 77 ff., 128, 143 f., 307
- 'Great Church,' the, 8, 12, 14, 40, 47, 53, 58, 60, 63
- Greek philosophy :
- and Christianity, 22, 31, 37, 39, 43, 49 f., 123, 234 ff.
- and redemption by knowledge, 111, 236
- Gregory of Tours, 325 f.
- Group-religion, 175 ff.
- Harnack, Adolf von, 16, 32, 34, 37, 312
- Hegel, 66, 86, 125 ff., 237 f., 310 f.
- Hegelian philosophic system, 42, 48, 125, 197, 237 f.
- Herrmann, W., 74
- Higher Criticism :
- defined, 17
- and the New Testament, 28 f., 227 ff.
- and the Old Testament, 17 f., 190 f., 198
- 'Highest Criticism,' 17, 28
- Hippolytus, the Anaphora of, 422 ff., 443
- Hooker, Richard, 58, 253, 261, 460 f.
- Hopkins, Gerard Manley, 314
- Horus and Osiris, rites of, 104 f.
- Hume, David, 69, 156, 305
- Ignatius, St., 296
- Incarnation, Doctrine of the, 7, 12, 15, 49, 70, 78, 250, 261 ff., 301, 304
- Initiation, primitive rite of, 58 f., 80
- Instinct, psychology of, 158 ff
- Intellectualism, 70 ff., 81
- Irenaeus, St., 39, 298, 424 f.
- James, William, 131, 154, 157, 172, 180
- Jews, the :
- as the Chosen People, 123, 195 ff., 278
- function of Old Testament for, 193
- monotheism of, 20 f., 113 f., 123, 252
- prophets of, 200 ff.
- religious history of, 18 ff., 207 ff.
- unity of, 279 f.
- See also* Judaism
- John, St., of Damascus, 16, 45 f., 63, 300 ff.
- Judaism, 20 f., 113 f., 123, 252, 417 f.
- and Christianity, 15 f., 20, 22 ff., 31 f., 59, 123, 195, 232 ff., 294 f., 409 ff.
- and Hellenism, 123, 213, 234, 412
- Jung, C. G., 162 ff., 182
- Justin Martyr, 420
- Kant, I., 37, 66, 69, 73, 86, 122, 124, 132, 140, 156, 302, 305, 308 ff.
- Kenosis*, doctrine of, 51 f., 267
- Last Things, Doctrine of the. *See* Eschatology
- Leo XIII, Pope, 67 f.
- Leontius of Byzantium, 45, 51, 300
- Levy-Bruhl, L., 94
- Liberal Protestantism, 27 ff., 34 ff., 70, 314
- Liturgy :
- Anglican, 452 ff.
- Egyptian, 435 ff.
- Eucharistic, 410, 415 ff.
- genesis of, 409 ff.
- Reformation, 448 ff.
- Roman, 439 ff.
- Syrian, 431 ff.
- Liturgiology, 10, 13
- Locke, William, 69, 156, 160, 305
- Logos, the, 21 f., 39 ff., 49, 51, 73, 260 ff., 274, 296 ff., 302, 436
- Lombard, Peter, 64, 303, 323

- Lower Criticism, 17, 28
 and the New Testament, 225 ff.
 and the Old Testament, 201 ff.
- Luther, Martin, 16, 56, 58, 60, 78,
 305 ff., 449 ff.
- McDougall, W., 157 ff., 175
- Magic, 97 ff.
- Malinowski, B., 97, 101
- Modernist Movement, the, 16, 33,
 313 f.
- Murray, Gilbert, 108 f.
- Mystery Religions, the, 31, 35,
 108 ff., 114, 235 ff., 417 f.
- Mysticism :
 psychology of, 181 ff.
 religious evidence of, 138
- Myth, 100 ff.
- New Testament, the, 219 ff.
 Exegesis, 230 ff.
 Form Criticism, 230
 Greek of, 224 f.
 Hebraic background, 232 ff.
 Hellenistic background, 234 ff.
 Higher Criticism, 227 f.
 Interpretation, 239 ff.
 Lower Criticism, 225 f.
 value, 219 ff.
 as vehicle of an historical Revela-
 tion, 25 ff., 221 ff., 240 f.
 worship and sacraments in, 410 ff.
- Nicene Creed, 43, 249 ff., 292 f., 299
- Nilsson, M.P., 110
- Numinous, theory of the, 70, 92 ff.,
 125, 181
- Old Testament, the, 189 ff.
 archaeology and, 202 ff.
 attitude of Church towards, 193 ff.
 function, 193, 205 f.
 as Hebrew history, 196 ff., 207 ff.
 Higher Criticism and, 18 f., 190 f.,
 198
 Lower Criticism and, 201 ff.
 Religious teaching in, 206
 value, 189 ff.
- Origen, 39, 43, 60, 63, 77, 297, 472
- Original Sin, 7, 23, 55 ff., 167
- Orphism, 60, 110 f., 122
- Otto, R., 70, 92, 125, 131, 181
- Oxford Movement, the Anglican, 314,
 466 f.
- Paris, Matthew, 327 ff.
- Pascal, 129, 133, 139, 369
- Paul, St., influence on Christianity,
 27 f., 31 f., 35, 39, 54, 56, 114,
 195, 234, 284, 294 f., 414 ff.
- Pelagius, 55 f., 302
- Petrie, Flinders, 104 f.
- Philo, 21 f., 236, 412, 475
- Plato, 3, 11, 36, 38, 60, 67, 110 f.,
 122, 133, 155
- Platonism, 22, 49 f., 60, 66, 145, 220,
 237, 302
- Pliny, the Younger, 419 f.
- Pratt, J. B., 154, 173, 181
- Prayer, Book of Common, 291, 346,
 453 ff.
 Puritans and the, 470 ff.
- Prayer, psychology of, 174 f.
- Predestinarianism, 57, 78
- Primary unconscious, the, 168 ff.
- Projection and the reality of God,
 178 f.
- Psychology, defined, 152 ff.
- Pythagoras, 111 f., 427
- Rationalisation, psychology of, 179 ff.
- Reformation, the, 16, 85, 195 f.,
 305 ff., 324 f.
 liturgy, 448 ff.
- Reincarnation, 111 f.
- Religion :
 defined, 131 ff., 154 f.
 origins of, 91 ff.
 Philosophy of, 9, 12, 65 ff., 121 ff.
 Psychology of, 9, 12, 127, 129,
 151 ff.
 scientific study of, 87 f., 121 f.,
 124 f., 312
- Religion, Comparative, 20, 22, 85 ff.,
 127 ff.
- Ritschl, Albrecht, 16, 124 f., 311
- Ritchhianism, 37, 74 ff.
- Ritual :
 and Christianity, 114 f.
 in primitive religion, 100 ff.
- Rymer, Thomas, 328 f.
- Sabellianism, 42, 44
- Sacraments, Doctrine of the, 7, 12,
 15, 57 f., 77 ff., 414 ff.
- Sacrifice and Christian worship, 22,
 427 ff.
 among primitive people, 22 f.,
 105 f., 130
- Sainthood, 166, 172
- Schleiermacher, 16, 70, 76, 94, 124 f.,
 311
- Schweitzer, A., 32, 312
- Sed-festival, Egyptian, 103 ff.
- Serapion, 291, 435 f., 472
- Sin :
 formal and material, 395 f.
 mortal and venial, 395 ff.
 psychology of, 165 ff.
 use of term, 394
- Spencer, John, 85
- Spinoza, 78, 126, 139
- Suggestion, problem of, 172 ff.
- Synoptic problem, the, 28, 35, 229 f.
- Tammuz cult, the, 107
- Targumists, the, 21
- Tertullian, 43, 60, 472

Theology :

- connotation of, 3 ff.
- Ascetical and Mystical, 10, 13
- Dialectical, 57, 76
- Dogmatic, 8 f., 12 ff.,
- Historical, 4, 13 ff., 44, 52, 58, 81 f.
- Moral, 9, 12, 363 ff.
- Natural, 8 f., 65 ff.
- Pastoral, 13
- and Philosophy, 66 ff.
- Symbolic, 249 ff.
- Systematic, 4, 13 f., 43, 47, 58, 61 ff.
- Theresa, St., 182, 306
- Thomasius of Erlangen, 51
- Totemism, 95 ff.
- Trinity, Doctrine of the, 7, 12, 15,
 - 21 ff., 41 ff., 49, 70 ff., 180,
 - 250 ff., 274 ff., 300 f., 304

Tritheism, 44

Tyler, E. B., 87 f.

Underhill, E., 13, 102 f.

Upanishads, 112

Vatke, Wilhelm, 197 f.

Von Hügel, F., 66, 125, 131, 182

Watts, Isaac, 474 f.

Werenfels of Basle, 10 f.

Wilkins, David, 331 f.

William of Occam, 55, 305

Yahweh, 19, 114, 252

Zwingli, 449 f.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
LIBRARY



12 430 078

BR
50
.K601

Kirk

The study of theology

1289600

JUN 11 1954

BR 50
.K601

MAY 26 1955 *Kirk*

MAY 9

1955 *Kirk*

KIRK

The Study of Theology
1289600

MAY 9

1955

MAY 11

1955

MAY 11 1955

JUN 1

JUN

American Institute of Sacred Literature